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Abstract 
 
 
The unauthorised disclosure of official information has caused embarrassment to 
successive governments regardless of political affiliation. At times, the disclosure of 
highly important documents pertaining to national security has reportedly caused 
immeasurable harm to the defence of the realm and damaged international cooperation. 
The protection of national security may however be used as a shield behind which 
malpractice can occur. Use of the Official Secrets Acts to prosecute Crown Servants for 
the unauthorised disclosure of information damaging to the reputation of government has 
proved controversial. Crown servants operate in an environment whereby a relationship 
of trust and loyalty is paramount to the running of government in a democratic society. 
Crown servants, however, remain in a unique position to witness acts of malpractice or 
maladministration. When other checks and balances fail, the Crown servant is faced with 
the unenviable prospect of allowing the malpractice to continue or to blow the whistle. 
 
This thesis provides an assessment of the existing officially prescribed mechanisms for 
Crown servants to blow the whistle and the position of the Crown servant as a 
journalistic source. It considers Crown servants in the Civil Service and is extended to 
provide two distinct case studies of servants in the UK intelligence community and 
members of the UK armed forces.  
 
This thesis critically evaluates the available whistleblower procedures alongside the 
current mechanisms used to hold the government and its departments to account, 
concluding that there are significant gaps in the current processes. Comparative analysis 
of other jurisdictions is used to bolster understanding with the objective of providing a 
number of key recommendations to provide strong, viable, alternatives to unauthorised 
disclosures.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION  
 
 
“[Freedom of expression] serves a number of broad objectives. First it promotes 
the self fulfilment of individuals in society. Secondly, in the famous words of Holmes J 
(echoing John Stuart Mill) 'the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself 
accepted in the competition of the market.' Thirdly, freedom of speech is the lifeblood of 
democracy. The free flow of information and ideas informs political debate. It is a safety 
valve: people are more ready to accept decisions that go against them if they can in 
principle seek to influence them. It acts as a brake on the abuse of power by public 
officials. It facilitates the exposure of errors in the governance and administration of 
justice of the country.”1  
 
This study considers the role of Crown servants who leak information which they believe 
to be in the public interest. The term ‘Crown servant’ is taken from s.12 (1) (c) and (d) 
Official Secrets Act 1989 (OSA) which extends to ‘a minister of the Crown, any person 
employed in the civil service of the Crown.’ Particular focus is given to Civil Servants 
because they closely serve the government of the day.  
 
This thesis will also provide two case studies. The first study considers the position of 
employees in the Security and Intellience Services who do not have access to the Public 
Interest Disclosure Act 1998 (PIDA). The second case study will consider members of 
the Armed Forces who are incorporated into section 12 (1) (d) OSA 1989.  
 
The purpose of this first chapter is to consider the theoretical justifications for freedom of 
expression with the aim of creating a theoretical model for whistleblowing.  The first part 
                                                        
1 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p Simms [1999] 3 WLR 328, 337, per Lord Styn.  
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of the chapter will concentrate on theoretical arguments. It will start by providing an 
overview of the most identifiable justifications for freedom of expression, encapsulated in 
the aforementioned dicta of Lord Styn, before proceeding to consider theoretical 
justifications for restricting expression and for keeping information private/ secret. Focus 
will then narrow to consider existing theoretical concepts of whistleblowing. The first 
part of the chapter will end by considering theoretical concepts of necessity and civil 
disobedience in order to contribute to understanding circumstances whereby an 
unauthorised disclosure of information results in the committal of a criminal offence.  
 
The second part of the chapter will place emphasis on the legal, rather than theoretical 
justifications for whistleblowing.  It will start by providing reference to the jurisprudence 
of the European Court of Human Rights, placing particular emphasis on political 
expression cases. The chapter will then consider what information should be disclosed in 
the public interest. Focus will be given to traditional common law principles arising from 
breach of confidence cases before  
1.1. Part I: Theoretical Arguments 
 
1.1.1 Moral Autonomy  
 
 
The argument from moral autonomy advocates that all matters of moral choice must be 
left to the individual.
2
 Autonomous individuals must have access to all median without 
restriction and an unfettered right to free expression. Essentially, it is the right to be one’s 
own person, to do what one wants to do and to say what one wants to say based upon 
their own assessment of what is right or wrong. The argument from moral autonomy may 
not easily cohere with some of the realities of life in modern democratic society. 
                                                        
2 H.Fenwick and G.Phillipson, Media Freedom under the Human Rights Act (OUP, Oxford, 2007) 304. 
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Individuals in society would be unable to co-exist without some form of compromise to 
benefit society as a whole.  
 
Individuals may be restricted from access to extreme forms of pornography; they may be 
prevented from viewing material which outrages public decency or incites racial hatred.
3
 
An individual’s right to free speech may be restricted and or he may face prosecution if 
that person is deemed to have overstepped societal norms by communicating ideas or 
ideals that are seen to be in direct conflict with values.
4
 An employee of an organisation 
may find it difficult to exercise his right to moral autonomy in the work place and to 
remain in employment for doing so. An employee upon entering employment may agree 
to terms which may restrict his right to certain forms of expression to maintain discipline 
in the workplace.
5
 The argument from moral autonomy does however provide a strong 
theoretical basis for an employee who wishes to raise a concern because he may consider 
a matter or course of action before him to be in conflict with his own moral code. 
 
1.1.2 To enhance the individual 
 
The argument that freedom of expression enhances the individual may provide a more 
reasoned justification for individuals in modern democratic society. Barendt identifies 
that to restrict what an individual is allowed to say or write, hear, and read, is to inhibit 
                                                        
3 A person may commit the Common Law offence of ‘outraging public decency’ if: the act was of such a 
lewd character as to outrage public decency and it took place in a public place and must have been capable 
of being seen by two or more persons who were actually present, even if they had not actually seen it. For a 
contemporary interpretation see R v Hamilton [2007] EWCA Crim 2026.   
4 The Equality Act 2010 provides a useful example. It aims to protect discrimination of a number of 
‘protected characteristics’ including: sex and sexual orientation, race, religion or belief, age, gender 
reassignment and disability. See in particular ss.4-12 Equality Act 2010.  
5 This so-called waiver of freedom expression rights is considered further below. 
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their personality and development.
6
 Fenwick argues that the right to individual moral 
autonomy and the argument from individual self-fulfilment are separate and distinct 
concepts.
7
 
The argument may be identified as separate and distinct to the argument from moral 
autonomy, however in exercising his right to moral autonomy it is submitted that the 
individual is exposed to the benefits that the right confers. Mason argues that freedom of 
expression may be seen as serving the private interests of the individual, enabling the 
citizen to lead his life as an ‘autonomous individual in society,’ thus allowing him to 
contribute to the ‘formation of public opinion,’ to ‘participate directly’ or ‘indirectly in 
the political process’ and to ‘oppose actions and policies which may be detrimental to his 
interests.’8  
 
Barendt opines that the arguments associated with individual self-fulfilment are hard to 
distinguish from general libertarian or moral autonomy claims.
9
 Moreover, the concepts 
share similar difficulties. The argument from self-fulfilment does not allow for an 
assessment of the content of the speech or consideration of potential harm caused by the 
speech to others and the effect such speech may have on another individual’s 
development. Conversely, the argument does not allow for consideration of the benefit of 
the speech to society as a whole.  
 
                                                        
6E.Barendt, Freedom of Speech (OUP, Oxford, 2005) 13. Similarly Vickers identifies that the right to 
communicate and develop ideas on moral and political issues is fundamental to individual development, 
L.Vickers, Freedom of Speech and Employment (OUP, Oxford, 2002) 49.  
7 Above, n 2. 
8 R.Mason, Freedom of Expression and Freedom of Information: Essays in Honour of Sir David Williams 
(OUP, Oxford, 2000), Eds J.Beatson and Y.Cripps, 237. 
9 Above, n 6,14. 
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2.1.3 To enhance the public good  
 
Protection of an individual’s right to freedom of expression may also be beneficial to the 
wider public good. Raz argues that the benefits to others are the result of the benefit the 
right brings to the right holder  rather than merely a coincidental independent effect. 
Thus the respect for the interest in one person’s rights sometimes essentially serves the 
interests of others as well.
10
 He identifies the argument that a person’s right to freedom 
of expression is protected not in order to protect him, but in order to protect the public 
good, a benefit which respect for the right of freedom of expression brings to all those 
who live in the society to which it is respected, even those who have no personal interest 
in their own freedom.
11
  
 
In contrast, Schauer suggests that the recipients of the speech are the primary object of 
the justification for free speech. The speaker is afforded derivative rights in order protect 
and enhance the recipients’ right to information.12 Barendt is critical of this assertion 
believing that in reality a court deciding a free speech case would assume that although 
the right of the recipient may attach equal or slightly more weight than it does to the 
speaker, it would be wrong to uphold a case that did not respect the speaker’s interest in 
the ability to communicate or share his ideas or information.
13
  
 
The argument that freedom of expression is necessary to enhance the public good 
provides a strong justification for the communication of ‘whistleblowing speech.’ It may 
be observed that the Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998 was enacted in response to a 
                                                        
10 J.Raz, Freedom of Expression and Freedom of Information: Essays in Honour of Sir David Williams 
(OUP, Oxford, 2000), Eds J.Beatson and Y.Cripps, 305. 
11 Ibid 
12 F. Shauer, Free Speech: A Philosophical Enquiry (CUP, Cambridge, 1982) 105.  
13 Above, n 6, 27. 
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number of incidents during the 1980s and 1990s including the Clapham Rail Crash, the 
Piper Alpha explosion, the Zebrugger Ferry tragedy and the Maxwell pension’s scandal. 
The Act covers a number of broad categories whereby the disclosure of information may 
qualify for protection, including: a breach of health and safety, damage to the 
environment, a miscarriage of justice or a breach of a legal obligation. It is submitted 
that the number of qualifying disclosure categories contained within the Act identify the 
underlying purpose of the legislation; to encourage the raising of concerns beneficial to 
the public interest.    
 
2.1.4. Truth 
 
Freedom of speech is essential because speech leads to the discovery of the truth. In his 
seminal work, On Liberty, John Stuart Mill developed the proposition from Milton’s 
Areopagitica. Mill identified that opinion which is suppressed on the grounds of 
falsehood may later be found to be true, or alternatively the speech suppressed may 
contain a ‘portion of truth.’14 The consequences of suppression of speech on this basis, 
Mill argued, are that truth is not established or it is replaced by falsity. The vision, as 
Schauer identifies, is a marketplace of ideas whereby the allowance of argument and 
opinion leads to increased knowledge which in turn contributes to the enhancement of 
society as a whole.
15
   
 
The inherent difficulty with Mill’s argument stems from the fact that Mill suggested that 
the discovery of truth need not be immediate but may be disseminated over a period of 
                                                        
14 On Liberty, Chapter 2.  
15 Above, n 12, 15. 
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time.
16
 In modern democratic society, the population may require access to true 
information in order to participate in a particular issue. Fenwick argues that this rationale 
provides a strong argument against secrecy and, in particular, against: 
 “the propensity of UK governments to attempt to conceal political secrets until 
revelation would no longer have a damaging effect on their interests.”17 
 
The discovery of truth is of most importance where the public has been presented with 
false information on key government policy, where misconduct has been covered up, or 
where true information has been ‘spun’ in such a way as to mislead. Delay or refusal to 
disseminate the truth leads to suspicion of authority. Freedom of information requests 
may take a considerable length of time to be answered, may be redacted, refused or 
vetoed. The mechanisms used to hold government to account may take several years of 
investigatory processes to discover the truth and may extend beyond the life of the 
Parliament and the administration it concerns. Secrecy fuels mistrust in authority. In the 
modern technological age as Dean suggests, ‘techno culture materialises the belief that 
the key to democracy can be found in uncovering secrets.’18  
 
The argument from truth provides a strong theoretical argument for the need for 
whistleblowers in Crown service. Crown servants may be placed in a unique position 
within the confines of government departments to witness the truth of executive action. 
Where the public has been misled about the government’s immigration policy or has not 
been informed about the illegal bugging of sovereign states, a Crown servant may be 
best placed to provide the public with the truth. Moreover, the emergence of online 
facilities such as Wikileaks or OpenLeaks provide platforms for the swift dissemination 
of information.  
                                                        
16Above, 14. 
17 Above, n 2. 
18 J.Dean, Publicity’s Secret (2009) Political Theory 29 (5) 646. 
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1.1.5 Participation in a Democracy  
 
The argument from democracy is closely linked to the argument from truth. It comprises 
of two essential ideals. First is the notion that citizens as active participants in the 
democratic process require information on political issues to engage in open debate and 
to make informed decisions, thus government should be accountable. Second, in a 
democracy the government serves at the will of the people. It is therefore vital that 
citizens have the opportunity to freely communicate their wishes to the government of 
the day so that its actions accurately reflect the will of the people. 
 
According to Barendt, the argument from democracy is centred on the rights of citizens 
who have an equal right to engage in public debate and exchange information and 
ideas.
19Schauer believes a democratic system acknowledges that ‘ultimate political 
power resides in the population at large, that the people as a body are sovereign, and that 
they, either directly or through their elected representatives, in a significant sense 
actually control the operation of the government.’Schauer’s reasoning is a development 
of the principles first considered in the work of Alexander Meiklejohn.  
 
Vickers is critical of the sovereignty argument, suggesting that if the justification is ‘the 
need to do the sovereign will of the electorate’ this does not ‘automatically guarantee 
free speech.’20 She identifies that if this were indeed the case; the electorate could ‘chose 
a government which does not uphold free speech’ or choose to ‘suppress the speech of a 
                                                        
19 Above n 6, 36. 
20 Above, n 6,24. 
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minority.’21 She suggests that the solution to this limitation is to allow government 
decisions to be ‘debated widely’ because the issues involved in the decision making 
process are ‘rarely clear cut.’ Vickers further opines that the right to freedom of speech 
‘in relation to government actions and policies’ acts ‘a form of accountability on the 
state.’22  
 
It is submitted that the argument from democracy creates a strong justification 
whistleblowing. Again, Crown servants may be best placed to raise concerns about 
government actions or policy, particularly where the traditional mechanisms of holding 
the executive to account have failed. Regardless of the veracity of the sovereignty 
argument it is clear that citizens elect politicians to govern on their behalf and do so on 
the understanding that the individuals concerned will have their best interests at heart. It 
is therefore vital that citizens are provided with sufficient information to engage in and 
enhance political debate, to decide who to elect based upon clear and informed decision 
making, and ultimately, so that they can be aware on what actions are taken in their 
name.  
 
1.1.6. Right of access to information 
 
Arguments justifying a right of access to information have close links with the 
arguments from truth and from democracy. Access to official information can further 
enhance an individual’s knowledge of political issues, assisting informed participation in 
political debate leading to an enhanced society as a whole. According to Sedley, the 
mechanisms of fact holders are almost always self interested – driven not by an 
                                                        
21 Above, n 6,24. 
22Above, n 6, 25. 
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acknowledged right in others to know what the organisation knows but what suits the 
organisation that others should know.
23
  Neocleous notes that the publicity of official 
deliberations ensures the connection between ‘private citizens as voters and public 
officials as representatives.’24 Birkinshaw identifies that ‘disasters are avoided, accidents 
prevented and sustenance provided’ by allowing access to the information.25 An 
individual’s ‘moral and ethical evaluation,’ he opines, depends upon information 
‘acquired by our own and our predecessor’s experiences.’26  
 
Birkinshaw develops a theoretical framework for the right to information based upon 
Habermas’ ‘ideal speech theory.’27 The theory requires all participants to have the ‘same 
opportunity to debate and justify without external pressure or domination.’ Birkinshaw 
argues that freedom of information is an ‘essential component,’ in order to ensure that 
individuals who participate in debates have access to the truth so that if others are trying 
to deceive them they will be able to distinguish between truth and lies. Birkinshaw 
however identifies that the pursuit of ‘secrecy or confidentiality or the quest for privacy’ 
is ‘essential to full human development.’ Thus he suggests that there are areas of life 
which are a legitimate object of secrecy, such as intimate personal relationships, medical 
facts, prolonged negotiations and investigations in the public interest.
28
  
 
It is submitted that the right of access to information provides a strong justification for 
whistleblowing. It will be illustrated later in this thesis that despite the introduction of 
the Freedom of Information Act 2000, members of the public are faced with a number of 
                                                        
23Above, n 10, 241.  
24 M.Neocleous, Privacy, Secrecy, Idiocy (2002) Social Reseach 69 1, 87. 
25 P.Birkinshaw, Freedom of Information: the Law the Practice the Ideal (Butterworths, London, 2001) 16. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid, see further: J.Habermas, Toward a Rational Society (Beacon Press, London, 1971), Ch 5 and 6.  
28 Above n 25. 
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barriers to the disclosure of information. A whistleblower may be best placed to provide 
the public with information that they would otherwise be unable to obtain through 
legally prescribed means. It will be indentified that there are circumstances where the 
right of free expression may be curtailed in order to prevent harm. The next section 
considers the theoretical justifications for limiting expression rights and the right of 
access to information.  
 
1.2.1. Justifications for the Limitation of Expression Rights and the Right to Access 
Information 
 
J.S. Mill argued that the only legitimate justification for the limitation of an individual’s 
free speech rights is the prevention of harm to others.
29
 Barendt states that a free speech 
principle may not confer absolute protection but the principle does mean that 
governments must show strong grounds for interference.
30
Dworkin suggests that 
limitation to the right to freedom of expression may be justified if the state demonstrates 
‘a clear and substantial risk’ that the exercise of the right will do great damage to the 
person or property of others.
31
  
 
Shauer correctly identifies that speech can and frequently does cause harm, thus by an 
individual saying something to a group of people may cause them to be harmful to 
society by disobeying the law.
32
Such reasoning can be transposed to the unauthorised 
disclosure of information harmful to national security. A leak of information may be 
useful to the ‘enemy,’ it may also provide encouragement to colleagues working in the 
same environment to also leak information. It may be argued therefore that the existence 
                                                        
29 On Liberty, Chapter 2. 
30Above, n 6, 7. 
31 R.Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Harvard University Press, New York, 1978). 
32Above, n 12, 10. 
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of an Official Secrets Act which limits the freedom of expression of the Crown employee 
is necessary to protect the information concerned and to act as a deterrent effect.  
 
The United States Supreme Court in Schenke v United States developed considered when 
the restriction on freedom of expression would be justified, resulting in the formulation 
of a ‘clear and present danger’ test: 
“Words which, ordinarily and in many places, would be within the freedom of 
speech protected by the First Amendment may become subject to prohibition when of 
such a nature and used in such circumstances a to create a clear and present danger that 
they will bring about the substantive evils which Congress has a right to prevent. The 
character of every act depends upon the circumstances in which it is done.”33 
 
The subsequent decision of Abrams v United States
34
 adopted a ‘bad tendency’ principle, 
which enabled the restriction of speech by government if it believed that it had the sole 
tendency to incite or cause illegal activity. Oliver Wendel Homes, dissenting, opined that 
regardless of whether the speech in question had been communicated in a time of war or 
any other time the principle would be ‘always be the same.’35 Thus, he opined that 
Congress could ‘only limit the expression of opinion’ whereby the ‘present danger of 
immediate evil or intent to bring it about warranted the intervention.’36 The reasoning is 
significant. Holmes advocated that such a restriction should only be warranted where the 
threat is immediate, and that the decision should be made by Congress rather than 
government.  
 
The decision in Abrams was overturned following Brandenburg v Ohio. The court 
adopted a new standard of review which authorises the restriction of speech whereby the 
circumstances give rise to ‘imminent lawless action.’ Mr Justice Douglas, concurring, 
                                                        
33 [1919] 249 US 49, 51. 
34 [1919] 250 US 616. 
35 Ibid, 628. 
36 Above, n 33, 628. 
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was critical of the ‘clear and present danger’ test. He suggested that the application of the 
principle could result in decisions where ‘the threats were often loud but always puny’ 
and ‘made serious only by judges so wedded to the status quo that critical analysis made 
them nervous.’37  
 
It may be identified from the aforementioned decisions and theoretical reasoning that in 
order for the state to restrict the expression of a citizen it must first establish an 
overriding justification, such as the prevention of harm or the security of the state. A 
court must have the opportunity to test this justification based upon a pre-determined 
analytical framework. Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights provides 
for such a framework. Article 10 (2) provides a number of potential restrictions on the 
right to freedom of expression provided that they are ‘prescribed by law’ and ‘necessary 
in a democratic society.’38Barendt argues that ‘necessary in a democratic society’ can 
only be determined in the light of all the circumstances. The process therefore does not 
only require judges to determine the importance of the relevant state interest and the 
degree of danger threatened by the expression but further enables them to examine the 
‘precise character of the speech.’39 Based upon this reasoning, it is suggested that it is 
insufficient for the government of the day or an executive department to argue that 
speech ought to be restricted because it relates to national security, or is necessary to 
prevent crime. It must provide a justification, as to why, in the particular circumstances 
complained of, the speech would cause harm. A court must then be provided with the 
ability to rigorously test this justification. It will be argued later in this thesis that the 
Official Secrets Act 1989 and the harm tests associated with it do not allow for such 
analysis. The next section will consider the theoretical justifications for secrecy 
                                                        
37 [1969] 395 US 444. 
38 Full consideration of Article 10 ECHR and related jurisprudence is provided below.  
39 Above, n 6, 20. 
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1.2.2. Theoretical concepts of secrecy and security 
 
According to Simmel, all relationships of people to each other rest, as a matter of course, 
on the pre-condition that they know something about each other.
40
 As citizens elect 
politicians to act on their behalf they bestow the executive with the power to make 
decisions for the good of the state. Neocleous argues the tendency towards secrecy is 
endemic to all states.
41
 Thus, if a situation arises whereby the ideal course of action is to 
preserve the state it is the statesman’s task to discern this course and as a consequence 
determine which information should be suppressed in the public interest.
42
  
 
Bok suggests that the conflicts over secrecy between state and citizen are conflicts of 
power. It may be argued that the citizen’s acceptance of state secrecy, and as a 
consequence state power, is a natural extension of Hobbes’ concept of the social contract 
– the surrender of natural rights to accept the jurisdiction of the sovereign.43 Part of a 
citizen’s acceptance of secrecy - or the government’s justification for it - may the 
inability for the public to adequately assess and understand information. Bok suggests 
we are limited by our ‘capacity to perceive and remember’ and that if provided with 
information our capacity to make judgment is ‘severely limited’ and is ‘subject to bias 
from all directions.’44 
 
Similarly, in discussing justifications for secrecy in contrast to arguments for publicity, 
                                                        
40 G.Simmel, The Sociology of Secrecy and of Secret Societies, American Journal of Sociology (1906) 441. 
41 Above, n 24. 
42 Above, n 24, 97.  
43 T. Hobbes, Leviathan, 1651, Ch 14, I. Mcleod, Legal Theory (5th Edition, Palgrave: Basingstoke, 2010), 
53. 
44 S.Bok, Secrets: on the Ethics of Concealment and Revelation, (Vintage, New York, 1989) 104. 
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Dean identifies Bentham’s proposition that some individuals may ‘defend government 
secrecy’ on the basis that the public’ lacks of capacity for judgment.’45 Dean further 
develops Bentham’s reasoning, suggesting that the public is split into three classes. The 
first, those ‘who do not have time for public affairs;’ the second, those who ‘believe 
through the judgements of others,’ and the third ‘few’ who ‘judge for themselves on the 
basis of the available information.’46 Dean suggests that it is the second class – those 
who believe in the judgment of others – who most require publicity to ensure that they 
are not misled. 
 
Part of the difficulty is the requirement to keep a check on government control of secret 
information. Neocleaous identifies that civil society lacks a ‘sense of equality’ or 
‘reciprocity’ with the state as it has ‘no spying machine.’ The best it can hope for is some 
kind of ‘left opposition’ to keep tabs on it but it will always be at a ‘serious technical and 
organisational disadvantage.’47 However, whilst Neocleous suggests that the way to 
combat secrecy is to combat the state collectively, Szikinger is highly critical of this 
assertion identifying that it would most likely result in the collapse of the state itself.
48
 
Moreover, he suggests that if such action were to succeed, greater openness based on 
‘collective knowledge’ and ‘collective efforts’ would not result in ‘challenging’ the 
‘oppressive tendencies of the state.’  
 
Fenster considers the notion of transparency by providing a modern interpretation of 
Bentham’s Panopticon, a means of allowing the public to view the actions of their 
                                                        
45Above, n 18, 649. 
46 Ibid.  
47 Above, n 24, 86. 
48 I. Szikinger, Privacy, Secrecy, Idiocy: A Response to Mark Neocleous, Social Research (2002) 69 1 
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political rulers.
49
 In doing so he identifies that the motivation for such a design is to 
create a structure whereby the subject is unable to recognise when he is being watched. 
This creates a feeling of ‘permanent surveillance’ leading the subject to regulate 
‘discipline and organise behaviour and thought.’50 Fenster argues that a truly 
‘panopticised state’ would be difficult to achieve but serves as a metaphor for 
transparency and open government.
51
  
 
It is submitted that the benefits associated with a ‘panopticised state,’ namely that 
executive malpractice is less likely to occur for fear of the wrongdoer being found out, 
should be contrasted with the potential damaging consequences of transparency 
controlling behaviour. The principles of collective Cabinet responsibility and candour 
have been developed to ensure that members of the Cabinet may speak freely without 
fear that their words may result in future criticism and so that Civil Servants can provide 
full and frank advice. The ‘panopticised’ ideal, if implemented, could have a detrimental 
impact on the machinery of the state resulting in delayed or hesitant decision making or 
decisions made which do not best serve the public interest.  Conversely, Bok identifies 
that the notion of ‘collective secrecy’ can diminish the sense of ‘personal responsibility 
for joint decisions’ resulting in ‘skewed’ or ‘careless judgement’ and the taking of 
‘needless risks.’52  
 
1.3 Theoretical Perspectives on Whistleblowing 
 
According to J.S. Mill: 
‘A person may cause evil to others not only by his actions but by his inaction, and 
                                                        
49 M.Fenster, Seeing the State: Transparancy as Metaphor [2010] Admin.L.Rev. 62 669.  
50 Ibid. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Above, n 43, 109. 
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in either case he is justly accountable to them for the injury.’53 
 
The recent Wikileaks revelations highlight an inevitable tension between the need to 
maintain national security and a duty of confidence to the employer on the one hand, and 
the burning moral obligation to have the perceived wrongdoing addressed. Unauthorised 
disclosures may be a product of an overbearing and outdated regime to protect official 
secrecy and a failure of the existing oversight mechanisms to hold those in power to 
account. Conversely, a leak to the wider public domain by a disgruntled or disaffected 
employee may be identified as a disproportionate response to a matter which could have 
been dealt with internally.   
 
Bok provides a detailed philosophical analysis of whistleblowing. She identifies that 
unauthorised disclosures, or leaking of information and authorised whistleblowing bear 
similarities. She suggests that both forms of expression can be used to challenge ‘corrupt 
or cumbersome systems of secrecy,’ however whilst they may ‘convey urgent warnings’ 
the information concerned may be false and may contain ‘vicious personal attacks.’54 Bok 
therefore recommends that society should draw distinctions between the types of 
information communicated; ultimately asking whether the matter communicated is 
relevant to the public interest.
55
 She proposes that individuals who are contemplating 
blowing the whistle must consider whether the information in question is something to 
which the public is entitled to know ‘in the first place’ or whether it ‘infringes on 
personal and private matters’ that ‘no one should invade.’ Conversely, she argues that 
those who raise matters relating to an individual’s private life as ‘a threat to the public’ 
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54 Above, n 44, 219. 
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voice their own ‘religious or political prejudice.’56  
 
Bok, suggests that it may be ‘disloyal’ to colleagues and employers and a ‘waste of time 
for the public’ to raise concerns to the public first. She recommends that raising concerns 
internally first can often ‘uphold both sets of loyalties and settle the problem without 
going outside of the organisation.’57 Bok considers that raising concerns directly to the 
public should remain a last resort, where other options have been considered and rejected. 
Bok suggests public disclosure may be considered where the other options ‘do not apply 
to the problem at hand,’ where there is ‘no time to go through routine channels,’ or when 
the organisation is considered ‘so corrupt or coercive that steps will be taken to silence 
the whistleblower’ if regular mechanisms are used.58 
 
It is submitted that Bok’s approach to the subject of whistleblowing provides a strong 
foundation with which to construct a theoretical framework for the purposes of this 
thesis. Just as Bok aims to distinguish between the values of different types of 
information, it can be observed that the European Court of Human Rights and domestic 
courts have taken a similar approach. However, Bok’s recommendation that society 
should draw distinctions between the types of information communicated is not without 
difficulty. According to the aforementioned perspective of Dean, society may not be 
equipped to make the critical distinction between the types of information communicated. 
Taking Dean’s conception of society, those who ‘believe through the judgments of 
others,’ and the ‘few’ who ‘judge for themselves on the basis of the available 
information,
59
 may encounter the most difficulty.  
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Faced with leaked information which purportedly originates from a government 
department, society cannot make an adequate assessment of the value of the speech 
communicated or the motivation behind the disclosure unless they understand the 
information communicated to them. Traditionally the public have been reliant upon 
traditional media outlets to report on such material. Technological advancements have 
meant that vast quantities of official documents can be made readily accessible by 
organisations such as Wikileaks. Despite these developments it will be illustrated in 
chapter two that traditional media outlets are still utilised a means to present and explain 
the material to the public.  
 
Potential difficulties occur when the information is provided to a journalist via a conduit, 
creating further distance between the source and journalist than ever before. How can 
journalists be certain that they are not being fed with false information without having 
access to the source to test his motives? One must consider whether society can reach 
informed conclusions as to the value of the information communicated without knowing 
the identity of the source.  
 
Bok does identify that those who take ‘openly accepted responsibility’ for blowing the 
whistle should be preferred to anonymous leaking.
60
 Open whistleblowing can allow for 
the information to be ‘easily checked,’ for the ‘source’s motives to be challenged,’ and 
for the information concerned to be ‘tested.’61 Bok argues that anonymous leaking is 
‘safer’ and can be ‘kept up indefinitely’ whereas in comparison the person who reveals 
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his identity ‘shoots his bolt by going public.’62 Unauthorised leaking, Bok suggests, 
means that the messages conveyed in the leaks may be lost, because the leaker cannot 
explain their messages. Moreover, the information often ‘passes through several 
intermediaries’ before being printed, meaning that the information may be changed or 
may not be printed in its entirety.
63
 Ultimately, Bok opines that: 
 “…Unless the information is accompanied by indications of how the evidence can 
be checked, the source’s anonymity, however safe, diminishes the value of the 
message.”64 
 
Rains and Scott provide a theoretical model of receiver responses to anonymous 
communication in which they identify that many whistleblowers elect to remain 
anonymous so that they may avoid personal or legal retribution for their actions.
65
In 
organisations where mechanisms are provided for anonymous concern reporting, they 
suggest that such communication has ‘raised concerns about the perceived credibility of 
claims’ and ‘the ability of the accused to take action’ to counteract the claims made 
against him.
66
 Ultimately, they identify that understanding a ‘source’s qualifications’ and 
‘trustworthiness’ are ‘central to evaluating his or her message.’67 The authors propose 
that whilst whistleblowing can be considered a ‘pro-social act’ some receivers of the 
information may desire to know the identity of the source. They argue that the identity of 
the source could be of ‘integral importance to assessing the veracity of his or her claims’ 
– the ‘inability to ascertain the identity of the source’, they opine, ‘may explain the 
relative ineffectiveness of anonymous whistleblowing and the negative reactions of 
message receivers to such forms of communication.’68 
                                                        
62 Above, n 43, 223. 
63 Ibid. 
64 Ibid. 
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It is submitted that the theoretical perspectives of Rains and Scott are consistent with the 
work of Bok. Anonymous whistleblowing may cause suspicion of not only the 
motivation behind the disclosure but of the information itself. To the whistleblower, 
however, anonymous leaking may appear to be the only ‘safe’ option. Perry suggests that 
the fate of whistleblowers is ‘characteristically bleak’ – ‘if they have not already decided 
to resign’ they can ‘expect to be dismissed from their employment’ following the making 
of the disclosure.
69
 Whistleblowing, he suggests, may be classified as a form of 
‘occupational suicide.’70 Consistent with this approach, Mansbach suggests that 
whistleblowing is a form of ‘fearless speech’ – even though wrongdoers are in a position 
to hurt the individual for raising the concern - the individual chooses to do it anyway.
71
 
Anonymous whistleblowing, however, may be a way of limiting the potential damage 
caused by the act.  
 
One must further consider whether there may be circumstances when the value of the 
information in question outweighs the fact that it has been communicated anonymously. 
Moreover, the whistleblower may be motivated by spite or revenge, but the information 
communicated may still be of a high value to society. This, it is suggested, supports the 
argument that freedom of expression can enhance the public good. It will be identified 
later in this discussion that the European Court of Human Rights, and the domestic UK 
courts have sought to distinguish between the requisite value of different forms of speech 
and that a whistleblowing model which supports anonymous communication should be 
consistent with a framework which provides an assessment of the circumstances in which 
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the disclosure was made and the value of the speech communicated.  
 
Mansbach likens the act of whistleblowing to Michel Foucault’s notion of Parrahesia, a 
form of truth telling originally practiced in ancient Greece. Mansbach defines workplace 
whistleblowing as ‘the disclosure by a person working within an organisation of acts, 
omissions, practices, or policies by that organisation that wrong or harm a third party.’ It 
is submitted that this widely framed definition would cause difficulties for the Crown 
servant as whistleblower. Whilst it can be acknowledged that certain actions or the failure 
to act may cause harm to an individual, Mansbach’s focus upon the impact of 
organisational policies on a third party needs careful consideration. A secret policy on 
extraordinary rendition and torture, the practice of which may be illegal under both 
domestic and international law may be distinguished from a policy to raise the retirement 
age or a policy to reform the benefit system. All of the aforementioned policy examples 
would have a likely impact upon a third party. The consequences for the individuals 
concerned if such policies were implemented may be very different. This distinction 
identifies the importance of being able to categorise the value of the speech 
communicated by the whistleblower.  
 
The unauthorised disclosure of a government policy document, which may be politically 
controversial but not illegal, could be a justifiable form of political expression. Yet the 
act of communication, depending on the content of the information concerned, may be 
more beneficial to the communicator, allowing him to be an active participant in the 
political process, than the recipient public. Moreover, the information concerned may 
only benefit a narrow group of the population. However, there may be circumstances 
where the information communicated may not disclose an illegal or highly controversial 
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policy, but the disclosure of the information could still be of benefit to the electorate. If 
the contents of a policy have been deliberately concealed or misrepresented to 
Parliament, the disclosure of the information highlighting the act of concealment may 
assist the electorate in determining the conduct of those in power. Consistent with the 
premise that the disclosure certain types of information may be more justifiable than 
others, the discussion will now progress to consider the theoretical justifications for 
releasing information out of necessity. 
 
1.4 Necessity and Duress of Circumstances 
 
In a report entitled ‘Leaks and Whistleblowing in Whitehall.’72 The Public 
Administration Select Committee identified that unauthorised leaks of information 
undermine the relationship of trust between servants and ministers but stated that there 
are exceptional circumstances in which leaking could be justified in order to expose 
serious wrongdoing. Such circumstances would require a ‘failure of proper channels both 
of disclosure and challenge within government.’ 73 
 
The following two sections place emphasis upon circumstances whereby the 
unauthorised disclosure of official documents may result in the committal of a criminal 
offence and whether such an act may be justifiable in the circumstances. It is necessary 
to distinguish between the concepts of necessity and civil disobedience. Necessity, 
according to Brudner, most commonly refers to circumstances whereby someone 
chooses to break the law in order to avoid a greater evil.
74
 The evil, it is suggested, must 
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73 Ibid. 
74 A.Brudner, A Theory of Necessity [1987] OJLS 7 3, 340.  
 36 
 
 
present an immediate threat of harm to the communicator or to others. In the context of 
whistleblowing, such speech would be consistent with the arguments from autonomy and 
to benefit the public good. In contrast, civil disobedience provides the means for an 
aggrieved individual to object to a particular law or policy to which he does not agree. 
Determination of the appropriate circumstances whereby either concept will be 
applicable is highly subjective.  
 
With regards to the defence of necessity, Lee suggests that it is not enough that the 
commission of an offence resulted in ‘a lesser evil than the evil avoided through the 
violation’ – it must have been the ‘only option the individual had available to address the 
choice of evils he was facing.’75 The defence, it is suggested, requires an individual to 
make the decision to break the law based upon an overriding imperative. Howard Dennis 
claims that such action will be permitted by society because the act will result in a 
reduction of harm which would otherwise occur.
76
 In an alternative view, Brudner 
suggests that necessity can be considered as a ‘momentary aberration from, rather than 
an expression of, the accused’s moral character’ which if accepted should lead to 
acquittal.
 77
  It is submitted that regardless of whether either argument is accepted, 
Crown servants may be placed in a unique position, whereby the disclosure of 
information may be considered necessary because of a perceived duty of care owed to 
citizens. Determination of what constitutes the ‘lesser evil,’ the most proportionate 
course of action in the circumstances, requires careful consideration.  
 
Brudner argues that necessity cannot be used as a justification where an individual 
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‘imposes grave risks on the health of persons, regardless of the magnitude of the net 
saving of lives.’78 Transposed to the circumstances of unauthorised disclosure of 
government documents, the release of information identifying that an illegal war is about 
to take place may be justified, but the whereabouts or identities of the soldiers may not. 
The Crown servant would be faced with the unenviable task of determining what 
disclosures of information would be justifiable and to whom. The difficulty of making 
such a determination is further complicated by the lack of an available codified legal 
framework; in particular a codified defence of necessity contained in the Official Secrets 
Acts.  
 
Howard Dennis opines that the development of necessity as a defence should be restricted 
to two situations, firstly where there is an emergency situation, and second, where there is 
a conflict of duty; giving rise to a ‘danger of death or serious injury.’79 Howard Dennis 
suggests that where a situation concerns ‘less serious harm’ it should be for the 
legislature to ‘regulate the ordering of harms with specific defences.’ He suggests that it 
may also be appropriate to delegate the task of ‘ordering harms’ to the courts by 
providing general words in statutory provisions to allow the court to undertake such a 
task. It is submitted that this proposition further supports the need for a framework which 
categorises the value of speech communicated proportionate to the harm caused by the 
act of disclosure. This discussion will now turn to consider civil disobedience.  
 
1.5 Civil Disobedience  
 
Perry poses two objectives for disobeying law:  
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  “first is to resist a coercive law to which one 
conscientiously objects – a law requiring one to do what one believes one may not do or 
forbidding one to do what one believes one must do. Second to achieve a greater good- a 
good greater than the evil(s) entailed by the disobedient act; for example to undermine 
those in power (Ghandi’s objective), to change or at least focus serious attention on a law 
(e.g. racially discriminatory one) or policy (e.g., the deployment of cruise missiles), or 
simply to protect someone (e.g., a Salvadorian refugee illegally in the United States).”80  
 
The act of civil disobedience will most notably arise when a Civil Servant chooses to 
break the law in order to raise his concern. The Crown servant may feel duty bound to 
engage in civil disobedience as a means of pursuing a greater good. This in effect 
becomes an overriding obligation to act.
81
 The laws protecting official information are 
indentified in chapter four of this thesis which considers official information. The Official 
Secrets Act 1989 does not include a public interest test for unauthorised disclosures made 
directly to the public. Moreover, it will be identified that the harm tests provided in the 
various sections of the act are easily satisfied. The increasing use of the common law 
offence of Misconduct in Public Office as an alternative to prosecution under the Official 
Secrets Act has further widened scope for punishment of unauthorised disclosures of 
official information. Therefore, if a Civil Servant decides to disclose official information 
without information it is highly likely that he will break the law as a result. 
 
Rawls contends that the act of civil disobedience is both public and political; it is neither 
covert nor secretive.
82
 The act of civil disobedience generally requires the individual to 
provide an explanation as to why he chose to break the law and an explanation as to why 
he disagrees with a certain policy complained of. Civil disobedience may therefore be 
considered as a form of ‘protest speech.’ An explanation as to why the individual broke 
the law in raising a concern may be considered as significant as the information 
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81 H.D. Thoreau, Walden, or, Life in the Woods; and On the duty of Civil Disobedience ( New American 
Library, New York, 1960) 288. 
82 J.Rawls, A Theory of Justice (OUP, Oxford, 2nd Edition 1999), 374. 
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disclosed. Consequentially, it would be very difficult for an individual to justify that his 
act constituted an act of civil disobedience if he chose to remain anonymous in raising the 
concerns. Disclosures made possible via an online outlet such as Wikileaks lack both the 
proximity between the whistleblower and the material communicated and furthermore do 
not provide an explanation as to why the individual disagrees with the information 
complained of, instead generally leaving the recipient audience with the task of drawing 
their own conclusions on the material. 
 
Rawls identifies a concept of equal society. Civil disobedience may be regarded as a 
‘stabilizing device,’ a ‘healthy but illegal method of accountability.’83 Thus allowing a 
civil servant to break the law to identify acts of wrongdoing or afford the electorate 
greater access to official information may be justified. This position is further enhanced 
by the justifications from truth or to enhance the public good, as the recipients of the 
information would benefit from such disclosures. The act of civil disobedience may also 
bear close similarities to the justification from moral autonomy and to enhance the 
individual. The justifications must be contrasted with a moral obligation to obey the law, 
regardless of whether it is considered to be unjust or bad. This stems from a duty to 
prevent risk to the legal system and the very principles that govern it.
84
 Crown servants 
owe a duty of loyalty to the government of the day. Widespread civil disobedience may 
undermine the trust needed between Ministers and their Civil Servant counterparts. 
 
It is submitted, that the act of civil disobedience may be acceptable until it reaches the 
extent that respect for the law of the land and the constitution breaks down.
85
 Civil 
disobedience may appear necessary in rare and individual circumstances, but it can also 
                                                        
83 Ibid. 
84J.Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (Clarendon, Oxford, 2011) 383. 
85 Above, n 82. 
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undermine not only the purpose of the law in question (no matter how invalid it may 
appear at the time) but the rule of law as a whole.
86
 As Thoreau contends the remedy of 
civil disobedience may be worse than the evil, an imbalance that should be rectified by 
the legislative.
87
 The question of whether a Crown servant may be justified in disclosing 
official information without authority should therefore be dependent upon the content of 
the information itself and the benefits to which such disclosures may confer.  
 
Dworkin identifies three types of civil disobedience. The first, he identifies, is ‘integrity 
based,’ where a citizen chooses to disobey the law when he feels that the law in question 
is immoral. The second is ‘justice based,’ where the individual chooses to act in order to 
assert a right to which he feels has been wrongly denied. The third is ‘policy based,’ 
where the citizen believes that a chosen policy is ‘dangerously unwise.88 Dworkin opines 
that this requires the individual to believe that the policy to which they oppose is ‘bad for 
everyone, not just for some minority.’89 Dworkin makes a distinction between persuasive 
and non-persuasive strategies. Persuasive strategies require the individual to attempt to 
convince the majority that the policy in question is wrong in order for it to ‘disfavour the 
program it formerly favoured.’90 In contrast, non persuasive strategies require the 
individual to ‘make the majority pay so heavily for its actions without having been 
convinced’ by the need for change.91 In identifying the quandary that civil disobedience 
poses to majority rule, a recognised requirement in a democracy, Dworkin suggests that 
persuasive strategies have less of an impact because they do not challenge the principle of 
majority rule in a fundamental way. In comparison, he suggests that non-persuasive 
                                                        
86 Above, n 81. 
87 Above,n 81, 289. 
88 R.Dworkin, A matter of principle (Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA, 1985) 107.  
89 Ibid, 110.  
90 Above, n 87. 
91 Above, n 87, 111. 
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strategies attack the ‘roots and foundations’ of the principle of majority rule, because to 
be successful, the act requires ‘minority coercion’ of the majority.92 
  
Dworkin draws a significant distinction between different forms of policy protest. He 
suggests that the civil rights movement had persuasive force because of a ‘rhetorical 
tradition’ that had justice on its side. In a contrasting example he suggested that the 
trespass of Greenham Common in order to protest the deployment of nuclear missiles in 
Europe is a more difficult act to justify because the arguments for nuclear deployment 
are complex. Dworkin argues that such acts are going to make the general public ‘pay 
less attention’ to ‘complex issues’ because it will be motivated to follow the policy its 
leaders have adopted because any change to that policy would result in ‘giving way to 
civil blackmail.’93Dworkin categorises such action as ‘non-persuasive.’ Dworkin 
identifies that there is a contrast between the types of policy and the justification for civil 
disobedience in which he believes that non-persuasive action taken to highlight bad 
economic policy may not be justified.
94
  
 
It is submitted that Dworkin’s concept of civil disobedience is most relevant to this thesis. 
Unauthorised disclosures by Crown servants may result in the disclosure of information 
detailing the information of what the servant considers to be a dangerous policy decision. 
It is submitted that such disclosures may be considered as non-persuasive. Anonymous 
disclosures such as those disclosed to the online website Wikileaks may provide the 
general public with information regarding bad policy decisions or even illegality. 
However, the difficulty associated with such disclosures is that the communicator does 
not identify himself to communicate to the audience why he opposes such a policy. 
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93 Above, n 87.  
94 Above, n 87. 
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 The mass disclosure of numerous documents which detail different policies is, by its 
nature, a non-persuasive act designed to prompt those in power to pursue a different 
course. The anonymous whistleblower, if exposed, may have difficulty articulating to the 
majority that his motivation for making an unauthorised disclosure was justified on civil 
disobedience grounds. It is submitted, that similar to the concept of necessity, the content 
of the information communicated and the method in which the communication takes 
place will be highly relevant to this consideration. 
 
Part II Freedom of Expression and the Public Interest 
 
This section will consider jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights and 
domestically. It will identify cases which justify the expression of political speech before 
discussing domestic common law principles which have attempted to define matters 
which may be deemed ‘in the public interest.’  
 
1.6 European Convention on Human Rights  
 
Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights provides: 
“1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include 
freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without 
interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This article shall not prevent 
States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises. 
2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may 
be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by 
law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, 
territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the 
protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for 
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preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the 
authority and impartiality of the judiciary.” 
 
The protection of the right to freedom of expression constitutes one of the ‘essential 
foundations of a democratic society.’95 subject to the aforementioned limitations 
identified in subsection 2, it is applicable ‘not only to information or ideas that are 
favourably received or regarded as inoffensive or as a matter of indifference, but also to 
those that offend, shock or disturb the State or any sector of the population.’96  
 
1.6.1 Political Expression  
 
The protection of political expression is of most relevance to this thesis. It provides a 
strong justification for the freedom of expression rights of individuals and has been 
afforded special protection at Strasburg. In Sunday Times v UK the case concerned a 
contempt of court action brought in respect of an article it published which detailed the 
risks posed by the use of the drug Thalidomide by pregnant mothers and criticisms 
against a company involved in ongoing litigation at the time.
97
  The Court held that 
Article 10 guarantees not only the right of the press to inform the public but also the 
right of the public to be informed.
98
 The families of the victims of the medical tragedy 
therefore had a ‘vital interest in knowing all of the facts and the various possible 
solutions’ particularly as they were unaware of the legal difficulties involved.99 In Jersild 
v Denmark, the Court held that whilst the press must not overstep the bound set 
(identifiable in Art. 10(2) above) it is incumbent on journalists to ‘impart information in 
                                                        
95 Handyside v UK (1976) A 24, para 49. 
96 Ibid. 
97 (1979) A 30. 
98 Ibid, para 66. 
99 Ibid. 
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the public interest.’100 If the press were restricted from doing so they would be unable to 
exercise their vital role as ‘public watchdog.’101 
 
The following cases provide examples of where the Court has protected the applicant’s 
free expression rights for criticising authority whether it be the mechanism of authority 
as a whole or individual political figures. Such protection draws strong parallels with the 
theoretical justifications from truth and from democracy. With regards to the criticism of 
a mechanism of authority as a whole, In Thorgeirson v Iceland, a journalist had been 
prosecuted for writing newspaper articles detailing allegations of police brutality.
102
 The 
Court noted that the journalist had not made allegations against particular officers but 
had written with the ‘sole purpose’ that the Minister of Justice would establish an 
independent body to investigate.
103
 The articles were, it held, about a matter of ‘serious 
concern.’104 The journalist’s conviction and sentence were therefore deemed capable of 
discouraging open discussion of matters of public concern.
105
 Strasbourg later identified 
in Castells v Spain that ‘In a democratic system the actions or omissions of the 
government must be subject to close scrutiny not only of the legislative authorities but 
also of the press and public opinion.’106 
 
With regard to criticism of individual political figures, in Lingens v Austria the European 
Court of Human Rights (‘ECtHR’) identified that freedom of expression constitutes one 
of the essential foundations of a democratic society and one of the basic conditions for 
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its process and for each individual’s self-fulfilment.107 Central to this, ‘freedom of 
political debate’ is at the ‘very core of the concept of a democratic society which prevails 
throughout the convention.’108 The case concerned the alleged defamation of a politician 
by a journalist. The court recognised that freedom of the press ‘affords the public one of 
the best means of discovering and forming an opinion of the ideas and attitudes of 
political leaders.’109The Court noted that a politician who was himself ‘accustomed to 
attacking his opponents had to expect fiercer criticism than other people.’110 Unlike 
private individuals, politicians knowingly lay themselves ‘open to close scrutiny’ of their 
‘every word and deeds’ both by ‘journalists and the public at large.’ As a consequence 
they must display a greater degree of tolerance to criticism.
111
   
 
Most importantly, in Lingens the Court identified that the matter at issues was not ‘his 
right to disseminate information but his freedom of opinion and his right to impart ideas’ 
subject to the restrictions in Art.10 (2).
112
 The protection of political speech must 
therefore extend beyond the communication of pure factual information to include 
protection of expressions of opinion. The communication of opinion and ideas is central 
to the theoretical justification for participation in a democracy. However, it will be 
identified later in this discussion that the communication of opinion may be in conflict 
with the requirement for employees of the Civil Service to remain politically impartial.  
 
Whilst the aforementioned cases identify that Art.10 may confer strong protection for 
free expression rights. It should be noted that where such expression extends to criticism 
                                                        
107 Lingens v Austria (1986) 8 EHRR 103, para 41. See further below. 
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of an individual politician’s conduct of a personal relationship the individual may not 
receive protection. Thus, it was held in Tammer v Estonia that criminal penalties 
imposed in respect of reporting of a sexual relationship between the Prime Minister and a 
political aid did not constitute a violation of Article 10.
113
 The right to freedom of 
expression may justifiably provide a strong trump right, however, all rights under the 
qualification are qualified, not absolute. The right may be subject to other conflicting 
rights such as the right to privacy, contained in article 8. The Council of Europe has 
identified that the right to privacy afforded by art.8 should ‘not only protect an individual 
against interference by public authorities but also against interference by private persons 
or institutions, including the media.’114 This section will now progress to consider how 
the domestic jurisdiction has dealt with matters considered to be in the public interest. It 
will then consider how the courts have dealt with conflicting rights to privacy, post 
incorporation of the Human Rights Act 2000.   
 
1.6.2 Contractual limitation of the Right to Freedom of Expression.  
 
The Commission has stated that an individual may contract to limit his expression rights 
and as a consequence, enforcement of the restriction agreed to will not amount to an 
interference with his rights under Article 10(1).
115
 Allen Crasnow and Beale argue that 
an employer and employee could agree to limitation of freedom of expression provided 
there was no improper coercion of either party and that the employer must show that 
such a waiver is made in full awareness of the right and the restriction did not interfere 
with other legal obiligations.
116
 It is submitted that this reasoning is consistent with the 
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approach taken by the Strasbourg court in a number of decided cases. 
 
The ECtHR has indicated that appointment as a civil servant does not deprive the 
individual of the protection of Article 10
117
 however; whilst the Court and the 
Commission have observed that a person’s employment will not affect their freedom of 
expression, the existence of contractual obligations has indicated that limitations are 
evident in certain circumstances. In Rommelfanger v Germany
118
 a Doctor working at a 
Catholic hospital had his contract of employment terminated after signing a letter 
criticising the church’s stance on abortion. The Commission accepted that by entering 
into contractual obligations with his employer the applicant had accepted a ‘duty of 
loyalty’ towards the Catholic Church which ‘limited his freedom of expression to a 
certain extent.’119 Most importantly the Commission noted that similar obligations may 
also be agreed with other employers than the Catholic Church or its institutions and that 
the Commission permitted contractual obligations of this kind if they are freely entered 
into by the person concerned.
120
 
 
In Vogt v Germany
121
 the case involved the dismissal of a teacher who was a member of 
the German Communist party. The ECHR accepted that the dismissal was sufficient to 
constitute an interference with the teacher’s right to freedom of expression.  The decision 
                                                                                                                                                                     
2007) at 265. 
117 Glasenapp v Germany Application No. 9228/80, 49-50. The case involved a school teacher appointed 
with the status of a probationary civil servant. In undertaking the role she agreed (as required by German 
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at the school was terminated. Whilst the court agreed that there was not a right of recruitment to the Civil 
Service, it did however believe that members of the Civil Service maintained their right to Freedom of 
Expression basing their opinion on Articles 1 and 14 ECHR which stipulate that ‘everyone within the 
jurisdiction of the Contracting States must enjoy the rights and freedoms in Section 1 ‘without prejudice on 
any ground.’    
118 (1989) D & R 151. 
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did not deal explicitly with the position of employees, who ‘contract out their free speech 
rights,’122 this is effectively the premise that a person who chooses to undergo 
employment with a certain body, must then conduct themselves in keeping with the 
duties and needs of their employer. The cases of Rommelfanger and Vogt can be 
distinguished, in Rommelfanger, the employee of the hospital effectively gave a public 
display of disloyalty, whereas in Vogt membership of the German Communist Party 
constituted a personal expression of a differing viewpoint.    
 
The European Court of Human Rights identified in Ahmed v UK that regulations 
designed to prevent local government officers from engaging in political expression 
would be a proportionate restriction of art.10 rights, particularly where the system of 
government in question is historically based upon the need for politically impartial 
advisers.
123
 The reasoning in Ahmed v UK may be transposed to the position of Civil 
Servants working in Whitehall.  
 
The Strasbourg Court identified that the restriction would be within the domestic 
authorities’ margin of appreciation.124 The Court held that the local government system 
was reliant upon a relationship of trust between council members and their officers, 
whereby council officers are politically neutral and are loyal to the council as a whole. 
Members of the public: 
  “have a right to expect that those whom they voted into office 
will ‘discharge their mandate in accordance with the commitments they made during an 
electoral campaign and that the pursuit of that mandate will not founder on the political 
opposition of their members’ own advisers it is also to be noted that members of the 
public are equally entitled to expect that in their own dealings with local government 
departments they will be advised by politically neutral officers who are detached from 
                                                        
122 See L.Vickers, Freedom of Speech and Employment (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2002) 81. 
123 [1998] ECHR 78, para 63. 
124 Ibid, para 61. 
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the political fray.”125 
 
It will be identified later in this analysis that Crown Servants have obligations to be 
politically impartial; such obligations may inhibit the rights of those individuals to be 
active participants in democracy. Speech regarding disagreements on policy issues may 
give rise to accusations that the Crown servant is disagreeing with the decision taken for 
political reasons. By failing to carry out the wishes of the government of the day, the 
Crown servant may face accusations of disloyalty.  
 
By becoming a Crown servant involved in national security matters, the individual 
effectively waives the right to freedom of expression, at least in the context of disclosing 
information relating obtained during his employment.
126
 This was illustrated in a slightly 
different scenario to that of the ‘whistleblower.’ In Hajianastassiou v Greece127 the 
ECHR considered the case of a Greek Air Force officer who had originally written a 
missile assessment, classified secret for the Airforce.
 
 Later, he wrote an assessment of 
another missile for a private defence contractor. He was convicted and sentenced to five 
months imprisonment for unlawfully disclosing military secrets, despite arguing that the 
information was already published in widely available scientific publications and that the 
second assessment contained no information derived in the first. The ECHR stated that 
the conviction was justified under Article 10 (2) ECHR as it was “necessary in a 
democratic society,” this was regardless of the fact that the information had been 
published in scientific journals. It was considered sufficient that the first document had 
been classified as ‘secret.’ The information and nature of disclosure is irrelevant.  
                                                        
125 Above, n 123, para 53. 
126 For an interesting comparison see: Vereiging Rechtswinkels Utrecht v Netherlands 46 DR 200 (1986) 
Application 11308/84 EComHR it was held that there would be no interference by the state where an 
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The mere fact that the person entrusted with secret information makes an unauthorised 
disclosure is enough to make the person a future security risk. Where the employee owes 
a contractual duty of loyalty to his employer not to disclose information, the Court will 
be required to weigh up the competing interests. It will be identified in chapter four of 
this analysis that the Official Secrets Act 1989 does not provide sufficient scope for 
courts to accurately assess the public interest in disclosure against the public interest of 
non disclosure. Any disclosure of national security information is likely to be considered 
as damaging, regardless of the public benefit of the disclosure. This analysis will now 
turn to consider specific Strasburg jurisprudence relating to whistleblowing.  
 
1.7 Whistleblowing and Article 10 ECHR 
 
The question of whether ‘whistleblowing’ speech will be protected by Article 10 has 
been considered in recent decisions at Strasbourg. The case of Guja v Moldova
128
  is 
most relevant for the purposes of this analysis as it involved the actions of a public 
servant.  
 
The head of the Press Department of the Moldovan Prosecutor General’s Office made an 
unauthorised disclosure of two letters to the press. The letters contained information 
suggesting that the Moldovan Parliament had asserted pressure on the Prosecutor 
General to discontinue criminal proceedings against four police officers. Shortly after the 
letter was received by the Prosecutor General the charges against the officers were 
dropped. Guja contended that the letters The Prosecutor General’s Office dismissed Guja 
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on the basis that the letters were secret and that he had failed to seek prior authorisation 
before disclosure. Guja brought proceedings against the office seeking reinstatement on 
the grounds that the disclosure of the letters were not damaging, they were not 
confidential and had not been classified as secret. In conducting the proportionality test, 
the court developed a new framework for dealing with Article 10 claims involving 
whistleblowing. This framework will now be considered below. 
 
1.7.1 Whether the applicant had alternative channels for making the disclosure 
 
Firstly, the Court must ask whether the applicant had ‘alternative channels for making the 
disclosure.’129 Disclosure should therefore be made, in the first instance to the person’s 
superior or other competent authority or body. Public disclosure will only be justified ‘as 
a last resort’ where it would be ‘clearly impractical’ to raise concerns using the 
aforementioned methods.
130
 In conducting the proportionality test, the court must have 
regard to whether there were ‘any other effective means of remedying the wrongdoing’ 
which the individual intended to uncover.
131
  
 
It is submitted that post Guja v Moldova, a Court, in conducting the proportionality 
analysis, must place significant emphasis, not only on the existence of internal 
procedures, but also the effectiveness of those procedures. Inclusion of this consideration 
is highly significant. In R v Shayler, which pre-dates the decision in Guja, the House of 
Lords identified that David Shayler had a number of authorised channels available to 
raise his concerns but did not seek to test the effectiveness of those channels.
132
 
                                                        
129 Ibid, para 73. 
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132 Detailed treatment of the Shayler decision is provided in chapters four and six of this thesis. 
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The Council of Europe has argued that member states must have comprehensive 
arrangements for allowing employees to raise concerns and that these provisions should 
extend to members of the armed forces and security and intelligence services.
133
 This 
thesis will later identify that the effectiveness of available mechanisms in the United 
Kingdom may be called into question.  
 
1.7.2 The public interest in the disclosed information 
 
The court must have regard to the public interest involved in the disclosed information. 
The damage suffered by the public authority must be weighed against the interest of the 
public in having the information revealed. The Court identified that, in a democratic 
society, ‘acts or omissions must be subject to close scrutiny’ not only of the legislative 
and judicial authorities but also of the media and public.
134
 The interest of the public in 
the information concerned may therefore be ‘so strong as to override even a legally 
imposed duty of confidence.’135 The Strasbourg Court did not develop further what types 
of information may be considered in the public interest. Later in this section, the author 
will identify domestic jurisprudence which will be highly relevant to the proportionality 
analysis if conducted by a domestic court.  
 
1.7.3 The authenticity of the disclosed information 
 
The Court identified that the authenticity of the information disclosed will be relevant to 
                                                        
133 Council of Europe, Resolution 1979 ‘Protection of Whistleblowers’ 
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the balancing exercise. The Court suggested that it was open to the competent State 
authorities to ‘react appropriately and without excess to defamatory devoid of foundation 
or formulated in bad faith.’136 Ultimately, the individual who chooses to disclose the 
information must ‘carefully verify’ its contents ‘to the extent permitted by the 
circumstances’ to determine whether it is ‘accurate and reliable.’137 
 
1.7.4 The detriment to the Employer  
 
The Court identified that it must then weigh the damage suffered as a result of the 
disclosure in question and then must assess whether the ‘damage outweighed the interest 
of the public of having the information revealed.’138 The court identified that the ‘subject 
matter of the disclosure’ and the ‘nature of the administrative authority’ concerned may 
be relevant in this process.
139
  
 
1.7.5 Whether the applicant acted in good faith 
 
The Court found that it was important to establish that in making the disclosure ‘the 
individual acted in good faith and in the belief that the information was true and in the 
public to disclose it.’140 If the disclosure was motivated by a personal grievance or an 
expectation of personal advantage this would not justify a strong level of protection. 
Moreover, the Court held that it must consider whether ‘no other, more discreet means of 
remedying the wrongdoing’ were available.141  
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1.7.6 Severity of the Sanction  
 
Finally, the Court must consider the severity of the sanction imposed on the Applicant for 
making the disclosure.
142
 
 
1.7.7 Application of the framework to the Guja v Moldova decision and subsequent 
influence 
 
The Court found in favour of the Applicant. Guja’s motivation for disclosing the letters 
had been to help combat corruption in Moldova. It noted that the President of Moldova 
had campaigned against political interference with the criminal justice system. The 
letters were genuine and their disclosure shed considerable light on an issue which the 
public had a legitimate interest in being informed.
143
 The Court found that the decision to 
dismiss the applicant was a ‘very harsh measure.’144 The decision could also have a 
‘serious chilling effect’ on other Civil Servants and employees from raising concerns in 
the future.
145
 Most importantly, the ECtHR found that the Applicant did not have access 
to an effective alternative channel to make the disclosure.  
 
The test in Guja v Moldova was later adopted in the case of Heinisch v Germany.
146
 In 
Heinisch, the applicant worked in a home for the elderly. She had regularly attempted to 
raise concerns to management that they were short staffed and that this had had an 
impact on the level of care provided. After falling ill, the applicant made a criminal 
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complaint via her lawyer prompting the public prosecutor to investigate. Heinisch was 
later dismissed the applicant citing her repeated illness as a justification.  
 
The ECtHR identified that in conducting the proportionality test it must weigh up the 
employee’s right to freedom of expression ‘by signalling illegal conduct’ or wrongdoing 
on the part of the employer against the latter’s interests.147 The nature and extent of the 
duty of loyalty owed by an employee to their employer in a particular case will impact 
upon the weighing of those conflicting interests. The Court reiterated that as a 
consequence, concerns should first be raised to a person’s superior or other competent 
authority or body. It is only where this is clearly impractical that the information could 
be disclosed directly to the public.
148
 In the instant case, the Court held that the no other, 
more discreet means of remedying the situation available to her. Upholding her 
complaint, the Court held that the public interest in having information regarding the 
poor provision of care for the elderly by a state owned company was ‘so important in a 
democratic society that it outweighs the interest in protecting the employer’s business 
reputation and interests.’149  
 
1.8 Analysis of the ECHR approach to whistleblowing: Contribution to the Analytical 
Model 
 
It is submitted that the proportionality framework developed for whistleblowing cases is 
consistent with the political expression cases outlined above. Communication of matters 
of ‘serious concern’ directly to the public will be justified, as previously identified in 
Thorgierson v Iceland and Sunday Times v UK. The position is less clear, however, when 
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considering the communication of opinions or ideas, as per the justifications identified in 
Lingens v Austria. The communication of a policy decision which does not identify 
wrongdoing or illegality but is nevertheless a decision to which an employee does not 
agree, would be justified under the principles underlined in Lingens v Austria but may 
not be justified using the framework provided in Guja v Moldova. This is because the 
communication of such information may not be of a sufficiently high value to outweigh 
the competing interests of the employer.  
 
Vickers draws a distinction between ‘Watchdog Whistleblowing’ and ‘Protest 
Whistleblowing.’150 ‘Watchdog whistleblowing’ requires the individual to disclose 
misconduct or wrongdoing whereas ‘protest whistleblowing’ allows for the disclosure of 
information relating to lawful policies, on the basis that the individual raising the issues 
has the necessary experience to provide an opinion that the policy complained of is the 
wrong course of action.  
 
The difficulty with ‘protest whistleblowing’ is that it may lead to accusations that the 
individual concerned is engaging in an overtly political act. Employees of the United 
Kingdom Civil Service are required to be ‘a-political’ dependent upon their requisite 
level of employment. Those involved in ‘industrial’ and ‘non-office’ grades are 
identified as ‘politically free’ individuals, whereas those working in the politically 
contentious offices of Whitehall must follow the restrictions imposed by the Civil 
Service Management Code. Most importantly, for the purposes of this analysis, 
paragraph 4.4 requires Civil Servants to not ‘speak in public on matters of national 
political controversy; expressing views on such matters in letters to the press, or in 
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books, articles or leaflets.’151 Similarly, paragraph 14 of the Civil Service Code requires 
Civil Servants to be ‘political impartial.’ The restrictions are arguably consistent with the 
principles established in the Vogt and Rommelfanger decisions, in that Civil Servants 
upon entering employment must agree to a restriction, at least in part, of their art.10 
rights.
152
   
 
In discussing political speech, Vickers suggests that ‘in order to serve its purpose of 
contributing to the democratic process’ it ‘requires publicity,’ therefore, the ‘only 
suitable channel for communication of the ideas will be external to the employer.’153 The 
communication of protest whistleblowing may not be justified under the framework 
provided in Guja v Moldova, as the applicant is expected to use internal channels and to 
only communicate the information to the public directly ‘as a last resort.’ The Court will 
inevitably question whether the individual who disagreed with a policy position 
attempted to make his misgivings heard to colleagues or superiors before raising the 
concerns externally.  
 
It is submitted that a solution is required to appropriately address the distinction between 
so-called ‘watchdog whistleblowing’ and ‘protest whistleblowing.’ Currently, the Public 
Interest Disclosure Act 1998 would afford protections to ‘watchdog whistleblowers’ but 
would not protect ‘protest whistleblowers.’ It is argued that ‘watchdog whistleblowing’ 
primarily concerns the expression of fact judgements. This reasoning is consistent with 
the requirement in the Guja decision that the applicant ‘proves the authenticity of the 
information.’ ‘Watchdog whistleblowing’ is consistent with the theoretical justifications 
                                                        
151 The Code can be accessed at the following link: http://www.civilservice.gov.uk/about/resources/civil-
service-management-code (accessed 04/01/12). 
152See also: Ahmed v Uk [1998] ECHR 78, para 63. 
153 Above, n 6, 56. 
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outlined in the first part of this chapter, namely that such information may enhance the 
public good and may lead to truth. Whilst whistleblowing may be justified as an act of 
autonomy, it is submitted that it ultimately benefits the public interest.  
 
In contrast, ‘protest whistleblowing’ primarily concerns the expression of value 
judgements. Proof of the authenticity of such information is not required. Whilst the 
opinion of an informed individual may be highly beneficial to some members of the 
public, it may not be of as much value to others.  In applying the theoretical justifications, 
the act of protest whistleblowing may primarily serve the right to autonomy by allowing 
the individual to be an open participant in political debate.  
 
One must consider whether it is appropriate to use the proportionality framework 
developed in the Guja v Moldova decision for assessing an act of ‘protest 
whistleblowing.’ It is submitted that, the Court should first identify the applicant’s 
motivation for the speech. If the applicant was motivated by the desire to engage in 
political debate but not to raise an issue he believed to be wrongdoing, proportionality 
balancing using the established political expression cases should be used and 
counterbalanced against the competing interests of the employer. Where the applicant 
alleges wrongdoing the test in Guja v Moldova should be applied.  
 
It is submitted that in ‘watchdog whistleblowing’ cases, domestic courts should now 
consider and apply the Guja v Moldova test as per the obligations indentified in s.6 
Human Rights Act and the interpretative provision set out in s.2 Human Rights Act 
1998. Whilst it should be noted that domestic courts are afforded a margin of 
appreciation when considering the jurisprudence of the ECtHR, it has been identified in 
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R (Ullah) v Special Adjudicator
154
  that whilst decisions of the Strasbourg court are ‘not 
strictly binding’ domestic courts should identify special circumstances for not applying 
the principles.
155
 In conducting the proportionality analysis domestic courts will need to 
consider whether the public interest in disclosure and counter arguments for non 
disclosure. Domestic courts are most likely to identify existing common law principles to 
assist in this analysis. The next session will consider domestic jurisprudence.  
 
1.9 Domestic jurisprudence: What information may be disclosed the Public Interest? 
 
Prior to the enactment of the Human Rights Act, defining what constituted the public 
interest proved problematical for the courts. In B & C v A
156
 the Court of Appeal stated 
that it was impossible to provide a uniform definition as the ‘Circumstances in any 
particular case under consideration can vary so much that a judgement in one case is 
unlikely to be decisive in another case.’157   
 
The case of Gartside v Outram established that there is no confidence in the disclosure 
of iniquity.
158
 This reasoning was further extended in Lion Laboratories v Evans and 
Others to provide that publication of confidential information would be acceptable in 
situations where it could be proved that there was a serious and legitimate interest in the 
information being disclosed to the public domain.
159
 In Bellof v Pressdram the Court 
further attempted to define a defence of public interest in breach of confidence cases:  
“…Must be disclosure justified in the public interest, of matters carried out or 
contemplated, in breach of the country’s security, or in breach of the law, including 
                                                        
154 [2004] UKHL 26. 
155 Considered further in Chapter 3 of this thesis.  
156 [2002] EWCA Civ 337. 
157 Ibid. 
158 (1856) 26 LJ Ch 114 
159 [1985] Q.B. 526, para 534. 
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statutory duty, fraud or otherwise destructive of the country or its people, including 
matters medically dangerous to the public; and doubtless other misdeeds of similar 
gravity.”160 
 
In Initial Services v Putterill Lord Denning focussed upon the disclosure of information, 
noting the significance of the recipient of the information. He opined that the disclosure 
should be to a person who has a ‘proper interest to receive the information.’ He 
suggested that it would be appropriate to disclose a crime to the police and that also there 
may be ‘some cases where the misdeed is of such a character that the public interest may 
demand, or at least excuse, publication on a broader field, even to the press.’161 
 
In D v National Society for the prevention of Cruelty to Children,
162
 the plaintiff was 
subject to an inaccurate complaint lodged with the N.S.P.C.C. She sought disclosure of 
the identity of the complainant and any documents relating to the complaint with the aim 
of seeking damages against the N.S.P.C.C. In allowing the order Lord Diplock indicated 
that the private confidentiality agreement made between individuals must give way to 
‘the general public interest that in the administration of justice truth will out, unless by 
reason of the character of the informant, a more important public interest is served by 
protecting the information or the identity of the informant from disclosure in a court of 
law.’163 
 
In Marks v Beyfus
164
 it was indicated that if the identities of police informant were able 
to be disclosed in a prosecution, the number of persons assisting the police with 
                                                        
160 Beloff v Pressdram Ltd [1973] 1 All ER 241, para 260. 
161 Initial Services Ltd v Putterill [1968] 1 Q.B. 396, 405-406. 
162  Ibid 
163  Ibid at 218 
164  (1890) 25 QBD 494. 
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information on criminal activity would be dramatically reduced, preventing the police 
from effectively performing their duties, contrary to the public interest.
165
 However, it 
was later confirmed in R v Agar
166
 that disclosure of a police informant’s identity could 
be necessary in order to enable to defendant to argue that he had been set up by both the 
police and the informant. This was dependant on the nature of the defendant’s defence in 
each case. Mustill L.J. drew emphasis on the fact that whilst there was a strong public 
interest in not revealing the identities of informants, there was a greater requirement in 
ensuring that the accused put forward his defence, although he did concede that the 
position might alter if the defence put forward was ‘doomed to failure.’167 
 
1.9.1 Private Information and the Public Interest 
 
The right to an individual’s freedom of expression becomes more difficult to justify 
when the information concerned does not appear to be in the public interest, but is rather 
of interest to the public. A conflict between the individual’s art.10 rights and the art.8 
rights of the subject of the information communicated is likely to arise where an 
individual chooses to criticise an individual in a position of authority, as opposed to 
criticising the conduct of an organisation as a whole. Rigorous analysis of the conflicting 
rights has been a necessary consequence of the emergence of a new area of law, the 
misuse of private information. 
 
The European Court of Human Rights recognised in the case of Von Hannover v 
                                                        
165  Ibid at 498 per Lord Escher M.R. See also Y.Cripps, The Legal Implications of Disclosure in The Public 
Interest (Second Edition, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1994). 
166  (1989) 90 Cr.App.R.318. 
167 Ibid. 
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Germany that public officials have a right to a private life.
168
 The Court defined ‘public 
figures’ as ‘all those who play a role in public life, whether in politics, the economy, the 
arts, the social sphere, sport or any other domain.’ It identified that certain facts relating 
to the private lives of public figures, particularly politicians may be of interest to 
citizens, and as a consequence, may be legitimate for readers ‘who are also voters,’ to be 
‘informed of those facts.’169  
 
The Court identified that it was necessary to balance the competing interests between the 
right to respect for one’s private life and the right to freedom of expression. Most 
importantly, for the purposes of this study, the Court held that a ‘fundamental 
distinction’ needed to be made between reporting facts capable of ‘contributing to a 
debate in a democratic society relating to politicians in the exercise of their functions’ 
and reporting details of the private life of a person who does not exercise official 
functions.
170
  
 
Whilst the Court placed emphasis on the fact that the applicant did not hold an official 
function, it identified that politicians would also be entitled to a private life. The Court 
held that a ‘decisive factor’ in balancing the competing interests of art.8 and art.10 
should lie in the contribution that the published photographs and accompanying articles 
make to ‘a debate of general interest.’171 In the instant case, it considered that the 
photographs and articles related exclusively to the applicant’s private life.172   
 
                                                        
168 Von Hannover v Germany (2004) (Application no. 59320/00). Note that at the time of writing the 
decision was due to be heard by the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights.  
169 Ibid, 9. 
170 Ibid, 63.  
171 Ibid, 76. 
172 Ibid, 77. 
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It is submitted that domestic the domestic jurisprudence of most value to this study 
concerns individuals who are identified as ‘public figures.’ Particular reference is given 
to cases whereby the conduct of those individuals has been called into question, whether 
those individuals may be considered ‘role models’ and whether such information should 
be disclosed to correct a false impression.   
 
Prior to the Human Rights Act 1998 coming into force, in Woodward v Hutchins, the case 
involved alleged sexual activities concerning a pop star travelling on a passenger plane. 
An employee who was subject to a confidentiality agreement sought to disclose the 
information to a newspaper.
173
 Lord Denning identified that if a group of people aimed to 
seek publicity which is to their advantage they then ‘cannot complain if a servant or 
employee of theirs afterwards discloses the truth about them, if the image which they 
fostered was not a true image, it is in the public interest that it should be corrected.’174 
Bridge L.J. further supported this position by suggesting that ‘those who seek and 
welcome publicity of every kind so long as it shows them in a favourable light are no 
position to complain of an invasion of their privacy by publicity which shows them in an 
unfavourable light.’175  
 
In Theakston v MGN Ltd, a well known television personality had been photographed, 
without his consent, whilst attending a brothel. Following the visit Theakston received 
text messages informing him that prostitutes working at the brothel intended to go to the 
press and would do so unless he paid them money.
 176
 The prostitutes took their story to 
the Sunday People newspaper and Theakston sought an injunction to prevent publication 
                                                        
173 [1997] 1 WLR 760.  
174 Ibid 763. 
175 Above, n 172,765. 
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of the details of his activities at the brothel and also the photographs. During the course of 
proceedings, Mr Justice Ouseley made a distinction between the different forms of 
relationships where sexual activity could occur, identifying marital relationships and 
unmarried but long term partnerships, to extra marital relationships, long and short term 
to one night stands and ‘fleeting encounters with prostitutes.177 Intimate physical 
relations, he opined, could occur in a range of places from ‘a private house to a hotel 
bedroom, to a car in a secluded spot, to a nightclub or a brothel.’178 Ouseley L.J. 
suggested that the nature of the relationship, the nature of the activity, the circumstances 
in which it took place, and the individual personalities engaged  was significant to 
identifying the quality of confidence.  
 
Ouseley L.J. identified that there was a ‘real element of public interest’ in publishing the 
details of Theakston’s activities. Theakston was employed by the BBC as a presenter on 
‘Top of the Pops’ which was made available to younger viewers. Ousley L.J. suggested 
that whilst he was not ‘presented as a role model’ the nature of his job in presenting 
programmes to a younger audience meant that his lifestyle would be generally considered 
‘harmless if followed.’179 Theakston’s activities, he stated, were likely to make his 
viewers and parents of views act differently towards him. Ousley L.J. held that the free 
press was entitled to communicate the information so that that the general public could 
make up its own mind. Ousley L.J. held that there was no public interest in the 
publication of the photographs which if published would constitute a ‘deeply humiliating 
and damaging’ intrusion into Theakston’s personal life.  
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In Campbell v MGN, Naomi Campbell brought proceedings against the Mirror 
newspaper after it published photographs of the supermodel leaving a Narcotics 
Anonymous meeting alongside the headline ‘Naomi: I’m a Drug Addict.’ The Court 
identified that Campbell was a public figure who had made ‘very public false statements’ 
that she had not taken drugs, it was these falsehoods which the newspaper argued had 
made it justifiable for a newspaper to report the fact that she was addicted to drugs.
180
  
Lord Hoffman identified that had Campbell been an ‘ordinary citizen’ with a drug 
addiction the case would have been different. Campbell had sought publicity about 
various aspects of her private life.
181
 He opined that whilst freedom of expression 
constitutes one of the ‘essential foundations of a democratic society and one of the basic 
conditions do its progress and the self-fulfilment of each individual’ there were ‘no 
political or democratic values at stake’ in the instant case.182 
 
Baroness Hale identified that there are different types of speech which may qualify for 
protection, some of which are ‘more deserving than others.’183 She suggested that 
political speech was at the ‘top of that list.’ The ‘free exchange of information and ideas 
on matters relevant to the organisation’ of the ‘economic, social and political life of the 
country’ was crucial to democratic society.184 Such political speech, she opined could 
include revealing information about ‘public figures – especially those in elected office – 
which would otherwise be private but is relevant to their participation in public life.’185 
Baroness Hale identified that intellectual and educational speech was also important in 
society in order to aid an individual to develop ‘to play a full part in society and 
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182 Above, n 179, para 117. 
183 Above, n 179, para 148. 
184 Above, n 179. 
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democratic life. For similar reasons, she suggested artistic speech and expression was 
also important to foster individual originality and creativity for a ‘free-thinking and 
dynamic society.’186 
 
Baroness Hale identified that it was difficult to make any of the aforementioned claims 
in the instant case. The ‘political and social life of the community’ was not assisted by 
‘pouring over the intimate details of a fashion model’s private life.’187 The newspaper 
had sought co-operation with Campbell to run the story, however this was refused.
188
 
 
Baroness Hale identified that the newspaper were justified in revealing the private 
information without Campbell’s consent.189 Campbell had presented herself to the public 
as a person who was not involved in drug taking. If Campbell was to be ‘admired and 
emulated’ as a role model then it was important to correct this false impression. The 
‘possession and use of illegal drugs’ is a criminal offence and is ‘a matter of serious 
public concern.’ The press must therefore ‘be free to expose the truth and put the record 
straight.’190 
 
The Court, however, held that Campbell’s right to privacy outweighed the right to 
journalist’s right to freedom of expression. The publication of photographs clearly 
showing Campbell leaving a Narcotics Anonymous meeting in a well known area were 
considered to be unnecessary and intrusive. Had the photographs identified Campbell 
merely walking in a public place the outcome would have been different.
191
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In Mosley v News Group Newspapers
192
, the News of the World published a front-page 
story alleging that Mosley had taken part in sexual activities with five prostitutes and 
alleged that there had been a ‘Nazi’ theme to the encounter. Various photographs of 
Mosley accompanied the article and an edited video of the event was also made available 
on the newspaper’s website. The photographs and video had both been covertly recorded 
by one of the participants who had made a secret deal with the News of the World to sell 
the story. Mosley brought legal proceedings against News Group International, owners 
of the News of the World, for misuse of private information. He did not dispute that the 
sexual activities had taken place but contested the existence of the alleged Nazi theme. In 
addition, he sought an injunction to restrain the footage being made available on the 
newspaper’s website. 
 
Eady J identified that it had been recognised in Campbell that there could be a genuine 
public interest in the disclosure of the existence of a sexual relationship if such a 
relationship resulted in a situation giving rise to favouritism or corruption.
193
 Yet the 
addition of ‘salacious details’ or ‘intimate photographs’ would be disproportionate and 
unacceptable and would be too intrusive even if they accompanied a legitimate 
disclosure of the relationship.
194
 Public figures are entitled to a private and personal life, 
a notion of privacy which extends beyond sexual relationships to include personal 
relationships more generally.
195
 People’s sex lives are to be regarded as essentially their 
own business – provided at least that the participants are genuinely consenting adults and 
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there is no question of exploiting the young or vulnerable.
196
 
 
With regard to the public interest in reporting the story, Eady J. noted that the Claimant, 
in his role as president of the FIA had to deal with many people of all races and religion 
and has previously spoken out against racism in sport.
197
 Eady J. identified that there 
could be a public interest in the secret filming and subsequent publication of behaviour 
which involved ‘mocking the way Jews were treated’ or ‘parodying Holocaust horror’ 
where the claimant was accountable to an organisation and his behaviour could call his 
role into question.
198
 Ultimately, he opined that where the law is not breached, the 
private conduct of adults is ‘essentially no-one else’s business.’ The fact that a particular 
relationship happens to be adulterous, or that someone’s tastes are unconventional or 
perverted did not give the media carte blanche.
199
  
 
Eady J. found that the evidence did not support the conclusion that there was a Nazi 
theme to the event. He identified that the material had been properly checked for Nazi 
content and that the German dialogue in the footage had not been translated.
200
 Eady J. 
found that the journalist and editor’s general assessment ‘in the round’ could not be 
satisfactory given the gravity of the allegations and the devastating impact that the 
publication would have on those involved.
201
 Eady J. focussed on the reasoning in Terry 
v LNS, whereby the court identified:  
 
 “…the fact that conduct is private and lawful is not, of itself, conclusive of the 
question whether or not it is in the public interest that it be discouraged. There is no 
suggestion that the present case ought to be unlawful…but in a plural society there will 
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be some who would suggest that it ought to be discouraged.”202  
  
In the recent decision of Ferdinand v MGN Ltd the decision concerned a well known 
football player who brought an action against the Sunday Mirror after the newspaper 
published an article and interview with a former acquaintance to which it was claimed 
Ferdinand had had an affair.
203
 The alleged affair had taken place whilst Ferdinand was in 
a long term relationship with another women whom he fathered a child and later married. 
The action was significant as Ferdinand had been appointed England captain after John 
Terry had lost the position following his widely reported infidelity. Ferdinand had 
previously given a lengthy interview to the News of the World whereby he suggested that 
he was a reformed character and no longer a ‘football bad boy’ following settling down 
with his girlfriend. In conducting the parallel analysis between art.8 and art.10 Lord 
Justice Nichol identified that there was a public interest in publishing the article, even 
though the interviewee had been paid to provide the story, the claimant had, in a previous 
interview, wished to portray himself as a reformed character. Ultimately, the matter 
turned on the fact that he had portrayed an image of himself in the earlier article and 
‘whilst that image persisted’ there was a ‘public interest in demonstrating that the image 
was false.’204  
 
   
The Mosley case should be contrasted with the later decision in Ferdinand. In Mosley, 
once it was identified that that ‘Nazi’ accusation was no longer justifiable, the claimant’s 
sexual activities were not sufficient to constitute information in the public interest. The 
key distinction between the two cases is that it was held in Ferdinand that he had 
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deliberately painted a false and misleading image to the public. In Mosley this 
consideration did not arise.  
 
Post Ferdinand, it is submitted that information relating to a sexual relationship will be 
more likely considered as a matter for the public interest when balancing the competing 
rights. It is submitted that a politician who gives the impression of a family man or a man 
who claims family values when the reality is quite different is less likely to tip the 
balance in favour of the protection of privacy. Using the aforementioned privacy 
jurisprudence it is submitted that a whistleblower may be justified in revealing 
information relating to a personal matter if the disclosure of which is necessary to correct 
a false impression. It is submitted, that such information may be of a lower value to 
information which highlights serious wrongdoing or illegality in government. The public 
interest in the disclosure may be heightened if the personal matter in question has an 
impact on the conduct of the individual in public life. An example of this conduct may 
include circumstances whereby a minister engaged in an extra marital affair with a 
member of his staff and then promoted the person, thus giving the individual an unfair 
advantage over colleagues, thus bypassing procedures relating to fair recruitment and 
promotion.  
 
In whistleblowing cases involving information considered to be of a private or personal 
nature, it is submitted that it may be necessary for the Court to engage in a parallel 
analysis of the competing rights of the right to private and family life afforded by article 
8 and the right to freedom of expression afforded by article 10. The court must first 
consider whether the applicant enjoys a reasonable expectation of privacy in respect of 
the information which is intended to be published. If this is determined, the courts must 
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then, secondly, balance the competing Convention rights against each other in the parallel 
analysis. Guidance on the parallel analysis was provided by Lord Steyn in Re S: 
First, neither article has as such precedence over the other. Secondly, where the 
values under the two articles are in conflict, an intense focus on the comparative 
importance of the specific rights being claimed in the individual case is necessary. 
Thirdly, the justifications for interfering with or restricting each right must be taken into 
account. Finally, the proportionality test must be applied to each.
205
 
 
This approach clearly identifies that domestic courts will not grant presumptive priority 
to either Convention right, and the value of both privacy and free speech will be equally 
scrutinised when they are structurally balanced against each other.  
 
It is submitted that in cases applying the Guja v Moldova framework for assessing 
proportionality, domestic courts will need to adapt the test to take into account the 
competing privacy interest afforded by art.8. It is submitted that the correct approach in 
such a case would be for the Court to first apply the ‘new methodology’ test established 
in Re S. Second the court should apply the Guja v Moldova framework. However, in 
considering whether it should be in the public interest to disclose the information an 
‘intense focus’ will be required to balance art.10 against art.8. It is submitted that it 
would not be sufficient to just consider the detriment to the employer in cases where 
privacy rights are engaged. A new category should therefore be included to consider the 
‘detriment caused to individuals’ as a result of the disclosure. 
 
In considering the detriment caused to the employer, it is submitted that domestic courts 
will need to provide focus as to the justifications for keeping official information secret. 
The next section will consider matters specific to the operation of government. 
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1.9.2 Matters specific to the operation of Government 
 
Government departments may decide to withhold the release of information relating to 
the formulation of government policy or other aspects of the decision-making process. 
The justification for doing so stems from the need to maintain the longstanding doctrine 
of collective responsibility and to allow for ‘candour’ – the frank and open discussion of 
ideas without fear of inhibition. According to the convention of Cabinet collective 
responsibility, members of Cabinet must: 
“Publically support all Government decisions made in Cabinet, even if they do 
not privately agree with them and may have argued in Cabinet against their adoption. 
They must also preserve the confidentiality of the Cabinet debate that led to the 
decision.”206 
 
 
The purpose of the doctrine is to essentially allow ‘Ministers to consider and test policy 
in robust debate’ without fear that their decisions would be ‘criticised by political 
opponents or a hostile media.’207  
 
In AG v Jonathan Cape Ltd
208
 an attempt was made to prevent the publication of Richard 
Crossman’s diaries on the ground that they contained confidential information of Cabinet 
discussions.  Lord Widgery considered the public interest in disclosing the information 
to the public domain against the public interest in maintaining the doctrine of collective 
responsibility, which entails the ability of Ministers to speak frankly and receive and 
make decisions on the advice Civil Servants without the possibility of the details of such 
                                                        
206 See further, Information Tribunal decision at para 38, 
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%20L 
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discussions from reaching the public domain.
209
It was argued that, in allowing such 
information to reach the public domain, ministers would not feel free to discuss matters 
frankly, and that this would therefore be harmful to the public interest.
210
  
 
Lord Widgery focused upon amount of time which had passed since the discussions were 
first documented; in this case eleven years had passed. He then stated that the Attorney-
General must show ‘(a) that such publication would be a breach of confidence; (b) that 
the public interest requires that the publication be restrained, and (c) that there are no 
other facts of the public interest contradictory of and more compelling than that relied 
upon’211 and that the Court must then ‘closely examine to which relief is necessary to 
ensure that restrictions are not imposed beyond the strict requirement of public need.’212 
 
There was a clear breach of confidence in this case; however the fact that the information 
was eleven years old meant that the ‘confidential character’ of the information had 
‘lapsed.’213 Perhaps most importantly Lord Widgery was unconvinced that the Attorney 
General had made out a case that the public interest required such a Draconian remedy 
when due regard is had to other public interests, such as the freedom of speech.
214
Lord 
Widgery clearly distinguished between different types of information discussed in 
Cabinet meetings. He identified that: 
  “Secrets relating to national security may require to be preserved 
indefinitely. Secrets relating to new taxation proposals may be of the highest importance 
until Budget day, but public knowledge thereafter. To leak a Cabinet decision a day or so 
before it is officially announced is an accepted exercise in public relations, but to 
identify the Ministers who voted one way or another is objectionable because it 
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undermines the doctrine of joint responsibility.”215 
 
It is submitted that the aforementioned comment by Lord Widgery may run counter to 
many of the theoretical justifications for the right to freedom of expression. In particular, 
the right to communicate the identity of Ministers who voted in favour of an illegal 
policy may be justified to obtain truth and may be the information an electorate in a 
democratic society needs to determine why such a decision was reached and whether 
such individuals should be elected into positions of power in the future. A countervailing 
theoretical argument for secrecy such as that proposed by Fenster would identify that the 
disclosure of the identities of Ministers and how they voted on a particular position may 
lead to a ‘panopticised state’ where individuals are afraid to make decisions.  
 
Judicial arguments for justifying candour in official decision making were considered at 
length in the case of Burmah Oil Co Ltd v Bank of England.
216
 Lord Wilberforce 
considered the public interest in keeping the information private, in particular he focused 
upon the need for candour in communication between those concerned with the business 
of policy making. He identified that: 
  “To remove protection from revelation in court in this case at least could 
well deter frank and full expression in similar cases in the future… another such ground 
is to protect from inspection by possible critics the inner workings of government while 
forming important government policy.
217” 
 
Later, in Air Canada and others v Secretary of State for Trade and another (2)
218
 Lord 
Wilberforce again opined that familiar contentions were put forward as to the need to 
protect [cabinet decisions] against disclosure in the interest of the confidentiality of the 
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inner workings of government and of the free and candid expressions of views.
219
 
 
The author will identify later in this thesis that despite advancements following passage 
of the Freedom of Information Act 2000, members of the public continue to encounter 
difficulty in accessing information and are denied access to the ‘inner circle.’ One must 
consider whether whistleblowers are the best persons to provide such access.  
 
It is submitted that in order to balance the competing interests between the need to 
maintain candour and open government, concerns raised by whistleblowers regarding the 
identities of decision makers and Civil Servant advisers should only be justified where 
the information concerned is of a high value to the advancement of the public interest 
and debate and truth.  
 
The disclosure of information which identifies that a Cabinet Minister who decided to 
vote in favour of a policy in private and then later so vehemently opposes it in public 
would be therefore be justifiable as evidence to correct a false impression. The disclosure 
of information regarding wrongdoing or illegality would also be justified. In contrast, the 
disclosure of information relating to routine policy decision making should not be 
justified. Such information, if disclosed, would make a limited contribution to public 
debate.  
 
Whilst the disclosure of such information may be beneficial to a minority of individuals, 
whom may be affected by the decision, it may be outweighed by a countervailing 
argument that candour is required to allow the free and frank exchange of views and 
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uninhabited decision making. Routine disclosure would inevitably lead to the 
‘panopticised’ extreme identified by Bentham resulting in an inevitable breakdown of 
the machinery of government.  As Shauer identifies, public citizens are sovereign but 
confer power to elected representatives to carry out actions in their name.
220
 It is 
therefore necessary, in a democratic society, to allow those representatives when making 
decisions beneficial to society, to do so without inhibition. The next section will consider 
national security as a justification for restricting the disclosure of information and 
whether the disclosure of national security information by a whistleblower may be 
justified.  
 
1.9.3 National Security  
 
In The Zamora, Lord Parker suggested that; 
“Those who are responsible for the national security must be the sole judges of 
what the national security requires. It would be obviously undesirable that such matters 
should be made the subject of evidence in a Court of law or otherwise discussed in 
public.”221 
 
Later in Council for Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service, Lord Roskill 
identified that it was for the Government, not the courts to determine whether the 
requirements of national security outweigh the duty of fairness in any particular case. 
The ‘government alone’ had access to the necessary information, and he suggested that 
the judicial process was unsuitable for reaching decisions on national security.
222
  
 
The question of whether information pertaining to national security may be disclosed by 
a whistleblower was considered in A G v Guardian (2) whereby the House of Lords 
                                                        
220 Above, n 12. 
221 [1916] 2 AC 77, 107.  
222[1984] 3 All ER 935, 28. 
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engaged in a lengthy balancing exercise in order to determine what constitutes the public 
interest. The case concerned the government’s attempt to suppress publication of 
‘Spycatcher’ the memoirs of a former MI5 employee, Peter Wright. Lord Goff 
highlighted that in a free society there was ‘a continuing public interest that the workings 
of government should be open to scrutiny and criticism.’223 Lord Griffiths conceded that 
if an employee of the Security Service discovered malpractice ‘detrimental to the 
national interest,’ and he was unable to ‘persuade any senior members of his service or 
any members of the establishment, or the police, to do anything about it,’ then he should 
be ‘relieved of his duty of confidence so that he could alert his fellow citizens to the 
impending danger.’ 224 
 
 Despite the assertion by Lord Griffiths that such information may be disclosed in the 
public interest where internal avenues have failed, the law remains clear. If an employee 
or former employee of the intelligence community were to breach confidence they may 
receive protection. However, the employee may still be liable to prosecution for an 
offence of unauthorised disclosure. It will be indentified later in this thesis that the 
Official Secrets Act 1989 does not contain a public interest defence. Moreover, the Act 
does not provide sufficient scope for courts to test the public interest value of the speech 
communicated something which is vital to maintaining the spirit of Article 10. In R v 
Shayler, Lord Bingham identified that a system which ‘favours official authorisation 
before disclosure’ and which is subject to ‘judicial review on grounds of proportionality’ 
was ‘within the margin of discretion which ought to be accorded to the legislature.’225 
Yet, the comments of Lord Roskill outlined above in the CCSU decision identify the 
                                                        
223 Attorney General v Guardian Newspapers Ltd (No 2)  [1998] 3 WLR 776, 807, Lord Griffiths found that 
no such considerations arose in the instant case.”  
224 Ibid, 795. 
225 [2002] UKHL 22, 83. 
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reluctance of the courts to intervene in national security matters. Post Human Rights Act 
1998, the courts are required, as a public authority (s.6) must act compatibly with 
convention rights. Whilst the proportionality test should be the appropriate standard of 
review for all decisions involving Convention rights, it should be noted that domestic 
institutions have traditionally been afforded a wide margin of appreciation where 
national security is concerned.  
 
Lord Bingham, in the Shayler case, justified his position by suggesting that ‘however 
well intentioned’ the employee or former employee may be he may not be ‘equipped 
with sufficient information to understand the potential impact of the disclosure’ which 
may cause ‘far more damage than the person making the disclosure was ever in a 
position to anticipate.’226It is submitted that the consequences of the disclosure of 
national security material may be harmful to the safety and public security of citizens. 
However, it will be identified later in this thesis that the widely drafted Official Secrets 
Act 1989 carries the potential to protect information not only harmful to the public 
interest but also information which may be more harmful to government or ministerial 
interests than national security. 
 
Aftergood suggests that there are three distinct categories of government secrecy. The 
first, he calls “genuine national security secrecy,” this aims to protect information which 
could pose an ‘identifiable threat to the security of the nation’ by compromising its 
defence or foreign relations and may include information about current military 
operational plans, identities of intelligence sources or confidential diplomatic 
initiatives.
227
 The second category, according to Aftergood, often ‘masks itself as 
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government secrecy’ so-called “bureaucratic secrecy” whereby the state ‘hoards 
information’ either ‘out of convenience’ or a ‘dim suspicion that disclosure is 
intrinsically riskier than non disclosure.’ The third category he identifies as “political 
secrecy” whereby classification authority is ‘used for political advantage.’ This, 
Aftergood argues, ‘exploits the genuine national security interests’ in order to ‘advance a 
self-serving agenda’ to ‘evade controversy, or to thwart accountability’ and in the 
extreme can ‘conceal violations of the law’ and threaten ‘the integrity of the political 
process itself.’ 
 
It is submitted that disclosures relating to genuine national security information may be 
justified where the information ordinarily protected by the Official Secrets Act 1989 is of 
a high value to the public interest. Such high value information may include a situation 
whereby a confidential diplomatic initiative includes an agreement to conduct illegal 
extraordinary rendition between nation states. Any disclosure of this ‘first category’ 
information must be counterbalanced against a competing argument that such 
information would be harmful to individuals. Applying the theoretical perspective 
adopted by Dworkin, a limitation of speech must be justified by a ‘clear and substantial 
risk’ to individuals. Therefore, the disclosure of the existence of a policy authorising 
extraordinary rendition may be justified, but the disclosure of the policy document itself 
identifying the names of operatives may not.  
 
The disclosure of bureaucratic secrecy may be less easy to justify. Routine leaks of 
routine bureaucratic secrecy may damage the ability of the security and intelligence 
services to remain ‘secret.’ The consequences of leaked material which is of a low value 
contribution to public debate may lead to a loss of confidence in the services. Lord 
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Nicholls argued in Attorney General v Blake and another that it was ‘of paramount 
importance’ that members of the services and those recruited as informers should ‘have 
complete confidence’ in their dealings with each other. Breaching that confidence, he 
suggested would, undermine ‘the willingness of prospective informers to co-operate with 
the services,’ and the ‘trust between members of the services when engaged on secret 
and dangerous operations’ which would ‘jeopardise the effectiveness of the service.’228 
 
1.10 Development of an Analytical Methodology    
 
The purpose of this chapter has been to identify the theoretical and legal justifications for 
whistleblowing. The chapter has, where appropriate, identified circumstances where 
unauthorised disclosure or whistleblowing directly to the public may not be justified. In 
order to accurately assess the material in this thesis it is therefore necessary to develop 
two analytical frameworks. The first will be referred to as the ‘Theoretical Framework’ 
and will concern information discussed in the first part of this chapter. The second will be 
called the ‘Legal Framework.’ It will focus on information discussed in the second part of 
the chapter. The principle motivation will be to assess whether the current laws and 
material discussed is compliant with Article 10 values and, where appropriate, the test 
provided in Guja v Moldova.  
 
As proportionality balancing requires a thorough determination of the public interest in 
any material disclosed, the author will then propose three categories of information, 
based upon existing case law principles, to ascertain the potential value of the disclosure 
of such information. As the test in Guja v Moldova requires an assessment of the 
                                                        
228 [2000] UKHL 45. 
 81 
 
 
detriment to the employer, a countervailing justification for non-disclosure of the 
information will be provided for each category.  
 
 
1.10.1 Theoretical Framework  
 
It is submitted that the argument from moral autonomy provides a strong justification for 
the right of individuals to raise concerns, in particular the right to make unauthorised 
disclosures of official information. In exercising his right to moral autonomy, the 
individual would not feel inhibited by social norms, legal restrictions or contractual 
obligations. The difficulty with the argument is that by bypassing the restrictions placed 
upon the individual as an employee or a citizen in democratic society, the argument fails 
to consider the practical realities of modern life. Upon entering employment, Crown 
servants agree to abide by rules of conduct in relation to political activities, legal 
obligations in relation to the law of confidence and the Official Secrets Acts, and the 
implied contractual term, existing in all contracts of employment that the employer and 
employee will treat each other with mutual concern and respect. Failure to abide by the 
aforementioned restrictions is likely to result in the Civil Servant losing his employment, 
or being prosecuted under the Official Secrets Acts.  
 
The argument that whistleblowing communication enhances the individual may be more 
easily justified. The communication of a political policy which is legal and which does 
not identify wrongdoing may still be justified to allow the individual to become a 
participant in political debate. The arguments from moral autonomy and to enhance the 
individual share close similarities in that both may provide strong justifications to allow 
‘protest whistleblowing.’ As neither argument requires a benefit conferred upon the 
recipients of the information, it is submitted that anonymous whistleblowing would be 
 82 
 
 
justified.  
 
Neither argument, however, allows for consideration as to the value of the 
communication to the recipient audience or to wider public debate. Such communication 
may be harmful to colleagues or to democratic society as a whole.
229
 The argument that 
freedom of expression is justified to enhance the public good provides a stronger 
justification for whistleblowing speech, because it concentrates on the contribution the 
communication makes to society as a whole. The discovery of truth will provide an 
important justification for whistleblowing, particularly where members of the public have 
been misled. Where there has been a cover up of information or if false information has 
provided, the Crown servant may be best placed to provide such information.  
 
The argument from participation in a democracy supports the argument from truth. In a 
democratic society it is vital that citizens are provided with sufficient information to 
engage in and enhance political debate, to decide who to elect based upon clear and 
informed decision making, and ultimately so that they can be aware on what actions are 
taken in their name. The arguments from truth and from democracy identify benefits to 
both the communicator of the information and the recipient audience. The argument that 
citizens should have a right of access to information is closely linked to the justifications 
from truth and democracy. Ultimately, where information has been suppressed from the 
public and such information could lead to truth or a better more informed electorate, a 
Crown servant may be justified in releasing such information. Conversely, information 
which discloses the private lives of individuals may not provide a contribution to the 
public debate and the disclosure of such material should be questioned.
230
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In a theoretical justification for whistleblowing, the public interest in the speech 
communicated is as important as the act of whistleblowing itself. Thus, as Bok identifies, 
society must test the information to determine whether it is in the public interest. 
Determination of the value of the information is central to considering whether the 
suppression of whistleblowing speech may be justified. Both Barendt and Dworkin 
identify that governments must show strong grounds for interference, a clear and 
substantial risk that the speech will harm people or property. The unauthorised disclosure 
of national security information may cause grave harm to individuals and may provide a 
justifiable restriction on speech but must be tested and weighed against the benefit  of the 
disclosure.  
 
The disclosure of secrets which are not harmful to national security may still be harmful 
to the public interest if routine disclosure leads to a ‘panopticised’ regime whereby public 
officials feel unable to make decisions in the national interest for fear of recrimination, 
undermining the purpose of government in democratic society. Conversely, the disclosure 
of national security information as an act of necessity must be counterbalanced against 
the disclosure of bureaucratic secrecy. Where necessity is used as a justification, the act 
should not create more harm to individuals than the threat the whistleblower is trying to 
prevent.  
 
The difficulty with information perceived to be confidential or pertaining to national 
security is that the act of interpreting the speech and balancing the public interest in the 
information often takes place post facto. It is therefore submitted that before deciding to 
make an unauthorised disclosure, a Crown servant should consider what official channels 
are available to him. Thus, external, unauthorised disclosure should be considered as a 
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last resort, where the official mechanisms available cannot deal with the concern, are not 
viable or may lead to suppression of the speech or where the matter is urgent and there is 
not time to use those official channels.  
 
Where unauthorised disclosures are made to the public, the individual should identify 
himself to the audience and should be available to explain the contents of the information 
and his motivations for the disclosure. This should be preferred as an alternative (where 
possible) to anonymous leaking. Anonymous leaking may prevent the recipient audience 
from making an assessment as to the value of the information communicated. It may 
therefore be detrimental to the aims identified in the justifications from truth and from 
participation in a democracy. Anonymous leaking should be reserved to ‘last resort’ 
situations whereby the individual feels that he will receive grave reprisals for raising the 
concerns if identified.  
 
1.10.2 Legal Framework 
 
 
Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights affords a high level of 
protection to freedom of expression. Generally, the protection will extend to political 
expression which has been identified as the right to criticise the actions or omissions of 
government who must, in a democratic society, be open to close criticism, not only from 
the press but also public opinion. Freedom of political debate has been identified as the 
right to criticise political figures, who unlike private citizens, must expect fiercer 
criticism than other people. The right to criticise extends beyond the right to 
communicate facts and may include the expression of opinion or ‘value judgements.’  
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Crown servants owe a contractual duty of loyalty to the government of the day. As a 
consequence of entering into employment as a public servant, the European Court of 
Human Rights has identified that voluntarily entering into such employment may 
constitute an agreed limitation of the employee’s  expression rights. By becoming a 
Crown Servant involved in national security matters, the employee owes a special duty of 
loyalty. Crown servants are placed in a position whereby they may disagree with policy 
decisions made their superiors who may be Ministers of the Crown or collective Cabinet 
decisions. It is submitted that it will be necessary for a court to distinguish between 
disclosures relating to policy decisions which may be legal but to which the Crown 
servant disagrees and disclosures of wrongdoing. Once determined the correct 
proportionality balancing may be applied. 
 
1.10.3 Disclosures relating to Policy Dissent  
 
It is submitted that where a Crown Servant chooses to raise concerns about a policy 
decision to which he does not agree but the information concerned does not identify 
wrongdoing, jurisprudence from ECtHR decisions regarding political expression should 
be considered. The value of any political expression made by a Crown Servant should be 
weighed against the duty of loyalty the individual has to the employer. The individual 
may express his opinion as to the quality of a certain policy decision to the public and 
may, as a Crown servant working in the area to which the information relates, be able to 
provide a contribution to public interest debate. The act of communication may amount to 
the disclosure of wrongdoing whereby the policy in question has been deliberately 
explained by a member of government in a way which is misleading to Parliament or the 
public. Or if a policy proposed is lawful but may result in a risk of serious harm. Where 
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any such matters arise, it is submitted that it would be appropriate for the Guja v Moldova 
test to be used.  
 
1.10.4 Disclosures of Wrongdoing  
 
Guja v Moldova is the leading decision on disclosures of wrongdoing and therefore the 
test applied in the proportionality analysis should be considered as the benchmark to 
determine whether the official whistleblowing mechanisms, the employment protections 
afforded by the Public Interest Disclosure Act, and the provisions used to control official 
information in the United Kingdom currently align with art.10 values.  
 
Guja v Moldova identifies that it will not be sufficient for an employee to raise concerns 
directly to the public without there being a strong public interest in the information 
disclosed. The court will also identify whether or not there were alternative mechanisms 
available which be utilised  
 
The first question in the analysis asks whether the employee had alternative channels for 
making the disclosure. Guja identifies that concerns should be raised internally unless it 
not practical to do so, therefore extensive consideration of the effectiveness of official 
whistleblowing mechanisms provided to Civil Servant employees will be considered in 
chapter three of this thesis, further consideration will be provided to employees of the 
Intelligence and Security Services in chapter six and members of the UK armed forces in 
chapter seven. 
 
In determining the public interest in the disclosure, it is submitted that information 
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detailing wrongdoing would be of a high value to the public interest. Such circumstances 
may include where Parliament or members of the public have been misled. The 
disclosure of a dangerous or illegal policy decision such as the extraordinary rendition or 
torture of individuals may also be considered to be information of a high value. A 
defence of necessity may be justified where there is an immediate risk of harm posed 
upon the person making the disclosure or others to which he has a responsibility. 
Evidence of the personal conduct of officials (such as Ministers of the Crown, officials in 
the Civil Service, Chief Executives or Special Advisers) may be considered of a medium 
value to the public interest, whereby the conduct in question is evidence to correct a false 
impression, and the conduct is relevant to the person’s work. The disclosure of an extra 
marital affair may not be considered to be of value. However the value is increased where 
that conduct has resulted in an employee receiving favourable promotion prospects or an 
abuse of office. The disclosure of a sexual relationship may not be considered relevant, 
unless where the public official has portrayed a very different image in the public domain 
and such disclosure is necessary to correct a false impression. Where personal matters are 
disclosed and article 8 is determined to be engaged, the court will be required to balance 
the competing rights of article 10 against article 8. As a consequence, it will be necessary 
for the court to consider the jurisprudence of cases concerning misuse of private 
information. 
 
The Court will need to test the authenticity of the information, if the information it found 
to be untrue, or if the individual who raised the concern is unable to verify the 
communication, it is unlikely that he will receive art.10 protection. This is where it is 
identified that for communication of value judgements, such as informed opinions to 
which the applicant cannot prove, it will be more appropriate for the court to undertake 
 88 
 
 
the proportionality assessment using the political expression cases such as Lingens v 
Austria.  With regard to the unauthorised disclosure of false information, it is submitted 
that there will be a strong public interest in ensuring that the public will not be misled. 
This is because with regard to national security information in particular, the United 
Kingdom government, most often operates a ‘neither confirm nor deny’ policy. This 
means that society may not be able to correct the untruth, which as J.S. Mill identifies 
will lead to falsity. 
 
The court will next need to consider the detriment caused to the employer as a result of 
the disclosure. Here, a court should consider the relevant domestic jurisprudence to 
consider whether, where appropriate, the disclosure will undermine the convention of 
collective Cabinet responsibility. It will need to identify whether or not the confidential 
character of the information has lapsed. If the information concerns a Cabinet decision 
taken several years before the disclosure it is more likely to be disclosed than a decision 
taken the day before. However, where there is a compelling reason that the disclosure is 
in the public interest, this should outweigh the detriment caused to the employer. If the 
disclosure was of national security information, the court will need to determine whether 
the disclosure could have a detrimental impact on ‘the willingness of prospective 
informers to co-operate with the services,’ and the ‘trust between members of the services 
when engaged on secret and dangerous operations.’231 
 
In determining whether the individual acted in good faith, it is submitted that the court 
will need to consider the circumstances in which the disclosure was made, i.e. whether 
the individual attempted to raise the concern internally before making an unauthorised 
disclosure. The Court will again need to refer to the public interest in the information 
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disclosed. It is submitted, that in determining whether the individual has acted in good 
faith, the court is likely to view any anonymous disclosures which have not attempted to 
utilise other official means with suspicion. This reinforces the proposition that 
unauthorised anonymous disclosures are likely to be protected by article 10 only as a last 
resort.  
 
Finally, the court will need to consider the severity of the sanction imposed for the 
making of the disclosure. It is submitted, that the least severe sanction is likely to result in 
‘detrimental treatment,’ such as sidelining an individual for promotion, or taking 
disciplinary action against an individual for a related or unrelated matter. A more severe 
sanction is likely to include the dismissal of the individual for the making of the 
disclosure. The most severe sanction available will be a civil action for breach of 
confidence, a criminal prosecution for a common law offence of misconduct in public 
office or prosecution under the provisions of the Official Secrets Acts. Any sanction must 
be weighed against the ‘chilling effect’ on other individuals raising public interest 
concerns in the future.  
 
The next chapter will consider unauthorised disclosures, with particular emphasis of the 
whistleblower as a journalistic source and the impact of disclosures made to online 
outlets such as Wikileaks. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
_________________________________________________________ 
 
UNAUTHORISED DISCLOSURES: TRADITIONAL JOURNALISTIC SOURCE 
PROTECTION AND THE EMERGENCE OF ONLINE OUTLETS TO FACILITATE 
DISCLOSURE 
 
The establishment of the online facility, Wikileaks has provided a new method of leaking 
documents. The website carries the promise of anonymity and the swift dissemination of 
official material. Established in 2006, the organisation has served as a forum to publish 
confidential and classified documents from anonymous sources. Whilst the unauthorised 
disclosure of thousands of official government documents, published by the website has 
brought the subject of whistleblowing to the forefront of the political agenda, the 
unauthorised disclosure of documents is not a new phenomenon. The news media have, 
for a number of years, utilised information obtained from Crown Servants in carrying out 
their vital democratic function as watchdog. The press require not only the use of ‘off the 
record sources,’ but the ability to protect them. This is an integral part of press 
freedom.
232
 The ECtHR has identified that an order for source disclosure may undermine 
the watchdog function, potentially resulting in a ‘chilling effect’ which will deter future 
individuals from providing the media with information in the public interest.
233
 
 
 
                                                        
232 T.Pinto, How sacred is the rule against the disclosure of journalist’s sources? [2003] Ent L.R. 14(7), 
170. 
233 See generally, Goodwin v United Kingdom (17488/90) (1996).  
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The purpose of this chapter is to provide an assessment of the avenues available to Crown 
Servants to leak information. It will consider how Wikileaks and other online facilities 
operate in comparison to the traditional journalist and source relationship. It will provide 
a critical evaluation of the protections afforded to the source by these avenues in the light 
of orders used to compel persons to reveal the origins of the information obtained. It will 
further consider potential offences for individuals who publish information. The chapter 
will conclude by providing an assessment of the avenues available alongside the 
theoretical and legal models developed in the previous chapter.  
 
2.1 The relationship of journalist and source 
 
The aim of this section is to consider the relationship of a journalist and the source of the 
information obtained. Before identifying the obligations a journalist may have to a source 
it is necessary to first consider the ways in which journalistic source material may be 
obtained. In providing an analysis of the theory behind the protection of journalistic 
sources, Carney identifies a number of different scenarios.
234
 Firstly, a source may be 
‘un-named’ in a story because of an ‘express undertaking given by the journalist not to 
reveal his name.’ Second, is a situation where a journalist may know the identity of the 
individual concerned but chooses not to reveal the name of the individual because ‘he 
believes that the source desires anonymity.’ Thirdly, is in circumstances where the 
journalist is ‘the recipient of an unsolicited document that does not identify the sender.’235 
It is submitted that following the increase in the use of information obtained via an online 
outlet such as Wikileaks it is necessary to add a fourth category: circumstances in which 
information has been obtained by a third party.  
                                                        
234D. Carney, The Theoretical Underpinnings of the Protection of Journalists’ Confidential Sources [2009] 
1 JML 97. 
235 Ibid. 
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2.1.2 Establishing an obligation: a matter of professional ethics and personal standards 
 
The requirement to protect a source is at the heart of journalistic ethics. The National 
Union of Journalists (NUJ) states in its code of conduct that a journalist shall: 
 “Protect the identity of the sources who supply information in 
confidence and material gathered in the course of her/his work.”236 
 
Signing the code, which originates from 1936, is still an integral part of the process to 
join the union. In 2006 the NUJ produced a code of conduct specifically concerning 
‘witness contributors’ in which it expressly stated that information obtained from a 
source should not be passed on to the Police or Security Services, without specific 
agreement of the contributor or by way of a court order.
237
 However, the code reminds 
journalists that they must not give the source ‘unrealistic guarantees’ of the legal 
consequences of their disclosure. Breach of the NUJ codes may result in disciplinary 
action taken against the journalist. Rule 24 of the NUJ Codebook identifies that if a 
member has been found guilty of misconduct ‘detrimental to the interests of the union’ or 
‘of the profession of journalism’ or is in breach of the code of conduct the union may: 
 “(I) impose on that member a fine not exceeding £1,000; (ii) 
suspend that member for a period not exceeding 12 months; (iii) express its censure in 
such terms as it deems appropriate; (iv) impose more than one of these penalties, or (v) 
expel him/her from the union.”238 
 
Upon considering whether to release information obtained from a source to the public 
domain the journalist is faced with an obligation not only to protect the source in 
question, but also to uphold perhaps the most important aspect of reporting contained 
                                                        
236 National Union of Journalists, Code of Conduct, para 7: 
http://www.nuj.org.uk/files/NUJ_Code_of_Conduct.pdf (accessed 05/08/11). 
237 National Union of Journalists, Code of Conduct for Witness Contributors, 2005, para 7. 
238 National Union of Journalists, Rule Book 2010: http://www.nuj.org.uk/innerPagenuj.html?docid=182 
(accessed 05/08/11). 
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within the code: to ensure that the information that he disseminates is fair and accurate 
and to avoid falsification by distortion, selection or misrepresentation.
239
  
 
The Press Complaints Commission acts as an independent self-regulatory body to the 
newspaper and magazine industry. The Commission comprises of ten lay members and 
seven members who are serving editors in.
240
If a complaint is made to the Commission 
and it is deemed to fall within the Commission’s remit, the PCC may investigate. The 
PCC aims to resolve complaints by a process of mediation between the editor of the 
publication and the complainant. The PCC may suggest that the editor publish a public 
apology, a correction, or provide the complainant with a private letter of apology or an 
undertaking as to future conduct. If the complaint cannot be resolved the PCC may 
uphold the complaint and give a ‘critical adjudication’ the full content of which must be 
published with due prominence in the publication concerned. The PCC does not have the 
reach to investigate complaints regarding every newspaper and magazine in the United 
Kingdom because it is reliant upon print media organisations to subscribe to its funding 
body, the Press Standards Board of Finance (Pressbof). Several publications do not 
therefore come under the jurisdiction of the PCC.  
 
The House of Commons, Culture, Media and Sport Committee, has noted that ‘many, but 
not all, newspapers’ include a requirement to respect the PCC Code of Practice in their 
journalists’ contract of employment.241 The Committee are supportive of the practice and 
in their 2007 report entitled Self-Regulation of the Press, they suggested that including a 
contractual obligation to adhere to the Code would ‘safeguard journalists who believed 
                                                        
239 Ibid, para 3. 
240 Press Complaints Commission Website, About the PCC: http://www.pcc.org.uk/about/index.html 
(accessed 05/08/11) 
241 Culture Media and Sport Committee, Press Standards Privacy and Libel, 2009, HC 532, para 554. 
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that they were being asked to use unethical newsgathering practices.
242
  
 
Whilst paragraph 15 of the Press Complaints Commission Code of Practice identifies that 
‘journalists have a moral obligation to protect confidential sources of information,’ the 
press ‘must take care not to publish inaccurate, misleading or distorted information, 
including pictures.’ If the information contains a ‘significant inaccuracy, misleading 
statement or distortion,’ it must be corrected once recognised and where appropriate an 
apology published. Moreover, the press have an obligation to ‘distinguish between 
comment, conjecture and fact.’  
 
With regard to the obtaining of information, according to paragraph 10 of the PCC Code, 
the press must not ‘seek to obtain or publish material’ which has been acquired by the 
‘unauthorised removal of documents or photographs’ or by ‘accessing digitally-held 
private information without consent.’ In addition to this the code identifies: 
 “…Engaging in misrepresentation or subterfuge, including by 
agents or intermediaries, can generally be justified only in the public interest and then 
only when the material cannot be obtained by other means.” 
 
The Press Complaints Commission Code of Practice
243
 contains a detailed definition of 
the public interest which it expects the newspaper and periodical industry to adhere to. It 
essentially highlights information which would be deemed to be in the public interest as, 
including but not limited to: 
  “(i) Detecting or exposing crime or serious impropriety, (ii) 
Protecting public health or safety, (iii) Preventing the public from being misled by an 
action or a statement of an individual or an organisation.”244  
 
 
                                                        
242 Culture Media and Sport Committee, Self Regulation of the Press, 2007, HC 375, para 58.  
243 The details of which can be found on the PCC website: http://www.pcc.org.uk/cop/practice.html. 
244 Ibid at para 16. 
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The value of the information obtained must be called into question. If the source remains 
confidential, as Fenwick and Phillipson correctly identify, the information concerned may 
consist of ‘a mixture of substance and disinformation.’245 There is no way of checking the 
accuracy of the information and the identity of the source in an open public forum. This 
may prove particularly problematical when dealing with sources in Government or Civil 
Service whose motives may be political or for personal gain.  
 
By maintaining source confidentiality the journalist is inadvertently preventing the public 
from assessing the value of the information, and preventing further enquiries to the 
source in order to seek further information or clarity. It also prohibits those with a vested 
interest in the information, whether it is an employer or a person in receipt of criticism 
resulting from the disclosure to seek redress. Furthermore, it has also been suggested that 
members of the public will ‘confuse self-protective instincts with cowardice and 
deceitfulness.’246 
 
2.2 Wikileaks and the emergence of online resources to facilitate unauthorised disclosure 
 
Wikileaks was established in 2006 as a not for profit organisation to provide “the most 
secure platform for whistleblowers the world had ever known.”247 Wikileaks is not a 
media organisation in the traditional sense – it is unconstrained by both commercial 
interests and professional and regulatory codes of practice. The founder of the service, 
Julian Assange, is a formerly convicted computer hacker and together with a team of staff 
has utilised those skills to establish a web-based system deemed impenetrable to law 
                                                        
245 H.Fenwick and G.Phillipson, Media Freedom under the Human Rights Act (Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 2006) 311. 
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254. 
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enforcement and online monitoring.  
 
Early publications on the website relate to allegations of corruption in Africa and the logs 
of equipment acquired by the U.S. Army for use in the Afghanistan war.
248
 The website 
gained momentum in April 2010 when it published the ‘collateral murder’ video which 
had been recorded via an on-board camera on a U.S. Army Apache Helicopter. The video 
reportedly from July 2007 showed the killing of two Iraqi journalists, and the apparent 
indifference of the helicopter pilot who after being informed that he had injured children 
had replied that ‘it was their fault for bringing them into battle.’  
 
In July 2010, the website released 90,000 documents detailing military operations in 
Afghanistan. Known as the ‘Afghanistan War Logs’ the documents detailed the true 
extent of civilian casualties in the country and the use of US Special Forces to assassinate 
terrorist suspects. In October 2010 the website published 400,000 documents relating to 
the Iraq War, enabling a map to be drawn detailing the location of every fatality which 
occurred during the conflict. In November 2010 Wikileaks published 120,000 diplomatic 
cables – communications intended to be read by senior officials in Washington. The 
cables detailed a wide range of issues, from matters of high public concern, such as 
orders to obtain intelligence information on foreign diplomats the status of the perceived 
terror threat posed by the Middle East, to the innocuous yet deeply embarrassing 
revelations of US attitudes towards foreign leaders.  
 
The alleged source of the leaks US military and diplomatic leaks is Bradley Manning, a 
U.S. Military Intelligence Analyst – it is not clear at this stage whether other sources 
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provided Wikileaks with information. Manning’s apparent involvement was exposed 
when he reportedly discussed his conduct in an online discussion with Adrian Lamo, a 
computer hacker who later reported Manning to the Federal Bureau of Investigation. 
Manning is currently awaiting trial, following his arrest in May 2010. It is suggested that 
Manning had downloaded and removed the thousands of documents with relative ease.
249
 
The documents were readily accessible via the Secure Internet Protocol Router Network 
(‘SIPRNET’). The Network had been established by the U.S. authorities to ensure that 
intelligence information could be shared between agencies, in response to key findings of 
the 9/11 Commission Panel Report.
250
  
 
Julian Assange is currently awaiting extradition to Sweden after a European Arrest 
Warrant was issued on the basis that he committed sexual offences against two women. 
Currently he has not been charged with any offences arising from the publication of any 
unauthorised material. Assange disputes the allegations and his defence team have 
alleged that if he is extradited to Sweden this may result in attempts by the US authorities 
to extradite him to face trial in the United States or that he could face extraordinary 
rendition to the US facility at Guantanamo Bay.
251
 At present Wikileaks has suspended its 
operations. The primary focus of this section will be to consider how Wikileaks can 
provide protection to sources and how it operates as a conduit to pass leaked documents 
to traditional media organisations and how it operates as a media organisation in its own 
right in comparison with those traditional organisations. It will also identify and critically 
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evaluate the number of ‘copycat’ organisations established following the prominence of 
the Wikileaks organisation.  
 
2.2.1 Wikileaks as a Media Organisation  
 
Once information has been sent to the organisation, a decision is made whether to publish 
the information on the website. In this sense, use of the term ‘wiki’ or a user controlled 
interface, allowing participants to upload and edit material is somewhat of a misnomer. 
The final decision to publish the material falls upon Assange, who may be identified as 
being the equivalent of an ‘editor in chief.’ Documents are reportedly vetted by Assange 
and four unidentified ‘experts’ with different areas of expertise.  
 
Assange identifies that the first document published on the website, purportedly a letter 
from the Union of Islamic Courts in Somalia was obtained via a Chinese source and 
concedes that they ‘couldn’t be sure’ that it was genuine.’252 He continues: 
 “Even if the document was a fake, perhaps prepared by 
Chinese sources, it still raised important questions and showed how the disclosure of 
secret documents could enhance our understanding of complex political situations.”253 
 
The aforementioned comment identifies that despite concerns that the document may 
have been a forgery Assange was prepared to publish the document anyway. Domscheit-
Berg, a former member of the Wikileaks organisation had deceptively created the 
impression that all documents were subject to ‘authenticity checks’ and that ‘until late 
2009’ nobody except Assange and himself had checked the ‘vast majority of 
documents.’254 With regard to the claim that the organisation had access to a pool of 
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approximately eight hundred experts at its disposal, he identifies that ‘strictly speaking’ 
they were ‘not lying’ but did not identify that the individuals in question did not have 
access to the material received by Wikileaks.
255
 Checks were limited to Assange and 
Domscheit-Berg checking to see if documents had been ‘manipulated electronically’ and 
‘a few Google searches.’256 Ultimately he suggests that: 
 “…Apparently we developed a pretty good sense for what was 
authentic and what wasn’t; at least as far as I know, we didn’t make any major mistakes 
but we could have.”257 
 
 It is submitted that whilst Wikileaks could provide an important resource for public 
information, it could as easily serve as a platform for the dissemination of disinformation 
with the aim of destabilising international relations or the political process. This assertion 
is supported by Aftergood, who suggested prior to the establishment of the website that it 
could ‘become hijacked to serve vendettas.’258 A further difficulty is caused by the fact ‘it 
is a longstanding procedure that the government do not comment on leaked 
documents’259 or national security matters.  Moreover, there are no safeguards in place to 
prevent a scenario where authentic material has been disclosed as a result of self-
authorisation or political leaking by government ministers seeking political advantage.
260
 
Such action would represent a significant departure from the utopian ideal the Wikileaks 
service aims to create. 
 
The process of checking whether the information is harmful, to national security or to 
individuals either directly working for intelligence agencies or the armed forces or 
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 100 
 
 
indirectly as a source, requires consideration. In the United Kingdom media organisations 
observe a voluntary code of ‘Defence Advisory’ or DA Notices. The DA Notices cover a 
number of categories relating to military operations, plans and capabilities and matters 
concerning the UK Security and Intelligence Services.
261
 If a journalist is due to publish 
information which may conflict with one of the standing DA Notices he is expected to 
contact the committee for advice before publication. Speaking on the editorial discretion 
to redact documents, Assange appears to hold a view contrary to current journalistic 
practices; 
 “We simply felt it was for history to judge what was in the 
‘public interest’ and what was not. We would use our best editorial judgment, but it was 
not for us to do as most media organisations do, and act as censors on behalf of 
governments and commercial interests.” 
 
With regard to the publication of the Afghan war logs Assange had reportedly claimed 
that all documents had been checked for named informants and as a consequence of the 
process, 15,000 documents had not been published.
262
 However, the Times newspaper 
had sifted through the material, finding the identities and locations of many informants. 
The Campaign for Innocent Victims In Conflict, Open Society Institute, Afghanistan 
Independent Human Rights Commission, International Crisis Group and Amnesty 
International responded to the publications by requesting Wikileaks analyse all documents 
to ensure that those ‘containing identifying information’ were ‘taken down or 
redacted.’263Wikileaks responded to the criticism by redacting the documents later 
published regarding the Iraq War. However, in September 2011 the organisation released 
an un-redacted version of all 250,000 diplomatic cables, a move criticised by the 
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organisations Reporters without Borders and Amnesty International.
264
 Most 
interestingly, some of the cables had revealed the identity of military whistleblowers and 
individuals who were under ‘permanent police protection’ before they spoke to US 
diplomats.
265
  
 
Assange has stated previously: 
 “…the promise we make to our sources… is that not only will we defend through 
every means that we have available, but we will try to get the maximum possible political 
impact for the material they give us.”266 
 
The ‘maximum possible impact’ Assange refers to has in practice required the 
organisation to engage with traditional media outlets. Unless members of the public 
choose to visit the website in order to view the material for themselves, public awareness 
of the available information, has to the greatest extent, been achieved via traditional 
media reporting. Thus, Assange has brokered deals with the Guardian newspaper in the 
United Kingdom, Der Spiegal in Germany, Le Monde in France, El Pais in Spain, the 
New York Times in the United States and Channel Four News (UK) to publish material 
provided to them by Wikileaks acting as a conduit.  
 
2.2.2 Wikileaks as a Conduit  
 
The use of Wikileaks to provide information to journalists requires consideration. It is 
submitted that the position of Wikileaks acting as a conduit engages the Code of Practice 
for Witness Contributors to which members of the National Union of Journalists are 
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required to follow. Paragraph one of the Code requires that organisations using material 
obtained from ‘a citizen journalist’ must agree to uphold s.1 of the Press Complaints 
Code of Practice, that they should not publish ‘inaccurate, misleading or distorted 
information.’ Paragraph two of the Code identifies that organisations ‘should check and 
provide sufficient resources’ for the ‘adequate checking of witness contributions’ in order 
that they ‘establish their accuracy and authenticity before publication.’ In relation to 
television and radio, all organisations except those regulated by the BBC Trust, must 
adhere to the Ofcom Broadcasting Code. The Code requires that the news, ‘must be 
reported’ with ‘due accuracy’ and ‘presented with due impartiality.’267 Thus, any 
‘significant mistakes’ must be quickly ‘acknowledged and corrected on air.’268 
 
There is a danger that any information provided by a source may be false or misleading. 
The resignation of Piers Morgan as editor of the Daily Mirror newspaper in 2004 
provides a pertinent example.
269
 Morgan had published photographs purportedly showing 
the torture and abuse of Iraqi prisoners provided to the newspaper by an anonymous 
source. The Queen’s Lancashire Regiment, who was at the centre of the abuse 
accusations, proved that the photographs had been faked, by identifying that the vehicle 
and equipment shown in the photographs had not been deployed in Iraq.
270
  
 
It is submitted that the use of Wikileaks or any third party acting as a conduit creates 
detachment between the source and the publisher of the information. The potential for the 
news organisation to publish information which may be false or misleading is far greater 
than if the journalist knows the identity of the source and has either agreed to an 
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undertaking not to disclose the identity of the individual or believes that the identity of 
the source should not be disclosed. In both circumstances the journalist is provided with 
the opportunity to communicate with the source directly, to question the veracity of the 
material and to test the motivations of the source.  
 
The publication of material from Wikileaks or other forms of online publications such as 
blogging or via social networking may also place members of the National Union of 
Journalists under an additional code relating to “witness contributors.”271 The code of 
conduct was published in 2006 in response to an increasing trend for traditional media 
outlets to publish information obtained from online sources. Paragraph one of the Code 
provides that organisations which use material obtained from ‘witness contributors’ agree 
to uphold s.1 of the PCC Code of Practice, the requirement that ‘inaccurate, misleading, 
or distorted information’ should not be published and that, if required, corrections must 
be published. Paragraph two of the Code requires that organisations should: 
  “…check and provide sufficient resources for the adequate checking of 
witness contributions to establish their accuracy and authenticity before publication.” 
 
It is submitted that whilst the future of the Press Complaints Commission is currently in 
doubt following recent developments of phone hacking and the ongoing Leveson Inquiry 
into that issue and press standards in general, the aforementioned Code of Practice 
provides a recognition for existing ECtHR jurisprudence on the issue of accurate 
reporting. The enhanced level of protection afforded to journalists carries with it ‘duties 
and responsibilities’ and as a consequence journalists should act ‘in good faith and on an 
accurate factual basis and provide reliable and precise information in accordance with the 
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ethics of journalism.’272  
 
It should be identified that if Wikileaks sought the ‘enhanced protection’ afforded to 
journalists by article 10 in the future, a court (provided that the action was brought in a 
jurisdiction to which the ECHR applied), would need to identify what steps the 
organisation has taken to test the veracity of the source and information concerned. 
Regardless of whether it can be successfully argued that Wikileaks as an organisation 
have an ethical obligation to determine the veracity of a source and the material obtained, 
the position of Wikileaks acting as a conduit, must not detract from the obligation for the 
traditional media outlet to undertake the necessary checks before information is reported 
on and published. One must ask however, whether such checks could be possible, given 
the amount of information disclosed and the way in which Wikileaks has conducted its 
operations.  
 
Bok argues that where anonymous whistleblowing occurs, journalists and intermediaries 
will be faced with the task of determining whether the information received from a source 
should be published in its entirety, and whether it should be used at all if the accuracy of 
the information is in doubt.
273
 Bok suggests that unless the information disclosed is 
accompanied by ‘indications of how the information can be checked’ the value of the 
communicated message is diminished.
274
 It does not appear that the relationship of 
Wikileaks acting as a conduit provided sufficient scope for the accurate checking of 
information. One must ask how such an operation could have been carried out without 
seeking assistance from other sources in the United States military that were privy to the 
information or by directly communicating with the source. It is submitted that the 
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position of Wikileaks and other similar organisations acting as a conduit presents a 
quandary for the traditional media outlet. If the identity of the source is revealed to a 
domestic media outlet so that the information and source may be verified, the potential 
for a domestic authority to apply for a Norwich Pharmacal order is increased. However, 
by not having access to the source of the information, the likelihood of publishing false 
information to the public is also increased. The potential for this is further enhanced by 
the volume of documents provided by Wikileaks to the journalistic partners. As Dean 
distinguishes three classes of the recipient audience, it may be suggested that ‘those who 
believe through the judgements of others’ are placed at the most risk. Neocleaous bolsters 
this position by identifying that society is placed at a ‘serious technical and organisational 
disadvantage’ when it comes to secret information. Society may lack the ability to 
determine whether the information disclosed is true.
275
 The next section will consider the 
reported protections available to the sources that provide information to Wikileaks. 
 
2.2.3 Wikileaks and Source Protection  
 
At the heart of the protection available to sources is a system called ‘The Onion Router,’ 
more commonly known as ‘Tor.’ The system utilises a network of ‘2,000 global 
computer servers’ and multi-layered encryption in order to route anonymous information 
via other computers using the Tor system, the result being that the origin of the 
information cannot be identified.
276
  
 
Leigh and Harding identify that despite the sophisticated level of encryption, ‘anyone 
who is monitoring the sender or receiver’s internet connection will be see the receiver 
                                                        
275 Above, n 24, 95. 
276 D.Leigh and L.Harding, Inside Julian Assange’s War on Secrecy (Guardian Books, London, 2011) 52. 
 106 
 
 
and source information,’ therefore they will be able to identify that communication has 
taken place between source and recipient but not the content of the information.
277
 Leigh 
and Harding suggest this is ‘disastrous for whistleblowers.’278 Prior to the official launch 
of Wikileaks, Ben Laurie, commenting on the levels of protection Wikileaks intended to 
provide to whistleblowers, suggested that he ‘would not trust his life or even his liberty to 
Tor.’279   
 
Indeed, it may not be difficult for an executive department to deduce that encrypted 
communication between a government employee and a recipient known to be linked to  a 
‘whistleblowing service’ is likely to be the source of documents later published on the 
site, if his colleagues have not been engaged in such communication. Other identifying 
behaviour such as an employee bringing in unauthorised recording, media or storage 
devices or being engaged in unauthorised copying or removal of intelligence material 
may also assist to provide evidence a certain individual is the source of the unauthorised 
disclosures.
280
  The published documents may provide identifying marks as to the origin 
of the leaks. Publication of documents in their entirety may assist prosecuting authorities.  
 
Following the arrest of Bradley Manning as the alleged source of the leaks, Domscheit-
Berg, reportedly suggested that the Wikileaks organisation should not publish any more 
material for the time being as this may be harmful to Manning’s legal position. The 
suggestion went un-noticed and Assange proceeded to publish the rest of the material 
provided by the source. It should be noted that neither Assange nor Domsheit-Berg have 
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confirmed or denied that Manning is the source, citing source confidentiality. The 
organisation has reportedly based its main operating location in Sweden because of the 
comprehensive nature of the legal protection available to journalistic sources.
281
  
 
2.3 Court orders requiring journalists to reveal their sources. 
 
An order to compel a third party to disclose identify the source of leaked information may 
be made by the High Court subject to the principle established by Norwich Pharmacal Co 
v Customs and Excise Commissioners.
282
 The Norwich Pharmacal test for third party 
disclosure provides that:  
 “…if through no fault of his own a person gets mixed up in the 
tortious acts of others so as to facilitate their wrong-doing he may incur no personal 
liability but he comes under a duty to assist the person who has been wronged by giving 
him full information and disclosing the identity of the wrong-doers…”283 
 
The following sections will provide a contemporary analysis of the exercise of Norwich 
Pharmacal orders and with particular reference to the impact on the protection of 
whistleblowers. As a response to recent technological advancements it is submitted that 
such orders may arise in the following situations: firstly, the ‘traditional journalist and 
source relationship’ whereby the journalist works for a commercial media outlet such as a 
newspaper or television news organisation. Second, where the information is submitted to 
an outlet available on the internet, such as Wikileaks. Third, where an Internet Service 
Provider (‘ISP’) hosts the outlet and may hold information as to the whereabouts of 
individuals involved. Fourth, where an internet search engine may identify the 
individual(s) involved in the making of the disclosure. Fifth, where an online email 
service or social media service has been used in the course of the disclosure. The next 
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section will consider the operation of Norwich Pharmacal orders alongside s.10 Contempt 
of Court Act 1981. 
 
2.3.1 Section 10 Contempt of Court Act 1981 
 
In the United Kingdom journalistic source protection is provided by Section 10 Contempt 
of Court Act 1981 which states that:  
 “No court may require a person to disclose, nor is any person 
guilty of contempt of court for refusing to disclose, the source of information contained in 
any publication for which he is responsible, unless it be established to the satisfaction of 
the court that disclosure is necessary in the interests of justice or national security or for 
the prevention of disorder or crime.” 
 
Section 10 recognises the public interest in the protection of journalistic sources and 
imposes a presumption that courts are not to order the disclosure of a source unless 
satisfied that it is necessary to do so in one of four clearly defined circumstances. The 
four exceptions to section 10 rest upon the central term of ‘necessity.’ The element of 
necessity is deemed as a crucial justification for court’s use of the contempt power.284 Its 
meaning has been stated as “more than merely relevant or desirable, useful or 
expedient.”285 Although it is based upon a question of fact,286 judgment will also be 
dependant upon the extent of enquires made by the person requiring the order of 
disclosure.
287
 It is also expected that the person requesting the order give specific reasons 
for doing so.
288
  Section 10 covers ‘any speech, writing or other communication in 
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whatever form, which is addressed to the public at large or any section of the public.’289 It 
is therefore submitted that a Norwich Pharmacal application should be subject to Section 
10, regardless of whether the communication has been published by a traditional media 
outlet or by an online outlet such as Wikileaks. 
 
2.3.2 Application of Section 10 post Human Rights Act 1998 
 
Following the incorporation of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) into 
domestic law by the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA), s.10 CCA must be read and given 
effect to by the courts, so far as is possible to do so, in a way which is compatible with 
art.10 ECHR under s.3(1) HRA.  
 
The term ‘interests of justice’ does not appear in art.10 (2) ECHR. It is therefore 
appropriate to consider whether the term may be applicable the existing provisions in 
art.10 (2). The term is open to particularly wide interpretation. Whilst, pre HRA domestic 
courts did not seek to provide a clear definition of the term, for the purposes of this study 
it may be identified that the ‘interests of justice’ would cover breach of confidence 
actions. Post HRA, the art.10 (2) exceptions, ‘for the protection of the reputation or rights 
of others,’ and ‘for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence,’ 
would be most applicable. Whilst it is noted that ‘interests of justice’ could also be 
interpreted under the exception of ‘prevention of disorder or crime’ it should be identified 
that s.10 already carried such a provision. In order to be compliant with art.10 (2), the 
term ‘necessary’ must now be interpreted as ‘necessary in a democratic society.’290  
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It is clear that the restrictions identified require domestic courts to apply proportionality 
balancing. In doing so, domestic courts required by Section 2 (1) Human Rights Act, to 
take into account any ‘judgment, decision, declaration or advisory opinion of the 
European Court of Human Rights’: 
 “…whenever made or given, so far as, in the opinion of the 
court or tribunal, it is relevant to the proceedings in which that question is given.” 
 
Domestic courts are not bound to follow decisions of the Strasbourg Court but are 
required to take the jurisprudence into account in so far as it is relevant to the instant case 
before them.  
 
In giving reference to s.2 (1) HRA Lord Bingham identified in the House of Lords 
decision of R (Ullah) v Special Adjudicator
291
 that while the Convention jurisprudence 
was: 
 “…not strictly binding, it has been held that the courts should, 
in the absence of some special circumstances, follow any clear and constant jurisprudence 
of the Strasbourg court. This reflects the fact that the Convention is an international 
instrument, the correct interpretation of which can be authoritatively expounded only by 
the Strasbourg court. From this it follows that a national court subject to a duty such as 
that imposed by s.2 should not be without strong reason dilute or weaken the effects of 
the Strasbourg case law. It is indeed unlawful under s.6 of the 1998 for a public authority, 
including a court; to act in a way which is incompatible with a Convention right…The 
duty of national courts is to keep pace with the Strasbourg jurisprudence as it evolves 
over time: no more, but certainly no less.”292 
 
Lord Bingham’s statement in Ullah must be considered and contrasted with the later 
decision in Price v Leeds City Council.
293
In Price, the House of Lords was required to 
consider the impact of the  Strasbourg decision in Connors v UK
294
 on the domestic 
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precedent set by the House in Harrow London Borough Council v Quazi.
295
 The Court of 
Appeal in Price had found the Strasbourg decision to be incompatible with Quazi but had 
identified that it was bound to follow the decision of the superior court. Lord Bingham 
indentified concerns that different courts could take differing views of the same issue. He 
adopted a more restrictive approach, suggesting that ‘certainty is best achieved by 
adhering, even in the Convention context, to our rules of precedent.’296 If judges, in the 
course of reviewing Convention arguments before them consider a binding precedent to 
be inconsistent with Strasbourg authority then they may ‘express their views and give 
leave to appeal.’297  
 
It is submitted that in cases involving orders for the disclosure of journalistic sources, the 
domestic courts have grappled uneasily with the application of proportionality, the end 
result consistently favouring the applicant making the disclosure order. The resultant 
failure may be attributed to the domestic courts’ lack of regard to a strong body of 
Strasbourg jurisprudence which is heavily weighted in favour of the role of the press as 
watchdog in a democratic society. This section will now consider proportionality analysis 
developed in the leading Strasbourg decision of Goodwin v UK.
298
 
 
2.3.3 The Strasbourg Standard 
 
In Goodwin v UK
299
 the Strasbourg Court held that the House of Lords had not applied 
the required high standard of protection to press freedom when upholding an order for 
source disclosure. The applicant, a trainee journalist for The Engineer magazine, had 
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received a telephone call from an anonymous source detailing the financial status of a 
company. The information appeared to have been obtained from a confidential corporate 
plan, a copy of which was missing from the company in question. The company 
successfully applied to the High Court for an injunction to restrain publication and a 
Norwich Pharmacal order to obtain the applicant’s notes from the telephone conversation 
in order to identify the source. The applicant resisted the order and appealed to the Court 
of Appeal and to the House of Lords but was unsuccessful.  
 
At Strasbourg, the Court set a particularly high standard for the protection of journalistic 
sources: 
“Protection of journalistic sources is one of the basic conditions for press 
freedom, as is reflected in the laws and the professional codes of conduct in a 
number of Contracting States and is affirmed in several international instruments 
on journalistic freedoms without such protection, sources may be deterred from 
assisting the press in informing the public on matters of public interest. As a result 
the vital public-watchdog role of the press may be undermined and the ability of 
the press to provide accurate and reliable information may be adversely affected. 
Having regard to the importance of the protection of journalistic sources for press 
freedom in a democratic society and the potentially chilling effect an order of 
source disclosure has on the exercise of that freedom, such a measure cannot be 
compatible with Article 10 (art. 10) of the Convention unless it is justified by an 
overriding requirement in the public interest.”300 
 
The Court identified that with regards to the proportionality test, national authorities 
‘enjoy a certain margin of appreciation’ in order to determine whether there is a ‘pressing 
social need for the restriction.’301 Yet, the Court held that with regard to the protection of 
journalistic sources, the ‘national margin of appreciation’ is ‘circumscribed by the 
interest of democratic society in ensuring and maintaining a free press.’302 Limitations 
imposed on the confidentiality of journalistic sources therefore ‘call for the most careful 
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scrutiny by the Court.’303  
  
Most importantly, the ECtHR reiterated that it will not be sufficient for a party seeking an 
order for disclosure to show that without the order he would be ‘unable to exercise the 
legal right or avert the threatened legal wrong’ in order to establish the necessity of the 
disclosure.’304 The Court identified that during the domestic proceedings the aggrieved 
party had successfully applied for an injunction. The Court suggested that the injunction 
had achieved its objective of preventing the further dissemination of material. In the 
Court’s view the purpose of the Norwich Pharmacal order and the injunction was the 
same, to namely prevent further disclosure of the offending information. This proved a 
significant factor in finding the Norwich Pharmacal order disproportionate to the 
legitimate aim pursued.
305
The restriction in Goodwin caused by the Norwich Pharmacal 
order could not be deemed necessary in a democratic society, ‘notwithstanding the 
margin of appreciation available to the national authorities.’306   
 
2.3.4 Domestic Application 
 
The failure of domestic courts to sufficiently apply the aforementioned reasoning can be 
indentified in the post Human Rights Act 1998 case of Interbrew SA v Financial Times 
Limited.
307
 In Interbrew, a major brewing company based in Belgium, commissioned the 
assessment of a potential takeover bid for a large competitor in the brewing industry. A 
document disclosing that Interbrew was considering this takeover was leaked by an 
unknown person and sent anonymously to various newspapers and a news agency in the 
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post. The leaked document  had been doctored by the unknown person to include an 
increased offer price as well as a fabricated timetable for the bid. The confidential 
information which the document contained was market sensitive and likely to affect the 
share price of both companies. 
 
The leak resulted in a number of published articles referring to the possible takeover, 
published by several media organisations including the Financial Times, The Times, The 
Guardian, and Reuters. In addition, The Independent published an article on the takeover 
after obtaining a copy of the leaked document from another source. As a result of the 
extensive media coverage, the share price of both companies as well as the number of 
shares traded were significantly affected. Interbrew brought an action in the High Court 
seeking a Norwich Pharmacal order requiring that the five media organisations disclose 
the leaked documents so that the unknown person may be identified. 
 
The High Court found that the unknown person had deliberately sought to manipulate the 
press by sending them incorrect information; moreover, there was a clear risk of 
repetition. Lightman LJ granted the order for disclosure after concluding that the public 
interest in allowing Interbrew to prevent further damage to its business and restore the 
integrity of the share market outweighed the public interest in the protection of 
journalistic sources. Whilst the court accepted that there was no certainty that the 
disclosure would ultimately lead to the identification of the unknown person, the order 
was granted on the basis that the document would assist in the investigatory process. 
 
The media organisations challenged the decision before the Court of Appeal. Lord Justice 
Sedley, handing down the leading judgment of the court, dismissed their appeal  on the 
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basis that Interbrew were entitled to the documents in order to enable them to ascertain 
the identity of the unknown person who had committed the actionable wrong of a breach 
of confidence against them. The court determined the compatibility of s.10 Contempt of 
Court Act with art.10 ECHR. Sedley L.J. held that the term ‘necessary’ in s.10 must be 
interpreted in accordance with art.10(2) ECHR which requires that any interference with 
the right to freedom of expression is ‘necessary in a democratic society.’ He then gave 
guidance on the proportionality test imported into the provision and held that for a 
disclosure order to be compatible with art.10 it ‘must meet a pressing social need, must 
be the only practical way of doing so, must be accompanied by safeguards against abuse 
and must not be such as to destroy the essence of the primary right.’308 
 
In undertaking the proportionality test Sedley L.J. recognised that it was well established 
in both the Convention's jurisprudence and the domestic common law that the protection 
of journalistic sources is one of the basic conditions for press freedom. In this regard, he 
said that there was a public interest in maintaining the confidentiality of sources. Sedley 
L.J. then indentified that there was a countervailing public interest in allowing Interbrew 
to restrain by court action any further breaches of confidence by the unknown person, and 
recover any possible damages for the losses sustained. In determining where the balance 
was to be struck between the two competing interests, Sedley L.J. held: 
 “What in my judgment matters critically, at least in the present 
situation, is the source's evident purpose. It was on any view a maleficent one, calculated 
to do harm whether for profit or for spite, and whether to the investing public or 
Interbrew or both. It is legitimate in reaching this view to have regard not only to what 
Interbrew assert is the genuine document but also to the interpolated pages; for whether 
they are forged or authentic, integral or added, they were calculated to maximise the 
mischief…. The public interest in protecting the source of such a leak is in my judgment 
not sufficient to withstand the countervailing public interest in letting Interbrew seek 
justice in the courts against the source.”309 
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The ‘malevolent motive’ of the unknown person was sufficient to satisfy that the Court of 
Appeal that the disclosure was necessary in the interests of justice.When the House of 
Lords refused leave to appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeal, the media 
organisations brought an action before the European Court of Human Rights against the 
United Kingdom alleging that the Norwich Pharmacal order granted by their domestic 
courts breached their art.10 right to freedom of expression.
310
 
 
The ECtHR found in favour of the protection of journalistic sources in a decision highly 
critical of the Court of Appeal’s reasoning. With regard to Sedley L.J.s emphasis on the 
‘malevolent nature of the unknown source, the Court reaffirmed that the conduct of the 
source can never be the decisive feature in determining whether a disclosure order ought 
to be made.
311
 Instead, it may ‘merely operate as one, albeit important, factor’ to be taken 
into consideration when carrying out the balancing exercise in the proportionality test.
312
 
Ultimately, the domestic legal proceedings had determined the source’s motive without 
the opportunity of hearing full evidence of the matter. The Court proceedings in question 
did not allow for a determination of the source to be made with the ‘necessary degree of 
certainty.’313 The Court identified, that domestic courts should be in ‘in the absence of 
compelling evidence slow to assume’ that the source was ‘acting in bad faith with a 
harmful purpose’ to disclose intentionally compelling evidence.314 
 
With regard to the risk that the source could leak again (the so called ‘risk of repetition’) 
the Court observed that all cases where an unauthorised leak of information has occurred 
create such a risk. Most importantly it was held that the risk of repetition could only 
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justify a disclosure order in the exceptional circumstances where there were ‘no 
alternative or less invasive means available of averting a sufficiently serious risk.’315  
 
The ECtHR focused on the fact that Interbrew had received prior notification from a 
journalist that that a leaked document had been obtained and that the newspaper intended 
to publish. Despite this, Interbrew did not seek an injunction to prevent publication. The 
Court of Appeal failed to consider that the matter could be dealt with by use of an 
injunction rather than an order for disclosure.
316
 Ultimately, the ECtHR found that the 
Court of Appeal had reached its conclusion that there was a no less invasive and 
alternative means of discovering the source by drawing inferences from the evidence 
before the court. The evidence available came from witness testimony from the Applicant 
and the Court of Appeal’s reasoning based upon this evidence was highly speculative.317  
 
The Court identified that the aim of ‘preventing further leaks’ would only justify an order 
for source disclosure in ‘exceptional circumstances.’ Those circumstances, the Court 
identified, were, firstly, where ‘no reasonable and less invasive alternative means of 
averting the risk were available. Second, is where the risk threatened is ‘sufficiently 
serious and defined’ to render the disclosure order necessary within the meaning of art.10 
(2).
318
  
 
When balancing Interbrew's cumulative interests in identifying the unknown person 
against the competing public interest of the protection of journalistic sources, Strasbourg 
unanimously held that the Norwich Pharmacal order issued by the domestic courts was a 
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disproportionate interference with the right to freedom of expression and could, therefore, 
not be said to be necessary in a democratic society. The national authorities had 
overstepped their margin of appreciation and had thereby violated art.10 ECHR. 
 
2.3.5 Analysis of the protection of Journalistic Sources Post FT v UK 
 
It is submitted that the FT v UK decision has reiterated that where the protection of 
journalistic sources is concerned, domestic courts must undertake the proportionality 
analysis with the upmost care. The domestic Courts in the Interbrew decision failed to 
afford sufficient weight to the protection of journalistic sources and the ‘chilling effect’ 
that could prevent individuals from imparting information to journalists in the future for 
fear of exposure.  
 
The Strasbourg Court identified that the domestic proceedings did not allow the 
appropriate forum for the determination of the source’s motivation for the disclosure. 
This factor is most important because it identifies the different approach needed to 
proportionality balancing of journalistic source cases in comparison with the Convention 
jurisprudence concerning Whistleblowing cases. In applications for Norwich Phamacal 
orders, the motivation of the source must not be a significant part of the balancing 
exercise. Whereas, in whistleblowing cases whereby the identity of the source is known, 
the motivation of the source becomes most important in determining whether the 
individual had made the disclosure in good faith.
319
 Regardless of whether a court is 
considering a whistleblower as a journalistic source, or a whistleblower who approaches 
the public or other external avenue of disclosure directly, the ‘chilling effect’ is the same. 
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In both circumstances, the impact of a decision which will adversely affect the 
whistleblower is most likely to deter future employees from raising concerns. It may be 
argued that because the court in journalistic source cases should place emphasis upon the 
public interest of the information in question, rather than the purported motivation of the 
source, a whistleblower who acts out of revenge, but who raises information in the public 
interest is more likely to be protected. In post facto disclosure cases the source’s 
motivation may be sufficient to outweigh the public interest in the information concerned. 
Whilst this may appear to the reader to be an unlikely occurrence, the individual 
circumstances of the case will necessitate full determination of the competing interests.  
 
In a co-authored piece with Paul David Mora, the author has previously argued that in FT 
v UK the Strasbourg court had failed to determine whether the risk of repetition could 
have been dealt with using alternative and less intrusive means.
320
 The authors identified 
that the grant of an injunction could have prevented further harm to Interbrew. This 
position is in line with the stance previously taken in Goodwin v UK whereby the 
previous grant of an injunction was considered as sufficient to prevent the risk of further 
disclosures. 
 
In FT v UK, the Strasbourg Court did however identify that the risk of repetition could 
only be justified by a disclosure order in exceptional circumstances, firstly, where it was 
clear that there were no less alternative or invasive means available, and second, where 
the risk threatened is ‘sufficiently serious and defined’ to render the disclosure order 
necessary within the meaning of art.10 (2).
321
 It is submitted that in cases involving new 
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media, whereby the information was disclosed either via the internet per se or via an 
online outlet such as Wikileaks, the success of an injunction to counter the risk of 
repetition must be clearly called into question. It will be identified in Chapter 5 of this 
thesis that the traditional grant of injunctions may only be successful prior to any 
publication concerned.  
 
Extensive publication of information on the internet is likely to result in individuals 
downloading or re-publishing the material in locations all over the world. The prevention 
of further publication is therefore extremely unlikely. Furthermore, one must consider 
whether the grant of an injunction prior to publication is likely to have the desired effect. 
The grant of an injunction against individuals based outside the jurisdiction will cause 
inevitable difficulties for any subsequent enforcement. The threat of any subsequent 
enforcement action may therefore not be enough for individuals based outside the 
jurisdiction to be convinced not to publish. This satisfies the first limb of the 
‘exceptionally serious’ criterion identified in FT v UK. If the information disclosed by the 
whistleblower contains information pertaining to national security or its disclosure would 
be likely to result in the committal of an offence for misconduct in public office, it is 
submitted that this is likely to satisfy the second limb of the criterion, namely that the 
circumstances are sufficiently serious that a disclosure order is required to protect 
national security or to prevent disorder or crime. A Norwich Pharmacal order is therefore 
likely to be justified, applying both the reasoning in Goodwin v UK and FT v UK. The 
extraterritorial application and enforcement of Norwich Pharmacal orders against 
individuals based outside of the domestic jurisdiction is considered further below. The 
position relating to persons who disclose information to Wikileaks or similar 
organizations should be contrasted to whistleblowers that approach traditional media 
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outlets. 
 
 Domestically, if a newspaper pre-notifies the organisation to which it intends to publish 
leaked documents, then that organisation will presented with an opportunity to apply for 
an injunction against a newspaper or other traditional media outlet. In situations whereby 
the information disclosed is not pertaining to national security information or the 
disclosure of which is unlikely to result in the commission of a criminal offence it is 
likely that the grant of an injunction may provide the least obtrusive means to prevent the 
risk of repetition. This consideration would most likely render the grant of a Norwich 
Pharmacal order as disproportionate. If the same individual were to contact Wikileaks or 
a similar organization, it is submitted that the situation would more likely find the grant 
of a disclosure order to be justifiable and proportionate because the grant of an injunction 
in the circumstances may not be sufficient to prevent further disclosures. This discussion 
will now progress to consider where disclosures of information have engaged the 
competing right to privacy contained in article 8 ECHR.  
 
2.3.6 Protection of Journalistic Sources and Countervailing Privacy Rights 
 
Ashworth Hospital Authority v MGN Ltd
322
 concerned the use of extracts of confidential 
medical records of ‘Moors murderer,’ Ian Brady, in an article by the Daily Mirror. Brady 
had chosen to go on hunger strike at the time and consequentially had received wide 
spread media coverage on the matter. Rougier J ordered the publisher of the Daily Mirror, 
MGN Ltd to make a witness statement identifying the source whom it had obtained the 
records from. MGN Ltd appealed stating, in its defence, that Rougier had no jurisdiction 
                                                        
322  [2002] 4 All ER 193 HL. 
 122 
 
 
to grant such an order. The Mirror journalist stated that he had assumed the source to be 
an employee of Ashworth hospital, but did not know the identity of the source. He did 
however, acknowledge that he knew the identity of the intermediary with whom he had 
obtained the information and that in revealing the identity; the original source would 
probably be exposed. The Court of Appeal and later the House of Lords took the step of 
upholding the order for disclosure. At the Court of Appeal Laws L.J. did however express 
the importance of ‘off the record’ sources and the protection of a free press: 
“The public interest in the non-disclosure of press sources is constant, 
whatever the merits of the particular publication, and the particular source… the 
true position is that it is always prima facie contrary to the public interest that 
press sources should be disclosed; and in any given case the debate which follows 
will be conducted upon the question whether there is an overriding public interest, 
amounting to a pressing social need, to which the need to keep press sources 
confidential should give way.”323   
 
The court considered hospital-patient confidentiality a more important relationship than 
journalist and source. The court believed that such leaks to the press are detrimental, not 
only on the relationship of practitioner-patient, but also that it creates an atmosphere of 
distrust amongst professionals and would fuel fears that further leaks may take place. 
Crucially, the case rested upon two key factors: trust and confidence. Lord Wolf C.J.  
drew guidance from Z v Finland
324
: 
  “Respecting the confidentiality of health data is a vital 
principle in the legal systems of all contracting parties to the Convention. It is crucial not 
only to respect the sense of privacy of a patient but also to preserve his or her confidence 
in the medical profession and in the health services in general.”325                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
 
Following the successful disclosure of Ackroyd as the intermediary, the Hospital then 
applied for a Norwich Pharmacal order to compel Ackroyd to reveal the identity of his 
source(s). The application failed in both the High Court and Court of Appeal. At trial, Mr 
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Justice Tugendhat identified that the right to freedom of expression afforded by art.10 
ECHR was in conflict with the right to respect for private and family life afforded by 
art.8. Tugendhat L.J. then engaged the ‘new methodology’ test formulated in Re S (A 
Child) (Identification: Restrictions on Publication): 
“(1) neither article has precedence over the other 
(2) There must be a detailed examination of the ‘comparative importance of the 
specific rights being claimed’ 
(3) Judges should identify the reasons for interfering with or restricting each right. 
(4) The ultimate balancing test is determined by reference to proportionality.”326 
 
As Clayton and Tomlinson correctly identify, the new approach post HRA, requires that 
the court must consider the public interest value of the disclosure and balance it against 
the confidentiality rights of the individual whose information has been disclosed.
327
 It is 
submitted that in importing the ‘new methodology’ test to Norwich Pharmacal orders, the 
court will need to consider the jurisprudence of a number of decided cases concerning 
actions brought for misuse of private information.
328
  
 
For the purposes of this analysis, it is submitted that Article 8 is less likely to be engaged 
whereby the information disclosed refers to governmental activity. Thus, it would be 
highly unlikely and improbable that the UK government would be able to assert art.8 
rights. As Baroness Hale identified in Campbell, in the domestic courts the ‘problem of 
balancing two rights of equal importance arises most acutely in the context of disputes 
between private persons.’329 
 
It should be noted that the information disseminated as a result of the Wikileaks 
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disclosures created a high likelihood of the publication of details regarding private 
individuals not working in an official governmental capacity or information detailing the 
private lives or private conduct of public officials. It is submitted that both of the 
aforementioned scenarios would most likely engage art. 8 and would require the most 
careful scrutiny of the court using the new methodology test. The grant and enforcement 
of a Norwich Pharmacal order against an organisation, such as Wikileaks, based in a 
different jurisdiction will now be considered below. 
 
2.3.7 Extraterritorial application of Norwich Pharmacal Orders  
 
The emphasis of this next section will be to consider the application of Norwich 
Pharmacal orders served outside of the domestic jurisdiction. In circumstances such as 
the Wikileaks disclosures, it is submitted that Norwich Pharmacal orders may be sought 
against the organisation that facilitated the disclosure (Wikileaks), an Internet Service 
Provider (more commonly referred to as an ‘ISP’) and any organisations relevant to the 
facilitation of the disclosure. Such organisations could include chat or discussion forums, 
social networking sites, providers of email facilities and internet search engines.  
 
Before considering the extraterritorial application of Norwich Pharmacal orders it is 
necessary to briefly outline the process for making such an order. The common process 
requires the claimant to serve a claim form to the relevant party. In making the claim 
form the Claimant should also make an application to the court for a disclosure order. 
The Claimant may alternatively make an application ‘without notice’ to the High Court.  
 
With regard to proposed action taken against a person based outside the jurisdiction, the 
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Claimant will first need to consider whether he can serve a claim form without the need 
for permission of the court. Civil Procedure Rules 6.33 and 6.34 identify the 
circumstances where permission of the court is not required. However, even if permission 
of the court is not required and a claim form is served, the Claimant will still require the 
assistance of the court to obtain a Norwich Pharmacal order.  
 
According to Civil Procedure Rule 6.36, it is necessary for the claimant to argue that the 
relevant provisions of the Practice Direction apply and that the order should be granted 
on that basis. Firstly, he must identify that the claim is made against a person on whom 
the claim form has (or will be) served. Second, that there is ‘between the claimant and the 
defendant’ a real issue which is ‘reasonable for the court to try’ and thirdly that the 
claimant wishes to serve the claim form on another person who is ‘a necessary or proper 
party to that claim.’ 
 
It should be reiterated that in addition to the aforementioned conditions detailed in the 
Practice Direction, the claimant must also satisfy the conditions established in the 
Norwich Pharmacal decision, reaffirmed and considered in detail following the 
establishment of the Civil Procedure Rules by Mr Justice Lightman in Mitsui & Co Ltd 
and Nexen Petroleum UK Ltd.
330
 Most importantly, the person against whom the order is 
sought must be a) mixed up in so as to have facilitated the wrongdoing and b) be able or 
likely to be able to provide the information necessary to enable the ultimate wrongdoer to 
be sued.’331 The first hurdle for the claimant to overcome is therefore the difficulty in 
being able to ascertain the identity of the person(s) involved in the facilitation of the 
unauthorised disclosure. The second hurdle is to establish the jurisdiction to which the 
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individuals or the organisation is based, this is necessary for the court to establish 
whether the proposed method of service is legal in the jurisdiction in question and more 
importantly for the purposes of enforcement if the order is not complied with. Ultimately, 
a Norwich Pharmacal order cannot be used as a ‘general licence to fish for information 
that will not do more than potentially assist them to identify a claim or a defendant.’332 
Technological advancements have enabled individuals to access the internet and post 
information globally, thus allowing organisations such as Wikileaks the opportunity to 
operate using laptop computers and remote servers, making the identity of the individual 
and the location to which he is based considerably more difficult to ascertain. This 
discussion will now progress to consider the case law developments where Norwich 
Pharmacal orders have been considered in the context of actions conducted on the 
internet.  
 
2.4 Norwich Pharmacal Orders and the Internet  
 
In Grant v Google UK Ltd
333
 the applicant, a trustee of a trust owned the copyright to a 
book to which an early draft had been made available for free download via an 
advertisement on the search engine Google. Following investigations, the trust 
determined that the website in question had been registered through a company which 
specialises in ‘cloaking’ the identity of owners of web domains. After failed requests for 
information were made to the company, the trust contacted Google on the basis that the 
company would possess the identity of the advertiser. Google declined to provide the 
information without giving explicit reasons for doing so but suggested that the Trust 
apply for a Norwich Pharmacal order, prompting the Trust to do so. In the course of the 
                                                        
332 Arab Satellite Communications Organisation v Saad Faqih & Another [2008] EWHC 2568 (QB).    
333 [2005] EWHC 3444.  
 127 
 
 
proceedings, it emerged that Google had identified that it would not oppose the order 
provided that the trust abandon a proposed prohibitory injunction, the details of which 
were not made clear in the judgment.
334
 On this basis Mr Justice Rimmer granted the 
order without considering the jurisdictional implications or how such an order could be 
enforced.  
 
In G and G v Wikimedia Foundation Inc (A Company Organised under the Laws of the 
State of Florida) the applicants were a mother and young daughter. The first applicant 
contended that private and confidential information had been published on an entry to the 
Wikipedia website. The applicants sought a Norwich Pharmacal order against the 
proprietors of Wikipedia for the IP address of the registered user involved in the posting 
to prevent further breaches of privacy. The first applicant was in dispute with another 
individual who was making claims against the company she worked for. The first 
applicant identified to the court that she had been sent anonymous communications 
threatening to publish details of her personal expenses to which she denies any 
wrongdoing. The first applicant believed that she was subject to an attempt at blackmail 
by a person working for the company who was subject to a confidentiality clause. During 
the course of proceedings it was identified that the Applicants’ solicitor had contacted the 
respondent requesting for the information contained on the website to be taken down and 
for the IP information to be disclosed. Wikipedia removed the information but resisted 
disclosure of the information. It identified that: 
 “Without waiving our insistence that no court in the United 
Kingdom has proper jurisdiction over us as a foreign entity, we nevertheless are willing 
to comply with a properly issued court order narrowly limited to the material 
[requested].”335  
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Mr Justice Tugendhadt drew attention to the Form of Search order, paragraph 20, given 
in the practice direction to CPR Part 25, which prohibits the Respondent from directly or 
indirectly informing wrongdoer until 4.30pm on the return date specified or by further 
order of the court. The motivation for this provision is to prevent the wrongdoer from 
being ‘tipped off’ by the third party. Tugendhadt L.J. identified that the privacy policy 
adopted by Wikipedia indicated that the organisation would notify the user within three 
days of receiving the order. Tugendhadt L.J. noted that since the Respondent had not 
agreed to refrain from notifying the alleged wrongdoer and had stated that it did not 
accept the jurisdiction of the court there would have been ‘difficulties in making or 
enforcing an order with which it had not agreed to comply.’336 As Tugendhadt L.J. had 
not been asked to prohibit disclosure of the making of the order against the Respondent 
he did not feel it appropriate to ‘make observations’ as to prohibiting disclosure of the 
fact that a disclosure order had been made.
337
  
 
It is suggested that Tugendhadt L.J.’s failure to consider the jurisdiction of the court to 
prevent the Respondent from disclosing to the alleged wrongdoer that an order had been 
made represents a missed opportunity to close a lacuna which runs contrary to the spirit 
of the practice direction and to the nature of Norwich Pharmacal orders, which may be 
applied for without notice. To allow the Respondent to notify the alleged wrongdoer may 
provide sufficient time for the individual to commit further acts of wrongdoing, before 
the opportunity for the aggrieved party to take action has arisen. If the wrongdoer 
commits further wrongdoing by releasing confidential information over the internet, the 
effects of a subsequent injunction will be severely limited, thus denying the aggrieved 
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party the chance of obtaining an adequate remedy.
338
 
 
In Lockton Companies International & Others v Persons Unknown & Google Inc
339
 the 
case concerned the sending of offensive emails purportedly by employees of an English 
company based in the jurisdiction. The recipients of the emails were also based in the 
jurisdiction. The applicant applied for a Norwich Pharmacal order against Google who 
operated the online email service used to send the emails. Mr Justice Eady identified that 
during the course of proceedings there had been communication with Google in which 
the company had indicated that it would comply with an order if served but that it does 
not accept the jurisdiction of the court. Eady L.J. therefore determined that it was 
necessary to consider whether it was appropriate to grant permission to serve an order on 
Google. Eady L.J. determined that as the circumstances related to an English company 
and to its employees based in the jurisdiction it was reasonable to infer that once the 
persons had been identified service would be affected on them in the domestic 
jurisdiction. Eady L.J. held that ‘Norwich Pharmacal relief is substantive relief,’ 
therefore, ‘the application did not offend against the principle that that one could not 
assert jurisdiction against a party resident abroad purely for the purposes of the disclosure 
of documents.’  
 
Eady L.J. applied the test developed by Lord Justice Lightman in Mitsui & Co Ltd v 
Nexen Petroleum UK Ltd
340
 which requires three conditions for the court to satisfy before 
it can exercise Norwich Pharmacal relief: 
 “(I) a wrong must be carried out, or arguably carried out, by an 
ultimate wrongdoer; 
(ii) there must be the need for an order to enable action to be brought against the ultimate 
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wrongdoer; and 
(iii) the person against whom the order is sought must: (a) be mixed up in so as to have 
facilitated the wrongdoing; and (b) be able or likely to be able to provide the information 
necessary to enable the wrongdoer to be sued.”341 
 
Eady L.J. granted the order on the basis that the above conditions had been met. In 
particular, it was held that such an order could only be made against Google. The 
judgment is therefore consistent with the principle that an order made against a party 
outside the jurisdiction cannot be made for the disclosure of documents alone.
342
 The 
Mitsui test provides a more stringent standard of review requiring the court to ask 
whether the order is necessary to obtain the information required. However, it is 
submitted that the test may still be easily satisfied. If an aggrieved Crown servant sent an 
email disclosing official information from a Google email account, or posted it on a blog 
operated by the company, discussed the matter on an online forum, used a certain internet 
provider to which the authorities are aware, or created a Wikipedia entry or posted 
information on Facebook or Twitter, there would be sufficient proximity between the 
wrongdoer and the company involved to satisfy the test. Moreover, if an online outlet 
(such as a Wikileaks type organisation) was used to publish and disseminate material and 
the applicant could not determine the location or identity or means of contacting the 
persons concerned, but was able to establish that one of the above methods were used to 
establish communication with the outlet or pass the information this would still satisfy all 
three limbs of the Mitsui test. 
 
In determining whether a Norwich Pharmacal order should be granted outside of the 
jurisdiction it should be reiterated that before doing so the court is bound by s.6 HRA to 
Act compatibly with the Convention rights. Utilisation of different internet services and 
                                                        
341 Ibid, para 21. 
342 This further bolsters the principle that Norwich Pharmacal orders cannot be granted to as a general 
licence to ‘fish for information’ see above 332. 
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the purpose of the use of those services are likely to engage different rights under the 
Convention. Therefore, an email sent using an online email system such as Google 
resulting in private correspondence between individuals is likely to engage art.8 of the 
Convention, particularly where disclosure of the contents of the emails is sought. 
Disclosures sought relating to the identity of persons conducting searches carried out 
using Google’s search facility would also likely engage art.8, whereas, posting 
information on a blog or on Twitter is likely to engage art.10 of the Convention. As has 
been outlined above, the court must rigorously test the competing interests to achieve the 
high level of scrutiny required by the proportionality test. This becomes most difficult 
when an order is applied for ex parte, without giving the party proposed to be subject to 
an order notice to present their competing argument as to why the information should not 
be disclosed. Where the party is notified that they may be subject to an order they are 
provided with an opportunity to identify their objections to disclosure of the information. 
It is most concerning that the organisations identified in the above cases have not 
attempted to resist the Norwich Pharmacal orders and instead have suggested that where 
information is sought, applicants may apply to obtain an order for disclosure from the 
court which if granted will lead to the unopposed disclosure of the information, without 
accepting the jurisdiction of the court. The following section will consider the 
Extraterritorial application of Norwich Pharmacal orders, with particular reference as to 
whether such orders can be enforced. 
 
2.4.1 Extraterritorial application of Norwich Pharmacal Orders: Enforcement for non 
compliance.  
 
This section is not intended to be a comprehensive treatment of the various international 
treaties and agreements for the service and enforcement of court orders. It will, however, 
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identify some of the considerations and difficulties in enforcing Norwich Pharmacal 
orders abroad. It will start by considering proceedings against online outlets such as 
Wikileaks who are located outside the domestic jurisdiction of the courts but inside the 
jurisdiction of EU member states. 
 
Domestic courts are bound to adhere to EU Regulations, as per the obligations set out in 
s.2 European Communities Act 1972. Council Regulation 44/2001, Brussels Regulations 
I concerns the jurisdiction, recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and 
commercial matters. According to Article 2, a judgment made by the court in one 
European jurisdiction may be enforced by the court in another. A judgment is defined to 
include an ‘order’ or a ‘decision.’343 Therefore a Norwich Pharmacal order against a 
person in another EU jurisdiction would apply. However, according to Article 34, a 
judgment may not be enforced where recognition of it is ‘manifestly contrary to public 
policy in the Member State in which recognition is sought.’  
 
It is submitted that the extraterritorial enforcement of a Norwich Pharmacal order against 
a journalistic organisation will be more difficult to achieve where the EU member state 
has comprehensive journalistic source protection.
344
 Assange reportedly chose to base the 
Wikileaks organisation in Sweden because of the strength of journalist shield laws.
345
 
Chapter 3, Article 3 of the Freedom of the Press Act (1949) (Sweden) in particular 
protects the anonymity of journalistic sources. However, it should be noted that Chapter 
3, Article 3 (3) contains an exception to the protection of anonymity whereby a person 
                                                        
343 Defined in Article 32. 
344 For reasons of focus this section will concentrate upon Sweden as an example. A detailed summary of 
the various journalistic source protections in EU members states is contained in: Briefing Paper on the 
Protection of Journalistic Sources, Article 19, 1998: 
http://www.article19.org/data/files/pdfs/publications/right-to-protect-sources.pdf (accessed 04/01/12). 
345Sweden plays key role in Wikileaks Operations, Swedishwire:  
http://www.swedishwire.com/politics/5586-sweden-plays-key-role-in-wikileaks-operations (accessed 
09/01/2012). 
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who contributes to a publication as author or other originator renders himself guilty of: 
“1. high treason, espionage, gross espionage, gross unauthorised trafficking in 
secret information, insurrection, treason or betrayal of country, or any attempt, 
preparation or conspiracy to commit such an offence; 
2. wrongful release of an official document to which the public does not have access, or 
release of such a document in contravention of a restriction imposed by a public authority 
at the time of its release, where the act is deliberate; or 
3. deliberate disregard of a duty of confidentiality, in cases specified in a special act of 
law;” 
 
It may be identified that in Sweden, the protections afforded to journalistic sources are 
not absolute. With regard to the unauthorised disclosure of official documents, Chapter 7, 
Article 4 (3) identifies espionage as whereby ‘in order to assist a foreign power’ a person 
‘conveys, consigns or discloses without due authority’: 
 “Information concerning defence installations, armaments, 
storage installations, import, export, mode of fabrication, negotiations, decisions or other 
circumstances the disclosure of which to a foreign power could cause detriment to the 
total defence system or otherwise to the security of the Realm, regardless of whether the 
information is correct.” 
 
Chapter 7, Article 4 (4) identifies the unauthorised trafficking of secret information as 
whereby a person ‘without due authority but with no intent to assist a foreign power’ 
makes an unauthorised disclosure of secret information ‘regardless of whether the 
information is correct.’ Such an act is taken to include circumstances whereby the 
offender disclosed information ‘entrusted to him in conjunction with public or private 
employment.’ 
 
It is submitted that the aforementioned provisions provide a strong basis on which the 
United Kingdom could argue that a Norwich Pharmacal order could be enforced in 
Sweden and would not be ‘manifestly contrary to public policy.’ The Freedom of the 
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Press Act is part of the Swedish Constitution. Moreover, it may be argued that Chapter 7, 
Article 4 represent a more widely defined but similarly overarching counterpart to the 
exemptions of national security or the prevention of disorder or crime contained in s.10 
Contempt of Court Act 1981. 
 
The apparent transient nature of  Wikileaks’ operations suggests that it may be difficult to 
enforce Norwich Pharmacal proceedings in another jurisdiction. Unlike a traditional 
media organisation, individuals from online reporting outlets could move to another 
jurisdiction, frustrating any order sought. Individuals may be prompted to engage in 
‘rights tourism’ by travelling to a state which has stronger journalistic source protections 
than another. In Iceland, for example, the Icelandic Modern Media Initiative has sought 
to make Iceland a ‘safe haven for investigative journalism.’346 In 2010, the Icelandic 
Parliament passed approval for a resolution, if the legislative changes proposed are 
implemented in their entirety, it would be highly unlikely that a Norwich Pharmacal 
order could be obtained in the jurisdiction. Moreover, as Iceland is not a member of the 
European Union, the Brussels Convention I will not apply.  
 
Before this discussion progresses further, it is necessary to reiterate that a breach of a 
Norwich Pharmacal order may result in the committal of the criminal offence of 
Contempt of Court, as per the Contempt of Court Act 1981. A European Arrest Warrant 
may be issued by an EU member state to request another state to arrest and deport an 
individual for the purposes of conducting a criminal prosecution.
347
 For a European 
Arrest Warrant to be issued, the alleged crime with which the warrant is concerned must 
                                                        
346 IMMI Website, http://immi.is/Icelandic_Modern_Media_Initiative#Timeline (accessed 05/01/2012). 
347 For treaty documents see further: http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32002F0584:EN:NOT (accessed 03/01/12). 
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carry a custodial sentence of twelve months.
348
 It should be noted that s.14 of the CCA 
1981 identifies that a ‘superior court’ may hand down a custodial sentence not exceeding 
two years. Section 19 of the Act, defines ‘superior court’ to include the High Court, 
which is where Norwich Pharmacal orders are issued. The United Kingdom therefore has 
the jurisdiction to issue a European Arrest Warrant for non compliance with a Norwich 
Pharmacal order.  
 
It is suggested that a person wishing to contact a Wikileaks type organisation would still 
at the outset need to identify how to access such a website. It may therefore be that whilst 
traditional Norwich Pharmacal orders against the press may not be as successful against 
online journalistic organisations, they may be successful against other actors who may 
either host the necessary information to which enquiries may be made or may provide a 
method of communication which may assist in identifying the source of an unauthorised 
disclosure.  
 
The following cases provide information with regards to jurisdiction in the United States 
of America, in Louis Bacon v (1) Automattic Inc (2) Wikimedia Foundation (3) Denver 
Post Inc
349
 the applicant sought a Norwich Pharmacal order requesting the names and 
addresses, IP addresses and other information to assist in identifying the person(s) 
responsible for publishing alleged defamatory material on the websites, Wikipedia, 
Wordpress and the Denver Post. The first two defendants were based in California 
whereas the third defendant was based in Colorado. As in the above cases, solicitors for 
the applicant first contacted the defendants requesting the information. The controllers of 
Wordpress requested a court order (the response did not stipulate the jurisdiction to which 
                                                        
348 Ibid.  
349 [2011] EWHC 1072. 
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it would accept a court order). Counsel for Wikimedia responded that there is a procedure 
for having a foreign subpoena recognised by US courts and that they would only comply 
with a US court subpoena. The controllers of the Denver Post website did not respond. 
 
The Claimant provided a witness statement, adduced in evidence to the proceedings. 
California council advised that a Norwich Pharmacal order may be enforced in California 
by virtue of the Interstate and International Depositions and Discovery Act, Cal Code of 
Civil Procedure Section 2029.100, and that he did not envisage difficulty in enforcing 
such an order in California.
350
 Mr Justice Tugendhadt did not conduct a further analysis 
of the jurisdiction issue. Tugendhadt LJ granted Norwich Pharmacal orders against all 
three defendants in the case, allowing service by email.  
 
It is submitted that Norwich Pharmacal orders are unlikely to be enforced in all states in 
the United States of America. The Uniform Interstate and International Depositions and 
Discovery Act was introduced to implement the provisions of the Hague Convention on 
the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters in all States. However, 
the Uniform Interstate and International Depositions and Discovery Act has only been 
adopted by seven states and territories.
351
 Morgan identifies that a foreign state may make 
a request for discovery directly to a United States Federal Court, via the Department of 
State, or directly to a United States District Court.
352
 It is submitted that the difficulty will 
be for courts in other states (not including the seven identified) to accept jurisdiction of 
the Norwich Pharmacal order.  
                                                        
350 Ibid, para 14.  
351 California, Arkansas, District of Columbia, Louisiana, Massachusetts, 
Pennsylvania, and the Virgin Islands, see further: Memorandum, Oregon Law Commission, 2008, 
http://www.willamette.edu/wucl/olc/groups/2007-2009/pdf/uidda_prop_1_30.pdf (accessed 09/01/2012).  
352 E.Morgan, Discovery [1999] EJIL 10, 583, 585.  
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Whilst the UK could seek assistance from the U.S. Department of Justice to obtain 
discovery where a criminal case is pending, in Re Request for Assistance From Ministry 
of Legal Affairs of Trinidad and Tobago
353
 the United States Court of Appeals held that 
the district judge making the determination as to whether discovery could be granted 
should be satisfied that ‘a proceeding is very likely to occur.’354 Thus, if the judge has 
doubts that proceedings will be forthcoming or ‘suspects that the request is a fishing 
expedition’ he should deny the application.355  
 
2.4.2 Proceedings brought in third party’s home jurisdiction 
 
Whilst it may be identified that enforcement of the Norwich Pharmacal orders may be 
difficult in other jurisdictions. It is suggested that as an alternative the authority could 
bring proceedings directly in the individual’s home jurisdiction. In a recent case brought 
before the San Mateo court in California, USA, Tyneside Council sought disclosure of 
the identity of a local counsellor who had allegedly libelled the council via a number of 
anonymous accounts.
356
 The Supreme Court of California upheld an order forcing Twitter 
to disclose the information. Twitter disclosed the name and email address of the 
                                                        
353 [1988] 848 F.2d 1151. 
354 Ibid, para 15.  
355 Ibid. 
356J. Halliday, Twitter Anonymous User Battle, Guardian, 29/05/2011: 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2011/may/29/twitter-anonymous-user-legal-battle (accessed 09/11/11). For 
related court docments see further San Mateo Court Website: 
http://www.sanmateocourt.org/midx/strip.php?kase=jp5w3 (accessed 09/11/11) and  
http://openaccess1.sanmateocourt.org/getpdf/pdftemp/201112010648088477/A-0000074796-1.pdf (accessed 
09/11/11). 
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Counsellor. Whilst it is currently not known whether further action is intended to be taken 
against the Counsellor in the domestic jurisdiction, it should be observed that the 
Counsellor argued that a number of employees had contacted him as whistleblowers in 
order to disclose alleged malpractice at the authority. The success of the application is 
particularly significant for the purposes of this analysis as the United States Government 
have successfully been granted a ‘secret’ court order to obtain all information from 
Google and Twitter to hand over account information from users of messaging facilities 
provided by the respective organisations.
357
  
 
2.4.3 Analysis of the Current Status of Norwich Pharmacal Orders and the Internet 
 
The aforementioned analysis has identified that domestic courts have failed to rigorously 
engage proportionality balancing to the standard exercised at Strasbourg. The failure of 
domestic courts to correctly apply the Strasbourg jurisprudence has meant that 
journalistic sources in the UK have not been adequately protected. The decision in FT v 
UK reinforces the Goodwin decision as the right approach, and correctly applied, should 
the apparently unequal balance caused by applicants making often ex parte applications 
for disclosure orders. Disclosure orders must therefore only be granted in exceptional 
circumstances, whereby no other alternative and less obtrusive means are available. The 
difficulty with this reasoning for disclosure made via the internet is that the applicant will 
                                                        
357For commentary about the order see further Reauters, US Order Targets Wikileaks Supporters Mail, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/10/10/us-google-wikileaks-idUSTRE79918F20111010 (accessed 
10/10/11)  and Reporters without Borders, Twitter Forced to Hand Over Personal Data to Subscribers 
http://en.rsf.org/united-states-justice-department-ordered-twitter-11-01-2011,39270.html (accessed 
01/11/11). 
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have strong grounds to state that an injunction will not be sufficient to prevent the risk of 
repetition. If the information disclosed pertains to national security, it is most likely to 
fall within the exception indentified in art. 10 (2). It is submitted therefore, that with 
regard to the online leaking of official information there is still a strong possibility that a 
Norwich Pharmacal order will be granted.  
 
The prior discussion has highlighted the apparent difficulties in the enforcement of such 
an order outside of the jurisdiction. However, the ease in obtaining the orders in cases 
like Louis Bacon v (1) Automattic Inc (2) Wikimedia Foundation (3) Denver Post Inc 
requires further consideration. Bacon and the cases identified prior, show a willingness of 
the organisations based outside of a jurisdiction to comply with a disclosure order without 
accepting the jurisdiction of the court. Neither the courts, nor the organisations 
themselves appear willing to question whether such an order could be enforced outside of 
the jurisdiction. This is significant because even if disclosures are made to a Wikileaks 
organisation or similar and the organisation refuses to comply with a Norwich Pharmacal 
order, it may be that the identity of the source could be determined from making a 
disclosure against organisations such as Google or Twitter with apparent ease.  
 
Neither Google nor Twitter are journalistic organisations, meaning that they are less 
likely to oppose disclosure orders on the basis that they owe an undertaking to protect the 
identity of a journalistic source. Such organisations will lack sufficient proximity for 
protection under s.10 Contempt of Court Act. It should be reiterated that Norwich 
Pharmacal orders are often made ex parte, thus preventing the intended recipients of such 
an order with the chance of stating their opposition to it. Whilst s.10 may not be a 
consideration, the courts will still be placed under an obligation as per s.6 HRA to engage 
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the art.10 rights of source. It is submitted that in order to satisfy the high standards of 
protection afforded by article 10, domestic courts must not view the lack of proximity 
between the internet organisations such as Google and Twitter as justification to not apply 
Strasbourg jurisprudence relating to the protection of journalistic sources. Such 
applications will require the most careful scrutiny by the courts.  
 
It is submitted that Norwich Pharmacal orders in the internet age will most likely to 
engage art.8, the right to private and family life, not as a competing right to art.10 but as 
an added layer of protection for the individual using those services. The providing of user 
account data is likely to identify private information which may not assist in the 
investigatory process. Any interference must therefore be proportionate within the 
exceptions identified in art.8 (2) which most likely for the purposes of an investigation 
into unauthorised disclosure are the exceptions: necessary for the prevention of disorder 
or crime, public safety, or the protection of national security.  
 
It should be noted that police or other investigatory agencies could of course attempt to 
request the information directly from the provider. Google, which provides search 
facilities, webmail and blogging facilities, track the number of requests from 
governments for user data. In the period 2010-2011, Google reportedly received 1,444 
government requests for user/accounts information and 1,279 requests for information 
regarding user data in the period 2010-2011. Google identified that they complied with 
63% of those requests.
358
 This discussion will now progress to consider the search and 
seizure of journalistic material, whereby recent Strasbourg case law has taken a consistent 
approach to the reasoning in Goodwin. 
                                                        
358Google Transparency Report: 
http://www.google.com/transparencyreport/governmentrequests/GB/?p=2011-06 (accessed 13/02/12). 
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2.5 Search and Seizure of Journalistic Material 
 
The ECtHR decision in Roemen and Schmit v Luxembourg
359
 contains an example 
whereby a journalist openly questioned the integrity of a government minister, it also 
gives an example whereby instead of obtaining an order for source disclosure the 
prosecuting authorities instead obtained warrants for the search and seizure of documents 
and other objects in order to ascertain the identity of the source. After receiving a leaked 
confidential memo, the first applicant, a journalist had published an article in a daily 
newspaper stating that a government minister had been convicted of value-added tax 
fraud and alleging that as a result he had broken the Seventh, Eighth and Ninth 
Commandments. He proclaimed that the minister’s conduct was ‘shameful’ in that it 
involved ‘a public figure who should have set an example.’ It later emerged that the 
minister had appealed the conviction.
360
 The minister first attempted to bring an action in 
damages against the journalist however the District Court dismissed the action on the 
grounds of press freedom. The minister then requested criminal proceedings be brought 
against the journalist for handling information disclosed in professional confidence and 
proceedings for breaching professional confidence against the unknown source.  
 
The public prosecutor requested the investigating judge to carry out and arrange searches 
of the journalist’s home.361 The journalist unsuccessfully appealed for the search warrants 
to be set aside. Search warrants were then issued against the second applicant, the first 
applicant’s lawyer, to seize all objects relating to the offence. The searches did not reveal 
the identity of the source however charges were brought against the journalist. The 
                                                        
359(2003) (Application no. 51772/99).  
360Ibid para 9.  
361Ibid para 13. 
 142 
 
 
charges were later dropped when the applicants produced an article from another 
newspaper which revealed that the Prime Minister considered the actions taken against 
both applicants to be disproportionate.  
 
The ECtHR found that the searches carried out in the journalist’s home ‘indisputably 
constituted an interference with his Article 10 rights.
362
 The Court identified that there 
was a ‘fundamental difference’ between the instant case and Goodwin.363 It held that even 
if a search is unproductive it is a ‘more drastic measure; than an order to divulge the 
identity of a source,’ the searches undermined the protection of sources ‘to an even 
greater extent’ than the measures at issue in Goodwin.364 The Government had not shown 
the balance of competing interests between the protection of journalistic sources and the 
punishments of the criminal offences. With regards to the second applicant, the first 
applicant’s lawyer, the Court found a breach of Article 8 ECHR, finding that the warrant 
was drafted in particularly wide terms and that carrying out the search early on in the 
proceedings and had a bearing on the first applicant’s Article 10 rights.365 
 
It is recognised that the right to protect journalistic sources should be protected, unless 
the applicant can persuade the court of a compelling reason for disclosure. Lord Wolf 
highlighted in Ashworth that the source’s ‘reasonable confidence’ of anonymity makes a 
‘significant contribution’ to the press in performing their role in society, by making 
information available to the public. It is suggested by members of the press that a failure 
                                                        
362Ibid para 47. 
363Ibid para 57.  
364Ibid. See also the earlier case of Nordisk Film & TV A/S v Denmark (Application no. 38224/03) (2006) 
whereby the ECtHR rule that an order to produce unedited footage of a documentary on paedophilia to 
assist a criminal investigation did not constitute a breach or Article 10. The Court noted the investigation 
was into a serious crime and that order to specifically disclose footage of a man under criminal 
investigation was less intrusive than the more drastic measure of searching a journalist’s home or 
workplace.  
365Ibid para 71. 
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to provide such a duty of confidentiality would have a detrimental effect on media 
reporting and prevent the key role of the media as ‘public watchdog,’ as those who may 
wish to disclose information of the public interest may be dissuaded from doing so, over 
fears of legal repercussion and job security. 
 
In the case of Sanoma Uitgevers BV v Netherlands, the applicant company was the 
publisher of the car magazine Autoweek.
366
 The applicant had sent journalists to cover an 
illegal street race at the invitation of the organisers. The journalists were permitted to take 
photographs on the condition that they would guarantee that they would not reveal the 
identities of any participants by modifying the photographs. The photographs were to 
feature in an article on illegal street racing. Police officers were also in attendance at the 
event, however, no arrests were made. Following the event, police officers contacted the 
editors of the publication demanding that they provide all photographs taken at the event. 
The police officers claimed that the photographs would assist with an investigation into a 
series of robberies whereby they believed that a car used by the participants was also used 
at the street race. The criminals were clearly dangerous and on one occasion a firearm 
had been used to threaten a bystander. The editor of the publication refused the request, 
identifying that he had given an undertaking of anonymity to the participants.  
 
Police officers made several attempts to obtain the information including issuing the 
editor with a summons obtained from the Amsterdam Public Prosecutor to surrender the 
photographs. Police officers later detained the editor on site and closed down the scene, 
preventing other publications from being able to function. The editor eventually 
                                                        
366 (38224/03) (2010). For commentary see: A.Savage and P.D.Mora, Independent Judicial Oversight to 
Guarantee Proportionate Revelations of Journalistic Sources: The Grand Chamber’s Decision in Sanoma 
Uitgevers B.V. v. The Netherlands [2011] 22(1) Ent LR 65. 
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surrendered the photographs contained on a CD Rom and brought proceedings to return 
the disc and to destroy any copies. The domestic court refused the request, holding that it 
was satisfied that the public interest in preventing and detecting crime outweighed the 
protection of journalistic sources. The data stored on the CD-ROM had been used by the 
police for the investigation of a serious offence where all other avenues had led to 
nothing. Following an unsuccessful appeal to the Supreme Court on the grounds of 
inadmissibility, the applicant company brought a case before the ECtHR against the 
Netherlands alleging that the summons to surrender the photographs issued by the police 
compelling them to hand over privileged journalistic material that would allow the 
identity of their sources to be revealed breached their right to free expression guaranteed 
by art.10 ECHR. 
 
In applying the proportionality test to the facts of the case, the Third Chamber of the 
ECtHR noted that the crimes were serious in that they had resulted in the loss of physical 
property, and had the potential to cause danger to the public as the robbers had been seen 
with firearms. As the police had only become aware of the participation of the suspected 
vehicle in the street race after it had taken place, the Chamber was satisfied that there was 
no reasonable alternative possibility for identifying the vehicle at any time. Moreover, the 
Chamber found that because the authorities had not utilised the information for any 
purpose other than to identify and prosecute the perpetrators of the robberies, the 
applicant's sources had not been inconvenienced. Finally, the Chamber took into 
consideration the extent of judicial involvement in the case. The public prosecutor had 
also obtained the approval of the investigating judge, despite not being under an 
obligation to do so. The Court therefore held by a narrow majority of four votes to three 
that the reasons put forward for the impugned interference had been relevant, sufficient 
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and proportionate to the aims pursued. Accordingly, no violation of art.10 was found. 
 
The applicants challenged the reasoning before the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR. The 
Grand Chamber found that despite the public authorities’ argument that the CD Rom was 
necessary to pursue individuals unrelated to the journalistic sources, the distinction made 
by the Government was not crucial. Any requirement for journalistic material to be 
handed over to a public authority carries with it a chilling effect on freedom of 
expression. The Grand Chamber noted that there will be a chilling effect in all instances 
where journalists are seen to assist in the identification of anonymous sources. Secondly, 
the Grand Chamber identified that whilst the applicant's premises had not been searched 
or seized, there was a credible threat of such action, which culminated in the arrest of a 
journalist. The search and seizure of the premises would have resulted in the closure of 
the applicant's premises for a considerable time and would have affected not only the 
publication of the Autoweek magazine but also other magazines operating on the 
premises. News was a perishable commodity and any delay in publication, even for a 
short period of time, may deprive it of all its value and interest. It was therefore held that 
the summons issued by the police constituted a prima facie interference with art.10. 
 
The Court emphasised that given the importance of protecting journalistic sources under 
art.10, any laws which interfered with this right must be attended with procedural 
safeguards which adequately protect the principle at stake. The Grand Chamber identified 
that central to these safeguards are that disclosure orders be reviewed by a judge. In doing 
so it underlined that in situations where the investigatory public authority seeks the 
disclosure of a journalistic source, it is necessary for the courts to engage in an 
assessment of whether the legitimate aim for the disclosure outweighs the protection of 
 146 
 
 
the source.  
 
The Court held that the proportionality test must be independently undertaken by a body 
separate to the investigatory authority which have a clear and vested interest in obtaining 
the material sought. Moreover, the independent body must be in a position to carry out 
the balancing act before any disclosures are actually made by the investigatory authority; 
the exercise of an independent review after the material capable of revealing a source has 
been handed over would undermine the very essence of the right to confidentiality. 
Finally, the independent body should be in a position to refuse to make a disclosure order, 
or make a qualified order, so as to protect sources from being unnecessarily as well as 
disproportionately revealed. The Grand Chamber unanimously held that the absence of 
any procedure in domestic law which required an independent body to engage in an 
effective and adequate assessment of the proportionality of the interference made to the 
possible revelation of a journalistic source failed to satisfy the quality of law test. 
 
2.5.1 Domestic Impact of the Decision 
 
The decision in Sanoma builds upon the leading decision in Goodwin v United Kingdom 
by adding a further level of protection to maintaining the confidentiality of journalistic 
sources. In civil civil proceedings, whereby Norwich Pharmacal applications are 
considered, the decision reiterates the importance of courts correctly applying the 
proportionality test. Domestic courts must therefore only grant orders for the disclosure 
of journalistic material in cases where there is a clear and overriding public interest in 
disclosure.  
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In criminal proceedings, the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 contains safeguards 
for the protection of journalistic source material. Section 9 identifies such material to be 
excluded from the ordinary process of police officers obtaining search warrants. The 
police must instead apply for an order from the court for disclosure under the special 
procedures contained in s.1 of the Act. The officer must identify that there are reasonable 
grounds that an indictable offence has been committed, that the material is likely to be of 
substantial value to the investigation and relevant, and that it is in the public interest to 
order disclosure. Most importantly, the Act provides for the police to satisfy the court that 
other methods of obtaining the material have been tried without success or have not been 
tried because it appeared that they were bound to fail. If the application for the order is 
successful the journalist must produce the information to a police constable for him to 
take away or give him access to it. It is submitted that the  result of these statutory 
requirements imposed by PACE for an order to be granted by the courtsare akin to a 
balancing exercise which satisfy the quality of law test imposed by art.10(2) as 
interpreted by Sanoma. 
 
A breach of art.10 may occur when an order to produce the material results in the seizure 
of other material not intended in the original order. Section 50 of the Criminal Justice and 
Police Act 2001 provides that a police officer who is lawfully on the premises and has the 
power to seize material may seize items he is not entitled to seize if the material sought is 
contained within and it is not reasonably practicable to separate it. An example of such an 
item could be a CD-ROM, a computer or a USB memory stick. In applying this reasoning 
to the circumstances surrounding the Wikileaks disclosures, journalists and 
intermediaries were provided with USB memory sticks containing thousands of 
documents. Section 50 is therefore likely to be used where such searches take place. The 
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difficulty with modern technological devices is that the information required for the 
investigation may be contained on the same device whereby other information is stored. 
Thus, an investigation of the unauthorised disclosure of one document by one individual 
may expose the identities of other sources, with the likely consequence that prospective 
sources will be deterred from providing information, contrary to the spirit of the 
reasoning in Goodwin. Following Sanoma, it is submitted that s.50 should be amended to 
incorporate safeguards for the protection of journalistic sources as this provision appears 
to be in breach of art.10.  
 
With regard to the unauthorised disclosure of information pertaining to national security, 
various longstanding provisions contained in the Official Secrets Acts provide scope for 
search and seizure without the need to seek judicial authority. Section 6 of the Official 
Secrets Act 1920 (“OSA”), as amended by ss.1 and 2 OSA 1939, gives a wide provision 
for a chief of police, where he is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for suspecting 
that an offence under s.1 OSA 1911 has been committed (which essentially concerns 
espionage and the penalties for spying) and a person can furnish information then the 
officer can apply to the Home Secretary for permission to require a person to divulge the 
information, failure to do so will result in the committal of an offence. If there are 
reasonable grounds to believe that there is a “great emergency” and that in the “interest of 
the state” immediate action is necessary he may demand the information without needing 
the consent of the Home Secretary.
367
 
 
Whilst the OSA 1989 made the provision of search warrants obtained under s.9(1) OSA 
1911 subject to the “special procedures” in PACE, the Act also made it a criminal offence 
                                                        
367 Section 6(2) Official Secrets Act 1920. 
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to impart information resulting from an unauthorised disclosure
368
 and to fail to comply 
with an order to return the information.
369
 The Act provides no safeguards to protect 
journalistic sources as it does not provide special protection for material likely to be of 
substantial value for the purposes of a terrorist investigation which may reveal a source. 
In urgent cases a police officer with the rank of superintendent or above may authorise 
the warrant. 
 
Given the difficulties in controlling the unauthorised disclosure of national security 
material once it has been disclosed to an online outlet such as Wikileaks, it is submitted 
that the police and other investigatory agencies are likely to utilise the above provisions 
to ascertain the source of any leak. The risk of repetition may present catastrophic 
circumstances, if the information disclosed could cause harm to individuals or be useful 
to an enemy state. Urgent action is therefore likely to be considered to attempt to swiftly 
deal with the leak. However, it is reiterated that the police and investigatory authorities 
have an obligation as per s.6 Human Rights Act to ensure that any action taken is 
proportionate. It is therefore submitted that following Sanoma, in cases of urgency where 
the prosecuting authorities are unable to obtain authorisation from a court, procedures 
should be implemented to limit the possible damage caused by the chilling effect. The 
procedures should ensure that the respective authority has attempted other alternative 
means to obtain the information, and that any information is limited in so far as possible 
to the precise information sought. The judgment confers an obligation on investigatory 
authorities to also develop their own procedures to find viable alternatives to blanket 
search and seizure. The next section will consider the potential liability of journalists for 
                                                        
368 Section 5 Official Secrets Act 1911. 
369 Note also, provisions contained in sch.5 of the Terrorism Act 2000 which allow for a police officer to 
apply for search warrants for the obtaining of material likely to be of substantial value for the purposes of a 
terrorist investigation, including “excluded” or “special procedure” material as defined in PACE. 
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Official Secrets Act offences. 
 
 
2.6 Official Secrets Acts   
 
A journalist based in the domestic jurisdiction may incur personal liability under the 
Official Secrets Acts. The offence of receipt of information that formerly applied under 
section 2 of the 1911 Act has now been repealed , but journalists may still be liable under 
section 5 of the 1989 Act which allows for prosecution of persons who publish 
information which is in contravention of other sections contained in the Act ‘without 
lawful authority’. A recent notable example of this is the threat made by Attorney-
General Lord Goldsmith to prosecute newspapers under section 5 if they published the 
contents of a document which allegedly related to a dispute between Tony Blair and 
George Bush over the conduct of military operations in Iraq.
370
 The overall reach of 
section 5 is rather unclear particularly with regard to the publication of the memoirs of 
former servants.
371
  
 
It should be noted that s.5 Official Secrets Act 1989 will not apply to online disclosures 
made by individuals located outside of the jurisdiction. Section 5(4) of the Act identifies 
that a person does not commit an s.5 offence unless the disclosure (made by the third 
party) was by a British citizen or took place in the United Kingdom, any of the Channel 
Islands, the Isle of Man or a colony. Neither condition is likely to be satisfied in relation 
to a foreign individual who receives the information outside of the jurisdiction. It is 
                                                        
370 See: R.Norton-Taylor, Legal Gag on Bush-Blair war row, Guardian, 23rd November 2005. 
371 The concern was raised in Lord Advocate v Scotsman Publications [1989] 2 ALL ER 852. Lord 
Templeman believed that s.5 did extend to former ‘crown servants’ whereas Lord Jauncey thought that it 
did not. For further discussion see also: A.Nichol, G.Millar & A.Sharland, Media Law & Human Rights 
(Blackstone Press, London, 2001). 
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submitted that this creates a lacuna in the otherwise draconian official secrets protection. 
Section 1 Official Secrets Act 1911, would however provide an alternative to an s.5 
prosecution. Section 1 is more readily used for the prosecution of espionage. However, 
s.1 (1) (c) criminalises the obtaining or communication to any other person of any 
‘sketch, plan, model, article, or note, or other document or information which is 
calculated to be or might be or is intended to be directly or indirectly useful to an enemy.’ 
The unauthorised disclosure of official documents pertaining to national security is likely 
to satisfy the aforementioned criterion. Section 10(2) of the Act extends the reach of the 
offence, allowing courts within the jurisdiction to determine offences committed outside 
of the jurisdiction. The difficulty will be for the domestic prosecuting authority to 
prosecute an individual based outside the jurisdiction. Domestic courts have an obligation 
to ensure that a defendant has a fair hearing; the natural law principle of audi alteram 
partem has been an established part of our legal system for many years prior to 
incorporation of Article 6 ECHR. It is unlikely that a trial will therefore take place with 
the defendant in absentia. Extradition which requires co-operation with a country based 
outside of the European Union will be dependent upon whether the country has signed a 
treaty agreement with the United Kingdom. The extradition request will be likely to be 
blocked if the country in question does not have an applicable official secrecy law. This 
is identified as the principle of ‘dual criminality.’ A further bar to extradition may exist if 
the extradition is considered to be politically motivated. Such an argument is likely to be 
put forward by an individual facing extradition proceedings whereby the offence alleged 
concerns the unauthorised disclosure of government documents. In EU member states, it 
may be identified that a European Arrest Warrant may be obtained; both the country who 
issues the EAW and the country receiving the EAW must be compliant with the 
European Convention on Human Rights. It is submitted that the following case of Stoll v 
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Switzerland which considers the prosecution of a journalist for the unauthorised 
disclosure of national security information must be considered by the prosecuting 
authority in the home jurisdiction, and the jurisdiction to which an EAW will be issued.  
 
In Stoll v Switzerland
372
 the Applicant had been prosecuted for publishing a document 
containing discussion of deliberations between the World Jewish Congress and Swiss 
banks concerning compensation due to holocaust victims for unclaimed assets deposited 
in Swiss bank accounts. The author of the document, Carlo Jagnetti was the Swiss 
ambassador to the United States and the document was classified as ‘confidential.’ 
Jagnetti described the deliberations as ‘a war’ and referred to the Jewish organisations as 
‘adversaries’ proclaiming that ‘most adversaries were not to be trusted.’  
  
The document was disclosed by an unnamed civil servant to the newspaper Sonntag-
Zeitung in an act that the ECtHR describes could not have been carried out without a 
breach of official secrecy. Stoll was convicted for the publication of official deliberations 
contrary to Article 320 of the Criminal Code (Switzerland) and received a fine of CHF 
800. Stoll applied to the ECtHR. The chamber upheld the application; however the 
decision was reversed by the Grand Chamber. The applicant doubted whether the content 
of the paper had been ‘liable to reveal a state secret who’s disclosure might compromise 
national security.’373 The Court reiterated that notwithstanding the vital roll the press 
plays in a democratic society, journalists cannot be released from their duty to obey the 
ordinary criminal law on the basis that Article 10 affords them protection.
374
 The Court 
held that the safeguard afforded by Article 10 to journalists is subject to the proviso that 
in publishing the information they do so in good faith, that the information is accurate 
                                                        
372(2006) (Application no. 69698/01).  
373Ibid para 69. 
374Ibid para 102. 
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and that they have provided ‘reliable and precise’ information ‘in accordance with the 
ethics of journalism.’375  
  
The Court noted that the conviction of a journalist for disclosing information considered 
to be confidential or secret may discourage those working in the media from informing 
the public on matters of public interest, thus impacting on the role of the press as public 
watchdog.
376
. In order to determine whether the interference of the Article 10 rights was 
proportionate, the Court held that it must have regard to the following factors: the nature 
of the interests at stake, the conduct of the applicant and whether or not the fine imposed 
was proportionate.
377
 
 
With regard to the interests at stake, the Court held that it was vital to the running of 
government departments and the smooth functioning of international relations for 
diplomats to be able to exchange confidential or secret information. The court attached 
importance to the Government’s argument that the publishing of a report classified as 
‘confidential’ or ‘secret’ would have both an ‘adverse and paralysing’ effect on a 
country’s foreign policy and make the official’s position untenable – in this case the 
Court noted that the official was forced to resign.
378
 It followed the reasoning in 
Hadjianastassiou
379
 assessing that the disclosure of the report and the articles were at the 
time of publication capable of causing considerable damage. The court hearing the 
criminal case must determine in advance whether the ‘secret’ classification appears 
justified in the light of the purpose and content of the documents disclosed.
380
  
                                                        
375Ibid para 103. 
376Ibid para 110. 
377Ibid para 112. 
378Ibid  para 129. 
379 (1992) (application no. 12945/87)  para 45. 
380 Ibid para 138.  
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With regards to the conduct of the applicant, the ECtHR drew a distinction between the 
manner in which the applicant obtained the report and the form of the articles in 
question.
381
 The Court held that the manner in which a person obtains information 
considered to be confidential or secret may be of relevance to balancing interests in the 
context of Article 10 (2). The Court noted that the journalist could not claim in good faith 
to be unaware he was committing a criminal offence.
382
 It found that the way in which the 
paper was edited, the sensationalist headlines and the inaccuracy of the articles were 
likely to mislead the reader.
383
 Finally, the EC took into account the amount of the fine 
imposed upon the journalist for committing the offence and found the sum to be 
relatively modest.
384
 
  
Judges Zagrebelsky, Lorenzen Fura-Sanderstrom, Jaeger and Popovic dissented. They 
argued that the Court had found the protection of national security, public safety, and the 
reputation or rights of others, to be without relevance and that the only remaining 
justification was the protection of secret information. The legitimacy of the classification 
of a document could not, they suggested, be weighed against the fundamental right to 
freedom of expression, without ‘identifying the underlying interest for the protection of 
which the information must remain confidential.’ They argued that any damaged 
sustained in the instant case must have been ‘very minor’ when judged against 
‘everything the court has said in numerous judgments about the importance of freedom of 
expression.’  
 
                                                        
381Ibid para 140. 
382Ibid para 141. 
383Ibid para 149 
384 Ibid, para 160. 
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It is submitted that the aforementioned dissenting opinions identify the difficulty with 
national security classifications. Chapter five of this thesis will provide a detailed analysis 
of whether the classifications given to documents in the United Kingdom can be 
successfully tested before the court using the Official Secrets Act 1989. In contrasting 
this reasoning against the domestic cases of The Zamora and CCSU v Minister for the 
Civil Service discussed in chapter one of this thesis, it may be identified that the domestic 
position, at least pre HRA has been to suggest that decision to determine what matters 
should be in the interests of national security is a decision for the minister and the 
government of the day, not the courts. However, post HRA, it must be identified that 
art.10 proportionality balancing requires the most intense scrutiny of the whether the 
public interest in disclosure outweighs the public interest in non disclosure. The author 
therefore agrees with the dissenting judge’s comments concerning proportionality 
balancing. 
 
The decision in Stoll v Switzerland is further significant because the good faith of the 
journalist rather than the good faith of the source is considered. It is argued that, the 
Court in identifying that the headlines were inaccurate and were likely to mislead the 
public, took an approach consistent with pre-existing case law that art.10 protection 
carries a journalistic responsibility not to mislead the public. 
 
2.7 Conclusion  
 
 
 2.7.1 Theoretical Model  
 
It is submitted that the making of unauthorised disclosure to online outlets such as 
Wikileaks will be most readily justified by the argument from moral autonomy, such 
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actions aim to bypass existing inhibitions caused by legal restrictions or contractual 
obligations. Disclosures to Wikileaks would also be justifiable on the basis that such 
expression enhances the individual. The disclosure and subsequent publication of official 
documents in their entirety may be justified to obtain truth, particularly in circumstances 
whereby the truth has been deliberately concealed and the disclosure of the documents is 
considered necessary to correct false information. If Dean is correct and techno culture 
provides the key to democracy by uncovering secrets, Wikileaks is representative of such 
a platform. 
 
Disclosures to an online outlet which provides access to documents in a ‘raw’ form, 
satisfies both of the justifications from participation in a democracy. Firstly, to provide 
citizens with the information that they would otherwise be able to have access to so that 
they can make informed decisions on political matters and hold the government to 
account Second, as government serves at the will of the people, it is vital that citizens 
have the opportunity to communicate their wishes to the government of the day. 
Disclosures to websites such as Wikileaks may therefore allow citizens to review and 
monitor the actions of government and, to subsequently make representations to the 
government that they disagree, or indeed agree with current decision making. It is 
submitted that the public may encounter difficulties in interpreting the information 
disclosed. When faced with vast swathes of leaked documents, as occurred in the Iraq and 
Afghanistan war logs, one must ask whether members of the general public will be able 
to ascertain the messages the whistleblower is trying to convey by disclosing the material. 
Following the disclosures and subsequent publication of the material, the general public 
were essentially reliant upon traditional media outlets such as the Guardian newspaper to 
sift through and interpret the information. This position is supported by Bok, who 
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suggests that an individual’s capacity to assess information is severely limited and subject 
to bias. Dean also identifies that the public lack the capacity to make judgement. 
Regardless as to whether the theories proposed are considered to be correct, it should be 
noted that many of the disclosures contained troop records written using military 
abbreviations that the layperson would clearly not be able to understand.  
 
Further concerns regarding the justification from truth may be identified. The 
aforementioned discussion detailed the way in which Assange and his team sought to 
check the veracity of the information obtained. Domschiet-Berg suggests that many of the 
purported checks did not happen or were not sufficiently rigorous. One must consider that 
the sheer volume of information disclosed would make the verification of each document 
difficult. The lack of adequate checks may result in the disclosure of false information 
which would be contrary to the spirit of the justification from truth. Whereas Wikileaks 
do not have an obligation to abide by professional codes, traditional media outlets in the 
United Kingdom must still follow the Press Complaints Commission Code of Practice. 
One must ask whether the publication of material by traditional media outlets, with 
Wikileaks acting as a conduit, is still in keeping with the obligations set out in the Code.  
 
The use of Wikileaks as a conduit, allows the whistleblower to obtain greater publicity for 
the disclosures. However, in doing so the proximity between the source and the recipient 
audience becomes much wider than even the traditional journalist and source 
relationship. As a consequence, the message communicated may be distorted or lost.
385
 
As Bok opines, unless the information published is accompanied by indications of how 
the information can be checked, the source’s anonymity will diminish the value of the 
                                                        
385 Above, n 44, 223. 
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message communicated. It can be identified that neither Wikileaks nor the traditional 
media outlets have attempted to fully engage in checking the material or providing 
assurances to the public that the source of the information and the information itself is 
genuine. Raynes and Scott support this reasoning further by suggesting that anonymous 
whistleblowing may be relatively ineffective because the inability for the receivers of the 
information to check and verify the information will result in a negative reaction.
386
 
 
Bok considers that external disclosure directly to the public must be an act of last resort 
whereby other options have been considered and rejected. Bok suggests that disclosure 
direct to the public may be justified where there is no time to go through alternative 
channels. However, this must be questioned in relation to the Wikileaks disclosures. The 
disclosure of thousands of documents without providing an explanation as to why those 
documents uncover wrongdoing, may suggest that the time saved in bypassing the 
internal channels may be lost as the recipients of the information will need time to 
interpret and assess the information.  
 
The unauthorised disclosure of thousands of documents, many containing historical 
material, may not be considered as an act of necessity. Howard Dennis identifies that 
necessity should be restricted to two situations: firstly, where there is an emergency 
situation, and second, where there is a conflict of duty giving rise to a danger of death or 
serious injury. The extensive disclosures to Wikileaks did not appear to be a response to 
an emergency situation. The whistleblower chose to remain anonymous and did not 
provide explanations as to the value of the material or the risk he was trying to prevent. 
The second scenario whereby there is a danger of death or serious injury must also be 
                                                        
386 Above, n 24, 64. 
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questioned, whilst the disclosure of the ‘collateral murder’ video may have assisted 
holding the individuals concerned to account, it did not prevent the loss of life or injury 
shown in the footage. The disclosure of the Iraq war logs did not prevent further harm to 
the citizens of Iraq. The United States government had relinquished control of Iraq to the 
Iraqi forces by the time that the Iraq war logs were disclosed. It should be reiterated that 
the disclosure of many un-redacted documents detailed the identities and addresses of 
citizens who assisted the United States Government, causing grave harm to those 
individuals. As Brudner correctly identifies, necessity cannot be used as a justification for 
disclosure, where the individual imposes grave risks on the health of persons, regardless 
of the net saving of lives.
387
  
 
The disclosure of thousands of documents and other information may achieve different 
objectives depending on the value of the information concerned. Therefore it should be 
identified that the ‘collateral murder’ video may have conveyed the message intended by 
the whistleblower relatively easily whereas the Iraq War logs and Afghanistan War Logs 
were of a different value to different people.  
 
The disclosures, taken in their entirety, appear to be an act of protest whistleblowing, 
whereby the individual disagrees with the US government war policy. Yet, no 
explanation is provided by the whistleblower as to why, in his professional opinion, the 
policy is fundamentally wrong. As a form of Civil Disobedience, using Dworkin’s 
reasoning, the Wikileaks disclosures identify a form of ‘non persuasive’ expression 
whereby the minority attempt to make the majority pay for their misconduct or inaction. 
This is because anonymous disclosures by their very nature do not allow for the 
                                                        
387 Above, n74, 365. 
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whistleblower to openly explain and try to convince the majority as to why the 
documents communicated identify policy decisions which are fundamentally wrong.
388
 
This analysis will now progress to consider the legal model.  
 
 
2.7.2 Legal Model 
 
 
The emergence of Wikileaks and other online outlets to facilitate disclosure has most 
affected the United States Jurisdiction. Whilst it may be noted that there has been at least 
one disclosure by a purportedly British source,
389
 the United Kingdom is yet to have an 
equivalent disclosure to the extent of the Iraq or Afghanistan War Logs or the diplomatic 
cables. The aforementioned analysis on s.10 Contempt of Court Act 1981 has identified 
that domestic courts have failed to sufficiently apply the high standard of protection 
Strasbourg affords to journalistic sources. As a consequence Wikileaks and other online 
outlets based outside of the jurisdiction provide an attractive ‘safe haven’ whereby 
documents may be sent and swiftly disseminated across the globe, the whistleblower’s 
identity is shielded by sophisticated computer encryption and comprehensive journalistic 
protections in the host country where the organisation is based. Whilst the domestic 
courts continue to fail in providing the level of protection Strasbourg requires, online 
outlets will continue to be considered as a more viable alternative to the traditional media 
outlet.  
 
This chapter has identified that despite the claims made by Wikileaks that a source’s 
anonymity cannot be revealed, Norwich Pharmacal orders are available against the 
                                                        
388 Above, n 31, 111. 
389 Disclosure of an MOD security manual to advise on leak investigations.  
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organisation. The likelihood of a Norwich Pharmacal order being granted against the 
organisation may be increased as the applicant could argue that the provision of the less 
intrusive option of granting an injunction would not be sufficient to prevent the 
dissemination of further leaks. The nature of the Wikileaks site and the availability of the 
information on different ‘mirror sites’ based in different jurisdictions across the world 
make the grant and enforcement of an injunction to prevent further leaks an impossibility. 
This chapter has identified that whilst the journalistic source protections in Sweden are 
strong; they are far from absolute and contain exemptions concerning the unauthorised 
disclosure of national security information. This chapter has identified that a Norwich 
Pharmacal order could be potentially enforced in Sweden. 
 
Crown Servants will still need to obtain access to the website and will need to find a way 
of contacting the individuals concerned. It may therefore be more likely that investigating 
authorities could apply for a Norwich Pharmacal order against an online search engine or 
email service such as Google, or a social networking website such as Twitter. Such 
Norwich Pharmacal orders have been unopposed by the operators of websites, who 
whilst not agreeing to recognise the jurisdiction of the UK court have not sought to 
challenge the order. In order to be compliant with art.10 values, it is submitted that 
Norwich Pharmacal applications of this nature must be subject to the most careful 
scrutiny by the courts.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
EXECUTIVE ACCOUNTABILITY AND THE OFFICIALLY PRESCRIBED 
MECHANISMS TO REPORT MALPRACTICE 
 
“Accountability is a device as old as civilised government itself; it is indispensable to 
regimes of every kind. It provides the post-mortem of action, the test of obedience and 
judgement, the moment of truth; it can validate the power of command, or it can create 
favourable conditions for individual responsibility and initiative.” 390 
 
 
Despite an express or implied duty of confidence not to reveal information obtained in 
employment in either the public or private sector, leaks of highly sensitive information 
are a day to day occurrence. From information concerning the salaries of television and 
radio presenters, political gossip and exposure of serious malpractice, leaks have become 
a mainstay of British media reporting.  
 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide an insight into how Crown servants report 
concerns relating to wrongdoing or malpractice through official channels. It aims to 
identify the existing prescribed mechanisms available for Crown servants to report 
concerns, focusing upon authorised internal complaints procedures, and authorised 
external complaints to the Civil Service Commissioners and beyond. Close consideration 
will be given to these procedures in the light of the Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998, 
which offers protection in employment law to whistleblowers who report concerns and 
                                                        
390 El Normanton, Public Accountability and Audit: a Reconnaissance’ in B Smith and D Hague (Eds) The 
Dilemma of Accountability in Modern Government (MacMillan, London, 1971) 312. 
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who suffer reprisals as a result.  
 
The Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998 (PIDA) is legislation to protect the person 
reporting the concern, not to deal with the reported concern itself.
391
 The investigation of 
the concern once reported, whether it is through an internal investigation, or external 
investigation by an independent body is arguably just as important. Therefore, the 
chapter will broaden focus to include the current mechanisms used to hold the Executive 
to account, including the role of Parliament, Select Committees, the Parliamentary 
Ombudsman and the role of public inquiries to consider whether or not Crown servants 
have a role to play in providing information of wrongdoing or malpractice to those 
mechanisms.  
 
This chapter identifies the difficulties posed by the existing internal framework for 
reporting concerns and illustrates that the current safeguards of Executive accountability 
lack the required teeth or impartiality to be fully effective. It is intended therefore, that 
this study will contribute towards gaining a greater understanding of why Crown 
servants choose to override the existing procedures in order to make unauthorised 
disclosures. 
 
3.1 Internal Complaints and the Establishment of a New Civil Service Code 
 
 The formation of the Committee on Standards in Public Life in October 1994 by then 
Conservative Prime Minister John Major was introduced as a response to allegations of 
                                                        
391 A distinction most recognised by the fact that the Department for Business Innovation and Skills 
introduced a ‘tick box’  on the Employment Tribunal Claim form (ET1) for claimants who want details of 
their claim and whistleblowing concern to be referred to a regulator, for more information see 
http://www.berr.gov.uk/files/file54221.pdf  (Accessed 10/10/10). 
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unethical conduct in the public sector, in particular allegations of taking money for 
putting down Parliamentary questions. The Committee represents a significant step in 
setting ethical standards and monitoring issues of conduct, however investigations of 
malpractice on individuals are excluded from the Committee’s remit. In its first report 
considerable consideration was given to the establishment of a new Civil Service Code 
and appeals system. It was recommended that the Code cover circumstances in which a 
Civil Servant is aware of wrongdoing or maladministration and that it be clear and 
brief.
392
 The report also recommended that departments and agencies should nominate 
one or more officials entrusted with the duty of investigating complaints.
393
 
 
The second report shifted focus to ‘public spending bodies’; however it provided a 
framework for the internal reporting of concerns (based upon recommendations made by 
Public Concern at Work) which formed the basis for the Civil Service internal 
complaints procedure, it stated that the system should include: 
  “- A clear statement that malpractice is taken seriously in 
the organisation and an indication of the sorts of matters regarded as malpractice. 
- Respect for the confidentiality of staff raising concerns if they wish, and the 
opportunity to raise concerns outside the line management structure. 
- Penalties for making false and malicious allegations.” 
- An indication of the proper way in which concerns may be raised outside the 
organisation if necessary.”394 
 
Ultimately the committee stated: 
“Placing staff in a position where they feel driven to approach the media to 
ventilate concerns is unsatisfactory for both the staff member and the organisation.”395 
 
The new Civil Service Code and accompanying procedures incorporate the 
recommendations of the second report. However, this chapter will argue that the 
                                                        
392 First Report of the Committee on Standards in Public Life, 1995,  Cm 2850-1, 59. 
393 Ibid, 60. 
394 Second Report of the Committee on Standards in Public Life, 1996, Cm 3270, 22. 
395 Ibid. 
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provisions do not go far enough to provide a reassuring, clear and structured alternative 
to leaking to the media. Most importantly it will highlight that there is an urgent need to 
strengthen the role of the Civil Service Commissioners in handling complaints under the 
Civil Service Code.  
 
It should be noted that the Civil Service Code was further modified to be in line with 
provisions of the Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998 (PIDA). PIDA builds upon the 
recommendations of the second Nolan Committee report. The Act offers protection to 
persons who raise concerns and who suffer detriment as a result. By placing primary 
emphasis on protecting those who have utilised internal whistleblowing policies or 
procedures, rather than making external disclosures and leaking to the media, the Act has 
had a positive influence on the formulation of internal procedures. 
  
A key recommendation of the second Nolan Report was to not only provide robust 
internal reporting mechanisms but also to have an independent mechanism set apart from 
the management structure. PIDA achieved this objective by allowing for disclosures to 
be made externally to a substantial list of prescribed regulators. This chapter will 
illustrate that Crown servants are at a considerable disadvantage to employees in the 
private sector. This is because the Civil Service Commissioners, who investigate 
breaches of the Civil Service Code, deal with Civil Service appeals and who are included 
in the Code as a means of direct contact for Civil Servants are not a prescribed regulator 
under the Act. It will be illustrated that the current mechanisms for Civil Servants to 
report concerns goes against the spirit of the Nolan recommendations when it should be 
leading by example. This chapter will first look at the general provisions under the 
Public Interest Disclosure Act before sharpening focus to provide an assessment of the 
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internal reporting procedures used in the Civil Service. 
 
3.2 The Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998. 
 
“British whistleblowers will become possibly the best protected in the world.”396 
 
The Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998 attempts to recognise that whistleblowing does 
occur; it offers protection to those who wish to speak out in certain circumstances and in 
doing so promotes good practice. In the first three years of the Act coming into force a 
total of around 1200 PIDA claims had been registered.
397
  
 
In order to be a legitimate instance of whistleblowing under PIDA, the person must make 
a ‘qualifying disclosure.’ The authority for this is derived from s.43B (1) Employment 
Rights Act 1996 and is limited to cases whereby a worker reasonably believes the matter 
falls within the following specified categories: 
  “(I) a criminal offence, (ii) a failure to comply with any 
legal obligation, (iii) a miscarriage of justice, (iv) danger to the health and safety of any 
individual, (v) damage to the environment, (vi) the deliberate concealment of 
information tending to show any of the matters listed above.” 
 
PIDA skilfully achieves a delicate balance between the public interest and the interests 
of employers.
398
 The balance is provided by a tiered disclosure regime which is 
considered below.
399
 
 
                                                        
396 C.Camp, Openness and Accountability in the Workplace [1998] NLJ 149 46. 
397 Until 2nd July 2002, See Public Concern at Work (PCaw) report, 2Years Back, 3 Years Forward, 10 
Years Old, Review of 2001 and 2002, 18.    
398 The words of Lord Nolan, Hansard HL 5 June 1998, Col. 614, repeated in the British Standards Institute 
guide, Whistleblowing Code of Practice, 2008, 5. 
399 Also referred to as ‘stepped disclosure’ by the BSI Code of Practice Ibid. See also J. Bowers, 
Whistleblowing Law and Practice (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007) Chapter 5 which refers to ‘three 
tiers of protection.’ 
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3.2.1 Controlled Internal Disclosure
400
  
 
At the lowest tier the employee is protected by s.43C PIDA for making an internal 
disclosure such as to person in the line management chain, nominated officer or his 
employer. s.43C (2) PIDA would cover disclosures to the Civil Service Commissioners, 
who whilst independent of the management structure are designated to receive concerns 
under the Civil Service Code. The employee is required to show that the disclosure was 
made in good faith and has reasonable belief that the failure relates solely or mainly to 
the conduct of a person other than his employer or any other matter to which a person 
other than his employer has a legal responsibility.
401
 
 
3.2.2 Controlled External Disclosure 
 
The next level of the tier allows protection of a disclosure if made to a prescribed 
regulator. There is a noticeable difference between the evidential requirements for 
internal disclosures made under s.43C and external disclosures under s.43F. Under s.43F 
the employee must have good faith in making the disclosure and additionally must have 
reasonable belief that the relevant failure falls within any description of matters in 
respect of which that person is so prescribed and that the allegations contained in it are 
substantially true.
402
 This requirement is in contrast to s.43C where the employee does 
not have to show that the allegation is substantially true but rather that he held the 
reasonable belief that it was true. 
 
                                                        
400 These headings are provided by the author for ease of illustration and are not officially recognised titles. 
401 Section 43C PIDA 1998. The various internal reporting mechanisms of the Civil Service are considered 
below. 
402 Section 43F (b) PIDA 1998. 
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There is an extensive and diverse list of prescribed regulators, the most notable for the 
purposes of this study are: the Audit Commission for England and Wales, the 
Comptroller and Auditor General (C&AG) of the National Audit Office, the Chairman of 
the Criminal Cases Review Commission, the Health and Safety Executive, and the 
Information Commissioner.
403
 
 
The National Audit Office (NAO) deals with the proper conduct of public business, its 
primary focus being on the correct expenditure of public finances and value for money. 
It is independent of government and provides scrutiny on behalf of Parliament. The NAO 
also investigates allegations of fraud and corruption in relation to the provision of 
centrally funded public services. In relation to complaints made by Crown servants in 
central government departments, the NAO provides a ‘whistleblowers hotline’ and 
information of protected disclosures under the Public Interest Disclosure Act. However a 
note of caution is also given to those considering making disclosures whereby it is stated 
that the Act ‘does not require the C&AG to investigate every disclosure he receives’ and 
that the decision to investigate ‘is based upon various criteria designed to ensure the 
most effective use of the resources at his disposal in safeguarding the public interest.’404 
 
The advice given also indicates that the NAO has no powers to ‘determine that a 
disclosure is protected’ and that this is up to an Employment Tribunal to decide. The 
advice given by the NAO highlights the inherent difficulty of making unauthorised 
disclosures to regulators, whilst such disclosures may be protected, they also may not be.  
 
                                                        
403 See further: Statutory Instrument 2003 No. 1993 (for prescribed regulators in England, Wales and 
Scotland) and Statutory Rule 1999 No. 41 (for prescribed regulators in Northern Ireland). 
404 ‘Contacts at the National Audit Office: Whistleblowers Hotline’ http://www.nao.org.uk/whistle.htm 
(accessed 05/04/09). 
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Section 43E is a protection specifically for use by Crown servants. It provides for a 
protected disclosure to be made to a minister of the Crown if it is made by a Crown 
servant and if it is made in good faith. Whilst s.43E may be seen as a welcome addition 
to PIDA one must ask if it is best suited to situations where a Crown servant wishes to 
raise a concern about another Crown servant or issues in his department. Situations 
where the Crown servant wishes to raise a concern of a situation brought about by the 
minister or of ministerial conduct itself is inherently problematic. The minister is 
unlikely to address his own conduct and the Crown servant may not have the confidence 
to directly criticise the minister. Furthermore a Crown servant who questions the 
political decisions taken by a minister may find his good faith questioned if there is clear 
evidence that he shares a different political viewpoint.
405
  
 
3.2.3 Uncontrolled External Disclosure 
 
Section 43G PIDA 1998 provides the most stringent evidential requirements contained 
within the Act. Firstly in order for the disclosure to be qualifying it must be made in 
good faith. The employee must believe that the information disclosed and any allegations 
are substantially true and that the disclosure was not made for personal gain. 
Additionally the employee must meet one of the conditions contained in s.43G (2). For 
ease of reference this is quoted in full: 
  “(a) that, at the time he makes the disclosure, the worker 
reasonably believes that he will be subjected to a detriment by his employer if he makes 
a disclosure to his employer or in accordance with s.43F, 
(b) that in a case where no person is prescribed for the purposes of section 43F in 
relation to the relevant failure, the worker reasonably believes that it is likely that 
evidence relating to the relevant failure will be concealed or destroyed if he makes a 
disclosure to his employer, or  
(c) that the worker has previously made a disclosure of substantially the same 
                                                        
405 In any case this would potentially breach the requirement for Civil Servants to be impartial under the 
Civil Service Code. 
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information- 
  (i) to his employer, or  
  (ii) in accordance with s.43F (disclosure to a regulator)” 
 
Most importantly even if the relevant conditions are met above there is a further 
requirement provided by s.43G (e). In all circumstances of the case it must be reasonable 
for the employee to make the disclosure. This is determined by a series of considerations 
prescribed in s.43G (3) to which the Employment Tribunal (ET) must have regard. The 
ET must consider, the identity of the person to whom the disclosure is made, the 
seriousness of the relevant failure, whether the relevant failure is continuing or is likely 
to occur in the future, and whether the disclosure is made in reach of a duty of 
confidentiality to any other person. Additionally if the employee has reported the 
concern to his employer the ET will have regard to any action which was taken by the 
employer or might have reasonably been expected to be taken as a result of reporting the 
concern.
406
  
 
One should consider the differences in approaches taken by the Employment Tribunal in 
the cases of Collins v National Trust
407
 and Smith v MOD and Others.
408
 In Collins, the 
Claimant was an employee of the National Trust who had the responsibility for a stretch 
of coastline in Cornwall. Collins became concerned that a report detailing coastal erosion 
which identified the risk of a chemical leak from a nearby quarry had not been acted 
upon. Collins passed the report to a local newspaper and it ran a story quoting Collins as 
the source. Collins was dismissed and made a PIDA claim on the basis that his act 
amounted to raising a concern of an exceptionally serious failure under s.43H PIDA. As 
identified in the judgment, in order for the Claimant to obtain protection, section 43H 
                                                        
406 Section 43G (4) provides a natural extension to the external disclosure of the information if the 
disclosure is about the employers failure to take action as a result of reporting the concern.  
407 (2006) (ET, Case no. 250725505).  
408 (2005) (ET, Case No. 1401537/04). 
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requires that he must overcome five hurdles: 1) the disclosure must be made in good 
faith, he must reasonably believe that the information disclosed is substantially true 3) 
that he does not make the disclosure for the purpose of personal gain, 4) the disclosure 
itself is of an exceptionally serious nature, 5) in all circumstances of the case the 
disclosure was reasonable.
409
 The ET found that Collins had identified matters of n 
exceptionally serious nature in that the risk of chemical contamination proved a risk to 
health and safety and children playing at the beach could be put at serious risk.
410
 The 
claim was accordingly successful.  
 
The case of Smith
411
 concerned a security guard who had received a caution for indecent 
assault on a child. After the guard was allowed to return to work, seven members of staff 
expressed concerns about the decision, claiming that as a nursery school was situated 50 
yards away from their workplace this could pose a risk to the children. The seven staff 
members gave an interview to the media expressing their concerns and also contacted 
their local MP. The Claimants brought a PIDA claim. The ET held that their actions did 
not constitute a qualifying disclosure. The Claimants did not hold a reasonable belief, 
nor was the claim made in good faith. The ET identified that the Claimants had not 
attempted to use their departmental whistleblowing policy and that their act of disclosure 
to the media was therefore unreasonable.
412
    
 
With regard to anonymous leaks to the media, it is clear that an employee’s good faith 
will be questioned, particularly if the information is provided for a fee and a disclosure 
                                                        
409 Ibid para 5.4. 
410 Ibid para 5.8. 
411 Above, n 33. 
412 For commentary see also J.Bowers, M.Fodder, J. Lewis and J.Mitchell, Whistleblowing Law and 
Practice (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007) at 4.32. 
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made to the press will only be allowed in exceptional circumstances.
413
 Examples 
contained of chapter two of this thesis, of Crown Servants who have anonymously 
leaked to the media, indicate that it would be highly unlikely that any of those persons 
would qualify for PIDA protection.  
 
Section 43G (3) (e) effectively allows for employees to make an uncontrolled external 
disclosure when a disclosure to an external regulator has not taken action as a result of 
the disclosure. It is submitted that this applies to extremely narrow circumstances. Most 
interestingly, if a Civil Servant were to make a controlled external disclosure to a 
prescribed regulator such as to the National Audit Office and they did not take action it is 
highly unlikely that he would be protected for then making an uncontrolled external 
disclosure because the disclosure would be a clear breach of confidentiality and would 
breach the Civil Service Code.  
 
It can be observed that the provisions of s.43 G identify the main limitations of PIDA. 
PIDA is rooted in employment law and is therefore primarily aimed to protect 
employees. It does impose statutory obligations on the prescribed regulators to 
investigate the concerns raised. Furthermore, the Act places a strong emphasis on the use 
of internal reporting mechanisms. If there are internal reporting mechanisms in place it 
would be difficult for an employee to explain to the Employment Tribunal why he has 
chosen to bypass those mechanisms. This is particularly important for consideration of 
the position of Crown servants. It will be illustrated below that the current internal 
reporting procedures in the Civil Service are robust on paper but are ineffective in 
practice. It would be extremely difficult for a Crown servant to argue that he has 
                                                        
413 See further: C.Camp, Openness and Accountability in the Workplace [1998] NLJ 149 46. 
 173 
 
 
bypassed the mechanisms available to him because they are ineffective. It is unfortunate 
that a Crown servant who is faced with an ineffective internal reporting mechanism may 
find the tiered disclosure regime, coupled with a lengthy Employment Tribunal process 
too much to bear in comparison to a leak to the media. It should also be noted that 
Crown servants involved in national security matters are exempted entirely to the 
protections afforded by PIDA.
414
  
 
Finally, Section 43J provides that any contractual duty of confidentiality will be void if it 
precludes the worker from making a disclosure however at the time of writing this 
provision is yet to be untested. This chapter will now progress to consider internal and 
externally controlled disclosure mechanisms.  
 
3.2.4 The Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998 and the revised Civil Service Code: an 
Analysis of what types of information may be protected. 
 
 A new version of the Civil Service Code was published in June 2006. It has been revised 
to expressly recognise the Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998. It should be noted that 
paragraph 20 identifies that the Civil Service Code is part of a contractual obligation 
between the Civil Servant and the employer.
415
 It is submitted that this significantly 
widens the scope of protection available to Civil Servants. Section 43B (1) (b) defines 
the breach of a legal obligation as having a reasonable belief tending to show that a 
person has ‘failed, is failing or is likely to fail to comply with any legal obligation to 
which he is subject.’ It is submitted that this clearly extends to circumstances whereby 
the Crown servant’s employer is requiring him to act in a way which is incompatible 
                                                        
 
 
415 I would like to thank Bill Brooke of the Civil Service Commission for confirming this point. 
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with the Civil Service Code. Civil Servants are expected to uphold the values of 
‘integrity, honesty and impartiality.’416 They must ‘Set out the facts and relevant issues 
truthfully, and correct any errors as soon as possible; and use resources only for the 
purposes for which they are provided’ and must not ‘deceive or knowingly mislead 
ministers, Parliament or others; or be influenced by improper pressures from others. This 
means, it is submitted, that a Civil Servant may receive protection for raising a concern 
that he has been asked to lie by a Minister or senior official, despite the fact that such 
information would not ordinarily fall under the other categories, such as the fact that a 
criminal offence has been committed. It is submitted that whilst this may not trigger an 
investigation into the Minister’s conduct, the Civil Servant can at least receive 
employment protection for raising the concern. Section 43B (1) (b) would protect a 
disclosure whether or not the Minister’s request had been carried out or not. The mere 
fact that the Servant has been asked to act in a way that would breach his own Code 
would be sufficient to satisfy the section.  
 
It is submitted that with regard to disclosures of wrongdoing, the Public Interest 
Disclosure Act is consistent with article 10 ECHR values in that it offers protects and 
promotes speech of a value to the public interest. The leading decision in Guja v 
Moldova, primarily deals with external unauthorised disclosures, however, the 
framework in Guja requires the court to ascertain whether the whistleblower first 
attempted to raise concerns by using channels made available by the organisation or by 
contacting an appropriate authority. These options are clearly promoted by the PIDA 
stepped disclosure regime whereby protection is most readily available to disclosures 
made internally. From the lowest level upwards, all disclosures must be reasonable and 
                                                        
416 Civil Service Code, para 3. http://www.civilservice.gov.uk/about/values/cscode/rights.aspx (accessed 
17/05/11). 
 175 
 
 
made in good faith, this is again consistent with the test identified in Guja. The next level 
in PIDA, disclosure to a prescribed person requires that the information must be 
‘substantially true,’ Guja requires courts to test the authenticity of the information. It has 
been identified above that for first tier disclosures to an employer, an employee may 
receive protection for making a protected disclosure even if the information disclosed is 
later proved to be wrong. In comparison, applying the Strasbourg jurisprudence, an 
employee would not automatically be barred from the protection of article 10 if the 
disclosure he makes is false, although this is likely to weigh heavily against the 
employee in the proportionality analysis.   
 
With regard to external unauthorised disclosures, PIDA does not expressly require the 
Tribunal to consider the detriment caused to the employer as a result of the disclosure. It 
does however require the Tribunal, when it is determining reasonableness to, identify as 
to whether the disclosure breached a duty of confidence owed to an employer or another 
person. 
 
The fundamental difference between the Public Interest Disclosure Act and the Guja v 
Moldova test is that PIDA defines what types of disclosure may be protected whereas the 
resulting ECtHR decision requires the public interest to be determined on a case by case 
basis, using existing jurisprudence, as a consideration in the proportionality analysis. It is 
submitted that despite pre-determined categories of ‘protected disclosures’ the Public 
Interest Disclosure Act remains sufficiently flexible to allow Crown servants to disclose 
wrongdoing or malpractice in government departments. The fact that an actual breach or 
potential breach of the Civil Service Code may amount to a breach of a legal obligation 
considerably widens the scope of protection.  
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It is argued, however, that the Public Interest Disclosure Act is less likely to provide 
protection for protest whistleblowing, so-called disclosures relating to dissent about 
policy, where despite the fact that there is no express evidence of wrongdoing; the Civil 
Servant still believes that the policy is wrong. The Employment Appeal Tribunal has 
sought to consider whether PIDA is capable of protecting the expression of value 
judgements.  
 
In Cavendish Munro v Geduld, 
417
 the Employment Appeal Tribunal made a distinction 
between conveying information in the form of a fact, which would be covered by PIDA 
and making a statement of a person’s position or the making of an allegation which 
would not give rise to a protected disclosure. This reasoning was later considered in 
Goode v Marks and Spencer.
418
 The applicant had been dismissed after writing a letter to 
the Times newspaper in which he revealed the Respondent’s plans to change a 
redundancy package offered to staff. The applicant had previously expressed his 
concerns about the policy with line management and his union. The EAT held that 
expressing an opinion about a change in the redundancy policy was not sufficient to 
amount to a protected disclosure. The Tribunal held that the information was ‘at its 
highest’ a ‘statement of his mind that he was disgusted with the proposals that had been 
put forward.’419 
 
The inability of the Employment Tribunal to protect value judgments or protest 
whistleblowing should be considered. It has already been identified in this thesis that 
art.10 ECHR has the capacity to protect not only expressions of fact but expressions of 
                                                        
417(2009) UKEAT/0195/09/DM. 
418(2009) UKEAT/0442/09/DM. 
419 Ibid para 36. 
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opinion.
420
 Section 6 Human Rights Act holds that it is unlawful for a public authority to 
act in a way which is incompatible with a convention right. Section 6(3) defines ‘public 
authority’ to include ‘a court or tribunal.’ Therefore, in considering claims before the 
Tribunal where art.10 is engaged, s.2 Human Rights Act requires the tribunal to have 
regard to decisions made by the ECtHR so far as they are relevant to the proceedings at 
hand. Vickers suggests that Civil Servants may ‘at times have a special duty contribute to 
public interest matters’ this she identifies is ‘clearly stressed in Lingens v Austria.’421  
 
It is submitted that by placing such emphasis on the protected disclosures identified in 
PIDA, an Employment Tribunal may act in a way which is incompatible with the 
longstanding Strasbourg jurisprudence. Whilst it is clear that the aforementioned cases 
have dealt with value judgements in relation to company policy and the claimant’s own 
redundancy, the Tribunal is yet to encounter a PIDA case involving political expression. 
The Tribunal has the jurisdiction to consider article 10 claims and whilst it is difficult to 
monitor decisions because the Employment Tribunal Service operates a closed register, 
the recent case of Crisp v Apple Inc. highlights that the Tribunal is actively determining 
employment law rights based upon the protections afforded by the Convention.
422
 In 
Crisp, the claimant was an employee who was dismissed from his position for posting 
several comments on the social networking website Facebook, criticising both his job and 
Apple products. The Tribunal upheld the reasons for the dismissal identifying that the 
comments made by Crisp were ‘not the type of comment that are particularly important to 
freedom of expression.’ The Tribunal cited ‘political opinions’ as being the type of 
                                                        
420 Lingens v Austria applied, discussed further in Chapter Two of this thesis.  
421 Above, n 122, 92. 
422(2009)  ET/1500258/11, note that the decision is not easily accessible but may be obtained from the 
Employment Tribunal Service for a fee.  
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speech which may be of particular importance.
423
 
 
It is submitted that a particularly novel way of obtaining art.10 protection where a policy 
issue is raised as a form of protest whistleblowing would be for the Civil Servant to raise 
any action taken against him for making the disclosure with the Civil Service as a breach 
of a legal obligation. Public authorities have an obligation as per s.6 HRA to act in a way 
that is not incompatible with Convention rights. Any form of detriment received for 
exercising the right to engage in political speech is likely to infringe article 10. Thus an 
alleged breach of s.6 would amount to a breach of a legal obligation which would give 
the Tribunal the jurisdiction to consider the issue. The tribunal would then need to 
balance the competing interests using the reasoning in Lingens v Austria against the 
detriment caused to the employer and the fact that the Civil Servant had agreed to a 
contractual limitation on expression rights.
424
  
 
As an alternative, there is scope to incorporate amendments to the Civil Service Code, in 
order to allow Civil Servants to obtain protection for exercising dissent about policy 
matters. Currently, the New Zealand and Canadian whistleblowing legislation allows for 
the disclosure of ‘gross mismanagement.’ Thus, by incorporating ‘gross mismanagement’ 
as a new matter under the Civil Service Code, a Crown servant would obtain PIDA 
protection for raising concerns where he believed that a policy decision taken was so 
wrong that it was in the public interest to disclose such information. This alternative 
proposal will be explored in more detail in chapter five of this thesis.   
 
This analysis will now progress to consider the authorised whistleblowing procedures 
                                                        
423 Ibid. 
424 Vogt v Germany considered, see further chapter one of this thesis. 
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available to Civil Servants before providing a critical analysis as to whether these 
procedures are consistent with the reasoning of the Strasbourg Court in Guja v Moldova. 
 
4.3 The Civil Service Code and Authorised Whistleblowing Procedures 
 
The Civil Service Code speaks of the whistleblowing provision under the heading of 
‘Rights and Responsibilities.’425 It directs servants who believe they are being required 
to act in a way contrary to the values set forth in the code to raise the concern with a line 
manager
426
 in the first instance or with ‘nominated officers’ which essentially act as staff 
counsellors.
427
 Alternatively it suggests that a servant may wish to seek advice from their 
nominated officer.
428
 In cases of criminal or unlawful activity the Code directs servants 
to report their findings to the police or other appropriate authorities.
429
 If the servant 
believes that the response given is unsatisfactory he may wish to contact the Civil 
Service Commissioners, or even to contact them directly, without using the internal 
channels available.
430
The following sections will provide an analysis of the above 
provisions, starting with the role of the nominated officer. 
 
3.3.1 The Nominated Officer 
 
The ‘Nominated Officer’ is a member of staff nominated by Permanent Secretaries in 
each department with the role of accepting complaints from aggrieved servants. 
Emphasis is on the premise that the officer must act impartially as a person outside the 
                                                        
425Civil Service Code 2006, para 15. 
426Ibid, para 16. 
427Ibid, para 17 
428Ibid. 
429Ibid. 
430This will be discussed in more detail below. 
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servant’s management chain.431 However the officer is required to undertake the role in 
addition to their normal activities.
432
 Their role is to advise individual servants on the 
interpretation and implications of the Civil Service Code, to advise them on steps which 
might be taken to resolve a concern relating to the code, to advise on how to take a 
concern through the departmental procedures should the servant wish to do so.
433
 The 
final part of their role may entail passing on the concerns in question to the ‘appropriate 
point within the department’ if the Nominated Officer is satisfied that the matter may fall 
within the code.
434
 
 
The concept of an impartial person for which a Crown servant can obtain advice and 
guidance appears from the outset to be a welcome addition to the code. If one were to 
compare it to the position of the servant who after observing malpractice feels 
increasingly isolated and who may even consider unauthorised disclosure, the 
Nominated Officer provides an informed individual to share the burden. However 
several important considerations arise. The strength of this internal framework rests upon 
the ability of the Nominated Officer to deal with the matter effectively and impartially, 
the Civil Service Code must be a clear and precise document and if the matter is 
reported, the matter must be investigated and dealt with appropriately. 
 
One must ask whether the Nominated Officer can deal with the matter effectively 
bearing in mind that he would have other departmental responsibilities in addition to the 
role. This also has a direct consequence on the requirement to be impartial. There is a 
key distinction between being independent and being impartial. Because of the 
                                                        
431Civil Service Commissioners, Annual Report 2004-2005, 25. 
432Ibid. 
433Ibid. 
434Ibid. 
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Nominated Officer’s strong connection to the department of which the Crown Servant 
has a concern to report, this may have a significant psychological impact upon the 
servant who is undecided as to whether to leak to the media or use the internal 
framework.  
 
The PASC report on Leaks and Whistleblowing and Whitehall found that nominated 
officers were often senior people and that this may intimidate staff at a lower grade. The 
report recommended that nominated officers should be ‘evenly spread across grades and 
offices,’ it also recommended that where possible nominated officers should be 
individuals with other pastoral roles such as welfare officers to ‘improve visibility and 
ensure consistency of advice.’435 An alternative way of tackling the question of 
independence could be to detach the role of the nominated officer entirely from the 
department itself. In the Security and Intelligence services the staff counsellor is 
independent of the services.
436
 Another way would be to increase the involvement of the 
Civil Service Commissioners in the nominated officer’s role. In giving evidence to the 
PASC report, the first Civil Service Commissioner has stated that they encourage Civil 
Servants to first discuss their concerns with the nominated officer and that the 
Commissioners were currently conducting an audit of the internal mechanisms across 
departments and that a dedicated website had been set up for nominated officers to share 
concerns.
437
  
 
Whilst the actions of the Commissioners are a visible improvement to increase their 
                                                        
435PASC, Leaks and Whistleblowing in Whitehall, 2009 HC 83 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmselect/cmpubadm/83/8302.htm (accessed 13/06/10) 
at para 100. 
 
437 See further, PASC, Leaks and Whistleblowing in Whitehall, 2009, HC 83, EV 37,  Q.241 
http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/cm200809/cmselect/cmpubadm/83/83.pdf 
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participation in the nominated officer scheme, they should be contrasted to the work of 
the Canadian Public Sector Integrity Commissioner. Whilst the Canadian office has been 
around for a relatively short period of time, the Commission is actively involved in 
training members of staff who receive complaints. This has the positive effect that 
concerns are more likely to be dealt with consistently ‘in house’ but with the added 
safeguard of independent Parliamentary oversight.  It is submitted that increased 
involvement in the training and oversight of nominated officers would be a positive step 
and would enhance the reputation of the nominated officer scheme. The next section 
details the current nominated officer scheme which identifies problems caused by the 
inconsistency of the role of nominated officers from which vary from department to 
department.  
 
3.3.2 Differing internal procedures  
 
Further to the appointment of ‘nominated officers’ different government departments 
also offer a number of different appointed persons in their internal policies who can be 
contacted, Public Concern at Work (PCaW) conducted a comparative analysis of the 
whistleblowing policy of each department. The list includes:  
“Officers with professional responsibility for standards, departmental advisers 
specialised in whistleblowing, internal audit, human resources, welfare officers, a Risk 
Assurance Division, a departmental whistleblowing hotline, special routes for particular 
issues-notably special contacts (sometimes a hotline) for suspicions of fraud.”438  
 
The use of a whistleblowing hotline appears an interesting prospect. It has the clear 
advantage of making the appointed person readily accessible and means that the concern 
can be reported quickly. However it is unclear as to whether or not it would be more 
                                                        
438 Whistleblowing and Whitehall, accessible via: http://www.pcaw.co.uk/policy/civilservice.htm (accessed 
06/12/08). 
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beneficial to report concern by way of the telephone rather than approaching a nominated 
officer or person direct. If the telephone line allowed for the sole purpose of anonymous 
reporting then it may be considered advantageous, however such anonymity is actively 
discouraged by PCaW
439
 and the Department for Culture Media and Sport states in its 
policy: 
  “…If you do not tell us who you are, it will be much more 
difficult for us to look into the matter or give you feedback. Accordingly, while we 
consider anonymous reports, this policy is not designed to deal with concerns expressed 
anonymously.”  
 
The PCaW report was particularly critical of the Cabinet Office which scored worse in 
the study with a total of 3.
440
 The highest department was the Department of Culture, 
Media and Sport which scored a total of 25. The fact that the Cabinet Office scored so 
poorly presents a real cause for concern. The Cabinet Office itself indicates that it ‘sits at 
the very centre of government’441 and that it has an ‘overarching purpose of making 
government work better.’442 Furthermore the department cites the strengthening of the 
Civil Service as one of its ‘core functions’:  
  “To ensure the Civil Service is organised effectively and 
has the capability in terms of skills, values and leadership to deliver the Government’s 
objectives.”443 
 
It is perhaps most alarming that the Cabinet Office is failing in this aim.  
 
3.4 Dissecting the Code: Conflicting Ethical Standards? 
 
                                                        
439 Note that it would be more difficult for an individual to prove that he has suffered a detriment as a result 
of raising the concern if he does so anonymously. The Respondent could argue that he did not know it was 
the Claimant who raised the concerns.  
440  League Table of Whitehall Departments, Ibid,12. 
441 See Cabinet Office webpage: www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/about_the_cabinet_office. 
442 Ibid. 
443 Ibid. 
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Despite the implementation of whistleblowing procedures contained within a revised 
Civil Service Code, Crown servants in positions within the Civil Service remain at an 
uneven keel with their private sector counterparts. The whistleblowing charity Public 
Concern at Work (PCaW) has welcomed the revised code, yet believes it to be 
inconsistent and confusing in parts, suggesting that the provisions contained within the 
code need to be ‘expressed more clearly and simply and made more consistent with the 
Public Interest Disclosure Act.’444  
 
The working group responsible for the revised drafting of the Civil Service Code 
received 2,150 mixed responses during a consultation process.
445
  In particular the 
consultation report drew upon anonymous comments made by Civil Servants, a number 
of who believed that the old version of the Civil Service Code was more explicit about 
reporting concerns.
446
 This position is rather unfortunate given that the Civil Service 
Commissioners identified the need for greater clarity as a particular motivation for 
drafting the new Code.
447
 Furthermore, the Commissioners highlighted that it was 
unclear whether the code ‘provided rules of conduct or a set of values’ and that this had 
implications as: 
  “…If it was a code of conduct, it could be seen as non-
negotiable. If, on the other hand, it was a set of values that might imply it was for 
individuals to take a view on how to apply the values in particular circumstances.”448  
 
Upon reading the revised Code it is difficult to ascertain how it is any more affective in 
securing this aim, this is particularly notable when considering servants who intend to 
                                                        
444G. Dehn: Public Concern at Work. Letter on the Revised Civil Service Code to the Cabinet Secretary, the 
First Civil Service Commissioner, the Chair of the Committee on Standards in Public Life and the Chair of 
the Public Administration Committee, dated 19 April 2006. 
445Summary of Responses to Consultation on a New Civil Service Code, Cabinet Office, June 2006. 
446Ibid para 31. 
447Civil Service Commissioners, Annual Report 2005-2006, OSCSC, 36. 
448Ibid. 
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raise concerns.  
 
The Code consistently refers to requirements detailing a high level of ethical standards. It 
defines ‘honesty’ as ‘being truthful and open’ and states that servants must: ‘Set out the 
facts and relevant issues truthfully, and correct any errors as soon as possible; and use 
resources only for the purposes for which they are provided.’ And therefore must not 
‘deceive or knowingly mislead ministers, Parliament or others; or be influenced by 
improper pressures from others or the prospect of personal gain.’ Furthermore, the Code 
requires servants to ‘handle information as openly as possible within the legal framework 
and comply with the law and uphold the administration of justice.’ 449 
 
However, the Code also specifies loyalty to the Government of the day. If one were to 
consider the position of Clive Ponting if he had served under the revised Civil Service 
Code, during the Belgrano affair he observed that ministers were attempting to mislead 
Parliament. Regardless of his obligations under the Official Secrets Act, under the 
revised Code he would be upholding the value of ‘honesty’ and yet would contravene 
other parts of the Code. For example he would clearly have ‘disclosed information 
without authority’ contrary to paragraph 6 and furthermore disclosing information to an 
opposition MP may be seen as contravening the requirement to be politically impartial 
(paragraph13).    
 
In a guide available to Crown Servants on the giving of evidence or information of 
suspected crimes the introduction states plainly that servants have a ‘general professional 
duty’ to ‘draw official information’ which they believe may be relevant to the 
                                                        
449 Civil Service Code, published 6 June 2006, Para 6. 
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investigation or prosecution of a criminal offence to the attention of their department. It 
is also stated that servants have a duty to support the ‘administration of justice’ by giving 
‘investigators, prosecutors and defendants ‘full and proper assistance in their search for 
information about the alleged offence.’ The servant is required to report concerns to their 
department via their line manager or Offence Enquiry Point. 
 
3.5 Reporting Possible Criminality: The Offence Enquiry Point 
 
The Offence Enquiry Point (OEP) or the Criminal Investigation Contact Point (CICP) as 
it is also known as is rather similar to the Nominated Officer in that an existing member 
of each department is nominated and given the responsibility to handle complaints 
relating to alleged criminality. The OEP also handles requests for information received 
from investigators, prosecutors or the defence.  
 
The guide states that Crown servants must be as helpful and as open as they ‘reasonably 
can’ but ‘must always’ seek advice through the OEP before revealing official 
information as ‘some information is protected by law and some will need to be protected 
in the public interest.’ Furthermore the document specifies that all contact with 
investigators or prosecutors should be made through the OEP.
450
 Advice is given clearly 
separating the difference between suspicion and belief. If a servant has a suspicion he is 
expected to confirm or deny that suspicion and then seek advice from the OEP. This 
directly contradicts the advice given by the Department for Culture media and Sport 
(DCMS) which states in relation to all concerns that: 
  “If something is troubling you which you think we should 
know about please tell us straight away. We would rather you raise the matter when it is 
                                                        
450Para 2.7. 
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just a concern rather than wait for proof”451  
  
In analysing the internal procedures in place in government departments and building 
upon the model provided by DCMS, PCaW recommended that in the advice given to 
Crown servants it would be helpful to indicate that staff are encouraged to raise concerns 
even if they have only a suspicion.
452
 It has also been held that an ‘overzealous 
investigation’ can jeopardise any protection under PIDA. In Bolton School v Evans453 the 
Court of Appeal upheld a judgement of the Employment Appeal Tribunal. The EAT had 
stated that a PIDA claim concerned two separate issues: 
  “…conduct designed to demonstrate that the belief was 
reasonable and, second (that) the disclosure of the information itself which tended to 
show a breach of the relevant legal obligation…the law protects the disclosure of 
information which the employee reasonably believes tends to demonstrate the kind of 
wrongdoing, or anticipated wrongdoing that is covered by s.43. B. It does not protect the 
actions of the employee which are directed to establishing or confirming the 
reasonableness of that belief.”454  
 
In considering the difference between the reporting of an incident of malpractice to the 
reporting of an instance of possible criminality, there appears to be a grave inconsistency 
in the advice given and the reporting mechanisms available. With regards to a non-
criminal instance of malpractice, there is no requirement to actively seek proof in order 
to confirm suspicions and in the Department of Trade and Industry and Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office guidance it is clearly stated that it is the responsibility of the 
department rather than the employee to provide proof. However, the reporting of 
possible instances of criminality requires the employee to seek proof in order to confirm 
suspicions. There appears to be no plausible explanation for why there is such a 
discrepancy. There is also the possibility that such amateur investigations might not only 
                                                        
451See further, Above n 438, 3. 
452Ibid. 
453[2006] EWCA Civ 1653. 
454Ibid para 13. 
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prove harmful to future official and possible police investigations, but also to the Crown 
servant, who may forfeit any available protection under PIDA and may also cause 
confrontation with other members of his department as a result.  
 
There appears to be no reason as to why such suspicions need to be confirmed before 
approaching the OEP. It could not be for the reasoning that such allegations if unfounded 
could be seen as wasting police time as the OEP would undoubtedly make his own 
enquiries into the matter and consider the weight of evidence before deciding whether or 
not to pass on a formal complaint to the Police. If it is a logistical issue, this should not 
be to the detriment of the Crown Servant wishing to make the complaint.  
 
The position of OEP carries a great deal of responsibility, the fact that one person is 
required to not only field complaints but also receive requests for information from 
investigators raises the question of whether or not that person is firstly equipped to deal 
with major instances of criminality and secondly, if the OEP has a heavy workload will 
he still be able to devote the same attention and provide a fair and just decision? There is 
however, the opportunity to consider the internal complaint procedures via the 
Nominated Officer, or as a last resort the matter may be taken to the Civil Service 
Commissioners. However, with a sense of irony, if the matter in question concerned 
sensitive information, the Civil Service Commissioners may be denied the information, 
on the basis of the fact that the information must be protected in the public interest or 
which would be unlawful to reveal, by the OEP.  
 
The PASC found that there was a lack of clarity in the Civil Service Code as to when a 
Civil Servant is allowed or encouraged to approach a law enforcement or regulatory 
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body and that the Civil Service Code should be amended to ‘give greater clarity on this 
issue and the circumstances where such disclosures would be protected under PIDA.’455 
It is submitted that in cases where there is clear evidence that criminal activity has taken 
place it should be a matter for the police to investigate it rather than a matter for the OEP 
to decide whether the information should be passed on to the police.  
 
3.5.1 Subsequent Investigation 
 
If the OEP decides to pass the information on, by way of making a formal complaint to 
the Police, they have a statutory obligation to investigate it. It is at this point that critics 
and conspiracy theorists alike would question the possible effectiveness and 
independence of a Police investigation, particularly if such an investigation involved 
persons at a high level within the political system. However, recent investigations into 
the ‘cash for honours/peerages’ scandal have appeared to be both thorough and 
unprecedented, with Tony Blair being the first serving Prime Minister to be questioned 
in relation to a criminal investigation. Whilst consideration of the Cash for Honours 
scandal is not directly relevant to the subject of Crown servants blowing the whistle, it is 
relevant to consider how the police would investigate a criminal complaint made by a 
Crown servant.  
 
The alleged scandal involved political loans or donations given to the Labour party in 
exchange for peerages. In March 2006 several men nominated for peerages by the Prime 
Minister were rejected by the House of Lords Appointments Commission. It later 
emerged that the men had loaned money to the Labour party on the advice of the party 
                                                        
455HC 83 at para 75. 
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fundraiser Lord Levy. A complaint was then referred to the Metropolitan Police by the 
Scottish Nationalist MP Angus MacNeil that the party had breached the Honours 
(Prevention of Abuses) Act 1925. 
 
It later emerged that several promises of either honours or peerages (depending upon the 
size of the loan) were made in exchange for loans, with the assurance that the loans 
would be kept secret, the justification for this was that donations made to a party had to 
be declared but those who made loans to the party were exempt.  
 
Several arrests were made, not only of those persons who had made loans but also high 
profile officials such as Lord Levy and government aid Ruth Thomas. The questioning of 
the Prime Minister highlights not only the severity of the allegations but also the extent 
to which the Police are prepared to go to in order to conduct a thorough investigation. A 
Police investigation for serious allegations of misconduct provides a powerful 
accountability mechanism. There are also a number of advantages to such an 
investigation. There is the availability of experienced manpower, with skills to 
investigate and question if necessary. Furthermore, officers must follow the strict 
guidelines of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act. A high level and detailed Police 
investigation also provides a symbolic indication to the public that such matters will be 
taken seriously and dealt with appropriately. Also in terms of media reporting it would 
have a similar media impact to an unauthorised disclosure, but would be both authorised 
and legal. 
 
3.5.2 Criminal Investigation, Prosecution and the Authorised Disclosure of intelligence 
and security information 
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If a Crown Servant has information regarding illegal conduct which relates to national 
security issues, reporting the matter to the police has particular relevance. This is 
because disclosure to the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police is authorised by s. 7 
(3) (b) Official Secrets Act 1989
456
 and provides a powerful, and legal, alternative to 
making an unauthorised disclosure to the media.  The question of whether the Police or 
prosecuting authorities will properly investigate and prosecute in cases involving alleged 
illegality when it involves individuals working in the security and intelligence field or 
within the executive remains to be seen.  
 
In considering the outcome of a Police investigation one must not only view the role of 
the Crown Prosecution Service but also the role of the Attorney General. The question of 
impartiality becomes particularly pertinent in cases involving national security. It is 
submitted that the use of Criminal investigations to provide a strong accountability 
mechanism for instances of serious malpractice, can only succeed if the Attorney 
General remains impartial. As former Prime Minister Harold MacMillan stated it would 
be ‘a most dangerous deviation…if a prosecution were to be instituted or abandoned as a 
result of political or popular clamour.’457  
 
Recently, the Director of the Serious Fraud Office’s (SFO) decision to discontinue the 
investigation into the alleged bribery of Saudi Officials by BAe Systems in order to 
secure defence contracts brought the operational independence of both the Director of 
the SFO into question. In December 2006 the SFO announced that its decision to 
discontinue the investigation into BAe Systems had been taken following 
                                                        
456For further information on the authorisation to disclose information see further Chapter 4, Section 4.2 and 
Chapter 6, Section 6.1 of this thesis.  
45716th February, 1959, H.C. Debs, Vol. 600. Col. 31. 
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‘representations’ made to the Attorney General and the SFO Director and that the 
representations concerned the need to safeguard national and international security.  
 
The SFO argued that it had been ‘necessary to balance the need to maintain the rule of 
law against the wider public interest’ and that ‘no weight had been given to commercial 
interests or to the national economic interest.’ The Attorney General released a statement 
the same day which argued that there was a strong public interest in upholding and 
enforcing the criminal law but that there was a distinction between this public interest 
and considerations of national security and ‘our highest priority foreign policy objectives 
in the Middle East.’458  
 
A judicial review action was taken by the non-profit organisation Corner House 
Research against the Director of the SFO into the legality of the decision to halt the 
inquiry after it emerged that both the Director and the Attorney General were placed 
under considerable ministerial pressure prior to the decision because Saudi-Arabia had 
threatened to pull out of a considerable deal to purchase Typhoon aircraft and would 
withdraw counter-intelligence co-operation arrangements with the UK. It emerged that 
during the investigation the Director had had meetings with the ambassador to Saudi-
Arabia who argued that “British lives on British Streets” would be put at risk as a 
result.
459
  
 
 The Queen’s Bench Division found that the Director's action was not lawful and 
                                                        
458 See further: Z.Yihdego & A.Savage, The UK Arms Export Regime: Progress and Challenges [2008] PL 
546 at 558 and British Aerospace Systems, Al Yamamah and the UK Serious Fraud Office, Briefing Note by 
Transparency International (UK), 15th January 2006. 
459 R (on the application of Corner House Research) v Director of the Serious Fraud Office [2008] EWHC 
714. 
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impartial under domestic law on the basis that ‘no-one whether within this country or 
outside is entitled to interfere with the course of justice’ and that because the Director of 
the SFO failed to challenge the claim of a security threat or make sure that all other 
avenues had been exhausted to avert the threat made by Saudi Arabia. The Director of 
the SFO appealed to the House of Lords. The appeal was allowed on the basis that the 
Director had made the judgement that the public interest in saving the lives of British 
citizens outweighed any potential conviction and that the Attorney General had left the 
decision as to whether to continue the investigation up to the Director.
460
  
 
The decision made by the Attorney General not to prosecute Katherine Gun despite clear 
evidence of a breach of the Official Secrets Act was arguably politicised.
461
 Whilst 
criticism of the role of Attorney General has been levelled during any stage of political 
history whereby the dual role of government minister and ‘guardian of the public 
interest,’ a recent report by the Constitutional Affairs Select Committee entitled the 
‘Constitutional Role of the Attorney General’462 has not only stated that the 
aforementioned events have ‘compromised or appeared to compromise the position of 
the Attorney General’463 but have called for major reform effectively splitting the current 
role into two: legal functions to be carried out by a non political official and ministerial 
functions to be carried out by a minister in the newly formed Ministry of Justice.
464
 
 
In giving evidence to the committee, the then Attorney General Lord Goldsmith 
vehemently defended his role, arguing that in exercising his position of superintendence 
                                                        
460 R (on the application of Corner House Research) v Director of the Serious Fraud Office [2008] UKHL 
60. 
461 For further critical discussion of the role of Attorney General as politician and legal officer see: J.Ll.J. 
Edwards  The Law Officers of the Crown (Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1964) 224. 
462House of Commons, Constitutional Affairs Committee, Constitutional Role of the Attorney General, HC. 
306, 2007. 
463Ibid. 
464Ibid, 3. 
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of the main prosecuting authorities,
465
 he had made significant improvements which he 
stated would not have been possible from a position outside government.
466
 
 
It is submitted that the main cause for critical analysis surrounds the ‘Shawcross 
exercise’ and the public interest. Here it is observed by the Attorney General that whilst 
considering whether or not to bring or discontinue prosecutions government colleagues 
should be consulted. From the outset Shawcross identified: 
  “In order to inform himself, he (the Attorney General) 
may…consult with any of his colleagues in Government, and indeed… he would in some 
cases be a fool if he did not. On the other hand, the assistance of his colleagues is 
confined to informing him of particular considerations which might affect his own 
decision, and does not consist, and must not consist, in telling him what that decision 
ought to be.”467 
 
Whilst Shawcross clearly carries the instruction to be politically impartial and not to be 
influenced by the advice given by his government colleagues, it is this very exercise that 
has brought the role of Attorney General into question in the aforementioned events and 
particularly in relation to the advice given by the former Attorney General, Lord 
Goldsmith on the war in Iraq. Without political impartiality, such exercises are open to 
criticism and their subsequent decisions can be consistently argued to be politically 
motivated. 
 
Andrews states that where matters of state interest are at risk the only way of achieving 
fairness for the defendant without giving the defence access to the information is to drop 
the case and that the extent to which criminal investigations and subsequent proceedings 
                                                        
465Namely, the Crown Prosecution Service, the Serious Fraud Office, the Revenues and Customs 
Prosecution Office and the Director of Public Prosecutions in Northern Ireland. 
466Ibid. 
467HC Debs, 29 January 1951, Cols 683-684. A brief explanation of the ‘Shawcross Exercise’ is also 
mentioned in the Code for Crown Prosecutors (Crown Prosecution Service, 2004) para 5.6. 
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are aborted because of national or political pressure is unknown.
468
 However one must 
ask when does the state interest become a political interest? And consequentially by 
dropping such prosecutions whether or not this supports the public interest of the 
administration of justice.  
 
The Code for Crown Prosecutors states: 
  “Crown Prosecutors must be fair, independent and 
objective. They must not let any personal views about ethnic or national origin, 
disability, sex, religious beliefs, political views or the sexual orientation of the suspect, 
the victim or witness influence their decisions. They must not be affected by improper or 
undue pressure from any source.”469  
 
The Code provides a widely framed instruction to disregard political considerations, 
however there is no guarantee that a Shawcross exercise will not result in a decision 
made to secure a political ideal. A consultation paper on the role of the Attorney General 
suggested that there is clear tension between the various functions of the Attorney 
General, being a member of Government, being an independent guardian of the public 
interest and performing superintendence functions. Furthermore, it stated that there is 
tension between being a party politician and a member of government and the giving of 
independent legal advice.  
 
The then Prime Minister, Gordon Brown, stated on 3
rd
 July 2007 that the role of the 
Attorney General needs to change and that the current Attorney General, Baroness 
Scotland had decided that ‘except if the law or national security requires it’ not to make 
‘key prosecution decisions in individual criminal cases.’470 Whilst this decision 
represents important progress, its necessary impact is yet to be determined. However it is 
                                                        
468 J. Andrews, Public Interest and Criminal Proceedings [1988] LQR 104, 413. 
469 See Code for Crown Prosecutors, para 2.2. 
470 Ibid 
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perhaps most notable that the difficulties posed in the Katherine Gun case would 
undoubtedly constitute a national security issue.  
 
The decision to question Tony Blair, whilst holding office as Prime Minister, represents 
a voyage into unchartered territory, but in terms of access it is one which should be 
embraced. The proposed reform of the role of Attorney General would ensure that if high 
level investigations of this nature are conducted again, decisions whether or not to 
proceed with prosecutions will be dealt with impartially and would potentially make 
significant headway in reducing criticism to provide a strong and publicly overt 
accountability mechanism. The investigatory powers of other independent bodies will 
now be considered, starting with the Civil Service Commissioners.  
 
 
3.6 The Civil Service Commissioners: Enforcement of the Civil Service Code. 
 
If a Civil Servant believes that a serious breach of the Civil Service Code has taken 
place, he is advised to firstly contact his line manager, a person in the management chain 
or nominated officer (staff counsellor).
 
 If he fails to obtain an adequate remedy he may 
then appeal directly to the Civil Service Commissioners. Like the Parliamentary 
Commissioner, the Civil Service Commissioners are appointed under the royal 
prerogative and it is highlighted in the appeals procedure that the Commissioners are 
completely independent.
471
  The procedure notes that in dealing with information marked 
“Secret or above” the servant should advise the Commissioners beforehand so that 
provision can be made for appropriate handling of the information.
472
 The procedure 
                                                        
 
 
472See Guide to the Civil Service Code, accessible via https://www.civilservicecommissioners.org/web-
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ends with a confidential report of the findings sent to both the individual and the 
department.  
 
The Commission can make recommendations to the department subject to the complaint. 
The Commission identifies in its guidance that there is no ‘specific obligation on a 
department to follow the Commission’s recommendations’ but suggests that if their 
recommendations are ignored there are ‘levers of significant power’ available to them.473 
It suggests that it may draw ‘public and parliamentary attention’ to the fact that their 
recommendations have not been auctioned and would raise the matter with the 
Permanent Secretary or Agency Chief Executive concerned and if judged necessary, with 
the Cabinet Secretary. It then indentifies that if the steps did not produce action then they 
would ‘probably’ draw the matter to the attention of other bodies such as the PASC or 
the Committee on Standards in Public Life.
474
  
 
Section 17(1) of the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010 allows for the 
Commission to produce an exceptional report on any matter relating to the carrying out 
of its functions, this identifies that there is certainly the legislative scope to produce a 
‘special report’ on an unresolved issue however this provision has been drafted in 
implied rather than express terms. Here the Act presents a missed opportunity. A 
provision for dealing with situations where the department has failed to act on the 
recommendations of the Commission would formalise an important aspect of the 
Commission’s functions and would reduce uncertainty. Such a provision could have 
contained a protocol allowing for the Commission to submit a notice with 
                                                                                                                                                                     
app/plugins/spaw2/uploads/files/Guide%20to%20the%20Civil%20Service%20Code.pdf (accessed 
07/09/10). 
473 Ibid 
474 Above, n 472. 
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recommendations for corrective action which specifies a reasonable time frame for 
completion. If the recommended action is ignored the legislation could identify a 3 part 
escalation process, allowing the Commission to serve notice on the Permanent Secretary 
or Agency Chief Executive to deal with the issue within a specified time frame before 
reporting to the Cabinet Secretary. If these avenues fail, the Commission could then 
submit a report to Parliament.  
 
The Commissioners received the power to investigate appeals under the Civil Service 
Code in 1996. A freedom of information request by the author of this thesis has 
identified that the total number of new approaches made by Civil Servants to the 
Commissioners making a complaint under the Code has remained low. In the period of 
1996-1997, a total of 6 new approaches were made, this should be contrasted to the 
period, of 2009-2010 whereby 24 new approaches were made. Very few appeals are 
accepted for full investigation. Between the years 1996 and 2009, the Commissioners 
investigated a total of 13 appeals, 10 were upheld or partially upheld and 3 were not 
upheld.
475
  
 
In 2009 the Public Administration Select Committee (PASC), highlighted in their report 
Whistleblowing in Whitehall that although awareness of the Civil Service 
Commissioners appeared to have improved, they still received a very low number of 
appeals considering the size of the Civil Service.
476
 In 2011, the Civil Service reportedly 
has 479,000 employees and it is clear that despite increased awareness of how to raise a 
concern under the Code, more work needs to be done to recognise the role of the Civil 
Service Commission in receiving and investigating complaints under the Code.  
                                                        
475 All information obtained by FOIA request to Civil Service Commission 19/05/11.  
476 Above  n 435, para 91. 
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There is no further opportunity to appeal if the Crown Servant is dissatisfied with the 
findings and he is advised to ‘leave the service.’477 It is submitted that the requirement to 
‘leave the service’ if the Civil Servant is unable to seek a remedy through the Civil 
Service Commissioners is unhelpful. As the Civil Servant will most likely view the 
appeal procedures and Civil Service Code before choosing whether or not to make an 
unauthorised disclosure and the statement, without any further explanation, does not 
provide reassurance and may have the adverse affect that Civil Servants will be inclined 
to bypass procedures and make unauthorised disclosures as they would probably have to 
leave their job anyway as a result of the Commissioner’s decision.  
 
3.6.1 Direct Access to the Civil Service Commissioners  
 
Paragraph 8 of the Civil Service Code states that the Civil Service Commissioners ‘will 
also consider taking a complaint direct.’ The Committee on Standards in Public Life 
highlighted in its 3rd Report that: 
  “ The essence of a whistleblowing system is that staff 
should be able to by-pass the direct management line because that may well be the area 
about which their concerns arise and that they should be able to go outside the 
organisation if they feel the overall management is engaged in an improper course.”478 
 
In the context of the Civil Service ‘going outside the organisation’ means approaching 
the Civil Service Commissioners. In a response to an article which encouraged Civil 
Servants to leak, the First Civil Service Commissioner, Janet Paraskeva stated that ‘clear 
routes are provided for Civil Servants to raise concerns.’479  
                                                        
477 Ibid. 
478 Committee on Standards in Public Life, 3rd Report, 1996, 48. 
479‘How Can a Government Function if it Cannot Trust its Civil Servants?’ 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2008/dec/16/whitehall-civil-liberties-response (accessed 
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A Crown servant may feel unable to discuss the issue with their line manager or 
nominated officer because of fears of reprisal, particularly if the person is involved in the 
matter he is reporting on. One must also envisage the Crown servant/ department 
relationship after the report has been published. Regardless of the outcome of the appeal 
the Crown servant may again fear reprisal, particularly if the report does not fall in his 
favour. The servant’s position has the potential to become swiftly untenable once he is 
identified as the source of the compliant and consequently the desire to make an 
anonymous unauthorised disclosure may become an attractive proposition.  
 
The British Standards Institute Code Practice for Whistleblowing Arrangements states 
that express provision for external disclosures ‘which is not surrounded by caveats and 
conditions’ should be included and that this would have a positive effect in ensuring that 
a concern is ‘less likely to degenerate into a protracted personal battle.’ However, there 
is no further opportunity to appeal if the Crown servant is dissatisfied with the findings 
and he is advised to ‘leave the service.’480  
 
It is submitted that the requirement to ‘leave the service’ if the Civil Servant is unable to 
seek a remedy through the Civil Service Commissioners is unhelpful. As the Civil 
Servant will most likely consider the appeal procedures and Civil Service Code before 
choosing whether or not to make an unauthorised disclosure the statement, without any 
further explanation, does not provide reassurance and may have the adverse affect that 
Civil Servants will be inclined to bypass procedures and make unauthorised disclosures 
as they would probably have to leave their job anyway as a result of the Commissioner’s 
                                                                                                                                                                     
18/12/08). 
480  Civil Service Code Para 19: http://www.civilservice.gov.uk/about/values/cscode/rights.aspx (accessed 
12/02/10). 
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decision.  If the Civil Service Commissioners are going to support and enforce the values 
of the Civil Service Code they must recognise that the need for consistent complaint 
handling and strong investigation and oversight of concerns is paramount to provide a 
realistic alternative to the unauthorised leaking of official documents. 
 
The Commissioners most recently published guidance for Civil Servants on raising 
concerns.
481
 Most interestingly, the new guidance identifies that it was published 
following the principles of the British Standards Code of Practice. The Commissioners 
cannot be consistent with the principles of the BSI code because the Civil Service Code 
carries the ultimate condition that if a Servant is not satisfied with the response he should 
leave.  
 
The new guidance is a positive step towards promoting the involvement of the 
Commissioners in concern reporting. Prior to the guidance, very little information 
existed on how the Commissioners operate and handle concerns. The publication of three 
documents, one aimed at the Civil Servant, one aimed at the department and another 
setting out a general statement of remit and values will undoubtedly enhance the work of 
the Commissioners however the timing of the publication is too early to gauge the 
impact of the work.  
 
The Civil Service Commissioners are not a prescribed regulator under s.43F PIDA and 
the former First Civil Service Commissioner Lady Usha Prashar had indicated that it 
would not be appropriate for the Commissioners to be prescribed.
482
 Lady Prashar 
indentified that this was because of concerns that the general public would approach the 
                                                        
481 http://www.civilservicecommissioners.org/Civil_Service_Code/Appeals_under_the_Code/ (accessed 
12/02/10).  
482 Letter of from Baroness Usha Prashar CBE to Guy Dehn, Public Concern at Work, 25 July 2003.  
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Commissioners with complaints. Nevertheless it could be argued that if the 
Commissioners were prescribed under s.43F PIDA it would instil a greater degree of 
independence in the process.  
 
It should be noted that regardless of any reporting mechanism in place, there will always 
be a person who disagrees with a decision or form of working practice. This may be for a 
moralistic reason or because of personal disillusionment with their position. There will 
always be unauthorised disclosures. But providing a clear and structured approach to the 
reporting and handling of concerns should discourage Crown employees from leaking 
documents to the media.  
 
3.6.2 Publication of the Outcome of Investigations 
 
Publication of the outcome of appeals in the public domain, in the form of reports such 
as those made available by the Parliamentary Commissioner would be a substantial 
improvement to Civil Service accountability. The introduction of the Civil Service Code 
provides a uniform code of standards, but it should not merely constitute a number of 
ideals. Enforcement of the Code would be best served if the information was readily 
available and consequently lead to a reduction in unauthorised disclosure. Special 
provision would be needed to ensure the protection of documents relating to national 
security, yet as the appeal procedures illustrate, the Commissioners are readily equipped 
to deal with such information.    
 
It may not be appropriate for the details of investigations to be published with the 
identities of individual Civil Servants and their department revealed. Government 
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departments need to be able to make decisions quickly. Departments would undoubtedly 
stall if they had to seek public approval, and individual Crown servants would be 
reluctant to make politically sensitive decisions for fear of repercussions. However, there 
is nothing to prevent the Commissioners from publishing redacted information to protect 
the identities of the Civil Servants concerned.  
 
The UK Civil Service Commissioners are also constitutionally an agent of Parliament 
and yet have no obligation to report findings to Parliament. The UK Parliamentary 
Ombudsman who is an agent of Parliament does report its findings of investigations to 
Parliament.
483
 The publication of investigations by the Commissioners would therefore 
be a positive step towards improving Parliamentary oversight and a step away from 
unnecessary secrecy in the Civil Service. 
 
3.6.3 The Case for Improved External Oversight 
 
In giving evidence to the PASC the First Civil Service Commissioner, Janet Paraskeva 
said that she would refer the most serious cases to the Permanent Secretary or to the 
Head of the Home Civil Service Sir Gus O’Donnell. The Commissioner then stated that 
if Sir Gus O’Donnell failed to take action that the Commissioners had a duty to report 
and that she would report the matter to the PASC. When asked what would happen if a 
Civil Servant raised a concern that a minister was being untruthful on a matter of public 
                                                        
483 It should be born in mind that the Canadian Public Sector Integrity Commissioner, as an agent of the 
Canadian Parliament, has a duty to report findings of investigations to the Canadian Parliament. Therefore 
there is scope for the publication of findings to Parliament without harming the interest of the individual or 
the department concerned. 
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interest, the Commissioner explained that she ‘would go to the Cabinet Secretary’ 
because: 
“If it is a matter of ministerial pressure being put on civil servants that is not a 
matter for us, as Commissioners, but it is a matter that the Cabinet Secretary would no 
doubt raise perhaps even with the Prime Minister.”484 
With regard to reporting to the PASC, there is a lack of information which states that in 
cases where the Civil Service Commissioners are unable to deal with whistleblower 
concerns they will refer the matter. Again, the approach lacks a clearly identifiable 
framework for civil servants who are unsure whether or not to blow the whistle, 
particularly in relation to breaches of the Ministerial Code. There is no assurance that the 
Commissioners will report to the PASC if such a situation occurred and furthermore 
there is no assurance that the PASC will be able to deal to appropriately deal with such a 
matter.
485
 
 
3.6.4 Reporting and Investigating Ministerial Misconduct 
 
With regard to reporting matters of ministerial pressure on Civil Servants the comments 
of the First Commissioner are worrying. If such a matter were to occur it would be 
referred to the Cabinet Secretary or the Prime Minister. The Cabinet Secretary is also the 
Head of the Home Civil Service, Sir Gus O’Donnell.  Whilst the Cabinet Secretary has 
the authority to deal with complaints arising under the Ministerial Code the position 
places Sir Gus O’Donnell as ultimate arbiter of the complaint or if he refers the matter to 
the Prime Minister there is a clear conflict between the need to maintain accountable 
government and the potential political embarrassment caused by dealing with the 
                                                        
484 Accessible via: http://www.parliament.the-stationery-
office.co.uk/pa/cm200809/cmselect/cmpubadm/c83-iv/c8302.htm (accessed 18/12/09). 
485 These concerns are fully addressed in the next section of this chapter. 
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complaint.  
 
The current position places too much power in the hands of government and the Cabinet 
Secretary at the expense of clear Parliamentary oversight. There is a clear risk that if the 
Civil Service Commissioners refer a complaint to the Cabinet Secretary, emphasis will 
be primarily placed on the need for Civil Servants to serve the government of the day, 
rather than dealing with the alleged ministerial misconduct.  
 
When Clive Ponting disclosed information to Tam Dalyell the then Cabinet Secretary Sir 
Robert Armstrong dealt purely with the unauthorised disclosure and did not deal with the 
ministerial misconduct. Similarly during the Christopher Galley leak investigation Sir 
Gus O’Donnell stated that the unauthorised disclosures were of a real risk to national 
security, a position repeated by then Home Secretary Jacqui Smith, claims later criticised 
by the Public Affairs Select Committee as an exaggerated impression of damage done by 
the leaks. Whilst it is understandable that a the Cabinet Secretary would not condone 
leaks by Civil Servants there is a risk, as a consequence of having a dual role of Cabinet 
Secretary and Head of the Civil Service, that by placing emphasis on the conduct of Civil 
Servants, the conduct of ministers may be overlooked.  
 
The Civil Service Commissioners are under no obligation to refer the matter to the 
Cabinet Secretary. Currently investigations of alleged breaches of the Ministerial Code 
may be carried out the Independent Advisor on Ministerial Interests, Sir Philip Mawer, at 
the behest of the Prime Minister. Sir Philip must then report to the Prime Minister who 
then decides, what action, if any should be taken against the minister concerned. Whilst 
Sir Philip has unquestionable experience and integrity as former Commissioner for 
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Standards in Public Life, the current investigatory process lacks the necessary 
Parliamentary oversight.  
 
In 2001 the PASC recommended that the Parliamentary Ombudsman should carry out 
investigations into ministerial misconduct.
486
Utilising the already existing mechanism 
would have provided the necessary oversight capability and co-operation with 
Parliament. However, following the appointment of Sir Philip’s predecessor, the PASC 
were satisfied with the system despite the fact that the appointment inevitably meant an 
apparent lack of oversight from the PASC.
487
 The next section will provide an analysis 
of the current role of the Parliamentary Ombudsman to consider whether the role could 
be enhanced to receive complaints from civil servants on matters falling under her 
current remit or under an extended remit to include investigation of breaches of the 
Ministerial Code. 
 
  3.7 The Parliamentary Ombudsman: A valuable deterrent against malpractice or a 
missed opportunity? 
 
In the United Kingdom the Ombudsman allows members of the public, not Crown 
employees to raise issues against the state. The Parliamentary Commissioner for 
Administration or ‘ombudsman’ was established in the United Kingdom by the 
Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration Act 1967. Once described as providing 
MPs with ‘a new powerful weapon with a sharp cutting-edge to be added to the 
antiquated armoury of Parliamentary questions and adjournment debates’ and ‘an 
extremely sharp and piercing instrument of investigation.’488  
                                                        
486 The Ministerial Code: Improving the Rule Book, HC 235, Session 2000-2001, para 31. 
487 The Ministerial Code: the Case for Independent Investigation, HC 1457, at para 23. 
488The Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration, Cmnd 2767, 1965; Hansard, H.C. Debs, 1966-67, 
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In the United Kingdom the Ombudsman sits uneasily between the requirements to adhere 
to an unwritten constitution, which places the concept of ministerial responsibility at the 
forefront, and the need to accurately highlight cases of maladministration and 
malpractice with the aim of promoting good, accountable governance. Most importantly, 
the Ombudsman can only receive complaints from Members of Parliament on behalf of 
the public
489
 (the so-called ‘MP filter’) and must report the result of her findings to the 
Member of Parliament concerned. 
 
3.7.1 Crown Servants and the Parliamentary Ombudsman 
 
In 1969 the Select Committee discussed whether the Civil Service, the armed forces and 
other Crown appointments should be given access for the purpose of reporting concerns 
relating to personnel matters.
490
 The government presented a memorandum to the 
committee strongly opposing any such additions to the office’s remit. It stated that the 
Ombudsman scheme concerned the relationship between the government and the 
governed, rather than the government as employer. Furthermore it stated that allowing 
such access would make the service a ‘privileged class’ affording them access to the 
Ombudsman when other employees would receive no such privilege (and one must also 
consider that members of the general public do not have the right of direct access to the 
Ombudsman, instead being reliant upon the MP ‘filter’). Also it was considered that 
Crown servants already had access to their staff associations and that this would be 
harmed as a result of allowing Crown servants access to the machinery.  
                                                                                                                                                                     
Cols 44, 49 and 60. See also R.Gregory and  J.Pearson, The Ombudsman: Twenty Five Years On 
(Cavendish, London, 1993) Ed. N.Hawke, 10. 
489Section 5.1 (a) Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration Act 1967. 
490The Committee debates are detailed at length in R. Gregory & P. Huchinson, The Parliamentary 
Ombudsman: A study in the Control of Administrative Action (George Allen & Unwin, London, 1975) 559. 
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There is a notable distinction between the reporting of personnel issues and the reporting 
of instances of maladministration. Personnel issues may be largely regarded as an 
internal matter, concerning the relationship between the state as employer and employee. 
However one must ask if instances of maladministration should also be regarded as an 
internal matter, bearing in mind that the consequences of such action may indeed affect 
the relationship between the government and the governed.  
 
Whilst the Civil Service Commissioners present an independent body to report concerns, 
their office can be largely regarded as a last resort, whereby an approach is made after 
the Civil Servant has failed to seek redress from approaching their line manager or staff 
councillor. It is also notable that the reports of such appeals are confidential. When the 
facts in issue concern information of high public importance one might again argue that 
such information should be available in the public domain.  
 
In justifying the original Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration Bill the Labour 
government had placed considerable emphasis on the fact that the Ombudsman should be 
a servant of MPs rather than of the general public. This was considered as necessary to 
allay MPs concerns that their own duty of fielding complaints from constituents would 
diminish as a result of the Ombudsman entering office.
491
 However, the Parliamentary 
Ombudsman is now an established part of the constitutional framework. Indeed, the 
Select Committee has identified the Ombudsman scheme as ‘part of the fabric of the 
UK’s unwritten constitution.’492  By allowing members of the public to directly approach 
the Ombudsman, the position is redefined as a servant of the people. The most logical 
                                                        
491 See further R.Crossman, Leader of the House of Commons, Parlaimentary Debates (Commons) 5th Ser. 
734. (1966) 42-43, 47-48, 51. W.B. Gwyn. Ombudsman or Ombudsmouse? [1973] J POLIT 35 1, 50.   
492  First Report from Select Committee, 1990-1991, HC 129, 19 December, 1990. 
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solution to this would be to allow members of the public to make complaints directly to 
the Parliamentary Commissioner. The unsuccessful Parliamentary Commissioner 
(Amendment) Bill 2004 made provision for complaints to be made not only to MPs, but 
also directly to the Commissioner.
493
   
 
3.8 Parliamentary Select Committees: External Oversight? 
 
In written evidence to the PASC, Public Concern at Work suggested that the chairman of 
an appropriate select committee, such as the PASC should be made a prescribed 
regulator under s.43F PIDA.
494
 This was on the basis that the Civil Service 
Commissioners had expressed that it would not be appropriate for them to be a 
prescribed regulator under s.43F. It would mean that Civil Servants would have PIDA 
protection if they reported a concern directly to the chairman of a select committee, 
provided that they made the disclosure in good faith and that the information disclosed 
and any allegation contained in it was substantially true.  
 
The PASC recommended in their report that a Civil Servant should be allowed to go 
directly to the PASC as a last resort.
495
 Protection for Civil Servants to go directly to a 
chairman of a select committee is similar to the US approach for members of the CIA 
who may report their concerns to a senate committee, albeit with management 
approval.
496
 Making an approach directly to a select committee would not be without its 
own problems and this chapter will now progress, in the light of these recommendations, 
to consider the work of Select Committees and Civil Servants appearing before them. 
                                                        
493  Cl.2 Parliamentary Commissioner (Amendment) Bill 2004. 
494http://www.pcaw.co.uk/policy/policy_pdfs/PASCWBinWhitehallPCAWJan09.pdf (accessed 12/01/10). 
495http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmselect/cmpubadm/83/83.pdf at para 36 (accessed 
12/02/10). 
496 See further: Chapter 6, Section 6.6.4 of this thesis. 
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Parliamentary select committees provide a mechanism of Parliamentary oversight which 
extends beyond the rowdy confines of the Commons chamber. Committees are staffed 
by senior backbenchers and are headed by a chairperson whose own selection process is 
somewhat dominated by the influence of party whips. There are advantages to Select 
Committees in that they choose to investigate any matter which comes under the terms of 
their remit whereas the Civil Service Commissioners or Parliamentary Ombudsman 
would have to accept a complaint before investigating. The clear disadvantage is that 
their investigatory work is limited to persons giving evidence before the Committees, 
unlike the Parliamentary Ombudsman and the Civil Service Commissioners who have 
access to investigate within departments. It may be argued therefore that this limits the 
questions that the committee can ask to the information it knows about which will most 
likely already be in the public domain. The next section will consider the role of 
ministers and Civil Servants giving evidence before Select Committees. 
 
3.9 Civil Servants and the Osmotherly Rules 
 
Parliamentary Select Committees maintain the right to summon named civil servants to 
give evidence
497
 however, in practice civil servants give evidence on behalf of ministers 
and may be instructed not to disclose certain information as the minister sees fit.  A 
memorandum of Guidance issued to senior civil servants, identifying what should and 
should not be discussed before Select Committees reaffirms the notion of executive 
control: 
  “Officials appearing before Select Committees do so on 
behalf of their ministers. It is accordingly government policy that it is for ministers to 
                                                        
497  Departmental Evidence and Response to Select Committees, para 42. 
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decide which officials shall give evidence to Select Committees on their behalf…If, 
however a Select Committee summoned by name any other official to appear before 
them, and insisted on their right to do so, it would be for the ministers to decide what 
course to follow. The formal constitutional position is that although a committee’s power 
under their terms of reference to summon persons and papers is normally unqualified, 
such a summons is effectively binding only if backed by an Order of the House.”498  
 
In the Westland Affair the Defence Committee sought evidence from five named Crown 
Servants. The Government resisted the requests. The Secretary of State for Trade, Paul 
Channon did not “regard it as appropriate” that the officials attend.499  Similarly, the 
Secretary of the Cabinet stated that he had conducted his own inquiry and held the belief 
that it would ‘neither be fair nor reasonable’ to ‘expect these officials to submit to a 
second round of detailed questioning, of the sort that would be involved in giving 
evidence to your Committee.’500 
 
The attendance of five named officials was substituted for evidence given by Sir Robert 
Armstrong, author of the infamous Armstrong memorandum.
501
 Not only did Armstrong 
request the utmost loyalty to Government from servants but he also assisted in 
preventing those officials from giving evidence. In reality the appearance of Crown 
servants at Select Committees, is meaningless if they are instructed by their ministers to 
answer questions in a certain way or not at all. 
 
If a minister is personally involved in an act of malpractice, the opportunity to frustrate 
the Committee and prevent an accurate representation of the facts is a very real 
possibility. This factor was made particularly apparent when the Trade and Industry 
Committee attempted to make inquiries into the tin crisis of 1985-86. Upon questioning 
                                                        
498 Ibid. 
499B. Hayes, Permanent Secretary to the DTI, Letter to the Clerk of the Defence Committee, 29 January 
1986. 
500Letter to the Clerk of the Defence Committee, 4 February 1986. 
501HC 519 (1985-86). 
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Civil Servants the Committee was faced with a series of refusals to answer questions 
resulting in an inaccurate representation of the facts meaning that the Committee had to 
base their conclusions ‘in some cases’ on ‘second hand evidence and on supposition’ and 
that the fault for this ‘lies with ministers.’502 
 
Former Crown servants were also being prevented from the opportunity to testify before 
the Treasury and Industry Committee, in the Supergun Inquiry.
503
 The inquiry was called 
after Customs and Excise officials alleged that the Matrix Churchill Company had 
breached export regulations after exporting machine tools to Iraq for use in the 
construction of a ‘supergun’. It later emerged that the government had authorised the 
exports and MI6 were fully aware of the fact. Tristan Garel-Jones, Malcolm Rifkind, 
Michael Heseltine and Kenneth Clark refused to disclose information relating to 
communication between the Department of Trade and Industry and the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office at the trial of the directors of the company. The case collapsed 
after former Defence Minister Alan Clark, in defence of Matrix Churchill revealed that 
the government were fully aware of the exports. In his report Sir Richard Scott was 
highly critical of the decision and did not accept the contention that retired Crown 
servants lack up to date information and therefore could not ‘contribute directly to his 
accountability to the House’.504 Scott Believed that the former servants were: 
  “Primary witnesses to the facts…Far from being 
unproductive; their evidence would have been highly pertinent and helpful. A minister’s 
duty to account to Parliament for what his department has done ought…to be recognised 
as extending…to an obligation to assist an investigating Select Committee to obtain the 
best first hand evidence available on the matters being investigated. The refusal to 
                                                        
502  Second Report, Trade and Industry Committee, HC 305-1 of 1985-6, para 12. 
503  The prevention of Crown Servants testifying before Select Committees has been noted to extend to the 
intelligence services, see Shifting the Balance: Select Committees and the Executive HC 300 (1999/2000), 
para 92 
504Rt. Hon. Sir Richard Scott, VC, Report of the Inquiry into the Export of Defence Equipment and Dual-
Use Goods to Iraq and Related Prosecutions, HC 1995-95, 115, Gen Notice 80/38, Para 44. Also see P. 
Birkinshaw, Government & Information: The Law Relating to Access, Disclosure & Their Regulation (3rd 
Ed, Tottel, Haywards Heath, 2005). 
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facilitate the giving of evidence…may be regarded as a failure to comply fully with the 
obligations of accountability owed to Parliament.”505 
 
The inability of Select Committees and inquiries to successfully hold the Executive to 
account, largely due to efforts by ministers to offer as little assistance as is required is 
counterproductive, not only because it fails to give an accurate representation of the 
facts, but because it is more likely to prompt Crown servants to leak. The impact of this 
is most important in considering whether a Crown servant could in practice approach a 
Select Committee directly.  
 
In going externally to the PASC the whistleblower would need reassurance that the 
Select Committee would be able to conduct an effective investigation. It is therefore 
difficult to envisage how an investigation would be conducted thoroughly if a minister 
chose to frustrate such an investigation. Furthermore, one must then ask what role the 
potential whistleblower would take in the process. By their very nature, Select 
Committees are reliant upon people giving evidence before them. This creates a 
significant difficulty for the whistleblower that is traditionally seen as a witness to 
wrongdoing or malpractice. However, whilst a select committee could convene a private 
session or give immunity from prosecution, unlike a witness in a court of law, a 
whistleblower appearing before a select committee would not be subject to the correct 
standards imposed on courts with regards to advocacy, witness and evidence handling. 
Despite the best intentions of the members of Select Committees it must not be forgotten 
that those members are elected members of Parliament. Perhaps unfairly an example of a 
whistleblower being handed particularly harsh questioning by members of a Select 
Committee is Dr David Kelly.
506
   
                                                        
505Ibid, para F4 66. 
506Oral Evidence of Dr David Kelly to Foreign Affairs Committee, 15th July 2003, 
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It is submitted that whilst there is considerable value in the work carried out by Select 
Committees the involvement of Crown servants in the Select Committee process is 
deeply problematical, partly because of the traditional doctrine of ministerial 
responsibility and the Osmotherly Rules and partly because since the introduction of the 
Civil Service Code, Civil Servants have a clear duty of political impartiality.  
 
A Civil Servant who blew the whistle to a Select Committee would clearly breach the 
Code. Firstly, Civil Servants have a duty of confidentiality and must remain politically 
impartial. Both requirements mean that an approach to a Member of Parliament would 
break the Code. Secondly, Civil Servants do not have access to report concerns to the 
Parliamentary Ombudsman. Select Committees would be best placed to investigate the 
work of the Civil Service Commissioners.  
 
A welcome reform would be to build upon the recommendation of the PASC report to 
allow the Commissioners to report to Parliament, and perhaps the best forum would be 
the PASC.
507
 This would have the dual benefit of allowing the Civil Service 
Commissioners to conduct a thorough investigation whilst still allowing the necessary 
involvement of the Select Committee by providing Parliamentary Scrutiny. It is therefore 
submitted that in cases where an extensive investigation is required the Civil Service 
Commissioners should produce a ‘special report,’ similar to those provided by the 
Parliamentary Ombudsman and the Intelligence and Security Committee, which can then 
be made available to the PASC. This proposal is both consistent with constitutional 
                                                                                                                                                                     
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200203/cmselect/cmfaff/uc1025-i/uc102502.htm (accessed 
12/09/10). 
507HC 83 accessible via: 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmselect/cmpubadm/83/83.pdf at para 34 (accessed 
12/02/10). 
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convention and the Civil Service Code. In the next section, this study will consider 
whether the Parliamentary Ombudsman be made available to receive whistleblowing 
concerns from Crown Servants. The next section provides analysis of public inquiries 
and Crown Servants appearing before them. 
 
3.10 When Things go wrong: Public Inquiries 
 
The role of public inquiries as a mechanism of public accountability is of great 
importance to the aim of this thesis. It is submitted that some of the most important 
investigations into Executive malpractice, if not all over the last 25 years have involved 
either a leak of information or the involvement of a ‘whistleblower.’ The Westland affair 
–for instance- involved the leak of a letter by MP Michael Heseltine to the press, which 
later resulted in the Cabinet Secretary conducting his own inquiry. Later notable scandals 
resulted in full scale public inquires. This section provides an overview of 
whistleblowers that have appeared before inquiries.  
 
The Scott Inquiry concerned an inquiry into the export of parts by the Matrix Churchill 
Company to Iraq.
508
 It was found that the parts could be used in the manufacture of 
weapons. Matrix Churchill had the permission to export the parts following a relaxation 
in export rules; however the then Secretary of State, Alan Clark had failed to inform 
Parliament of the change in the rules when asked if the rules had been relaxed in a 
Parliamentary question had denied that a change in the rules had taken place. The 
company was prosecuted by HM Customs on the basis that they did not have permission 
to export the parts. At trial, Public Interest Immunity certificates were obtained by the 
                                                        
508 Sir Richard Scott, Report of the Inquiry into the Export of Defence Equipment and Dual-Use Goods to 
Iraq and Related Prosecutions, 321. 
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government on national security grounds. The judge later overturned the certificates and 
the trial collapsed after Alan Clark MP admitted that he had been ‘economical with the 
actualite.’  
 
It later emerged that a Matrix Churchill company employee had sent a letter to the 
Foreign Secretary, Sir Geoffrey Howe and the Security Service identifying that the 
company was exporting parts which could be used in the manufacture of shell casings. 
Michael Heseltine refused to sign a PII certificate for fear that if he did so and the 
employee went to the press during the trial he would be accused of a cover up.
509
  
 
In 2003, retired judge Lord Hutton chaired an inquiry into the death of Dr David Kelly, a 
biological weapons specialist and former United Nations weapons inspector in Iraq who 
was employed by the Ministry of Defence. Dr Kelly had spoken ‘off the record’ to BBC 
journalist Andrew Gilligan claiming that a dossier detailing Iraq’s capabilities to launch 
weapons of mass destruction had been exaggerated or “sexed up” in order to provide 
justification to invade Iraq. Following BBC news reports, Dr Kelly was exposed as the 
source of the information and was subjected to questioning by the Foreign Affairs Select 
Committee. Dr Kelly was later found dead in woodland near his home and had 
apparently committed suicide. During the course of the Inquiry, Lord Hutton heard 
testimony from another apparent whistleblower, Dr Brian Jones. Dr Jones, an employee 
of the Defence Intelligence Staff, had expressed reservations about the worth of the 
intelligence contained in the dossier and had waited until he left employment before 
writing a letter to Sir John Scarlett, chairman of the JIC.  
 
                                                        
509 Ibid at para D2.318.  
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The Review of Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction
510
 was a Privy Council 
inquiry, chaired by Lord Butler. The inquiry, more commonly known as the ‘Butler 
Review’ specifically focussed upon the intelligence relating to Iraq’s WMD capability. 
Carne Ross, a UK diplomat testified before the inquiry that during his time in Iraq the 
UK government did not assess WMD to pose a threat.
511
 Ross opined that there were 
viable alternatives to the invasion of Iraq and believed that the actions of Saddam 
Hussain could be curtailed by putting a stop to illegal oil exports by the regime. Carne 
Ross later resigned from the diplomatic service and testified before the Iraq Inquiry.
512
 
The Iraq Inquiry, chaired by Lord Chilcott, also heard evidence from Elizabeth 
Wilmshurst, a former Deputy Legal Adviser to the Foreign Office.
 513
 Wilmshurst 
resigned in 2003 after the government reversed her legal opinion that the invasion of Iraq 
would be illegal without a second UN Resolution. Whilst the reasons for her resignation 
were not made public at the time, the letter was made available after a Freedom of 
Information Act request two years later.
514
  
 
Most interestingly, the Saville Inquiry into the events of ‘Bloody Sunday’ took the 
extraordinary step of receiving testimony from both David Shayler and his partner, also 
an ex-Security Service employee Annie Machon. This has relevance because 
surprisingly David Shayler was due to stand trial for offences of unauthorised disclosure 
under the Official Secrets Act 1989. The Security Service has since denied all of David 
                                                        
510 HC 98, The Review is accessible here: http://www.archive2.official-
documents.co.uk/document/deps/hc/hc898/898.pdf (accessed 09/10/10). 
511 Note that the Mr Ross’ statement before the Butler Review is not accessible on the review website nor is Ross 
identified in the Review. Carne Ross did however attach his statement to the Butler Review in his evidence to the 
Iraq Inquiry, accessible below.  
512 The inquiry was launched on 30th July 2009 and at the time of writing is yet to conclude.  Statement of 
Carne Ross http://www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/media/47534/carne-ross-statement.pdf (accessed 09/10/10). 
513Transcript of testimony of Elizabeth Wilmshurst  
http://www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/media/44211/20100126pm-wilmshurst-final.pdf (accessed 09/10/10). 
 
514‘Wilmshurst Resignation Letter,’ BBC News Website, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/4377605.stm (accessed 10/09/09) 
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Shayler’s allegations. Intelligence officers were then questioned on Shayler’s 
testimony.
515
 Before considering the position of a Crown servant appearing as a witness 
before a public inquiry it is first necessary to consider how a public inquiry is set up. 
  
3.10.1 Formation of an inquiry  
 
From the outset a government minister will decide whether or not to hold a public 
inquiry. The decision will be made whether to hold an inquiry under the terms of the 
Inquiries Act 2005 or on an ‘ad hoc’ basis, meaning that the Inquiry will not be subject 
to the legislative framework provided by the 2005 Act. Under s.1 Inquiries Act 2005 any 
minister can set up an inquiry if ‘particular events have caused, or are capable of causing, 
public concern, or there is public concern that particular events may have occurred.’ 
 
If a minister decided to hold an inquiry he may then choose a single chairman or a panel 
to conduct the proceedings. If the minister decides to appoint a judge, he is required 
under s.10 of the Act to ‘consult with’ the Lord Chief Justice as to the proposed 
appointment of judges. A Commons Library research paper highlights that an inquiry 
with a judicial figure as its chair might be referred to as a ‘judicial inquiry’ but that the 
term is ‘simply descriptive.’516 The advantage of placing a judicial figure in the role of 
chairman gives the inquiry legitimacy, in that the qualities of independence and thorough 
analysis are observed by way of association. A government consultation paper stated that 
the government believes that it can be appropriate for judges to chair inquiries because 
                                                        
515 At the time of writing the findings into the inquiry are yet to be published, however see inquiry website: 
http://www.bloody-sunday-inquiry.org/transcripts/Archive/Ts328.htm (accessed 10/09/09). See also article 
by Shayler in the New Statesman whereby he discussed the inquiry’s interested in what he has to say: 
http://www.newstatesman.com/200101220005 (accessed 10/09/09). 
516 K. Parry, Investigatory Inquiries and the Inquiries Act 2005, House of Commons Library 2007, 
SN/PC/2599.  
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‘their experience and position make them well rounded individuals.’517 The clear 
disadvantage is that a public inquiry is not a court of law and this places significant 
limitations on the powers and witness handling of inquiries.  
 
Section 5 of the Inquires Act affords ministers the power to decide the terms of reference 
of the inquiry. He also has the power to amend the terms of reference at any time if he 
considers that ‘the public interest so requires.’518 The minister is required to consult with 
the person he has appointed as chairman,
519
 when setting or amending the terms of 
reference but is not obliged to consult with any other person, or indeed with Parliament. 
After making such a change he must then inform Parliament by way of a ministerial 
statement, although at this stage Parliamentary involvement in the process may be 
regarded as minimal. In practice the chairman and any other members of the inquiry 
panel are empowered to investigate or make conclusions on information within the 
limitations of their prescribed remit. If the chairman finds information which is highly 
relevant to the facts in issue but which goes beyond the scope set by the terms of 
reference, the minister may inform the chairman of this, and may refuse to provide 
funding for such actions.
520
  
 
The minister may also make use of further provisions to restrict public access to the 
inquiry proceedings. He may prevent public attendance to the proceedings or any part of 
the proceedings
521
 and may restrict ‘disclosure or publication of any evidence or 
documents given, produced or provided to an inquiry’ as per section 19 (1) (b).  
                                                        
517 Government Consultation Paper, DCA, Effective Inquiries, CP 12/04 (6 May 2004) Para 46. The 
comment is in marked contrast to attitudes in the United States whereby the US Supreme Court in Mistretta 
v United States 488 U.S. 361 (1989) ruled that the use of judges in inquiries was unconstitutional. 
518 Section 5 (3) Inquiries Act 2005. 
519 Section 5 (4) Ibid. 
520 Section 39 Ibid. 
521 Section 19(1)(a) Ibid. 
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Subsection (4) details the particular matters and effectively proscribes a harm test which 
balances the potential damage caused by restriction of  information which might inhibit 
the allaying of public concern
522
 against any risk of ‘harm or damage’ which could be 
‘avoided or reduced by such a restriction.’523  
 
The minister has the power to wind up the inquiry before completion under Section 14 if 
he delivers a notice to the chairman that this is so. Under Section 24 the chairman is 
required to report his conclusions first to the minister in question who will then deliver 
the report before Parliament.  
 
It is important to note that regardless of the powers afforded by the Inquiries Act 2005 
the Executive may still if it so chooses, create an ad hoc inquiry. The Deepcut Review 
was conducted on such a basis. The Review, an investigation into the deaths of four 
soldiers at Deepcut Barracks in Surrey, whose families believed the deaths were not 
suicides, was conducted by a human rights lawyer, Nicholas Blake QC.
524
 Crucially, 
Blake chose not to conduct the inquiry in public as he acknowledged that ‘the Army was 
not required to have one.’525  
 
The Butler Review into the intelligence behind Iraqi weapons of mass destruction was 
also conducted in private. Again, the inquiry was set up on an ‘ad hoc’ basis and a 
number of Privy Councillors formed the inquiry panel and were given full access to the 
                                                        
522 The ‘harm or damage’ criterion contains a number of definitions: risk of death or personal injury, 
damage to national security and international relations, damage to United Kingdom economic interests and 
damage caused by disclosure of economically sensitive information s 19(4)(b) Ibid. 
523 Ibid. 
524 The Deepcut Review: A Review of the Circumstances Surrounding the Deaths of Four Soldiers at Princess Royal 
Barracks, Deepcut between 1995 and 2002, accessible via: http://www.official-
documents.gov.uk/document/hc0506/hc07/0795/0795.pdf 
(accessed 10/10/10). 
525 Ibid. 
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material in private. The panel was intended to be made up of representatives from all 
three major political parties. However the then foreign affairs spokesman, Menzies 
Campbell explained that the Liberal Democrats opted out of the review because it 
‘excluded politicians from scrutiny.’526 This analysis will now progress to consider 
Crown servants appearing before public inquiries.  
 
3.10.2 The Crown Servant as Witness  
 
The aforementioned analysis has illustrated that public inquiries are most often formed 
on an ad hoc basis, meaning that the nature and function of the inquiry will often differ 
depending on decisions made by the minister who decides the terms of reference and 
who selects the inquiry chairperson/ committee. Whether the minister appoints a 
chairperson with a judicial background or a person of standing, for example a privy 
counsellor, will often shape how the inquiry is set up. The Iraq inquiry provides the most 
recent example of a team of Privy Counsellors who are tasked with asking probing 
questions to witnesses.
527
 In the Hutton Inquiry such examination was carried out by the 
respective representative’s legal teams. Most importantly both inquiries were not a court 
of law. A question therefore arises as to how the Crown Servant as witness can give 
evidence in a setting which exists outside the courtroom.  
 
In order to facilitate and encourage the giving of evidence at a public inquiry several 
measures may be put in place. Section 37 (1) (c) Inquiries Act 2005 affords immunity 
from suit to ‘a person engaged to provide assistance to the inquiry’ provided that such 
evidence is given in good faith. Furthermore, the witness is protected from subsequent 
                                                        
526 Hansard, HC Debs, 3rd Febuary 2004, col 631.  
527 See ‘about the inquiry’ accessible via: http://www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/about.aspx (accessed 13/10/10).  
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actions in defamation for ‘any statement made in or for the purposes of proceedings 
before an inquiry and reports of proceedings before an inquiry’ as would be ‘the case if 
those proceedings were proceedings before a court in the relevant part of the United 
Kingdom.’ Other measures available are not part of the Inquiries Act 2005, and in 
keeping with the nature of the inquiry process have been implemented on an ad hoc 
basis.  
 
During the Scott Inquiry the government gave its ‘lawful authority’ to witnesses to 
disclose ‘official information’ to the Inquiry meaning that the ‘normal constraints’ 
imposed by the Official Secrets Acts were ‘effectively suspended.’ Such disclosure was 
dealt with by allowing hearings to go into closed session if the disclosure of information 
posed a risk to national security. Furthermore, in the ‘interest of securing full and honest 
testimony’ evidence given by witnesses would not be used in evidence in any subsequent 
prosecutions, this provision was afforded by the use of an ‘undertaking’ given by the 
Attorney General. Such arrangements are not superseded by the Inquiries Act 2005. 
 
The Cabinet Secretary also gave an assurance that any ‘admissions made during 
testimony’ before the Scott Inquiry would not be used in subsequent disciplinary 
proceedings against them. This assurance was facilitated by the sending of a letter to the 
heads of the Civil Service departments. The assurance contained two limitations. Firstly, 
that the Civil Service reserved the right to take disciplinary action against a Servant if the 
evidence given before the inquiry ‘turned out to be false’ or ‘incomplete.’ Secondly, the 
exemption did not extent to information already available to the Government from 
sources other that witness testimony at the inquiry.  
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The question of whether a public inquiry should be provided with an undertaking to 
encourage witnesses to give full and frank testimony raises several considerations. It 
may be argued that an undertaking from the Attorney General to give an assurance that 
evidence given before an inquiry will not be used in a subsequent prosecution is 
necessary in situations whereby the Crown Servant as witness may disclose information 
protected by the Official Secrets Acts. The government during the time of the Scott 
Inquiry dealt with the Official Secrets Act issue well by giving ‘lawful authority’ thereby 
authorising any disclosures of material normally protected by the OSA to the Inquiry.  
 
The Hutton Inquiry provided a degree of protection for witnesses to speak freely. 
According to the Inquiry website, the inquiry was ‘protected from any legal proceedings 
coming from information disclosed during the Inquiry, e.g. slander and libel, so long as 
publication of that material is consistent with the needs of the Inquiry.’528 However, 
there is no information from either the inquiry report or the available evidence on the 
Inquiry website that the Attorney General gave an undertaking that evidence given 
before the inquiry would not be used in any subsequent prosecutions. The Inquiry did 
state that witnesses should seek their own legal advice on legal protections required.  
 
In a similar way to the undertaking given to the Scott Inquiry, the Cabinet Secretary did 
provide Lord Hutton with an undertaking that Civil Servants would not be disciplined for 
information given in evidence before the inquiry. The undertaking contained two 
exceptions. Firstly, that it did not apply to Civil Servants who were charged with 
                                                        
528 http://www.the-hutton-inquiry.org.uk/content/faq.htm (accessed 03/01/2010). 
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deliberately misleading, lying, or deliberately omitting information before the inquiry. 
Second, whilst preventing departments from investigating information amounting to 
‘possible misconduct’ the undertaking did not apply to allegations of misconduct so 
serious ‘that it would justify summary dismissal for gross misconduct’ and that such 
information could be used in subsequent disciplinary proceedings.’529   
 
The use of such evidence in disciplinary proceedings may be deemed as overly 
restrictive in comparison to the undertaking provided to the Scott Inquiry. The Cabinet 
Secretary’s letter stated that the government required Civil Servants to give ‘full and 
frank testimony.’530 However, by including the threat that evidence may be used against 
them at a disciplinary hearing, the exception to the undertaking is more likely to create 
the opposite effect. The function of a Public Inquiry is not to operate as a court of law, 
nor to apportion blame but to act as a mechanism to determine the truth of a situation in 
order to learn lessons from it.  
 
An undertaking which relates to assurances that disciplinary action will not be taken 
against Crown servants who give evidence before an Inquiry was considered at length at 
the Baha Mousa Inquiry whereby the Inquiry Chairman drew a clear distinction between 
an undertaking to protect someone from disciplinary action if he gives evidence of his 
own misconduct and a person who gives evidence of someone else’s misconduct.531 This 
raises the question of what protection is available for Crown Servant who gives evidence 
                                                        
529 Ibid. 
530 Note also that the Cabinet Secretary provided a letter for disciplinary immunity in the Butler Review, 
interestingly because the hearings were conducted in private this limited the potential risks of actions taken 
against witnesses, for a link to the letter see further: 
http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/404pagenotfound.aspx?originalUrl=http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/publi
cations/reports/secletter/indem_let.pdf (accessed 06/09/09).  
531 See Rt. Hon Sir William Gage, Rulings (First Direction Hearing) at para 4. 
http://www.bahamousainquiry.org/linkedfiles/baha_mousa/key_documents/rulings1.pdf 
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of the misconduct of others. The Saville Inquiry and the Deepcut Review allowed for 
some witnesses to give anonymous testimony, thus limiting the opportunity for 
recrimination against those witnesses.  
 
3.11 Conclusion 
 
3.11.1 Theoretical Model 
 
The Civil Service Code requires Civil Servants to be politically impartial; this read in 
conjunction with the constraints imposed by the Civil Service Management Code creates 
a barrier to the expression of value judgements. Because of the nature of the work that 
Civil Servants do, any expression of opinion on such work is likely to be considered as a 
statement of political expression. Such communication could lead to disciplinary action 
for breaching the respective codes. This is contrary to the spirit of the arguments that 
communication can enhance the individual and that it can aid participation in a 
democracy. Whilst the restrictions may be considered an acceptable consequence of 
employment in the Civil Service, one must question what should happen if a Civil 
Servant believes that a policy decision taken is so fundamentally wrong or that an issue 
has been so grossly mismanaged that the public have a right to know. This argument 
gathers strength when applying the theoretical justification that communication can 
enhance the participant audience. Currently, the Public Interest Disclosure Act does not 
protect the expression of value judgements; as a consequence it will be most difficult for 
the Civil Servants who act as protest whistleblowers to obtain protection.  
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3.11.2 The Legal Model 
 
4.11.2.i The Public Interest Disclosure Act: application to art.10 values 
 
This chapter has argued that the Public Interest Disclosure Act is consistent with article 
10 ECHR values in that it offers protection for disclosures raised in the public interest. 
The framework in Guja v Moldova requires the court to ascertain whether the 
whistleblower first attempted to raise concerns by using channels made available by the 
organisation or by contacting an appropriate authority. The first step in the disclosure 
regime provided by PIDA, to an employer or to an individual designated to receive 
concerns, actively promotes internal disclosures because protection is most easily 
available. The next level in PIDA, disclosure to a ‘prescribed person,’ requires that the 
information must be ‘substantially true.’ With regard to wider disclosures, the claimant 
must satisfy a more stringent evidential test. Section 43G (2) closely mirrors the test 
formulated in Guja v Moldova by requiring the claimant to have a reasonable belief that if 
he raises a concern with his employer he will be subjected to detrimental treatment or that 
information will be concealed or destroyed. The claimant may also obtain protection if he 
has raised concerns to his employer or a prescribed person of substantially the same 
information, this provides a ‘safety valve’ to allow for protection where the available 
mechanisms have failed and is consistent with the reasoning in Guja that public 
disclosure should be a ‘last resort.’532 
 
4.11.2.ii The effectiveness of current available mechanisms 
 
In determining whether an act of whistleblowing will be protected by art.10 ECHR a 
                                                        
532 For further discussion see chapter one of this thesis.  
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court will need to first determine whether the applicant had alternative channels for 
making the disclosure and, second, whether those channels are effective. It is submitted 
that the reasoning in Guja v Moldova creates a positive obligation on public bodies to 
implement effective whistleblowing mechanisms.  
 
The work and respective remit of each accountability mechanism discussed in this 
analysis has the goal of either providing oversight of government departments, Executive 
action, ministers and Civil Servants and yet the accountability mechanisms are not often 
discussed together. The relationship and means of direct contact between Civil Servants 
and the Civil Service Commissioners is unclear, the work of the Ombudsman provides 
detailed investigation of government departments without being able to look into the 
conduct of the minister in charge of the department. The Independent Advisor on 
Ministerial Interests is responsible for carrying out investigations of breaches of the 
Ministerial Code but he must have prior authorisation from the Prime Minister to carry 
out the investigation and to report to Parliament.   
 
Crown Servants owe a duty of loyalty to their minister and also to the government of the 
day. However, paragraph 8 of the Civil Service Code makes it clear that Civil Servants 
‘must not deceive or knowingly mislead ministers, Parliament or others.’ The Code 
states at paragraph 13 that Civil Servants must be politically impartial. The provisions of 
the code are undoubtedly in conflict, particularly in situations whereby the Crown 
Servant observes Executive malpractice. Paragraph 18 of the Code states that if the 
matters cannot be resolved and that a Civil Servant feels that he cannot carry out the 
instructions he has been given he will have to resign from the Civil Service.
533
 
                                                        
533 http://www.civilservice.gov.uk/about/values/cscode/rights.aspx (accessed 06/01/10). 
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Paragraph 18 places considerable importance on the Civil Service Commissioners to 
carry out their role effectively. There is a clear risk that a Crown servant who reads this 
passage may believe that he is better off making an unauthorised disclosure because he 
does not have trust in the Civil Service Commissioners to appropriately deal the concern 
and believes that he would have to leave the Service anyway.
534
 Paragraph 18 creates an 
unnecessary ‘chilling effect’ and ought to be removed in order to build greater 
confidence in the Civil Service Code and internal provisions. Paragraph 18 is currently 
inconsistent with the spirit of Public Interest Disclosure Act which allows employees to 
take a detriment claim. A detriment claim may be made whilst the employee is still 
working at the organisation. Regardless of whether or not his claim is successful before 
an Employment Tribunal, the employee may continue to work in his position 
unhindered. 
 
With regards to reporting concerns internally, if a Crown servant observes malpractice 
he may approach his line manager or alternatively his nominated officer. The PCaW 
Whistleblowing in Whitehall report found that the level of support offered through the 
nominated officer system differed from each department.
535
 Whilst it may be observed 
that different government departments will have different internal structures and 
administrative practices it is noted that all Civil Servants must observe the same Civil 
Service Code. It therefore seems appropriate that a consistent level of support via the 
nominated officer system should be provided throughout the Civil Service. The author 
                                                        
534A proposition is supported by journalist David Henke that leaks mostly came about because the civil 
servant was ‘concerned about a specific issue and became exasperated with internal processes’ and that 
‘between 70% and 80% of civil servants who had leaked material to him had made some attempt to pursue 
the matter through official channels.’ HC 83 at 70: 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmselect/cmpubadm/83/83.pdf (accessed 02/02/10). 
535 Accessible via: http://www.pcaw.co.uk/policy/civilservice.htm  see in particular p.10 (accessed 
02/02/10).  
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proposes that in order to build consistency in the process the Civil Service 
Commissioners should provide training to nominated officers and should maintain a 
level of enhanced oversight over the respective nominated officers.  
 
The Civil Service Commissioners are not consistent with the stepped disclosure regime 
created by the Public Interest Disclosures Act 1998. The Committee on Standards in 
Public Life stated clearly in their Third report that in order for a whistleblowing 
mechanism to work effectively employees should be able to go outside of the 
organisation in order to report the concern. The Civil Service Commissioners are not 
currently prescribed under PIDA. It is submitted that making the Civil Service 
Commissioners a prescribed regulator under PIDA would highlight their independence 
and bolster confidence in their office.  
 
With regards to complaints of ministerial conduct, the Civil Service Commissioners 
cannot investigate. In evidence to the PASC inquiry, Leaks and Whistleblowing in 
Whitehall, the first Civil Service Commisioner Janet Paraskeva, said that she would refer 
such complaints to the Cabinet Secretary. Currently, no specific individual or 
organisation exists to assess complaints against ministers. Investigations may be carried 
out by Sir Philip Mawer the Independent Advisor on Ministerial Interests but Sir Philip 
must be instructed by the Prime Minister to investigate. The decision to make public the 
outcome of the investigation is made by the Prime Minister alone. 
 
The doctrine of ministerial responsibility means that the Prime Minister is ‘ultimately 
responsible to Parliament for the conduct of his administration.’536 This provides an 
                                                        
536 http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/media/135230/mawer_annualreport.pdf (accessed 05/01/10).  
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obstacle to independent scrutiny of ministerial conduct. A compromise is therefore 
required between the aforementioned doctrine and the need for an independent 
investigatory mechanism. It is submitted that a new commissioner is needed with the 
power to investigate concerns without needing the permission of the Prime Minister. The 
Commissioner should be able to submit his report to the Prime Minister and allow the 
Prime Minister a reasonable time frame, perhaps 21 days, in order to make corrective 
action. It would be for the Commissioner to report his findings to Parliament. This new 
role would effectively provide more ‘teeth’ than the current Independent Advisor on 
Ministerial Interests whilst recognising the Prime Minister is ultimately responsible for 
the conduct of his ministers.  
 
With regards to the role of the Parliamentary Ombudsman, It is submitted that if a 
member of the public is having difficulty with a government department and is alleging 
malpractice, the Crown servants who work in the department may be most likely aware. 
It therefore makes sense that if the Crown servant is aware that a member of the public 
has been mistreated he should be able to provide the Ombudsman with such information. 
 
It is submitted that to allow Crown servants to go directly to a Parliamentary committee 
may impair their obligations to remain politically impartial. Moreover, the Osmotherly 
Rules make it particularly difficult for a Crown servant to appear before a committee and 
make an independent contribution. The European Court of Human Rights has identified 
that Civil Servants may consent to certain restrictions of their article 10 rights upon 
entering employment with the Civil Service. Certain restrictions designed to limit 
political expression rights may therefore be proportionate to maintain political neutrality.  
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PIDA does not provide mechanisms to investigate concern or provision for the concern 
to be investigated. The employment protection is a secondary motivation and the use of 
PIDA will only be necessary if the Servant suffers a detriment as a result of raising the 
concern. It is of paramount importance therefore, that robust mechanisms are in place to 
effectively deal with whistleblower concerns. 
 
It is submitted that the difficulty created by apparently inconsistent and uncertain 
authorised mechanisms should be contrasted with the apparent ease in which an 
individual may leak documents via an online outlet such as Wikileaks. It may be 
identified from the aforementioned analysis that anonymous whistleblowing via the 
official channels may result in suspicion caused by the recipient of the message who may 
not be able to assess the information or identify the wrongdoing involved without seeking 
an explanation from the communicator. Conversely, by leaking information to the public, 
those working for the official accountability mechanisms lose the opportunity to deal 
with the wrongdoing internally. It was identified in chapter two of this thesis that 
anonymous whistleblowing may be seen as preferable to self identified whistleblowing 
because the employee is concerned about the risk of reprisals. The author proposes a 
system that the nominated officers and Civil Service Commission could utilise the 
advancements in technology which have lead to the promotion of online leaking. The 
computerised system could offer the opportunity for individuals to raise concerns 
anonymously but also offers the opportunity for those investigating to seek further 
information from the whistleblower. The system could take the form of an online secure 
inbox which encrypts communication between the sender and recipient. The 
whistleblower could be assigned a reference number so that the investigator could contact 
the whistleblower if further information is required and both parties could provide 
updates.  
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Similar enhancements should also be considered to the current online system which has 
been made available to nominate officers. It is suggested that whistleblowing concerns 
which have been raised to nominated officers should be recorded centrally by using an 
online reporting form; this could be a simple form which could assist in making sure all 
of the required information is recorded. The recording of such concerns should be made a 
mandatory requirement for all Civil Service departments and this should also extend to 
line managers who may also receive concerns. The form could be made secure so that the 
information is shared only between those receiving and investigating the concern and the 
Civil Service Commission. The next chapter will consider the protection and control of 
official information. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
THE PROTECTION AND CONTROL OF OFFICIAL INFORMATION  
 
The protection and control of official information is of particular relevance to this thesis. 
The Freedom of Information Act 2000 confers members of the public with a general 
right of access to official information held by public authorities. This so-called ‘right to 
know’ was intended to result in a ‘fundamental and vital change in the relationship 
between the government and the governed.’537 During passage of the bill, it was 
suggested that the Act would reduce the need for public servant whistleblowers. The first 
part of this chapter will provide a critical introduction to the Freedom of Information Act 
2000. Focus will be provided on the effect of the legislation on central government 
departments, the operation of the various exemptions contained on the Act, operation of 
the ministerial veto and public interest immunity.  
 
The second part of this chapter will consider how official information is ‘protected.’ The 
draconian use of section 2 Official Secrets Act 1911 failed to prevent high level 
unauthorised disclosures, particularly in the 1970s and 1980s, many of which exposed 
malpractice by the Executive. Despite reforms to narrow the provisions, the Official 
Secrets Act 1989 has failed to prevent leaks and most recently the arrest of Christopher 
Galley for the common law offence of Misconduct in Public Office has renewed the 
debate as to how official information should be protected from unauthorised disclosures 
by Crown servants. The section traces the history of the protection of official 
                                                        
537 Preface, Your Right to Know, White Paper, CM 3018: http://www.archive.official-
documents.co.uk/document/caboff/foi/foi.htm (accessed 05/01/11). 
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information, giving primary focus to the now repealed s.2 Official Secrets Act 1911. It 
then provides a critical analysis of the Official Secrets Act 1989 and the impact of the 
emergence of the common law offence of Misconduct in Public Office.  
 
Finally, the fourth section considers the civil remedy of breach of confidence. The 
motivation for combining criminal sanction and civil remedy in one chapter stems from 
the fact that actions for breach of confidence have, on occasion, been used as an 
alternative to a criminal prosecution for instances whereby Crown Servants have made 
unauthorised disclosures of information. Furthermore, the contents of the Official Secrets 
Acts have proved key considerations for judges in certain breach of confidence cases. 
This section will consider the grant of an injunction to restrain publication of official 
information, in the context of the recent developments in online unauthorised leaking via 
outlets such as Wikileaks.  
 
4.1 Part I: Freedom of Information
538
 
 
The introduction of freedom of information legislation was a key election pledge by New 
Labour. Shortly after entering office in 1997, the new administration produced a White 
Paper entitled ‘Your Right to Know.’539 It aimed to break down the ‘traditional culture of 
secrecy’ and change the relationship between the government and the governed.540 
Following publication of the White Paper, the proposals were generally well received. 
Birkinshaw proclaimed the proposals as an “all singin’ all dancin’ affair,” however, as he 
                                                        
538 Note that for reasons of focus, this section does not consider the following matters subject to exemptions 
under the Act: Relations within the United Kingdom (relations between the UK administration and the 
devolved governments) s.28 FOIA, The Economy s.29 FOIA, Audit functions s.33 FOIA, Health and safety 
s.38 FOIA, Environmental information s.39 FOIA, Commercial interests, s.43 FOIA, and Communications 
with Her Majesty, etc. and honours s.37 FOIA.  
539Above, n 537. 
540 Ibid, Chapter One. 
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later reflected some observers felt that they were “too bold to become a reality.”541 The 
Freedom of Information Bill received criticism for not going far enough to meet the 
stated aims of the White Paper. Palmer suggested that the Bill was a ‘deeply 
disappointing document’ which contained ‘devises’ to ensure that if a public authority 
wanted to maintain secrecy it could do so.
542
  
 
The Freedom of Information Act 2000 (“FOIA”) provides the general public with a right 
of access to information held by public authorities. Section 1 of the Act provides that 
‘any person’ making a request to a public authority is entitled to be informed in writing 
by the public authority whether it holds information of the description specified in the 
request and if that is the case to have that information communicated to him. If the 
public authority does not hold the information requested, the person is entitled to a notice 
of denial. Where the information is determined to be exempt from disclosure, the person 
is entitled to be informed of this. The definition of ‘any person’ is not restricted to 
natural persons, as a consequence companies and persons located both domestically and 
abroad are entitled to request for information. The request must be made in writing, 
including by electronic means provided that it is received in a legible form and is capable 
for being used for subsequent reference.
543
 
 
According to s.84 of the Act, information is defined as ‘information recorded in any 
form.’ The applicant is required to describe the information he requests.544 This 
requirement, according to Wadham, Harris and Griffiths places the applicant at a 
‘significant disadvantage’ as he will be likely unfamiliar with the way in which the 
                                                        
541 P.Birkinshaw, The Law Relating to Access, Disclosure & their Regulation (Tottel, Haywards Heath, 
2005) 1. 
542 S. Palmer, Freedom of Expression and Freedom of Information (OUP, Oxford, 2000) 266. 
543 Section 8(1)(a) – 8(2) FOIA.  
544 Section 8(1)(c) FOIA. 
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information has been stored by the public authority in question.
545
 However, they note 
that the public authority is under a duty to provide assistance under s.16 of the Act which 
could include providing an outline of the different types of information which might 
meet the terms of the request.
546
 Public authorities are entitled to charge a fee of £25 per 
hour in order to cover the cost of the time spent by staff in searching for and providing 
the information requested, they must however provide a fees notice to the applicant to 
notify him of the intended charge.
547
 Moreover, there is an exemption from providing 
information where to do so would exceed the cost of £650 for government departments 
or £450 for all other public authorities.
548
 Where this is likely to be the case, the 
authority should provide an indication of what information could be provided within the 
cost limit.
549
 A public authority must respond to a request for information by providing 
an acknowledgment as per the terms of s.1(1) promptly, and in any event not later than 
the 20
th
 working day following the date of receipt.
550
 A public authority is not obliged to 
provide information where the request is deemed ‘vexatious.’551  
 
4.2 Exemptions  
 
There are a number of exemptions to the types of information that may be disclosed. The 
exemptions take the form of either ‘harm-based’ or ‘class-based’ exemptions. A ‘harm-
based’ exemption requires a public authority to identify that the release of the 
information requested by the applicant would, or would be likely to cause ‘prejudice’ to 
                                                        
545 J.Wadham, J.Griffiths, K.Harris, Blackstone’s Guide to the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (3rd 
Edition, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007) 57.  
546 Ibid.  
547 Section 9(1) FOIA. 
548 Freedom of Information and Data Protection (Appropriate Limit and Fees) Regulations 2004.  
549 Secretary of State for Constitutional Affairs’ Code of Practice on the Discharge of Public Authorities’ 
Functions under Part I of the Freedom of Information Act, Para 14.  
550 Section 10(1) FOIA.  
551 Section 14(1) FOIA. 
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the interest specified in the exemption. The Information Commissioner’s guidance on the 
meaning of the prejudice test suggests that the prejudice shown ‘need not be substantial’ 
but should be ‘more than trivial.’552 Whilst the appropriate level of prejudice is not 
specified the Commissioner advised public authorities that ‘the less significant the 
prejudice is shown to be the higher the chance of the public interest falling in favour of 
disclosure.’ 553 
 
Some provisions apply an additional hurdle, the public authority must first consider the 
prejudice test before considering a public interest test contained in s.2 of the Act 
(considered further below). Some provisions require the public authority to engage the 
prejudice test but do not require the public authority to consider s.2 public interest test.  
 
In contrast, class-based exemptions require the public authority to identify that the 
information requested falls within the class of information contained in the substance of 
the exemption. There are provisions subject to a class-based exemption where a public 
interest test does not apply, these ‘absolute’ exemptions do not require a public authority 
to prove that harm or prejudice would result if the information is disclosed, this is easily 
achieved. There are provisions contained in the Act which are subject to a class-based 
exemption and where a public interest test will apply. It should be noted that a class-
based exemption subject to a public interest test will be more easily satisfied than a 
harm-based exemption which is subject to a public interest test, as the public authority 
does not have to show prejudicial effect, merely that the information fell within the 
prescribed category of information. This discussion will now progress to consider the 
operation of the public interest test. 
                                                        
552 Freedom of Information Act: Awareness Guidance No 20. 
553 Ibid. 
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4.2.1 The Public Interest Test 
 
Section 2(1)(b) FOIA provides that the duty to confirm or deny in section 1 does not 
apply where: 
 “In all the circumstances of the case, the public interest in 
maintaining the exclusion of the duty to confirm or deny outweighs the public interest in 
disclosing whether the public authority”  
 
With regards to the disclosure of the information s.2(2)(b) provides: 
 “in all of the circumstances of the case the public interest in 
maintaining the exemption outweighs the public interest in disclosing the information.” 
 
The Information Commissioner has issued guidance on the public interest test. He 
identifies broad categories which place a presumption in favour of disclosure. Firstly 
release of the information may ‘further the understanding of and participation in the 
public debate of issues of the day.’ Secondly, it may ‘promote accountability and 
transparency by public authorities for decisions taken by them.’ Thirdly, it may ‘promote 
accountability and transparency in the spending of public money.’ Fourthly, it may 
‘allow individuals and companies to understand decisions made by public authorities 
affecting their lives and, in some cases, assist individuals in challenging those decisions.’ 
Fifthly, disclosure of the information may ‘bring to light information affecting public 
health and safety’ the prompt disclosure of which may prevent accidents or ‘increase 
public confidence’ in official scientific advice.554  
 
                                                        
554 Guidance on the Public Interest Test, Information Commissioner’s Office, Version 3, 2009, 6: 
http://www.ico.gov.uk/upload/documents/library/freedom_of_information/detailed_specialist_guides/fep03
8_public_interest_test_v3.pdf (accessed 14/07/11).  
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4.2.2 Information Intended for Future Publication  
 
Before considering the specific categories of information subject to an exemption it is 
important to note that a public authority does not have to release information intended 
for future publicationthis extends to whether the future date is determined or not. ,
555
  At 
the time of the request the information should have been already held with a view to 
publication, and it is reasonable in all of the circumstances that the information should be 
withheld from disclosure until the date referred to. The purpose of this provision is to 
prevent individuals from gaining access to official documents early, for example a media 
organisation seeking disclosure of a public inquiry report in advance of its intended 
release. It is submitted that this provision may allow potential for considerable abuse by 
a public authority. In order to qualify for an exemption under this section the authority 
will effectively need to only prove that it intended to publish a document at a future date. 
The authority does not need to specify an intended date of the publication. It must 
consider withholding of the document ‘reasonable in all of the circumstances’ however, 
as it does not have to specify an intended date, this would theoretically allow a public 
authority to decide not to publish the document for 100 years and to consider it 
reasonable in the circumstances to do so. It would not have to disclose the intended date 
to the applicant; merely that it had considered it reasonable in the circumstances not to 
disclose the documents by an undetermined date in the future.  
 
4.3 Categories of Information subject to Exemptions 
 
4.3.1 National Security  
 
                                                        
555 Section 22 FOIA.  
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Whilst  the provision concerning information pertaining to national security provides an 
ordinary exemption subject to a public interest test
556
 it is important to note that an 
absolute exemption covers information which derives from or refers a number to bodies 
responsible for security detailed in s.23 FOIA, including: the Security Service, the Secret 
Intelligence Service, GCHQ, the Special Forces the Security Vetting Appeals Panel, The 
Security Commission, The National Criminal Intelligence Services, the Serious 
Organised Crime Agency, the various tribunals dealing with intelligence issues and 
others. Moreover, a public authority is exempt from communicating information where 
the exemption is required to safeguard national security.
557
 
 
A Ministerial certificate may be issued under s.23 concerning ‘information supplied by, 
or relating to bodies dealing with national security matters’ and s.24, concerning 
‘national security.’558The certificate may provide a general description of the 
information. According to s.60 an applicant may appeal to the Information Tribunal to 
challenge the veracity of the statement. With regards to s.23 information, the Tribunal 
has the power to quash the certificate if it determines that the information concerned did 
not constitute exempting information under s.23. With regards to s.24 The tribunal may 
quash the certificate if it determines that the Minister in question did not have reasonable 
grounds for exempting the information for the purposes of national security.  
 
4.3.2 Defence 
 
A specific provision relates to defence. Information is exempt if its disclosure would or 
‘would likely’ prejudice the defence of the British Islands or of any colony or the 
                                                        
556 Section 24 FOIA. 
557 Section 24 FOIA. 
558 Section 25 FOIA. 
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capability, effectiveness, or security of any relevant forces.
559
 Public authorities are 
exempt from their duty to confirm or deny where compliance with the duty would 
prejudice one of the aforementioned criterion. ‘Relevant forces’ is defined to include the 
UK armed forces but extends wider to include any forces co-operating with them. The 
provision is subject to a qualified exemption requiring the data controller to conduct a 
public interest test. Guidance issued by the Information Commissioner suggests that 
there is a presumption that the matters the exemption is designed to protect, namely, the 
national defence, safety and effectiveness of the armed forces are in the public interest.
560
 
He suggested a number of factors that would weigh in favour of disclosure. 
 
Firstly, the Commissioner suggested that disclosure may assist in ‘furthering the 
understanding of and participation in the public debate of issues of the day.’561 He 
identified that there is a strong public interest in decisions as to whether to deploy troops 
to go to war, the disclosure of such information resulting in improved decision making 
and an increase of public confidence in decision making. In contrast he suggested that it 
is likely that there will be strong arguments against the disclosure of operational 
information.
562
 Secondly, the Commissioner identified that the release of information 
would assist in promoting accountability and transparency for the decisions taken by 
them; this must however, be balanced with the prejudicial effect to current or future 
operations. Thirdly, the Commissioner identified that the disclosure may lead to 
‘promoting accountability and transparency in the spending of public money.’ The 
Commissioner argued that there would be a strong argument in favour of disclosing such 
information as the public have a ‘clear interest’ in knowing ‘that the very large sums of 
                                                        
559 Section 26 FOIA. 
560Information Commissioner, Freedom of Information Awareness Guidance: 10, The Defence Exemption, version 1, 
2006. 
561 Ibid, para D.  
562 Ibid. 
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money’ have been ‘wisely spent’ unless the disclosure would prejudice the security of 
the armed forces or national defence.
563
 Fourthly, he stated that disclosure may be in the 
public interest where it brings to light information affecting public health and safety,’ 
particularly where the information relates to the safety of equipment or the direction of a 
military operation which has resulted in a loss of life.   
 
4.3.3 International Relations 
 
A public authority is exempt from the duty to communicate information where disclosure 
of the information, would or would be likely to prejudice:  
 
 “(a) relations between the United Kingdom or another state, 
(b) relations between the United Kingdom and any international organization or 
international court; (c) the interests of the United Kingdom abroad; or (d) the promotion 
or protection by the United Kingdom of its interests abroad.”564 
 
Section s.27(2) contains an exemption from the duty to communicate information where 
that information has been obtained from another state other than the United Kingdom, or 
an international organisation or international court. Again, the public authority is exempt 
from its duty to confirm or deny, if to do so would involve the disclosure of confidential 
information obtained from another state, international organisation or international 
court.
565
  
 
4.3.4 Criminal Investigations and Law Enforcement 
 
A public authority is exempt from the duty to communicate information relating to 
criminal investigations and proceedings where the information has, at any time, being 
                                                        
563 Ibid. 
564 Section 27 FOIA. 
565 Section 27 (4)(b) FOIA.  
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held for the purposes of any investigation which the public authority has a duty to 
conduct with a view to it being ascertained whether a person should be charged with an 
offence or whether a person charged with the offence is guilty of it. The provision 
extends further to any investigation which is conducted by the authority and in the 
circumstances may lead to a decision by the authority o institute criminal proceedings 
and any proceedings which the authority has power to conduct.
566
 Section 31 FOIA 
exempts a public authority from the duty to communicate where to do so would, or 
would be likely to prejudice the prevention and detection of crime, the apprehension or 
prosecution of offenders, the administration of justice, the operation of immigration 
controls, the maintenance of security and good order in prisons, the assessment or 
collection of any tax or duty and any civil proceedings brought by or on behalf of a 
public authority. The aforementioned provisions have a clear aim to restrict individuals 
from obtaining information which may be prejudicial to a criminal investigation. 
 
4.4.5 Confidential Sources  
 
Section 30 (2) provides that a public authority is exempt from the duty to communicate 
information where it relates to investigations, criminal proceedings or civil proceedings 
to which the authority has the power to conduct and the information in question relates to 
the obtaining of information from a confidential source. It is a qualified exemption 
subject to a public interest test. The provision would, it is submitted, provide a safeguard 
to an employee who raises concerns about wrongdoing or malpractice resulting in a 
criminal or civil prosecution. The public authority is exempt from their duty to confirm 
or deny such information. Wadham, Griffiths and Harris correctly identify that the 
                                                        
566 Section 30 FOIA. 
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provision applies to information relating to the obtaining of the information as opposed 
to the information offered by the confidential source itself.
567
 As a consequence 
however, one must ask whether the safeguard offers sufficient protection to the 
confidential source. It may be that the information provided by the confidential source 
includes significant indicators as to the identity of the person who supplied the 
information. It is submitted therefore, that a public authority must proceed with 
considerable caution before releasing the information to an applicant, particularly after 
civil or criminal proceedings have taken place, whereby the public interest in 
withholding the information will have diminished – release of the information itself may 
inevitably lead to release of the identity of the informant.  
 
4.4.6 Duty of Confidence 
 
Section 41 (1) FOIA provides an absolute exemption of the release of information if, it 
was obtained by the public authority from any other person, including another public 
authority, and the disclosure of the information to the public by the public authority 
holding it would constitute a breach of confidence actionable by that or any other person. 
It is noted that the provision has the potential to prevent to release of government 
documents which may, if ordinarily subject to a qualified exemption, be in the public 
interest. Public authorities may be provided with an opportunity to frustrate the purpose 
of the freedom of information legislation by entering into relationships resulting in a 
duty of confidence between two public authorities the result being that applicants will be 
unable to obtain information on a particular topic from either authority. The provision is 
particularly overarching; as it confers an absolute rather than a qualified exemption, 
                                                        
567 J. Wadham, J. Griffiths and K.Harris Blackstone’s Guide to the Freedom of Information Act (3rd edn 
2007). 
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preventing an assessment of the public interest test from taking place. A subsequent legal 
claim for breach of confidence would require a court to engage in a detailed 
consideration of a public interest test, balancing the public interest in disclosure against 
the public interest in non-disclosure. It is submitted that this section should be replaced 
with a qualified exemption to ensure that public authorities utilise the public interest test 
contained in s.2 FOIA. This reform is necessary to ensure that the provision is consistent 
with the common law doctrine of confidence and necessary to ensure that the section 
cannot be used to prevent the release of information which would ordinarily be released 
under a section which provides a qualified exemption.  
 
4.4.7 Formulation of Government Policy 
 
Section 35 FOIA (1) provides that information held by a government department (or by 
the Welsh Assembly Government) is exempt from the duty to communicate information 
where it relates to: the formulation of government policy, ministerial communications, 
the provision of advice by law officers or any request for the provision of such advice; or 
the operation of any ministerial private office. The duty to confirm or deny is excluded in 
relation to information which is exempt under this section. The definition of 
‘government department’ includes any public body exercising a statutory function on 
behalf of the Crown. It is clear therefore that the provision has a particularly broad reach 
which could extend beyond central government departments to include Quasi Non-
Governmental Management Organisations and Arms Length Management Organisations.  
 
Section 35 is a class based exemption meaning that if the information requested falls 
within any of the aforementioned categories it is exempt. Section 35 is also a qualified 
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exemption which requires the data controller to engage the s.2 public interest test. The 
Information Commissioner has produced guidance on the correct operation of s.35.
568
 
With regards to the ‘formulation of government policy’ the Commissioner defines 
‘policy’ as: 
 “The development of options and priorities for ministers, who 
determine which options should be translated into political action and when.”569 
 
In defining the terms ‘formulation’ and ‘development’ the Commissioner notes that this 
should refer to something happening – the exemption cannot apply to a ‘finished product 
or a policy which has been agreed to’ and has been put into operation or is already 
implemented.
570
 
 
The Commissioner identifies that the arguments for exempting information regarding the 
formulation of government policy are that that the threat of public exposure would lead 
to ‘less candid and robust discussions about policy.’571 In addition to this, the 
Commissioner recommended that in engaging the public interest test the data controller 
consider whether the release of the information would make civil servants less likely to 
provide ‘full and frank advice or opinions and would thus harm working relationships. 
He advised that data controllers should consider whether the prospect of future release 
would inhibit consideration of the ‘full range of policy options’ - thus preventing 
discussion of options which may appear extreme. Finally he suggested that the controller 
should consider whether release of the information would result in Civil Servants having 
to defend everything that has been raised.
572
 
                                                        
568 Guidance Note 24, Information Commmissioner’s Office, Version 2, 2008: 
http://www.ico.gov.uk/upload/documents/library/freedom_of_information/detailed_specialist_guides/formu
lationofgovernmentpolicy.pdf (accessed 07/08/11). 
569 Ibid, B. 
570 Ibid, C.  
571 Ibid, D. 
572 Ibid, F. 
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In considering arguments in favour of disclosure the Commissioner identifies two 
essential arguments, the first relating to public participation and the second relating to 
the accountability of government decisions. With regard to the first argument, the 
Commissioner identifies that participation ‘cannot be meaningful’ without access to the 
relevant information,’ without allowing the wider public the opportunity to participate 
potential is given to ‘selected individuals’ to have an ‘unduly privileged position’ in the 
decision making process.
573
 Essentially, the Commissioner suggests that information 
which has been disclosed prior to a decision being taken will ‘lead to more informed 
public debate.’574   
 
With regard to the second public interest argument, that disclosure of information may 
aid public accountability, the Commissioner advises that it may: 
  “Disclose wrongdoing, or the fact that wrongdoing has been 
has been dealt with, or dispel suspicions of wrongdoing.”575 
 
 
The Commissioner further advises that information made accessible under FOIA which 
has not been ‘spun by government media units’ would assist the public to make an 
‘objective judgement on the facts.’576 He advises that disclosure should also be made 
where a decision taken is likely to lead to large amounts of public expenditure on a 
particular project and where a particular has been taken as a result of deviation from 
routine procedures.
577
 
 
                                                        
573 Ibid, F.  
574 Ibid. 
575 Ibid. 
576 Ibid. 
577 Ibid. 
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5.4.8 Information Prejudicial to the Effective Conduct of Public Affairs
578
  
 
Section 36 FOIA applies to information not already exempt by s.35 (above). A public 
authority is exempt from the duty to communicate information where in the ‘reasonable 
opinion of a qualified person’ disclosure of that information would or would be likely to 
prejudice: 
 “(a) (i) The maintenance of the convention of collective 
responsibility of Ministers of the Crown; or(ii) the work of the Executive Committee of 
the Northern Ireland Assembly; or  
(iii) the work of the Cabinet of the Welsh Assembly Government;(b) would or would be 
likely to, inhibit-(i) the free and frank provision of advice; or(ii) the free and frank 
exchange of views for the purpose of deliberation; or (c) would otherwise prejudice, or 
would be likely otherwise to prejudice, the effective conduct of public affairs.”  
 
The duty to confirm or deny is also exempted to the extent that, in the reasonable opinion 
of a qualified person, compliance with that duty would, or would be likely to have any of 
the prejudicial effects set out in s.36(2).  According to s.36(5)(o) a ‘qualified person’ 
must be either a Minister or a person authorised by a minister for the purposes of s.36.  
 
The Information Commissioner has produced detailed guidance on the operation of s.36 
FOIA. In particular, the Commissioner notes several considerations which may count 
against disclosure of the information. The provisions echo the advice given in relation to 
s.35 FOIA: 
 “In this particular case, would release of this information make 
civil servants less likely to provide full and frank advice or opinions on policy proposals? 
Would it, for example, prejudice working relationships by exposing dissenting views?  
Would the prospect of future release inhibit the debate and exploration of the full range 
of policy options that ought to be considered, even if on reflection some of them are seen 
as extreme?  
                                                        
578 Note that this section does not consider information held by the Houses of Commons or House of Lords 
which confers an absolute exemption. Consideration of this would reach beyond the purpose of this study 
which is to consider the effect of freedom of information and its relationship to Crown Servants. For a 
critical analysis of FOIA and the Houses of Parliament see in particular R.Winnett & G.Rayner, No 
Expenses Spared, (2009, Bantam Press, London), Chapter 1.  
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Would the prospect of release put civil servants in the position of having to defend 
everything that has been raised (and possibly later discounted) during deliberation?”579 
 
 
The reasoning identified by the information may be contrasted to the legal justification 
for candour in AG v Jonathan Cape Ltd, whereby it was argued that by allowing the 
contents of such discussions to be disclosed in the public domain, ministers and civil 
servants would not feel able to engage in full and frank discussion and that this would 
result in harm caused to the public interest.
580
  
4.5 Delay 
 
 
It should be indentified that public authorities have obligations under FOIA to provide a 
formal response within a specified time frame. Section 10 (1) requires a public authority 
to respond promptly and no later than the twentieth date of receiving the request. The 
Information Commissioner has produced guidance suggesting that it is good practice for 
public authorities to formally acknowledge receipt of the request.  Under s.1 (3) FIOA 
public authorities may seek to clarify the request with the applicant. In this case the time 
would begin when a response to the clarification has been received. The Information 
Commissioner’s guidance indicates that where a public authority has failed to comply 
with the time period set out in s.10 (1), the Commissioner may issue an enforcement 
notice.  
 
Currently, the reality is that a number of government departments have been quick to 
acknowledge receipt of requests, but have often failed to comply with the time period 
set. Several other Whitehall departments have been subject to formal monitoring, 
                                                        
579 The guidance can be accessed on the ICO’s webpage 
http://www.ico.gov.uk/for_organisations/guidance_index/freedom_of_information_and_environmental_inf
ormation.aspx (accessed 03/02/12). 
580 [1976] 1 QB 752. 
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between the months of October and December 2010. The ICO monitored the Cabinet 
Office, the Home Office and the Ministry of Defence.
581
  
 
In 2010, the Information Commissioner required the Permanent Under-Secretary of State 
for the Ministry of Defence to comply with the time limit set out in s.10. The 
Information Commissioner identified that less than 75% of requests to the MOD were 
dealt with within the time limit. In the same year, the Information Commissioner 
required the Finance Director of the Cabinet Office to sign an undertaking that the 
Cabinet Office would be compliant with s.10. The undertaking identifies that less than 
85% of FIOA requests received a formal response within the required timescale.
582
 The 
Commissioner required another undertaking to be signed in 2011 because of ongoing 
concerns that the Cabinet Office had still failed to comply with the time limits, noting 
that still less than 85% of FOIA requests received a formal response within the time 
period.
583
 The Commissioner noted that more formal action would be ‘disproportionate 
at this stage.’  
 
It is submitted that the delays caused by central government departments who flagrantly 
disregard the time limit set out in s.10 undermine the spirit of the legislation. If the 
department responds by applying an absolute or partial exemption to the information 
requested, the delay caused will then lead to further delay and time spent challenging the 
decision using the internal appeals procedure. Delays may prove detrimental to those 
who wish to participate in democratic society, for those seeking the truth may not have 
                                                        
581 Information on the monitoring can be accessed via the ICO’s website: 
http://www.ico.gov.uk/global/search.aspx?allwords=cabinet%20office%20monitoring&collection=ico&star
t=0 (accessed 23/02/12). 
582 The undertakings can be accessed via the ICO’s website: 
http://www.ico.gov.uk/Global/Search.aspx?collection=ico&keywords=undertaking  (accessed 23/02/12). 
583http://www.ico.gov.uk/Global/search.aspx?collection=ico&keywords=undertaking&start=40 (accessed 
23/02/12). 
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access to the information when it is required.
584
 A journalist seeking to determine the 
truth on a particular subject may be unable to do so before the news agenda has moved 
on, as both the ECtHR and domestic courts have identified ‘news is a perishable 
commodity.’ The difficulties caused by delay and the time frame required to receive a 
response may provide a strong indicator that whistleblowers based within the 
government department may be the only means by which those requesting the 
information could obtain access. It is submitted that where government departments are 
not being compliant s.10, those departments should be subject to enforcement notices per 
each request which has not being received within the time limit set. This discussion will 
now progress to identify how enforcement notices are made. 
 
4.6 Enforcement  
 
 
Section 77 provides that it is a criminal offence for a public authority and for a person 
employed by that authority to alter, deface, block, erase destroy or conceal any record 
held by a public authority, with the intention of preventing the disclosure of the 
information.
585
 It is a summary offence which is therefore subject to s.127 (1) 
Magistrates Court Act 1980. The Campaign for Freedom of Information have engaged in 
debate as to impact of s.125 following a statement by the Deputy Information 
Commissioner that action could not be taken action to prosecute individuals concerned in 
the loss of climate data held by the University of East Anglia.
586
 He identified that s.125 
required action to be taken with six months of the committal of an s.77 offence. It should 
be noted, however, that s.125 provides that a Magistrate’s Court shall not hear a 
complaint unless the complaint was made within six months from the time when the 
                                                        
584 Based upon the theoretical reasoning of Birkinshaw and Habermas, see further chapter one of this thesis.  
585 Note that s.77 came into force in 2005.  
586See Time Limit for Prosecution under s.77: http://www.cfoi.org.uk/fois77offence290110.html (accessed 
08/08/11).  
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offence was committed, or ‘the matter of the complaint arose.’ It is submitted therefore 
that the provision allows scope for a prosecution to be brought after six months has 
passed since the offence was committed, provided that magistrate’s court proceedings 
take place within six months of the date in which the complaint was made.  
 
It is further submitted that s.20 Theft Act 1968 would provide scope to prosecute an 
individual who dishonestly ‘with a view to gain for himself or another,’ or with the intent 
to cause loss to another,’ destroys defaces or conceals any original document which 
belongs, or is filed or deposited in any court of justice or any government department. 
The offence is indictable and, if convicted, an individual may be liable to imprisonment 
of a term not exceeding seven years. 
 
With regard to possible enforcement action taken by the Information Commissioner, 
Section 50 FOIA provides the statutory basis for an applicant to seek assistance. 
According to s.50: 
 “Any person (in this section referred to as “the complainant”) may apply to the 
Commissioner for a decision whether, in any specified respect, a request for information 
made by the complainant to a public authority has been dealt with in accordance with the 
requirements of [Part I of the Act].” 
 
The Commissioner is then required to make a decision provided that the application for 
information was not made with ‘undue delay,’ is ‘frivolous’ or ‘vexatious,’ or the 
complainant has failed to exhaust the internal complaints procedure made available by 
the public authority.
587
  Where the Commissioner decides that a public authority has 
failed to provide information or in its duty to confirm or deny it must issue a ‘decision 
notice’ on the authority.588 The notice will detail what steps the public authority must 
                                                        
587 Section 50 (1) FOIA.  
588 Section 50 (4) FOIA.  
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take to be complaint with the Freedom of Information Act. The Commissioner may serve 
an ‘information notice,’ requiring the public authority to provide him with information 
relating to the application or in compliance with the various provisions in the Act.
589
  
The Commissioner may also serve an ‘enforcement notice’ if he is satisfied that a public 
authority has failed to comply with their duties under the Act. The notice requires a 
public authority to act in order to be complaint with their duties under FOIA within a 
specified time period.  
 
The Information Commissioner’s Office had previously received criticism from the 
Campaign for Freedom of Information for having a backlog of cases awaiting 
investigation.
590
 The ICO has attempted to rectify the situation and reported in its 2010 
annual report that 82% of cases closed were now less than a year old. The CFOI have 
responded positively to the improvements.
591
 Moreover, the Information Commissioner 
has issued a regulatory action policy, which identifies that it will ‘name and shame’ 
public authorities that regularly delay responses to the Freedom of Information Act by 
publishing the details on the ICO website. The policy identifies that the Information 
Commissioner may issue a ‘practice recommendation’ if he feels that a public authority 
is failing to abide by a code of practice issued under FOIA.
592
 
 
4.7 Ministerial Veto 
 
Section 53 (1) provides an exception to comply with a decision notice or an enforcement 
                                                        
589 Section 51 (1) FOIA.  
590 http://www.cfoi.org.uk/pdf/foidelaysreport.pdf (accessed 08/08/11). 
591 ICO FOI Caseload Progress, http://foia.blogspot.com/2010/07/ico-foi-caseload-progress.html (accessed 
08/08/11).  
592Freedom of Information Regulatory Action Policy, 
http://www.ico.gov.uk/upload/documents/library/freedom_of_information/detailed_specialist_guides/freed
om_of_information_regulatory_action_policy.pdf (accessed 08/08/11).  
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notice. The provision is arguably the most controversial aspect of the Freedom of 
Information Act, allowing a Minister to veto a decision made by the Commissioner. In 
order for the veto to apply a notice must have been served on a government department, 
the Welsh Assembly government, or any public authority designated for the purposes of 
the section made by order of the Secretary of State.
593
 The notice must relate to a failure, 
‘in respect of one or more requests for information’ to comply with the general right of 
594
access to information contained in s.1 (1) (a) in respect of information which falls 
within any of the exemptions listed in Part II of the Act stating that the duty to confirm 
or deny does not arise; or a failure to comply with s.1 (1) (b) the duty to communicate 
information on the basis that it is exempt. 
 
Section 53 (2)(b) provides that the notice shall cease to have effect if, not later than the 
twentieth working day following the effective date the Minister concerned gives the 
Commissioner a certificate signed by him stating that he has: 
  “On reasonable grounds formed the opinion that, in respect 
of the requests concerned, there was no failure [to provide information].”  
 
Section 56 FOIA requires that the applicant must be provided with the reasons why the 
Minister has issued the veto. However, according to s.57 FOIA, reasons do not have to 
be given where doing so would reveal exempt information. The certificate must then be 
laid before Parliament. 
 
At the time of writing the ministerial veto has been used on three separate occasions. The 
veto was first used to prevent the release of Cabinet minutes relating to the decision 
taken to go to war in Iraq. The Commissioner issued a Decision Notice under s.50 FOIA 
                                                        
593 Section 53 (1)(a) FOIA.  
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which ordered the Cabinet Office to disclose the minutes of two Cabinet meetings where 
the Attorney General’s legal advice concerning the military action had been discussed. 
The Cabinet Office appealed to the Information Tribunal.
595
  
 
The Information Tribunal held that the convention of collective Cabinet responsibility 
‘affords considerable benefits’ to good decision making in government. It identified that 
the benefits afforded by the doctrine would be lost or severely reduced if ‘official records 
of Cabinet discussions were disclosed prematurely’ or without engaging in a thorough 
analysis of the public interest test. However, the tribunal identified that the convention 
‘was not a rigid dogma’ and decided to uphold the Commissioner’s decision. They 
identified that at the heart of their reasoning was the fact that Parliament had decided to 
categorise the section 35 exemption as ‘qualified’ not ‘absolute.’596  
 
The Tribunal found the public interest factors in favour of disclosure to be ‘very 
compelling.’597 The decision to commit UK armed forces to the invasion of another 
country was ‘momentous in its own right’ but was further increased by criticisms which 
had been made, particularly in the Butler Report of the ‘general decision making process 
in Cabinet at the time’ and criticisms of the Attorney General’s legal advice and the fact 
that it had not been made available to the Cabinet until the ‘last moment.’598 Crucially, 
the Tribunal held that the approach adopted during Cabinet meetings who were privy to 
the Attorney General’s first legal opinion ‘as well as those who were not’ was of: 
 “Crucial significance to an understanding of a hugely 
important step in the nation’s recent history and the accountability of those who caused it 
to be taken.”599 
                                                        
595 Cabinet Office v Information Commissioner [2008] EA/2008/0024 and EA/2008/0029. 
596 Ibid para 77. 
597 Ibid para 79.  
598 Ibid.  
599 Ibid.  
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Despite the detailed and clear ruling by the Information Tribunal to release the 
information, Jack Straw MP, then Secretary of State for Justice, used the ministerial veto 
to prevent disclosure. The certificate issued provides little if any justification as to why 
the decision to exercise the veto was made other than that ‘public interest favoured non-
disclosure.’600 
 
It is submitted that use of the Ministerial veto is contrary to the spirit of the legislation. 
The decision to suppress information relating to the controversial decision making 
process which led to the second Iraq war is particularly significant because Jack Straw 
was Foreign Secretary at the time and thus played an integral part in any decision being 
made. The veto allows ministers with a vested interest in the information to decide not to 
release it, allowing the potential for abuse whereby the information concerned may lead 
to criticism or may identify wrongdoing. Whilst the veto is part of the legislation, and is 
thus an expression of the will of Parliament, to allow a minister to disregard a judicial 
decision is contrary to a fundamental principle of the rule of law that all subjects should 
be treated equally before the law.
601
  
 
The second and third ministerial vetoes concern attempts to disclose Cabinet minutes 
relating to devolution in Scotland. In 2009 the UK government was due to appeal the 
decision of the Information Commissioner to disclose the documents before the 
Information Tribunal. However, before the hearing took place Jack Straw, acting as 
Justice Secretary, vetoed the decision.  
 
                                                        
600 http://www.justice.gov.uk/news/docs/section53-certificate.pdf (accessed 25/02/2012). 
601 For example the decision of the court in M v Home Office [1994] 1 AC 377, which identified that a 
minister could not disregard a court order by virtue of his position.  
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The Information Commissioner took a more considered approach in response to a second 
request for the information, ruling that the minutes should be disclosed but that the 
identities of individual ministers involved should be redacted. Central to his decision, the 
Commissioner identified the public interest in transparency and openness and noted that 
12 or 13 years had passed by the time that the request of information had been made. This 
was sufficient to negate the risk to the doctrine of collective Cabinet responsibility.
602
 
 
The government was due to appeal the decision before the Tribunal but instead exercised 
the ministerial veto on 22
nd
 February 2012. The Commissioner has expressed regret that 
the issues will not be tested before the Information Tribunal and has stated that will 
submit a special report to Parliament.
603
 
 
5.8 Public Interest Immunity 
 
Finally, it should be noted that any hearing of the Information Tribunal to which the 
government attends may be subject to the issue of a certificate of Public Interest 
Immunity by a minister of the Crown. Chapter Two of this thesis identified that the issue 
of Public Interest Immunity certificates has been considered as justifiable by the courts, 
in order to protect candour, the full and frank exchange of views and uninhabited 
decision making. The nature of proceedings should be considered against the comparable 
work of the Investigatory Powers Tribunal, whose remit will be considered later in this 
analysis.  
 
                                                        
602 The decision notices can be accessed via the Information Commissioner’s website: 
http://www.ico.gov.uk/news/latest_news/2012/statement-ico-response-government-decision-veto-
disclosure-devolution-08022012.aspx (accessed 26/02/12).  
603 Ibid. 
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Because the tribunal operates a system of closed hearings with a provision for the use of 
special advocates, Lord Brown has identified that a Public Interest Immunity Certificate 
cannot be introduced in proceedings before the IPT.
604
 One must question therefore, 
whether the Information Tribunal is the most appropriate forum to consider the 
disclosure of official government information. Section 35, of the Tribunal Procedure 
(First-tier Tribunal) (General Regulatory Chamber) Rules 2009 identifies that 
proceedings may be held in private. Furthermore, s.14 of the Rules, allows the Tribunal 
to prevent the disclosure of any documents which may identify an individual who the 
Tribunal considers should not be identified, if it believes that disclosure will lead to a 
risk of serious harm to the individual or it is in the interests of justice to do so. Even if 
the aforementioned provisions are not sufficient to allay fears that the provision of public 
interest immunity certificates is necessary, it is submitted that the Investigatory Powers 
Tribunal provides an alternative, whereby the matters complained of concern 
information regarding the security and intelligence services.
605
It is submitted that in 
order to give the Freedom of Information Act much needed teeth, the use of public 
interest immunity certificates before the Information Tribunal should not be allowed. A 
provision worded to this affect should be added to the tribunal procedure rules. It should 
be reiterated however that currently, ministers of the Crown are more likely to exercise 
the ministerial veto than use a PII certificate before the Information Tribunal. However, 
in removing the ministerial veto power, removal of the PII certificate will also be 
required. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
604 R (on the application of A) (Appellant) v B (Respondent) [2009] UKSC 12, para 14. 
605 Precedent for this can be identified in the case of Frank-Steiner v The Data Controller of the Secret 
Intelligence Service IPT/06/81/CH. 
 259 
 
 
5.9 Analysis and Application to Analytical Model 
 
The right of access to information provides a strong theoretical justification for 
whistleblowing. According to Birkinshaw, an individual’s moral and ethical evaluation is 
dependent upon information acquired by his or his predecessor’s experiences.606 In the 
context of government information, a freedom of information regime if exercised 
properly can provide much needed scope for analysis, not only by academics or 
historians but by members of the public. Here as Birkinshaw identifies, disasters may be 
avoided and accidents prevented.
607
 The information may therefore be consistent with 
the arguments from truth and democracy.  
 
Exercise of the ministerial veto may be seen as counter to the theoretical justifications 
outline above. The information concerning the decision making process which lead to 
the highly controversial decision to invade Iraq would have served the need for truth and 
would have enhanced democracy. As many of the Cabinet ministers involved in the 
decision making process still sit as MPs, albeit many on the back bench, information as 
to the decisions made may assist members of the general public in determining whether 
they should vote for the individuals or party concerned. More generally, the information 
could assist those with an active interest in such matters to develop and further 
understanding which may assist and inform decision makers if faced with a similar 
scenario in the future.  
 
This analysis may be counter balanced with the theoretical arguments for secrecy and 
security. In particular, Simmel identifies that citizens elect officials to act on their behalf 
                                                        
606 P.Birkinshaw, Freedom of Information: the Law the Practice and the Ideal (2001, Butterworths, London) 
16.  
607 Ibid. 
 260 
 
 
and in doing so bestow the power to make decisions on those individuals. Neocleaus 
argues that it is for the official to discern the most appropriate course of action and 
consequentially to determine which information should be suppressed in the public 
interest.
608
  This reasoning would support the use of a ministerial veto, or indeed public 
interest immunity certificates. Yet, as Sedley correctly identifies, mechanisms of fact 
holders are ‘almost always self interested’ meaning that information is disclosed as the 
fact holders see fit.
609
 Exercise of the ministerial veto places the ultimate responsibility 
in the hands of the fact holders, which in the absence of an overarching judicial oversight 
framework leaves the system open to abuse.  
 
The degree of control afforded to the ‘fact holders’ is further identified in a number of 
provisions in the Freedom of Information Act which, as a consequence, has severely 
weakened the legislation first proposed by the white paper. Particular exemptions 
regarding the formulation of government policy, conduct prejudicial to the effectiveness 
of public affairs and information regarding international relations do not provide an 
opportunity for a public body to determine whether there is a public interest value in the 
information. Whilst it has been argued in chapter two of this thesis that blanket 
disclosure of all information regarding government decision making and advice may lead 
to a breakdown of government because of fears of working in a Panopticon, the 
legislation must provide scope for the countervailing interests to be assessed. 
 
The difficulty with the Freedom of Information Act is that regardless of how easy the 
legislation makes access to information available, the citizen will still require a level of 
subject knowledge in order to know what information to request. As Neocleaus 
                                                        
608 Above, n 24, 101. 
609 S.Sedley, Freedom of Expression and Freedom of Information: Essays in Honour of Sir David Williams 
(OUP, Oxford), Editors J.Beatson and Y.Cripps, 241. 
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identifies, society lacks a ‘spying machine’ to provide the public with information to 
which they may not know exists.
610
 Crown servant whistleblowers may therefore be able 
to provide the public with the missing information. As a consequence however, the 
Crown servant may place himself in a dangerous position which may impact upon his 
working life and potentially even his liberty. Bok correctly identifies that a 
whistleblower ‘shoots his bolt’ by taking information to the public first.611 It can 
therefore be argued that society cannot be reliant upon whistleblowers to achieve 
government accountability alone. Greater transparency may be better served by adopting 
a model of proactive rather than reactive disclosure. The raising of concerns by 
whistleblowers may be most easily justified whereby the Crown servant uncovers a 
situation whereby information has been requested by a member of the public and despite 
being acceptable to disclose the information under the Act, the department covers up the 
information or provides the applicant with false information. In such circumstances, a 
Crown servant would be justified in releasing the information on the basis that the 
communication is justified by the argument from truth. In circumstances whereby the 
information requested has been deliberately delayed by the department a Crown servant 
may be justified in leaking the information if the disclosure is necessary to prevent an 
immediate risk of harm to people and property.
612
  
 
With regard to legal analysis of the law of freedom of information, it should be identified 
that whilst article 10 ECHR confers the right to communicate information in the public 
interest and the right of the audience to receive such information, article 10 ECHR does 
not currently extend to protect the right to access the information. Thus, it was identified 
                                                        
610Above, n 24, 95. 
611 Above, n 44, 221.  
612 For consideration of the justifications for necessity and duress of circumstances see further chapter one 
of this thesis.  
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in Leander v Sweden that article 10 did not confer a right of access to information, nor 
does it ‘embody an obligation on governments to impart such information to the 
individual.’613 Fenwick correctly reiterates this position by identifying that the wording 
of art.10 ECHR ‘speaks in terms of the freedom to receive and impart information’ this, 
she identifies, appears to ‘exclude from its provisions the right to demand 
information.’614  
 
In the absence of further judicial reasoning, it is suggested that, in the context of official 
information, art.10 places emphasis on Crown servants to impart the information. This 
reiterates the importance of providing adequate safeguards for Crown servants to raise 
concerns. It is suggested that the Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998 provides the scope 
to protect whistleblowers that raise concerns about breaches of the Freedom of 
Information Act. Such concerns would be a ‘breach of a legal obligation’ under the Act. 
Disclosures are further protected if raised to the Information Commissioner who is 
designated as a prescribed person to receive concerns under the Act.  
 
It is submitted that in order to improve the current freedom of information regime, a new 
provision should be made in the Civil Service Code to recognise that concerns raised 
regarding breaches of the Freedom of Information Act will be covered. In order to further 
bolster the protection, it is submitted that the Information Commissioner should be 
designated under the Code to receive concerns as an alternative to the Civil Service 
Commissioners. The motivation for this recommendation is two-fold. Firstly, as the Civil 
Service Commissioners do not have the power to investigate or act on FOIA matters it 
makes sense to provide the Information Commissioner as an independent regulator. 
                                                        
613[1987] 9 EHRR 433.  
614 H.Fenwick, Civil Liberties and Human Rights (Routledge-Cavendish, London, 2007) 191. 
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Second, by adding the Information Commissioner in the Code, the level of protection is 
enhanced as the ICO will become a ‘person designated under the policy.’ Therefore an 
individual making the disclosure will have the least evidential requirement to satisfy in 
making the disclosure, further reiterating the importance of freedom of information to the 
public interest. This section will now progress to consider the protection of official 
information. 
 
4.10 Part II:  the Protection of Official Information  
 
Part two of this analysis will consider the history of the legislation used to protect against 
unauthorised disclosures, namely s.2 Official Secrets Act 1911.The analysis will then 
progress to consider the Official Secrets Act 1989 and the common law offence of 
misconduct in public office before discussing the civil law alternative of breach of 
confidence. It will question the grant of injunctions to restrain disclosures in the age of 
the internet before providing recommendations and conclusions based upon the analytical 
model provided in chapter one of this thesis.  
 
4.10.1 A History of Section 2 Official Secrets Act 1911 
 
Prosecutions under section 2 were relatively few; indeed one could view the section as 
largely symbolic.
615
 Section 2 (1) of the Official Secrets Act 1911 provided: 
  “If any person having in his possession or control [any 
information…] which has been entrusted in confidence to him by any person holding 
office under His Majesty, or as a person who holds or has held a contract made on behalf 
of His Majesty, or as a person who is or has been employed under a person who holds or 
has held such an office or contract…(a) communicates the [code word, pass word,] 
                                                        
615   The ‘deterrent effect’ of section 2 was highlighted in the Franks Report. Departmental Committee on 
Section 2 of the Official Secrets Act 1911, Volume 1, Report of the Committee, 1972, Cmnd 5104 at 17. 
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sketch, plan, model, article, note, document, or information to any person, other than a 
person to whom he is authorised to communicate it, or a person to whom it is in the 
interest of the state his duty to communicate it,…that person shall be guilty of a 
misdemeanour.” 
 
The 1911 Act was passed in haste, it took one afternoon and 30 minutes of debate.
616
 
Following the unsuccessful prosecution of Jonathan Aitken in 1971 the Franks 
Committee was established to consider possible reforms. The report provided a definitive 
look at the Act and suggested some very plausible improvements.
617
  
 
The Franks committee found section 2 ‘a mess,’ that its scope was ‘enormously wide and 
that any law which ‘impinged on the freedom of information in a democracy should be 
much more tightly drawn. It found that the Attorney General’s discretion to prosecute 
left a ‘feeling of unease.’ Ultimately the committee found that people were not sure what 
the provision of section 2 meant, ‘how it operated in practice’ or ‘what actions posed a 
risk of prosecution under it.’618 
 
The Franks report received a lukewarm response from Edward Heath’s Conservative 
government. Home Secretary, Robert Carr accepted the recommendations of the report 
but stated that the government needed further time to consider them.
619
 The Conservative 
government was defeated at the 1974 general election before any reforms could be 
implemented.
620
 The Labour Party manifesto had detailed plans to abolish s.2 with a new 
‘Official Information Act’ which would be based upon the recommendations of the 
                                                        
616D. Hooper, Official Secrets: The Use and Abuse of the Act (Secker & Warburg, London, 1987) 30.  
617 Ibid, 2.  
618 Above, n 615, para 37. 
619 For discussion of this see D. Hooper Above, n 616, 293. For the House of Commons debate on the 
Franks Report see Hansard (Commons) 29th June 1973 col 1885-1973.  
620 Most interestingly Christopher Andrew states that as Prime Minister Edward Heath was ‘even more 
secretive about intelligence matters than the Secret Service itself’ and when intelligence chiefs requested 
that their successes were publicised he would refuse. C. Andrew, Secret Service: The making of the British 
Intelligence Community (William Heinmann, London, 1985) 696. This may suggest that if Heath’s 
government had remained in power the reforms may not have been forthcoming.  
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Franks Report, however once in power the Labour government failed to go further than 
giving backing to a private member’s Bill introduced by Liberal MP Clement Freud.621 
 
Sarah Tisdall was the first person to be sent to prison for unauthorised disclosure under s. 
2 since 1970. She leaked easily traceable copies of the documents to The Guardian, 
choosing to disguise their origin with only a marker pen. Tisdall chose to plead guilty 
and in doing so and received a prison sentence for six months. By failing to destroy the 
documents in question, the Guardian failed to protect its source. The newspaper was 
advised to not return the documents if asked and that they would have a defence under 
section 10 of the Contempt of Court Act 1981.  
 
In 1984 Civil Servant Clive Ponting leaked documents to opposition MP Tam Dalyell 
which identified that the government had misled Parliament over the circumstances 
surrounding the sinking of the General Belgrano during the Falklands conflict. Ponting’s 
defence was that it was in the ‘interests of the state’ for Parliament to be informed that it 
was being misled, by ministers and that ministers planned to further mislead a select 
committee.
622
  
 
The Ponting case had a lasting effect that can still be observed today. Following the 
acquittal and before the eventual demise of s. 2 the Crown Prosecution Service decided 
in 1985 not to prosecute Cathy Massiter,  a former member of the Security Service, MI5, 
who made claims in a Channel 4 documentary that MI5 had bugged the telephones of 
trade union members. It also resulted in a number of internal changes, the civil service 
and ministerial codes and perhaps most notably the Armstrong Memorandum. 
                                                        
621 The Official Information Bill, 1978-1979, Bill 96. 
622  Ibid at 5. 
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Before considering analysis of s.1 Official Secrets Act 1989, one should take note of the 
Spycatcher affair
623
. The case involved a civil action for breach of confidence rather than 
a breach of section 2.
624
 As Fenwick suggests, this may have been because of a lack of 
confidence in the section after Ponting.
625
 It was believed that civil proceedings would be 
more convenient and less risky. Peter Wright, a former MI5 officer, made allegations of 
illegal activity in his book entitled Spycatcher. The Guardian and Observer started to 
print extracts of the book. The Attorney General imposed several injunctions to prevent 
publication. The Government eventually lost the action and the episode reaffirmed the 
need for a reliable criminal sanction.
626
 
 
4.11 The Official Secrets Act 1989: From Catch All to Specified Categories of 
Information  
 
“There could not conceivably be a prosecution under the Bill on the ground of 
embarrassment to a British minister.” 
 
Douglas Hurd MP.
627
 
 
The Official Secrets Act 1989 replaces the complete ban on the unauthorised disclosure 
of all official information by servants of Her Majesty by limiting the information to six 
categories. Section 1 concerns security and intelligence information, section 2 concerns 
information regarding defence; section 3 concerns international relations, section 4 
concerns crime and special investigations (which include information regarding 
interception of communications). Section 5 concerns information resulting from 
                                                        
623  AG v Guardian Newspapers Ltd (No2) [1990] 1 AC 109. 
624 Discussed in further detail below.  
625  H. Fenwick, Civil Liberties and Human Rights (Cavendish, London, 2002) 339. 
626  Ibid at 39. 
627  HC Official Report (6th Series) Col 428, 15 February 1989. 
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unauthorised disclosures or entrusted in confidence and section 6 concerns information 
entrusted in confidence to other States or international organisations. This section will 
start with an analysis of Section 1. 
 
4.11.1 Section 1 (1) (a) and (b): the Unauthorised Disclosure of Security and Intelligence 
Information. 
 
Section 1 (1) (a) Official Secrets Act 1989 places current and former members of the 
security and intelligence services under a lifelong duty to remain silent. Furthermore 
under Section 1 (1) (b) the Act includes persons ‘notified’ by the Secretary of State 
(discussed below).  It provides that a current or former member or notified person is: 
“(1)…guilty of an offence if without lawful authority he discloses any 
information, document or other article relating to security or intelligence which is or has 
been in his possession by virtue of his position as a member of any of those services or in 
the course of his work while the notification is or was in force 
Moreover section 1 (2) provides: 
The reference in subsection (1) above to disclosing information relating to 
security or intelligence includes a reference to making any statement which purports to 
be a disclosure of such information or is intended to be taken by those to whom it is 
addressed as being such a disclosure.” 
 
From the aforementioned passage it can be observed that there is no available damage 
test and therefore any unauthorised disclosure made by the above category of persons, 
regardless of content will constitute an offence under section 1 (a).  
 
Part (b) includes ‘persons notified’ of the provisions contained in section 1. The process 
of notification is defined in section 1 (6) which provides: 
  “Notification that a person is subject to subsection 
(1)…shall be effected by a notice in writing served on him by a minister of the Crown; 
 268 
 
 
and such a notice may be served if, in the minister’s opinion, the work undertaken by the 
person in question is or includes work connected with the security and intelligence 
services and its nature is such that the interests of national security require that he should 
be subject to the provisions of that subsection.” 
 
Persons who are most likely affected by such a notification are members of the Joint 
Intelligence Committee and the Intelligence and Security Committee, whose work brings 
both committees into contact with information regarding national security and 
intelligence matters
628
 and Crown Servants on related work in the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office, the Home Office and the Ministry of Defence. The Intelligence 
Services Commissioner and the Interception of Communications Commissioner would 
also constitute notified persons under the aforementioned definition.
629
 
 
During debate of the Official Secrets Bill, at Committee stage, section 1 (1) received 
considerable criticism. Firstly, with regard to a lifelong duty of non disclosure, it was 
suggested that the duty was imposed as a reactionary measure after the government’s 
failure to suppress the Peter Wright book, Spycatcher.
630
 The resulting Act would have 
the potential to make a member or former member of the intelligence services criminally 
liable for writing a book about their experiences without authorisation.
631
 It is noticeable 
that the old s.2 Official Secrets Act 1911 already had widely defined statutory provisions 
to secure such an objective and yet it did not deter Crown servants such as Peter Wright 
                                                        
628 The exact terms of reference of the JIC can be viewed at: 
http://www.intelligence.gov.uk/central_intelligence_machinery/joint_intelligence_committee/jic_terms.asp
x (accessed 10/08/08)  For information regarding the work of the Intelligence and Security Committee see: 
http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/intelligence (accessed 10/08/08).  
629   Information regarding the exact terms of reference for both Commissioners can be found at: 
http://www.intelligence.gov.uk/accountability/commissioners_and_tribunal.aspx (10/08/08) 
630   Roy Hattersley MP 25th Jan 1989, Hansard, HC Debs Cm 198889 Col 1049: “Some cynics suggest that 
one reason why the Prime Minister allowed the Bill to be introduced at all was her obsessive determination 
to vindicate her paranoid behaviour in the case of Mr. Peter Wright and Spycatcher.” 
631  The Official Secrets Act 1989 did not prevent the former Director General of MI5 Dame Stella 
Rimington from publishing her memoirs. Despite controversy caused by the publication, the Home Office 
did not go further than voicing ‘regret and discontent’ for her decision to publish see further: S.Carrell, 
Rimington Calls For Independent Vetting of Spy Memoirs, The Independent, 9th September 2001. The 
publication of official memoirs is considered below. 
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from publishing his memoirs. Two fundamental issues arose during the debates at 
Committee stage, the first is that of the members or former members of the security and 
intelligence services who wish to publish accounts of their time in the services and 
second is that of the whistleblower who intends to report illegality or maladministration.  
 
5.11.1 Blowing the Whistle and the Public Interest 
 
With regard to the second consideration of the debates at the Committee Stage, the 
position of potential whistleblowers, it was argued that the Bill had no public interest 
defence. The white paper outlined the government’s position for not including such a 
reform: 
  “First, a central objective of reform is to achieve maximum 
clarity in the law and in its application. A general public interest defence would make it 
impossible to achieve such clarity. Secondly, the proposals in this White Paper are 
designed to concentrate the protection of the criminal law on information which 
demonstrably requires its protection in the public interest. It cannot be acceptable that a 
person can lawfully disclose information which he knows may, for example, lead to loss 
of life simply because he conceives that he has a general reason of a public character for 
doing so. There is adequate provision for a current or former member of the Security and 
Intelligence Services to expose illegality.”632 
 
One of the longstanding debates surrounding s.2 Official Secrets Act 1911 had been 
whether or not it could be interpreted to include a public interest defence. It is self 
evident from consideration of the aforementioned passage that the government intended 
to put an end to such debate. Whether or not the 1989 Act achieves clarity in the law and 
in its application without the inclusion of a public interest defence is still open to 
question. It shall be illustrated at a later point in this chapter that instances of decisions 
not to prosecute individuals or to discontinue proceedings, despite clear breaches of the 
Act suggest that there are inherent difficulties in the clarity of its application, particularly 
                                                        
632 See further: White Paper, Reform of Section 2, Cm 408 at para 36 onwards. 
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in cases involving issues relevant to the public interest. Such difficulties may have been 
remedied by the inclusion of a public interest defence. 
 
In the White Paper on the Reform of Section 2 it was stated that: 
 
  “The Government recognises that some people who make 
unauthorised disclosures do so for what they themselves see as altruistic reasons and 
without desire for personal gain. But that is equally true of some people who commit 
other criminal offences. The general principle which the law follows is that the 
criminality of what people do ought not to depend on their ultimate motives—though 
these may be a factor to be taken into account in sentencing—but on the nature and 
degree of the harm which their acts may cause.”633 
 
The above justification is problematic for two reasons. Firstly, one must ask whether 
criminal prosecution for the unauthorised disclosure of information protected by the 
Official Secrets Acts can be considered alongside ‘other criminal offences.’ A contrast 
can be drawn if one considers a person who commits an offence of spying under s.1 
Official Secrets Act 1911 alongside persons who make an unauthorised disclosure of 
information contrary to either the old s.2 provision. 
 
A person who commits an act of spying would fall under s.1 OSA 1911. For example, 
Kim Philby the MI6 operative who became a double agent to spy for the Russians chose 
to do so because he supported the Communist regime and believed it was the right thing 
to do, yet his actions were clearly wrong and detrimental to the national interest and the 
reputation of the Service.
634
 This should be contrasted to the examples of Winston 
Churchill and Clive Ponting. Churchill disclosed information contrary to the Act in order 
to warn Members of Parliament that the air defences in the run up to the Second World 
War were inadequate; the disclosure enhanced the defence of the realm. Ponting’s 
                                                        
633 Ibid at para 30. 
634 See for example: S.J. Hamrick, Deceiving the Deceivers (Yale University Press, New Haven) 2004.  
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disclosure of information regarding the sinking of the Belgrano caused great 
embarrassment to the government and yet gave opposition MPs and the general public 
information which they should have been made aware of the government. Such 
information is an essential feature of the democratic process. Under the new provisions 
contained in the Official Secrets Act 1989, the disclosures made by Churchill and 
Ponting would most likely be subject to a harm test under one of the provisions 
considered below.  
 
4.11.2 Section 1 (3) Damaging Disclosures of National Security and Intelligence 
Information. 
 
Section 1 (3) concerns persons who are Crown servants but who are not members of the 
Security and Intelligence Services. It provides: 
  “A person who is or has been a Crown servant or 
government contractor shall be guilty of an offence if without lawful authority he makes 
a damaging disclosure of any information, document or other article relating to national 
security or intelligence which is or has been in his possession by virtue of his position as 
such but otherwise than as mentioned in subsection (1) above.” 
 
A definition of what constitutes a ‘damaging disclosure’ is contained in section 1 (4) 
whereby the test will be satisfied if the disclosure causes damage to the ‘work of, or of 
any part of the security and intelligence services.’ Furthermore, under s.1 (4) a disclosure 
will be ‘damaging’ if: 
  “(a) It causes damage to the work of, or of any part of, the 
security and intelligence services; or- 
 
It is of information or a document or other article which is such that its unauthorised 
disclosure would be likely to cause such damage or which falls within a class or 
description of information, documents, or articles the unauthorised disclosure of which 
would be likely to have that effect.” 
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It is clear from the wording of the aforementioned test that it is both widely defined and 
easily satisfied.
635
 The White Paper indicates that the public interest is relevant as to 
whether a disclosure is damaging. In considering the evidential burden on the 
prosecution to prove the necessary harm to satisfy the test, the then government stated 
that ‘evidence may need to be adduced’ which involves ‘a disclosure which is as harmful 
as or more harmful than the disclosure which is the subject of the prosecution.’636 
 
The above argument provided a justification for not adducing such evidence in court. 
Instead it was held to be sufficient to state that the document or information concerned 
was of a “certain class or description.” The question of what constitutes a damaging 
disclosure of a certain class or description, or indeed who decides which documents 
belong to which class are a cause for confusion. The classification of documents is an 
established and integral feature to the control of official information. There are four 
essential classifications. ‘Top Secret’ means exceptionally grave damage to the nation if 
disclosed unauthorised, ‘Secret’ is identified as serious injury to the interests of the 
nation.  ‘Confidential’ means prejudicial to the interests of the nation and the lowest 
classification ‘Restricted’ means that the document is undesirable to the interests of the 
nation.
637
  
 
The White Paper expressly stated that the classification of the document will not be of 
‘evidential relevance’ to the jury or of the degree of harm caused by the leaks.638 The 
classification therefore only provides evidence of the person’s opinion of the importance 
                                                        
635  For an analysis of this point see H. Fenwick and G.Phillipson, Media Freedom under the Human Rights 
Act (Oxford University Press, Oxford) 2007 at 933 An example of the wide interpretation can be found in 
the case of A-G v Blake [1997] Ch 84 whereby Sir Richard Scott speaking in obiter suggested that the 
offence was committed regardless of whether or not the disclosure was damaging to the ‘national interest.’ 
636 Cm 408 para 39. 
637 See further, Cabinet Office, Security Policy Framework, accessible via: 
http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/resource-library/security-policy-framework (accessed 06/02/2012). 
638 Ibid at para 30. 
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of the document at the time of classification. The White Paper also stated that the 
classification of the document may provide evidence to suggest that the defendant knew 
that his unauthorised disclosure was likely to cause harm but the prosecution would be 
required to adduce further evidence to prove that the disclosure was likely to cause 
harm.
639
 During the committee stage of the Official Secrets Bill, Roy Hattersley MP 
expressed the opinion that the Home Office had wrongly equated the test for damaging 
disclosure with the specific harm test for each offence. He further stated that: 
  “Equating those two things was wholly unjustified because 
the definition in the Bill gives a whole new, much wider and, I would argue, more 
vacuous meaning--if, indeed, it has any meaning at all--to the word "damaging" as the 
Bill intends it to be understood.” 640 
 
It appears that if a Crown servant or former Crown servant made an unauthorised 
disclosure under s.1 (3) the test fails to allow for a full consideration of the damage 
caused by the disclosure and also the harm to the public interest. Firstly, regardless of the 
evidential value placed on the security classification of documents, disclosure of such 
documents will undoubtedly give evidence that the defendant knew of the potential for 
harm caused such a disclosure. It therefore fails to give adequate consideration to the 
particular worth of the document in question and moreover, does not consider the 
individual’s motivation for classifying the document in a certain way. The government’s 
justification for not adducing documentary evidence in court because of the potential 
harm caused by those documents is very much a moot point. The unauthorised disclosure 
of the documents may already be freely available in the public domain if disclosed to the 
media for example, thus the harm of adducing such evidence is diminished. 
 
Secondly, the potential to cause damage to the work of, or to any part, of the security and 
                                                        
639 Ibid at para 36. 
640 R. Hattersley MP. Hansard, HC Debs, 24th January 1989 Col 1050. 
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intelligence services is a test easily satisfied. Arguably any unauthorised disclosure of 
material protected under the Official Secrets Act 1989 can be said to cause damage to the 
services. It will undoubtedly cause adverse publicity but also undermine the integrity of 
those services and the level of trust needed to undertake intelligence activities. Thirdly, 
therefore, in the absence of any test to determine the public benefit of such a disclosure 
s.1 (3) provides little relief from the absolute nature of the other aforementioned 
provisions contained in Section 1. As we shall see from consideration of the other 
sections of the Act which include damaging disclosure tests, the tests for harm appear to 
be more clearly defined. 
 
4.11.3 Section 2 OSA: Unauthorised Disclosure of Defence Information and Section 3 
OSA: Disclosure of Information relating to International Relations. 
 
Section 2 (1) states: 
  “A person who is or has been a Crown servant or 
government contractor shall be guilty of an offence, if without lawful authority he makes 
a damaging disclosure of any information, document or other article relating to defence 
which is or has been in his possession by virtue of his position as such.” 
 
The test for damage is contained in Section 2 (2), whereby it states that a disclosure is or 
is likely to be damaging if: 
  “(a) It damages the capability of, or any part, of the armed 
forces of the Crown to carry out their tasks or leads to loss of life or injury to members 
of those forces or serious damages to equipment or installations of those forces; or  
(b) Otherwise than as mentioned in Para (a) above it endangers the interests of the 
United Kingdom abroad, seriously obstructs the promotion or protection by the united 
kingdom of those interests or endangers the safety of British citizens abroad; or 
(c) It is of information or of a document or article which is such that its unauthorised 
disclosure would be likely to have any of those effects.” 
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A definition of ‘defence’ is given in Section 2 (4).641 It can be observed that the 
damaging disclosure test in section 2 is far more specific than the damaging disclosure 
test in section 1 (4) as it clearly defines the potential of harm to members of the armed 
forces and their equipment. However, section 2 (b) is open to particularly broad 
interpretation. Endangering the ‘interests of the United Kingdom abroad’ remains 
undefined. This omission is of particular concern. During parliamentary debate on the 
White Paper, Mr Leon Brittan MP identified that a clear definition of harm to defence 
matters would allow for an ‘ingenious defence’ of the accused as the definition could be 
used to illustrate that the prosecution did not make its case except in the ‘clearest 
possible cases of damaging disclosure.’ Unfortunately, the impact of such a defence is 
greatly diminished by the provision contained in section 2 (b). The broad and ambiguous 
wording of section 2 (b) effectively reduces any benefit to the specific wording of 
section 2 (a) thus weakening any defence argument put forth.   
 
Section 3 relates to the damaging disclosure of international relations information. In 
particular s.3 (a) concerns any information, document or other article relating to 
international relations whilst s.3 (b) concerns any confidential information, document or 
other article which was obtained from another state or international organisation. 
Section.3 (2) replicates the provision contained in section 2 (b). Section 3 (6) gives a 
definition of ‘confidentiality’: 
  “For the purposes of this section any information, 
document or article obtained from a state or organisation is confidential at any time 
while the terms on which it was obtained require it to be held in confidence or while the 
                                                        
641   Section 2 (4) Official Secrets Act 1989:   
“(a) the size, shape, organisation, logistics, order of battle, deployment, operations, state 
of readiness and training of the armed forces of the Crown;(b) the weapons, stores or other 
equipment of those forces and the invention, development, production and operation of such 
equipment and research relating to it;(c) defence policy or strategy and military planning and 
intelligence;(d) plans and measures for the maintenance of essential supplies and services that are 
or would be needed in time of war.” 
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circumstances in which it was obtained make it reasonable for the state or organisation to 
expect that it would be so held.” 
 
The combination of section 3 (2) and section 3 (6) provides for an easily satisfied harm 
test. Section 3 (6) is particularly restrictive in scope. Firstly, the section gives no 
indication as to the circumstances in which documents should be held in confidence and 
in the absence of express instruction from another state on how the information is to be 
handled, the section infers that any disclosure of information obtained from other states 
is damaging. Secondly, the lack of a clear definition in the wording of section 3 (6) is a 
cause for confusion. This chapter has already indicated that there is a classification 
system for official documents, to which ‘confidential’ is listed as the third most harmful 
category. However, under the definition of section 3 (6) information harmful to 
international relations is to be regarded as confidential. This gives no recognition to the 
classification already in place, nor does it fully recognise the substance of the 
information concerned. The information may be of a particular low level of importance, 
yet this is not taken into account by the section. Furthermore information which is 
protected by the Official Secrets Act 1989 may not be protected in the same way by the 
other states’ domestic legislation. Indeed, the other state may not have an equivalent to 
the UK Official Secrets Act, it may not protect information relating to international 
relations or any such legislation may have a public interest defence.
642
   
 
The 1988 White Paper gave an example of a disclosure which would damage the UK 
interest abroad: 
                                                        
642  Leon Brittan MP voiced concern on this point (Hansard HC Deb 22 July 1988 vol 137 col 1455): 
  
“Some of the information derived from other Governments and international 
organisations is, frankly, highly trivial. Some of the information derived from other Governments 
and international organisations in confidence is material which, under the law of those countries, it 
is not a crime to publish abroad.”  
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  “A disclosure which disrupts relations between this country 
and another state may result in measures by that State against British interests and 
resident British citizens, or anti-British public reaction within that State, putting at risk 
the property or even the lives of British citizens.” 
 
The above example assisted the government to provide a justification for the inclusion of 
section 3 into the 1989 Act. It has been suggested, however, that the national interest 
should be treated as synonymous with the government of the day. This contention has 
proven particularly problematic when the actions of the United Kingdom government 
have been called into question.  
 
The controversial trial of Derek Pasquill brought the operation of s.3 into question. 
Pasquill was a Civil Servant in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO). He was 
charged with six breaches of s.3 Official Secrets Act 1989 after leaking several 
documents to Martin Bright, a journalist who used the information to write several 
articles in The Observer and New Statesman between August 2005 and February 
2006.
643
 Pasquill disclosed information relating to important and highly topical issues in 
the wake of the July 7
th
 bombings in London. The first concerned FCO policy on the 
handling of contact with Islamic groups. Pasquill alleged that a Civil Servant within his 
department had expressed sympathies for a number of individuals who, upon further 
research he believed to have a record of expressing an extremist viewpoint. The Civil 
Servant had then pressed for a policy forging links with the individuals and Islamic 
Groups, the result of which according to Pasquill would have been a ‘catastrophic policy 
for Britain.’  
 
In further disclosures, Pasquill delivered a document to Bright which contained the 
                                                        
643 Unreported, See D.Pasquill, I had no Choice but to Leak, New Statesman, 17 January 2008,   
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views of a senior official within the FCO that the Iraq war and British Foreign policy had 
radicalised Muslim youth. Pasquill made another leak which is perhaps the most 
controversial information disclosed by Pasquill and would undoubtedly constitute the 
principle motivation for a prosecution under s.3. He leaked information regarding top 
secret extraordinary rendition flights of terrorist suspects by the Central Intelligence 
Agency, which also identified that the flights had landed on UK soil to refuel, despite the 
fact this had been denied by then foreign secretary Jack Straw. The case was dropped at 
trial after it was admitted by counsel for the Government that there was ‘no realistic 
prospect of prosecution.’ This followed disclosure of a series of internal written papers 
within FCO which indicated that the leaks had not been damaging and had instead 
promoted positive debate. The documents had not been disclosed to the defence until the 
day before the case was dropped, 20 months after the police investigation had started.
644
 
 
4.11.4 Section 4 OSA: Disclosure of Information relevant to Criminal Proceedings. 
 
Section 4 OSA 1989 makes it an offence for a person who is or has been a Crown 
servant of government contractor to disclose any information relevant to criminal 
proceedings to which Section 4 (2) applies. In order to understand the interrelationship 
between the sections it is necessary to quote the next sections in their entirety. Section 4 
(2) states that: 
  “This section applies to any information, document or other 
article— 
(a) the disclosure of which— 
(i) results in the commission of an offence; or 
(ii) facilitates an escape from legal custody or the doing of any other act prejudicial to 
the safekeeping of persons in legal custody; or 
(iii) impedes the prevention or detection of offences or the apprehension or prosecution 
of suspected offenders; or 
                                                        
644 R. Norton Taylor, Civil Servant who leaked Rendition Secrets Goes Free, The Guardian, 10th January 
2008 
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(b) which is such that its unauthorised disclosure would be likely to have any of those 
effects.” 
 
Furthermore the section also applies to: 
 
  “(a) any information obtained by reason of the interception 
of any communication in obedience to a warrant issued under section 2 of the [1985 c. 
56.] Interception of Communications Act 1985, or under the authority of an interception 
warrant under section 5 of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, any 
information relating to the obtaining of information by reason of any such interception 
and any document or other article which is or has been used or held for use in, or has 
been obtained by reason of, any such interception; and 
(b) any information obtained by reason of action authorised by a warrant issued under 
section 3 of the [1989 c. 5.] Security Service Act 1989, any information relating to the 
obtaining of information by reason of any such action and any document or other article 
which is or has been used or held for use in, or has been obtained by reason of, any such 
action.” 
 
It can be observed that the above provisions contained in section 4 do not provide a test 
for harm. Instead, for an offence to be committed under s.4 it is required that the 
disclosure results in the commission of an offence, escape from custody etc under ss.4 
(2) (i) to (iii). This has the effect of creating an implied harm test, yet this too can be 
easily satisfied. An unauthorised disclosure of information which is leaked to a journalist 
or a publisher would mean that the person in receipt of the information would commit an 
offence under section 5 Official Secrets Act 1989 (see below). Furthermore, there is 
nothing contained within the provision to suggest that the ‘commission of an offence’ 
has to be the act of another person as a result of the disclosure. Therefore, a member of 
the Security Service, the Secret Intelligence Service or GCHQ would commit an offence 
under s.1 and consequentially engage s.4. Former MI5 officer David Shayler was 
convicted for offences under both ss.1 and s.4.  
 
Section 4 also has a particular impact upon police officers. The Public Interest 
Disclosure Act 1998 (PIDA) which protects employees from recrimination for making 
disclosures in the public interest had originally excluded police officers from 
 280 
 
 
whistleblowing protection. It was not until s.37 Police Reform Act 2002 inserted a new 
section 43K into the Employment Rights Act 1996 that police officers received the 
protection. However schedule 2 Public Interest Disclosure Act removes access to 
whistleblowing protections for any persons who have been convicted of an offence under 
the Official Secrets Act 1989 or who are likely to be convicted of an offence. Whilst one 
may argue that it is entirely proper that unauthorised disclosures of this nature are not 
protected by PIDA, one should also consider controversy surrounding the Regulation of 
Investigatory Powers Act.  RIPA is widely framed and allows not only the Security and 
Intelligence Services, the police, local councils, job centres and other local service 
providers (794 in total according to 2008 figures) to carry out surveillance. Originally 
intended to cover investigations regarding terrorism or serious crime, the Act has been 
used to carry out covert surveillance on persons for allegedly committing very minor 
offences.  
 
Because of the inherent uncontrollable nature of the Act one can surmise that there is 
significant potential for improper surveillance activities to take place. However, if a 
police officer were to disclose information regarding such an act to the media or to a 
Member of Parliament in opposition, for example, he would potentially be guilty of an 
offence under s.4 and would also lose the protection under PIDA, even if the surveillance 
activities in question related to a person who poses no risk to national security at all. 
Also the police officer may also be charged with the common law offence of 
‘misconduct in public office’ this would further bring the officer under the remit of s.4 
(2) (a) (i) as his disclosure would have resulted in the commission of an offence. 
 
4.11.5 Section 5: Information Resulting in Unauthorised Disclosures or entrusted in 
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Confidence. 
 
Section 5 applies to persons who have received information by a Crown Servant or 
government contractor under one of the following three circumstances under s.5 (1) (a): 
  “(a) any information, document or other article protected 
against disclosure by the foregoing provisions of this Act has come into a person’s 
possession as a result of having been—  
(i) disclosed (whether to him or another) by a Crown servant or government contractor 
without lawful authority; or  
(ii) entrusted to him by a Crown servant or government contractor on terms requiring it 
to be held in confidence or in circumstances in which the Crown servant or government 
contractor could reasonably expect that it would be so held; or  
(iii) disclosed (whether to him or another) without lawful authority by a person to whom 
it was entrusted as mentioned in sub-paragraph (ii) above…” 
 
An offence is committed when a person makes an unauthorised disclosure of the 
information which is damaging and which he knows or has reasonable cause to believe 
would be damaging under sections 1 to 3,
645
 provided that the disclosure is an offence 
under those sections.
646
 Section 5 carries a further safeguard whereby persons in receipt 
of information as a result of a breach of s.1 Official Secrets Act 1911 will be subject to 
the provision.  
 
Section 5 is primarily aimed at journalists who receive unauthorised disclosures from 
Crown Servants and publish the information in the public domain. It should be noted 
however that s.5 is used more for the threat of prosecution in order to attempt to restrict 
the publication of leaked documents or to determine the source of the leak. At the time of 
writing there is yet to be a successful prosecution under s.5 OSA 1989. Section 5 will of 
course cover any person in receipt of information under the circumstances contained in 
                                                        
645 S.5 (3) Official Secrets Act 1989. 
646 S.5 (1) (b) Official Secrets Act 1989. 
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the provision and would therefore cover for example, Members of Parliament or even the 
Defendant’s legal counsel, if the information were to be repeated outside of conference.  
 
It should be noted that s.5 (3) identifies that the test as to whether the disclosure is 
damaging is the same test that would be provided to Crown servants. However it should 
be noted as Fenwick and Phillipson correctly identify, the Court will need to give 
substantial consideration to free speech rights of the press by ‘reading down’ the 
provisions of s.5 OSA 1989 in line with Article 10 ECHR.
647
 A proportionality test will 
therefore be engaged whereby the public interest in disclosure will be weighed against 
the public interest in non-disclosure. 
 
It is submitted that the unauthorised disclosure of information published or reported upon 
in the public domain which uncovers information that does not appear to be harmful to 
national security but is evidence of malpractice or maladministration will be arguably 
non-damaging. The potential for damage caused by the unauthorised disclosure has 
therefore already been tested in the public domain. The defence may also suggest that the 
defendant did not know that the disclosure of such information would be damaging, 
which would be further supported by the fact that the very nature of a journalist’s work 
in democratic society is to inform the public and hold the executive to account. This 
should be contrasted to the position of a Crown Servant who has made an unauthorised 
disclosure to another person but is caught before any information is published. In this 
position the prosecution could raise an argument that the information is damaging and 
that by virtue of the Crown servant’s position he needs to be punished and prevented 
                                                        
647 For a detailed consideration of this point see further, Fenwick and Phillipson Above, n 2  at 934. 
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from making further disclosures. In these circumstances a damaging disclosure test will 
be easily satisfied, despite the fact that the information in question will not be tested. It is 
further submitted, therefore, that in the circumstances of a journalist or editor, a full 
analysis of whether or not the information in question is damaging gives rise to an 
implied public interest defence. This analysis shall now progress to consider s.8 Official 
Secrets Act which primarily concerns the loss of information protected by the Official 
Secrets Act. 
 
4.11.6  Section 8: Safeguarding Information. 
Section 8 (1) provides: 
   
“(1) Where a Crown servant or government contractor, by virtue of his position 
as such, has in his possession or under his control any document or other article which it 
would be an offence under any of the foregoing provisions of this Act for him to disclose 
without lawful authority he is guilty of an offence if—  
(a) being a Crown servant, he retains the document or article contrary to his official duty; 
or  
(b) being a government contractor, he fails to comply with an official direction for the 
return or disposal of the document or article,  
or if he fails to take such care to prevent the unauthorised disclosure of the document or 
article as a person in his position may reasonably be expected to take.” 
 
Section 8 is a summary offence with a maximum penalty of imprisonment for a term not 
exceeding three months or a fine not exceeding level 5 on the standard scale or both. The 
case of Richard Jackson is the first time that a person has been prosecuted under s.8 
Official Secrets Act 1989.
648
 On 9
th
 June 2008 Jackson, a senior Civil Servant on 
secondment from the Ministry of Defence, mistakenly took two confidential reports, one 
                                                        
648 Unreported see: (Author Unknown) Civil Servant Fined for leaving documents on Train, Independent, 
28th October 2008. 
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entitled ‘Al-Qaeda vulnerabilities’ and marked ‘top secret,’ the other with a lower level 
two classification, from his desk and returned home. Upon realising his mistake he made 
the decision to return the documents when he went to work the following day. The 
documents did not reach their intended destination. Instead Jackson had left them on a 
train at Waterloo station. By the time Jackson had discovered that he had forgotten the 
documents, the train had already departed towards Surrey. After making enquiries at the 
lost property office he returned to work whereby he failed to inform his superiors as both 
persons were on holiday. The documents, contained in an orange folder, were discovered 
by a concerned member of the public who passed the folder on to the BBC’s security 
correspondent.  
 
Jackson pleaded guilty to an offence of failing to take proper care to prevent 
unauthorised disclosure of the documents under s.8 Official Secrets Act 1989 at 
Westminster Magistrates Court. It was stated to the court that this was the first time that 
the provision had been used since the Official Secrets Act had been passed. Jackson 
received a fine of £2,500. District Judge Timothy Workman concentrated upon the 
degree of harm caused by the loss of the documents and stated that had there been a ‘real 
risk’ to national security a custodial sentence, perhaps suspended would have been 
inevitable. Jackson was allowed to retain a position, albeit at a much lower level, at the 
Ministry of Defence and has subsequently lost his security clearance. 
 
R v Jackson may provide the catalyst for future prosecutions of security breaches of this 
nature. The year 2008 saw an unprecedented level of official data loss reported in the 
news media. Several instances could have potentially been covered by the ‘forgoing 
provisions’ detailed in the Official Secrets Act 1989 and would therefore constitute an 
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offence under s.8.
649
 In January 2008, the loss of data regarding 600,000 persons 
interested in joining the UK Armed Forces by the MOD may have constituted a 
damaging disclosure of defence information contrary to s.2.
650
 In June 2008, the theft of 
a laptop owned by the then Cabinet minister Hazel Blears which contained details 
relating to religious extremism, resulted in calls from the Conservative opposition for a 
police investigation under s.8 on the basis that Ms Blears should not have held the 
information on the laptop in the first instance.
651
 Furthermore there have been several 
reported instances of laptops being lost or stolen, owned by members of the security 
services and in September 2008 a mobile telephone sold on the internet auction website 
eBay was found by the new owner to have photographs and information relating to 
terrorism investigations which had not been deleted by the previous owner, an operative 
in MI6.
652
 Such instances would be covered under s.1, the disclosure of security and 
intelligence information. Despite clear breaches of s.8 Official Secrets Act 1989, such 
persons who misplace or mishandle information pertinent to national security remain to 
be prosecuted. 
 
The case highlights the need for consistency in the way in which unauthorised 
disclosures of information covered by the Official Secrets Act 1989 are handled. Section 
8 is a relatively minor summary offence in relation to the provisions in sections 1 to 4 of 
the Act which all carry a maximum penalty on indictment a term of imprisonment not 
exceeding two years or fine or both or a term not exceeding six months or both if tried 
summarily. Yet section 8 is entirely reliant upon those ‘forgoing provisions’ of the Act to 
                                                        
649‘MOD admits loss of secret files,’ BBC News Website, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/7514281.stm 
(accessed 15/11/09). 
650‘MOD computer hard drive missing,’ BBC News Website, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/7662604.stm 
(accessed 15/11/09).  
651 ‘Blears PC Loss, BBC News website,’ http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/7459579.stm (accessed 
17/07/09). 
652 ‘MI6 Photos Sold on Auction Site,’ BBC News Website, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/7643374.stm 
(accessed 15/11//09). 
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provide the basis of the offence.  
 
It is submitted, therefore, that regardless of whether an unauthorised disclosure of 
national security information is made intentionally or by a failure to reasonably take care 
of the information the potential impact on national security once the information is 
disclosed will undoubtedly be the same. A lighter sentence may be justified because an 
s.8 offence does not require evidence of intention. However, the provisions contained 
within the Official Secrets Act 1989 act in a different way to a number of other offences 
governed by the English Legal System. Ss.1 (1) to (3) and 1 (4) do not require evidence 
of intention, merely evidence of disclosure. Similarly, the other provisions contained in 
the Act which apply harm tests, focus upon the harm caused by the disclosure, not the 
intention to cause harm by the making of a disclosure.  
 
The Jackson incident gives rise to an unsatisfactory proposition whereby any would be 
whistleblower may be inclined to ‘misplace’ documents they wish to be in the hands of 
the news media because the consequences of doing so may be far less impacting upon 
their career. The inconsistencies between s.8 and its relationship to the ‘forgoing 
provisions’ of the Official Secrets Act 1989 should be urgently reviewed.  
 
4.11.7   Authorisation to Disclose 
 
The circumstances whereby a Crown Servant is deemed to have made a disclosure with 
lawful authority are detailed in s.7 Official Secrets Act 1989. With regard to Crown 
servants, s.7 (3) states that a disclosure is deemed lawful ‘if and only if’ it is made: 
  “(a) to a Crown servant for the purposes of his functions as 
such; or  
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(b) in accordance with an official authorisation.” 
 
In the Shayler judgement, Lord Bingham considering the making of disclosures in the 
public interest suggested that if a Crown servant had information relating to malpractice 
or abuse he could seek authorisation to disclose the information. This was particularly 
important in cases whereby the information would reveal matters ‘scandalous or 
embarrassing’ but would not damage any national security or intelligence interest. It was 
suggested that in considering a request for authorisation officials should make a decision: 
  “…bearing in mind the importance attached to the right of 
free expression and the need for any restriction to be necessary, responsive to a pressing 
social need and proportionate.”653 
 
The aforementioned suggestion provides a solution to the difficulties posed by 
disclosures in the public interest by utilising the existing statutory framework. However, 
the solution is reliant upon the official making an objective judgement. The authorisation 
decision will undoubtedly involve a senior civil servant and the relevant minister to the 
department in question or in the case of the Security and Intelligence services, a senior 
member of those services. If the information concerned is ‘scandalous or embarrassing’ 
one must ask if a person making the decision can truly be objective. In the case of 
ministers, the political implications for the disclosure may be too great and the ability to 
refuse the disclosure too easy. The suggested framework outlined above considers 
proportionality, essentially weighing the public interest in disclosure against the public 
interest in non disclosure and thus engaging Article 10 ECHR. The test which is rooted 
in Convention jurisprudence is very much a legal test and yet whilst the minister or 
official in question may seek legal advice from the Government Legal Service, there is 
no statutory requirement to do so despite the fact that s.6 Human Rights Act 1998 binds 
                                                        
653 R v Shayler [2002] UKHL 22 at para 29. 
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public authorities to act in accordance with Convention rights.  
 
It is submitted that the decision to disclose information is far more complex than to be 
taken by one official and requires careful consideration of the legal principles. It is also 
submitted that considering the potential embarrassment or scandalous nature of the 
intended disclosure, the official is not in a position to make a wholly objective 
judgement. One way of alleviating the potential for a conflict of interest would be to 
introduce an independent mechanism for disclosure with a similar make up to the 
‘Publications Review Board,’ the unsuccessful amendment to the Official Secrets Bill 
which would have formed an independent body to view requests to publish memoirs of 
former members of the Security and Intelligence Services. Lord Bingham did however 
indicate that if a request is denied under the current framework, the Crown servant would 
be entitled to seek judicial review a course which the Official Secrets Act 1989 does not 
‘seek to inhibit.’654 
 
4.11.8 Available Defences: Expressly defined by statute. 
 
A common feature throughout the sections of the Official Secrets Act 1989 is the 
defence available, namely that it is a defence for a person charged with the offence to 
prove that he: 
  “…At the time of the alleged offence he did not know and 
had no reasonable cause to believe that the information, document, or article in question 
related to (the relevant provision).” 
 
The case of R v Keogh
655
 provides the most up to date and leading judgment on defences 
contained in the OSA 1989 and where the burden of proof lies. The case involved the 
                                                        
654 Ibid para 31. 
655 [2007] 1 W.L.R. 1500. 
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leaking of a memo detailing communications between President George W. Bush and the 
former Premier Tony Blair. It was alleged to contain discussions of the situation 
regarding the war in Iraq, however the exact content of the memo was never disclosed, 
including during the trial proceedings. Keogh passed the memo on to a friend of his, Leo 
O’Connor, a researcher working for the Labour MP for Northampton South, Tony Clarke 
who voted against the war in Iraq. O’Connor passed the memo on to Clarke who 
immediately contacted the Police. David Keogh was convicted and sentenced to six 
months imprisonment for offences under ss.2 and 3 OSA 1989 O’Conner as receiver of 
the information (s.5 OSA 1989) was convicted and sentenced to three months 
imprisonment.  
 
The case of Keogh is significant because the defence appealed the decision of the 
preparatory hearing that the defences contained in ss.2 (3) and 2(4)
656
 were compatible 
with the presumption of innocence guaranteed by Article 6 ECHR. The appeal was 
allowed. Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers focussed his analysis on the fact that ss.2 and 
3 OSA 1989 required ‘attention to be given to the defendant’s state of mind’ this was 
despite the fact that ss. 2(3) and 3(4) required the defendant to show a lack of knowledge 
that he has committed the offence.
 657
 Lord Phillips stated that the ‘most crucial question’ 
was whether or not the reversal of the burden of proof was a necessary element in the 
operation of ss.2 and 3, if it was not he could not see how placing the burden of proof on 
the defendant could be justified.
658
  This would create an ‘unbalanced position’ whereby 
the prosecution could wait until the defendant advanced his case (as per s.2 (3) and s.3 
(4)) before using such evidence to advance their own case in relation to the mens rea of 
                                                        
656 Namely that the defendant had to prove that ‘he did not know’ and ‘had no reasonable cause to believe’ 
that his disclosure related to defence or international relations and that the disclosure would be damaging. 
657 Ibid para 19. 
658 Ibid para 26. 
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ss.2 and 3. It was held therefore that the OSA could ‘operate effectively’ without the 
reversed burdens imposed by the defences contained in ss.2 (3) and 3(4) and that to 
interpret the sections with their ordinary everyday meaning would be incompatible with 
Article 6 ECHR. The sections should therefore be ‘read down’ as to be compatible with 
the Convention right as per s.3 Human Rights Act 1998;
659
 this has the effect that the 
accused has only an evidential burden rather than a legal burden. Because the wording of 
the defence is a common feature of all provisions of the OSA 1989 requiring ‘damaging 
disclosure’ the judgement should be seen as applicable to all defences under each 
respective section. Bailin suggests that the Court of Appeal’s willingness to ‘read down’ 
the reverse legal burden is an indication of how draconian it viewed the prosecution’s 
powers under the Act.
660
 The situation post the Keogh judgment still affords the 
prosecution with sizeable powers.  
 
It can be observed that the aforementioned harm tests for ‘damaging disclosures’ are still 
easily satisfied. Furthermore, it would be particularly difficult for a Crown servant to 
assert that he did not know that his disclosure would be damaging, firstly, because he 
will have already signed the Act in recognition that he is aware of his statutory 
obligations under it. Secondly, because of the nature of the work he is involved in which 
brings the servant into contact with the information (and the appropriate security 
clearance he received to become party to the information). Thirdly, because the legal test 
only focuses on harm rather than any benefit arising from the disclosure (therefore the 
tests do not allow for situations where the servant was aware of the potential 
consequences of the disclosure but this was outweighed by the benefit of disclosure) and 
fourthly because the classification system used to identify the importance and risk of 
                                                        
659 Section 3 Human Rights Act 1998.  
660 A. Bailin, The Last Cold War Statute [2008] Crim LR 625. 
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disclosure is clearly visible to the reader.  
 
Given the nature of the expressly defined defences available to Crown Servants this 
chapter shall now consider the Common Law defence of ‘necessity’ to consider whether 
such a defence is available under the OSA 1989 and whether it will give rise to a more 
substantial defence than those expressly defined by statute. 
 
4.11.9 An Implied Necessity Defence? 
 
From analysis of the Official Secrets Act 1989 one can ascertain that the unauthorised 
disclosure of any such material covered by the provisions of the Act will highly likely 
result in the commission of an offence. It should however be considered whether or not it 
can be acceptable to break the law in order to secure a greater good. This in effect 
becomes a defence of necessity.
661
 
 
 With regard to the whistleblower, the defence of necessity was considered by the House 
of Lords in R v Shayler. Lord Bingham took a pragmatic approach to the necessity 
question, to which he believed should be decided on a case by case basis.
662
 He also 
limited the availability of the defence to instances whereby a person commits an 
‘otherwise criminal act’ to avoid an imminent peril of danger to life or serious injury ‘to 
himself or towards somebody for whom he reasonably regards himself responsible.’663 
Lord Bingham disagreed with the trial judge Moses J
664
 who believed that ss.1 and 4 (1) 
                                                        
661It is important to note at this stage that had Katherine Gun’s case proceeded to trial, her defence would 
have rested upon a ‘necessity to prevent loss of life.’ See further, The Threat to Press Freedom, The 
Guardian, 24 November 2005 and related articles. 
662 [2002] UKHL 11, para 46. 
663 Ibid, para 48. 
664 For the conflicting opinion of Moses J see above n 662, para 43. 
 292 
 
 
OSA 1989 did not allow scope for a necessity defence, instead choosing to rely upon the 
reasoning of the Court of Appeal in R v Pommell which stated that ‘unless and until 
Parliament provides otherwise,’ the ‘defence of duress, whether by threats or from 
circumstances, is generally available in relation to all substantive crimes, except murder, 
attempted murder and some forms of treason.’665 
 
Lord Bingham, however, identified that the position of David Shayler did not fall under 
the definition of necessity as he was unable to provide evidence of imminent peril of 
danger to life; instead his unauthorised disclosure was motivated by a desire to expose 
malpractice and thus create greater accountability in the Security Service.
666
 Lord 
Bingham’s reasoning that the defence of necessity applies to the Official Secrets Act is 
particularly significant. Firstly, Lord Bingham stated that the defence applied to the 
Official Secrets Act, he did not provide any exceptions to this. He therefore incorporates 
the most restrictive provisions of the Act which do not provide a harm test and can be 
identified as ‘absolute’ in nature, ss.1 (1) and 4 (1). Secondly, one must remember the 
government’s reasoning for not including a public interest defence in the White Paper on 
the reform of s.2: 
  “The Government recognises that some people who make 
unauthorised disclosures do so for what they themselves see as altruistic reasons and 
without desire for personal gain. But that is equally true of some people who commit 
other criminal offences. The general principle which the law follows is that the 
criminality of what people do ought not to depend on their ultimate motives” 
 
The allowance of a necessity defence to unauthorised disclosures which fit the criterion 
outlined by Lord Bingham, namely to avoid an imminent peril of danger to life or serious 
injury, is clearly against the reasoning of the White Paper. One must consider why Lord 
                                                        
665 [1995] 2 Cr App R 607, para 615. 
 
666 Above, n 662 para 66. 
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Bingham chose to disregard the document. The White Paper led to the passage of the 
Official Secrets Act 1989, an Act which was passed with Parliamentary approval and 
without a public interest defence. This factor is particularly notable considering that Lord 
Bingham pays particularly close attention to the White Paper (including the above 
quotation) at an earlier point of the judgement. Furthermore, the House of Lords is not 
bound by judgments made in the Court of Appeal and the reasoning in R v Pommell is by 
no means definitive. It is submitted that Lord Bingham’s reasoning in Shayler is a 
noticeable attempt at providing an implied defence, albeit confined to a strictly 
controlled set of circumstances.  
 
Post Shayler the defence of necessity for alleged offences under the Official Secrets Act 
1989 is yet to be tested; however the case of Katherine Gun is a significant indicator as 
to the possible effect of such a defence.
667
 Katherine Gun was a GCHQ translator who 
disclosed a request by the US National Security Agency to intercept the communications 
of countries voting on whether to take action against Iraq at the United Nations. Gun was 
charged under s.1 OSA 1989. When the case advanced to trial the prosecution declined 
to offer evidence and the trial was dropped. It emerged that the day before the trial the 
defence had asked the government for disclosure of any documentation relating to the 
advice it had received as to the legality of the war in Iraq. Such a disclosure would have 
allowed the defence to argue that the reason for the disclosure was to stop an illegal war 
and thus prevent loss of life. This may have constituted a defence of necessity as per 
Lord Bingham’s reasoning in Shayler. However it may be argued that Gun lacked 
sufficient proximity from the persons in ‘imminent peril’ and the persons who would 
prevent the war. Gun’s act may be considered to comprise of three stages: firstly, the 
                                                        
667 Unreported see: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/3485072.stm (accessed 25/03/10). 
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disclosure will be published, secondly, the publication will lead to overwhelming public 
pressure, and thirdly, the public pressure will prevent war. Media speculation at the time 
suggested that the prosecution had been dropped because of fears that evidence 
surrounding the legality of the war in Iraq would be made public.  
 
5.12 The Official Secrets Act 1989: Compliance with Article 10 values 
 
In Shayler, when Lord Bingham considered the appropriate Strasbourg jurisprudence, he 
identified that reasoning that employees of the Security and Intelligence services and the 
‘special nature of their work’ imposes duties on them within the meaning of art.10 (2). 
Lord Bingham then suggested that a ‘blanket ban’ which ‘permitted no exceptions’ to the 
rule of non disclosure would be inconsistent with art.10 (1). It would not, he opined, 
survive the ‘rigorous scrutiny’ required to give effect to art.10 (2). Lord Bingham held 
that the fact that unlawfulness and irregularity could be reported to a number of 
authorities prescribed by the Act, if properly applied, were sufficient to be Convention 
compliant. For this reason, Lord Bingham held that the Official Secrets Act 1989 did not 
provide a blanket ban against disclosure because the employee, or former employee, 
could seek official authorisation from his superiors to disclose the information and if it 
were to be refused he could challenge the decision by way of judicial review.  
 
Lord Bingham held that if the wording of the Official Secrets Act 1989 were 
incompatible with Shayler’s Convention rights, the incompatibility must be left to 
Parliament to resolve. He did not believe that the legislation could not be interpreted 
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compatibly with s.3 Human Rights Act 1998.
668
 Whilst Lord Bingham identified that 
there may be some doubt as to whether a whistleblower could persuade the authorities to 
take his allegations seriously, he suggested that the effectiveness of the system had not 
been tested as Shayler had chosen not to use the mechanisms available. Furthermore, he 
noted that the Act was defective in the fact that it did not identify the criteria that officials 
should follow when deciding on whether information should be authorised, but was still 
satisfied that the Act was Convention compliant.  Lord Bingham did not seek to identify 
whether the official mechanisms were effective. 
 
It is submitted that because Lord Bingham placed such a strong emphasis on the 
availability of the authorised mechanisms, he neglected to consider whether the OSA 
could be compliant with the Convention even though the various sections contain little, if 
any scope for analysis of the public interest value of the speech. Neither s.1 OSA nor s.4 
OSA provide the opportunity to test the value of the information; this is inconsistent with 
art.10 values which aim to protect information of a high value to the public interest. 
Proportionality balancing thus requires a court to thoroughly assess the public interest in 
the disclosure against the public interest in non disclosure. If it is impossible for the 
legislation to provide such scope for analysis by reading down the sections to align them 
with article 10 values, the court should then make a declaration of incompatibility, as per 
s.4 HRA 1998.  
 
Post Guja v Moldova it is submitted that a domestic court will need to place emphasis 
upon the effectiveness of the mechanisms available. In Shayler, both Lord Bingham and 
                                                        
668 Above, n 662, para, 53. 
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Lord Hope placed great emphasis on the fact that Shayler had not attempted to use those 
mechanisms but did not fully question why this was the case. Applying the Guja 
framework, a public servant may bypass the official mechanisms if he believes that he 
will suffer mistreatment as a result of raising the concern. Public disclosure would also be 
acceptable ‘as a last resort.’ The Guja framework does not fully account for disclosures 
concerning national security information. It is submitted that in the proportionality 
analysis the special nature of employment in the security and intelligence services will 
shift the balance strongly in favour of the requirements identified in art.10 (2). However, 
where the information concerned is disclosed as a ‘last resort’ it may be sufficiently high 
to outweigh the special duty of confidence owed by the servant. Lord Bingham drew 
reference to the fact that the Official Secrets Act did not prevent Shayler from mounting a 
duress of circumstances defence, whereby the disclosure would be necessary to prevent 
the immediate risk of harm. Yet, by placing emphasis on the requirement in the Act that 
prior authorisation is needed in disclosure, both Lord Bingham and Lord Hope failed to 
adequately consider whether the lack of a codified public interest defence rendered the 
Official Secrets Act incompatible with the convention. It is submitted that following Guja 
v Moldova, the lack of a codified public interest defence is likely to make the Official 
Secrets Act incompatible with the Convention.  
 
A domestic court may seek to disregard the reasoning in Guja v Moldova on the basis that 
national security information falls within the ‘special circumstances’ principle established 
in Ullah v Special Adjudicator. It should also be noted that in Shayler Lord Hope had 
identified that a regime which favours official authorisation subject to judicial review is 
within the ‘margin of discretion which ought to be accorded to the legislature.’ In 
Financial Times v UK the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights 
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reiterated that margin of appreciation will be circumscribed by the interest of a 
democratic society in a free press and that such an interest would weigh heavily in the 
proportionality analysis.
669
 This reasoning if transposed to cases involving public servant 
whistleblowers suggests that the interest of a democratic society in whistleblowers who 
disclose information of a high value to the public interest would outweigh the margin of 
appreciation owed to the domestic authority. This is because in FT v UK and Guja v 
Moldova, the effects of restraining such expression were markedly similar, thus in the 
context of journalistic sources, the ‘chilling effect’ caused by the grant of an order for 
source disclosure may dissuade individuals from providing the press with public 
information. In the context of the employee as a whistleblower, the dismissal of an 
employee for raising concerns may cause a ‘chilling effect’ dissuading other potential 
whistleblowers from raising concerns.
670
 
 
4.13 Misconduct in Public Office 
 
The Act’s predecessor s.2 Official Secrets Act 1911 was considered particularly 
draconian in that it criminalised the disclosure of a vast amount of official information 
and was considered a ‘catch all’ provision. The main improvement brought by 1989 Act 
was that it reduced the protected information into specific categories of information with 
prescribed harm tests. Maurice Frankel, the Director of the Campaign for Freedom of 
Information has suggested that the Damien Green incident has ‘turned back the clock’ to 
a protection of information more likened to information covered by the 1911 Act.
671
 
 
                                                        
669Above, n 310, para 60. 
670 Ibid, para 70. 
671 http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/letters/article5281629.ece (accessed 07/02/12). 
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The difficulty with the common law offence of Misconduct in Public Office is that 
unlike the Official Secrets Act 1989, there is no prescribed class of information.
672
 This 
means that in theory, any person who as a public officer makes an unauthorised 
disclosure of official information may be liable to prosecution, despite the content of the 
information concerned.  
 
Currently, the CPS guidelines set out in November 2007, state that the elements of 
misconduct in public office are: 
  “(a) A public officer acting as such. 
(b) Willfully neglects to perform his duty and/ or willfully misconducts himself. 
(C) To such a degree as to amount to an abuse of the public’s trust in the office holder. 
(d) Without reasonable excuse or justification.” 
 
There is no clear definition of what amounts to ‘misconduct’ other than to ‘abuse the 
public’s trust in office.’ Historically, the cases have involved a variety of different acts. 
These have ranged from police officers imparting information held on the police national 
computer,
673
 the receipt of bribes, blackmail and embezzlement.  
 
Most recently, the offence of Misconduct in Public Office has been used as a means to 
arrest and or prosecute public officers for leaking information. The Damian Green/ 
Christopher Galley incident is an illustration that there is no clear definition as to what 
constitutes a ‘public officer’ in a misconduct offence.  
 
In 2003 the Court of Appeal declined to provide a precise definition as to what position 
constituted a public office, furthermore the court suggested that private employees doing 
                                                        
672 For information of the offence and its uses see generally: House of Commons Research Note: Lucinda 
Maer, Misconduct in Public Office, 30 December 2008, SN/PC/04909.  
http://www.parliament.uk/commons/lib/research/briefings/snpc-04909.pdf 
673 For example: R v Keyte [1998] 2 Cr. App. R. (S.) 165, R v Kassim [2005] EWCA Crim 1020. 
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similar work to public employees should be covered by the offence. This means that the 
offence can be widened not only to cover the work of MPs (as illustrated by the Damien 
Green incident) but also be potentially widened to cover the work of persons working in 
private organisations carrying out public work and also beyond the sphere of Crown 
Servants and ‘Government Contractors’ as defined by the Official Secrets Act 1989. This 
means that information that would not be covered by the OSA 1989 may still be covered 
by the offence of Misconduct in Public Office. The failure to provide a precise definition 
can only cause further confusion. 
 
In 2007 a civilian worker at Scotland Yard was convicted and sentenced to 8 months 
imprisonment for leaking information about a planned al-Qaeda attack on the West to a 
journalist at the Sunday Times.
674
 Lund-Lack pleaded guilty to an offence of Misconduct 
in Public Office and not guilty to and offence under the Official Secrets Act 1989. The 
fact that both offences were run side by side is a worrying development.  
 
In R v Kearney,
675
 a former Thames Valley Police detective Mark Kearney was charged 
with misconduct in public office for disclosing information to Sally Murrer, a journalist 
for the Milton Keynes Citizen. Murrer was charged with aiding and abetting misconduct 
in public life, alongside another journalist Derek Webb and Mr Kearney’s son Harry. 
The information had concerned the bugging of conversations between MP Sadiq Khan 
and a terrorist suspect at Woodhill Prison in Milton Keynes.  The trial collapsed because 
the judge held that the prosecution had breached the right to freedom of expression, 
Article 10 European Court of Human Rights. The case is worrying because it illustrates 
                                                        
674 Police worker admits secrets leak, BBC News Website, (18/07/09), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/6763377.stm, (accessed 15/11/09). 
675 Unreported, see ‘Detective Sergeant Mark Kearney: 'Refusing to bug inmates made me a thorn in their 
side' 
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/crime/article5254216.ece (accessed 06/07/10). 
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that the offence is capable not only of extending criminal liability to the person who 
leaks the information but also to the person who receives it.  
 
The recent Damian Green/Christopher Galley incident has highlighted notable confusion 
in the use of both the Official Secrets Act 1989 and Misconduct in Public Office. It was 
stated that the justification for the arrests was that national security had been put at risk 
as a result of the leaks. However, David Davis told the BBC that if the leaks were a risk 
to national security then charges should have been brought under the Official Secrets Act 
1989.
676
 The New Statesman suggested that there were yet to be any charges brought 
under the Official Secrets Act 1989 and this suggested that “the leaks were not especially 
serious.”677 Such confusion highlights a difficult contradiction between the two offences. 
 
The Public Administration Select Committee report ‘Leaks and Whistleblowing and 
Whitehall’ stated that the use of the Misconduct in Public Office to prosecute Crown 
Servants who leak information meant that the ‘boundaries established by the 1989 Act 
may be becoming blurred’ and that it was important that the offence is not used to 
‘subvert the clearly expressed will of Parliament’ in ‘limiting the scope of offences under 
the Official Secrets Act.’678 
 
It is submitted that where the Official Secrets Act 1989 does not apply the offence 
Misconduct in Public Office should not be used to prosecute leaks of information. As an 
alternative, it is submitted that the civil law doctrine of breach of confidence should be 
                                                        
676 ‘Tories Colluded Over Leaks, Mandleson Claims’ 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/politics/conservative/3544428/Tories-colluded-with-Damian-
Green-Peter-Mandelson-claims.html (accessed 06/07/10). 
677 ‘Government Needs Secrecy But the Public Needs Whistleblowers’ 
http://www.newstatesman.com/politics/2008/12/green-british-information (06/07/10). 
678Above, n 435, para 46. 
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used and it should not be forgotten that a leak of information would breach a Servant’s 
duty of confidence under the Civil Service Code paragraph 6. The next section considers 
the law of confidence.  
 
5.14   Breach Of Confidence 
 
The civil law remedy of Breach of Confidence seeks to protect information entrusted in 
circumstances where there is an obligation not to disclose the information unless 
authorisation has been sought from the person who imparted the information. Whereas 
the Official Secrets Act 1989 is used as a means to prosecute after an unauthorised 
disclosure has been made, the civil remedy of Breach of Confidence allows for the 
possibility of obtaining an injunction both at the interim stage, and later once a full trial 
has been decided to prevent further disclosures from taking place. In this sense, Breach 
of Confidence may be considered as an alternative protection of official information to 
the Official Secrets Act 1989. Modern technological advancements have meant that it is 
now very easy for an employee to make an unauthorised disclosure to an online outlet 
such as Wikileaks, leading to the swift dissemination of material across the globe. As a 
consequence, this analysis will seek to evaluate whether the traditional remedy of an 
injunction is now obsolete.  
 
It should be reiterated that breach of confidence actions are not only used for the purpose 
of securing an injunction. An action in breach of confidence may also be considered as a 
way of seeking to obtain damages from the Crown Servant where the individual has 
sought to profit from the information he has obtained in the course of his employment, 
 302 
 
 
such as by publishing memoirs.
679
 Parallels may therefore be drawn with Mosley case 
which concerned an action for misuse of private information, which emanates from the 
law of confidence. In Mosley it was determined that an injunction would not prevent the 
further publication of a video identifying the claimant involved in a sexual act.
680
 By the 
time that the court had considered the matter, the video had spread across the internet. 
Despite this, the action was used to obtain damages from the News of the World for the 
breach.  
 
In addition, it should be noted that the Crown may also bring a breach of confidence 
action against a third party who may have received the information from a Crown 
Servant, a provision which perhaps provides a civil law equivalent to s.5 OSA1989. This 
would allow potential for the UK government to take a breach of confidence action 
against Wikileaks or similar organisations. There are many notable comparisons to be 
made between the Official Secrets Act 1989 and Breach of Confidence. Both 
mechanisms aim to protect confidential information and candour yet do so in markedly 
different ways. It can be observed that at times the Official Secrets Act 1989 has been 
used in Breach of Confidence cases to illustrate that the Crown Servant in question owed 
a duty of confidence to his employer, this is regardless of the fact that the ‘signing’ of the 
OSA 1989 has a symbolic rather than contractual basis. This section will start by 
considering breach of confidence decisions prior to the Human Rights Act 1998. 
 
4.15 The Situation Pre- Human Rights Act 1998.  
 
During the 1980s the government made several                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
                                                        
679 Attorney General v Blake [2001] 1 AC 268, see also Blake v UK (2006) (Application no. 68890/01). 
680 Considered further below, also see Chapter Two.  
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attempts to prevent the publication of ‘Spycatcher’ a book written by former MI5 officer 
which detailed various descriptions of wrongdoing by the Security Service, including 
allegations that Head of MI5 Sir Roger Hollis, was in fact a KGB operative and several 
named individuals within the service had plotted to assassinate President Nasser and 
bring down the Wilson government. Most notably the ‘Spycatcher’ affair concerns two 
House of Lords decisions, the first, Attorney General v Guardian Newspapers Ltd
681
 
dealt with interlocutory injunctions, the second, Attorney General v Guardian 
Newspapers (No2)
682
 dealt with permanent injunctions. 
 
The first attempt to restrain publication of the book was in 1985. By 1986 temporary ex 
parte injunctions were granted to prevent further disclosure after extracts were published 
in The Guardian and Observer newspapers in the run up to the hearing. By 1987 the 
affair had started to appear an embarrassing episode for the government as the book had 
become widely available in the US and many copies had found their way into the United 
Kingdom. However, the House of Lords made the decision to continue with the 
injunctions on the basis that the Attorney-General still had an arguable case for obtaining 
permanent injunctions to ban the material.     
 
In A G v Guardian (2) The House of Lords considered the justification for permanent 
injunctions against further publication of the ‘Spycatcher’ material. The Attorney 
General argued that the public interest in maintaining confidentiality outweighed the 
public interest in free speech. In giving evidence for the Crown, Sir Robert Armstrong 
identified several factors of which be believed to be detrimental to the protection of 
                                                        
681   [1987] 3 All ER 316. 
682   [1990] 1 AC 109. 
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national security.
683
 He indicated that the unauthorised disclosure of information was 
likely to damage the trust with which officers have in each other, and that as a result of 
the publication of ‘Spycatcher,’ moral in the service had been damaged. He further 
argued that intelligence agencies of friendly foreign countries would lose confidence in 
the service if permanent injunctions were not granted and that informers to the service 
would have their confidences damaged as a result of publication. 
 
Essentially, Sir Robert’s arguments centred on the preservation of efficiency in MI5.684 
He believed that permanent injunctions were required regardless of the fact that the 
information concerned had become widely available. However it was because of this fact 
that the majority of Sir Robert’s justifications were rebutted, the Court highlighting that 
the granting of permanent injunctions would have little effect on changing the 
aforementioned factors. If there was the potential to cause damage to the Security 
Service, widespread publication had already allowed for this to be done. Indeed, further 
to widespread publication in other jurisdictions, including the Republic of Ireland, 
Europe, the United States and Australia, the Observer noted that Heinemann U.K. had 
estimated that 10,000 copies of Spycatcher were entering the United Kingdom every 
week. 
 
The House of Lords engaged in a lengthy balancing exercise in order to determine what 
constitutes the public interest. Lord Goff highlighted that in a free society there was ‘a 
continuing public interest that the workings of government should be open to scrutiny 
and criticism.’685 Furthermore Lord Griffiths conceded that: 
  “if a member of the service discovered that some iniquitous 
                                                        
683   Ibid at 169. 
684   Ibid at 142. 
685   Attorney General v Guardian Newspapers Ltd (No 2)  [1988] 3 WLR 776 at 807. 
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course of action was being pursued that was clearly detrimental to our national interest, 
and he was unable to persuade any senior members of his service or any members of the 
establishment, or the police, to do anything about it, then he should be relieved of his 
duty of confidence so that he could alert his fellow citizens to the impending danger. 
However, no such considerations arise in the case of Spycatcher”686 
 
Lord Griffith’s comments provide a consideration for the actions of the whistleblower 
intending to expose iniquity. The actions of the whistleblower can be easily 
distinguished from this case. Whilst Peter Wright’s book contained allegations of 
malpractice, it has been duly noted that these allegations were nothing new.
 687
 
Furthermore, the allegations were published in a book rather than a newspaper, the 
purpose being to capitalise on the information disclosed rather than to instigate 
investigations into the practices of MI5. It can therefore be argued that the primary 
purpose of serialisation of the Spycatcher book in the newspapers was to generate 
publicity for the book and increase sales of the newspapers. Again, prior publication of 
the material is evidential in this. If the purpose of publishing the material was to expose 
information of malpractice, this had been already achieved. Spycatcher is in marked 
contrast to the events surrounding the way in which Clive Ponting disclosed information 
of malpractice. Lord Griffiths’ view of acceptable disclosure ultimately require that the 
motives for disclosure are pure; Peter Wright had stated in the book that his motivation 
for later conceded that his allegations were ‘unreliable.’688 
 
                                                        
686   Ibid at 795. 
687   See further D. Burnett and R. Thomas, Spycatcher- The Commodification  of Truth, (1989) J.Law & 
Soc 16 2 210:    
“Many of its revelations are thinly disguised regurgitations and the only really serious 
piece of new information- concerning the British Security Service’s attempt to destabilize the 
Wilson Labour Government- is offered up in a quite unsatisfactory manner.” 
 
688   See further MI5: The Security Service, HMSO 3rd Edition 1998, para 40:    
“In his book Spycatcher, the former Security Service officer Peter Wright claimed that up 
to 30 members of the Service had plotted to undermine the former Prime Minister Harold Wilson. 
This allegation was exhaustively investigated and it was concluded, as stated publicly by 
Ministers, that no such plot had ever existed. Wright himself finally admitted in an interview with 
BBC1's Panorama programme in 1988 that his account had been unreliable.” 
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In the Court of Appeal, Templeman LJ focused upon the role of the press and their 
obligations to the confidence issue in question. The Attorney General had argued that as 
a third party in possession of information obtained as a result of a breach of 
confidence,
689
 the newspapers had an obligation to keep the information confidential. 
However he explained that newspapers ‘have a legitimate role in a free society in 
bringing before the public information which might not otherwise be accessible to the 
public’ and the balance to be stuck as between the government and an ex-officer of MI5 
is not, in my view, an identical balance to that which has to be struck between the 
government and the press.
690
  
 
It is submitted that Templeman LJ was correct in distinguishing the responsibilities of 
the press from the responsibilities of Peter Wright to keep information learnt in the 
course of his employment secret. Wright had signed the Official Secrets Act and was 
therefore obliged to maintain a life long duty of secrecy. This raises an important 
consideration with regard to the role of the media in dealing with confidential 
information. Editors are required to make judgements based upon their own reasoning. 
Again, this requires one to question the motivation of the disclosure. Scott J provided a 
further cautionary note: 
“It is in my judgement, unacceptable that newspapers and their editors should be 
judges in their own cause of the restraints on freedom of the press that the national 
security may require. It is equally unacceptable that the government’s assertion of what 
national security requires should suffice to decide the limitations that must be imposed 
on freedom of speech or of the press”691    
 
It is submitted that whist the public interest of allowing the information to be published 
was considered, the deciding factor was ultimately that the information was widely 
                                                        
689  Above n 685, para 138. 
690 Ibid  para 156. 
691 [1990] 1 A.C. 109 at 144. 
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available. This meant that the Crown’s motivation for pressing for the injunctions was to 
illustrate to Crown servants and to the general public that unauthorised disclosures of 
this type were far from acceptable rather than to suppress the information concerned. 
 
In AG v Guardian
692
the House of Lords held that the decision concerning the interim 
injunctions still stood. The newspapers in question applied to the ECtHR which believed 
that the injunctions in force before the publication of the book in the US were 
proportionate in order to prevent the publication of material which may have caused 
harm to the Security Service. The injunctions granted after the publication of the book in 
the US were regarded as disproportionate as the Attorney General’s aim became more of 
an exercise in the preservation of the Service’s reputation and to deter other officers or 
former officers from making such disclosures. The information had become readily 
available in the public domain and therefore the justification for continually granting 
injunctions was found to be a breach of Article 10. 
 
The Court recognised the important role of the press stating that: 
  “Whilst it must not…overstep the bounds set…it is 
nevertheless incumbent on it to impart information and ideas on matters of public 
interest. Not only does the press have the task of imparting such information and ideas, 
the public also has a right to receive them.”693 
 
It is submitted that this position is in direct contrast to AG v Guardian (2) which, as has 
been previously identified by this discussion, placed the rights of the press alongside 
private individuals. However, despite the ECHR placing the role of the media as an 
independent watchdog the Court still appeared to be influenced with the reasoning of AG 
v Guardian (2) which placed the prior publication of the material rather than the 
                                                        
692 [1990] 1 AC 109. 
693The Observer v United Kingdom (1991) 14 E.H.R.R. 153 Para 59,  see also I. Leigh, Spycatcher in 
Strasbourg [1992] PL 208. 
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justification of publication and the role of the press as the deciding factor. Whilst there 
were dissenting opinions which indicated that all of the injunctions were 
disproportionate, one can envisage a very different outcome in both the House of Lords 
in AG v Guardian (2) and subsequently at the ECtHR had the book not received 
widespread publication in the US.  
 
The final case worthy of note in the pre HRA era, concerns another book by a former 
intelligence officer detailing work of the security and intelligence services entitled ‘No 
Other Choice’. In Attorney General v Blake694 the autobiography had been written by 
George Blake, who was in the words of the House of Lords ‘a notorious self-confessed 
traitor.’695 In the 17 years that he worked for the SIS he became an agent for the Soviet 
Union and disclosed several documents and secret information harmful to national 
security and his fellow intelligence officers. In 1961 He pleaded guilty to five charges of 
unlawfully communicating information contrary to S.1 (c) of the Official Secrets Act 
1911 and was sentenced to 42 years imprisonment. He later escaped from Wormwood 
Scrubs prison and fled to Moscow.  In 1989 Blake wrote his autobiography containing 
certain parts which detailed his time in the Secret Intelligence Service and was to receive 
three separate payments of £50,000, the first for signing the contract, the second on 
delivery of the manuscript and the third on publication.  
 
The book was published without notice to the Security and Intelligence services or to the 
Government. The motivation behind this case is of particular interest as the court 
highlighted that the information contained in the book was ‘no longer confidential’ and 
                                                        
694[2001] 1 AC 268.  
695Ibid at para 1. 
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‘nor was its disclosure damaging to the public interest.’696 Instead the Attorney General 
sought to recover an amount in the region of £90,000 which was yet to be paid by the 
publisher. The court found in favour of the Attorney General, Blake then appealed to the 
House of Lords and lost. Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead focussed upon Blake’s signing of 
the Official Secrets Act 1911, noting the fact that it was contractually binding and had he 
not signed the Act he would have not been employed by the service. Furthermore, by 
failing to submit his manuscript in order to obtain clearance he had breached that 
contract.
697
 
 
Most importantly, Lord Nicholls placed great importance on Blake’s lifelong obligation 
to maintain the confidence he had agreed to upon joining the service. He stated: 
  “When he (Blake) joined the Secret Intelligence Service 
Blake expressly agreed in writing that he would not disclose official information, during 
or after his service, in book form or otherwise. He was employed on that basis. That was 
the basis on which he acquired official information. The Crown had and has a legitimate 
interest in preventing Blake profiting from the disclosure of official information, whether 
classified or not, while a member of the service and thereafter. Neither he, nor any other 
member of the service should have a financial incentive to break his undertaking. It is of 
paramount importance that members of the service should have complete confidence in 
all their dealings with each other, and that those recruited as informers should have the 
like confidence.”698     
 
Lord Nicholl’s comments give rise to a deterrent effect, whereby the legitimate interest 
in preventing Blake from profiting from his unauthorised disclosures is intended to 
prevent others from doing the same.
699
  
 
The justification that members of the security services should have complete confidence 
                                                        
696Ibid at para 2. 
697 Ibid at para 14. 
698 Ibid at para 55. 
699 Blake later applied to the ECtHR on the basis that the legal proceedings had taken 9 years and 10 months 
to complete. The Court accordingly found a violation of Article 6 (1) of the Convention Blake v UK (2006) 
(application no. 68890/01).  
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with each other echoes the sentiments of the government’s justification for the Official 
Secrets Act 1989. Breach of Confidence effectively compliments the OSA 1989 here. 
Where the OSA 1989 can give rise to a criminal prosecution, thus providing a deterrent 
to other Crown Servants who may be considering leaking information, the existing 
legislative framework does not allow for the recovery of profits obtained as a result of 
the disclosure.
700
 The successful development of the Breach of Confidence doctrine is 
indicative in the fact that the United Kingdom Special Forces, namely the SAS have 
opted for confidentiality agreements which give rise to breach of confidence actions over 
rigid enforcement of the Official Secrets Act 1989.
701
 
 
One must consider whether the outcome of the Blake case would have been any different 
if the information concerned had detailed malpractice, justifying disclosure in the public 
interest. It is submitted that in cases involving national security, the courts have focussed 
upon the duty of confidentiality and whether or not the information has already reached 
the public domain. As will be illustrated in the next case involving the former Secret 
Intelligence office Richard Tomlinson, the courts have been less inclined to consider the 
quality of the information in question and the benefit of it reaching the public domain.  
 
 
 
 
                                                        
700  The Crown would have access to the provisions of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 however this is yet 
to be tested for unauthorised disclosures of official information. Furthermore, this discussion has considered 
the recovery of profits for the purpose of a deterrent to prevent other Crown Servants from making 
unauthorised disclosures. As a mechanism for the recovery of profits does not appear in the Official Secrets 
Act or in related literature any such deterrent effect is lost.  
701 See further chapter 6 of this thesis. See also  R v Her Majesty’s Attorney-General for England and Wales 
Respondent from the Court of Appeal of New Zealand, Privy Council, Appeal No 61/2002 delivered 17th 
March 2003 whereby the publication of a former SAS soldier’s memoirs was granted but all profits of the 
book were awarded to the Crown. 
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4.16 Post Human Rights Act 1998 
 
In AG v Times Newspapers
702
 the case concerned a former SIS officer Richard 
Tomlinson. Similarly to Peter Wright, Tomlinson wrote a book detailing his time in the 
service. The book entitled The Big Breach had been published in Russia but on a 
relatively small scale, the Attorney General then applied for an injunction to prevent 
further publication. Again, the issue for the court to decide was whether the information 
had reached the public domain and subsequently whether the injunctions could be 
justified. On appeal it was upheld that the requirement to seek clearance from the Secret 
Intelligence Service should not be imposed, instead it was for the newspaper editor to 
decide whether he believed that the information was already available in the public 
domain. Conversely, it was therefore the requirement of the Attorney General to 
demonstrate that there was a public interest in restricting publication.  
 
The newspaper had argued that the injunction proposed by the Attorney-General would 
be disproportionate to the aim pursued and in doing so relied upon Article 10 ECHR and 
sections 12 (3) and (4) HRA. The court considered Bladet-Tromso and Stensaas v 
Norway
703
 which focused upon the fact that it was the media’s task to impart information 
to the public. Lord Phillips MR stated clearly the importance of informing the Secret 
Intelligence Service before publishing sensitive information, which may damage the 
Service or be capable of endangering those who serve in it.
704
 However, he then noted 
that: 
 “I do not, however, think it right to impose on TNL (the 
publisher of the Sunday Times) the requirement that they should seek confirmation from 
the Attorney General or the Court that facts that they intend to republish have been 
                                                        
702 [2001] 1 WLR 885. 
703 (1999) 6 BHRC 599 for further discussion see below. 
704 Ibid at para 34. 
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sufficiently brought into the public domain by prior publication so as to remove from 
them the cloak of confidentiality. That is a matter on which an editor will be in a position 
to form his own judgement and he should be left responsible for exercising that 
judgement. That is consonant with Article 10 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights and s 12 of the Act…”705  
 
 
Lord Phillips MR effectively imposes two obligations upon the newspaper editor, to 
inform the SIS of his intention to publish information relating to work of the service or 
persons working within the service and to make his own judgement as to whether the 
information has already been brought into the public domain. These obligations are 
beneficial to the newspaper as it would not have to got to the lengths of informing the 
Attorney General, who (as the experiences of the Spycatcher injunctions have shown us) 
would be highly likely to argue against publication and seek an injunction.  
 
The obligations are in keeping with the spirit of Article 10 and in particular Article 10 
(2). Lord Phillips MR is effectively stating that if an officer of the security and 
intelligence services first seeks approval from the service, there is no harm to national 
security and the officer’s freedom of expression will be protected. In these circumstances 
any action against publication will be disproportionate. However, for such a proposition 
to be effective, the newspaper editor is faced with a large burden of responsibility. By 
informing the SIS he may well endanger the source of the information and may also risk 
an injunction if he proceeds to publish. If the intended article contains information of 
serious malpractice within the Service, the editor may face a lengthy battle to which he 
must argue that the public interest of the information outweighs the requirement to 
maintain a confidential relationship of which the protection of national security is 
paramount.  
 
                                                        
705   Ibid. 
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If the source chooses to remain confidential, the newspaper editor can then face a variety 
of different statutory provisions
706
 in order to identify the source. If the discloser of the 
information chooses to go ‘on the record’ he would undoubtedly face prosecution under 
the Official Secrets Act. One may therefore argue that if the newspaper editor felt 
morally compelled to publish the information without the consent of the SIS, he would 
face the same criminal and civil liability as had he informed the Service, the underlying 
difference being that the information would reach the public domain.      
 
Lord Phillips MR also gave particular focus to the comments made in the judgment of 
Eady J who stated that: 
  “I wish to make one thing very clear about the decision I 
am about to make. It is not at all based on any argument to the effect that what the 
Sunday Times wishes to do is in the public interest. I see no evidence of that whatsoever. 
The situation is simply the other way about. It is in practical terms for the Attorney 
General to demonstrate, particularly perhaps in the light of the European Convention, 
that any restriction on freedom of expression sought to be imposed, or continued, can 
itself be justified by some countervailing and substantial public interest. In the light of 
what is today going to be readily available in the public domain in Russia, the United 
States and elsewhere in the world, I am afraid I am not persuaded that the public interest 
requires the Sunday times to be restricted, for reasons based on a duty of confidence.”707 
 
The requirement of the Attorney General to justify that an injunction is still needed 
despite the information reaching the public domain is a rather difficult justification to 
achieve. This ultimately falls in favour of the newspaper editor wishing to publish to 
story. However, by shifting the focus to determine whether prior notification was 
required, Eady J failed to afford sufficient weight to the public interest in the information 
concerned. It is submitted that the analysis conducted should have provided a rigorous 
balancing of the public interest value of the information against the public interest in 
restricting the expression by granting an injunction. Whilst the prior publication of the 
                                                        
 
 
707 AG v the Times [2001] EWCA, Civ 97, 11.  
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information in a number of jurisdictions is likely to provide the tipping point to identify 
to the court that the grant of an injunction to prevent the communication of information 
already readily available will be disproportionate, the reasoning in Bladet- Tromso and 
Stensaas v Norway identifies that a court must have sufficient regard to the public 
interest in the information concerned.
708
 The domestic court gave reference to this 
reasoning but failed to apply it in a sufficiently rigorous fashion.  
  
In cases where there is evidence of prior disclosure there can be little point in attempting 
to obtain an injunction as the information will have already reached the public domain. 
This contention is supported by the judgement in AG v Times because it  reflects that an 
injunction will be unlikely to be granted where even a small amount of prior disclosure 
has taken place. It is submitted, that had the Spycatcher litigation happened today, the UK 
government may have faced significant difficulty in obtaining an injunction against 
publication. Books can very often be purchased in an electronic format from anywhere in 
the world. A Portable Document Format file or ‘PDF’ as it is more commonly known can 
be made accessible for download by individuals located all over the world with relative 
ease. Unless prior notification of the disclosure is made, so that a government may seek 
an injunction prior to publication, there will be little point in granting an injunction at the 
interim stage. This makes the obtaining a permanent injunction once the full trial has 
been conducted a highly unlikely outcome. This section will now progress to consider the 
protection afforded by s.12 HRA with particular reference to interim applications.  
 
5.17 Section 12 HRA and Injunctions  
 
Section 12 HRA applies to any proceedings whereby a court is considering whether to 
                                                        
708   (1999) (Application no 21980/93)  at para 62. 
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grant any relief which, if granted, might affect the right to freedom of expression.
709
 This 
section will primarily focus upon injunctive relief, however it should be noted that the 
provision of damages awarded against an individual or a newspaper would also be 
covered by s.12.  
 
Section 12 (2) provides a safeguard whereby relief will not be granted unless the court is 
satisfied that the applicant has taken ‘all practical steps to notify the respondent’ or that 
‘there are compelling reasons why the respondent should not be notified.’ The purpose of 
this section is to provide a safeguard whereby an interim injunction is sought on an ex 
parte basis. If interim relief is granted without the knowledge of the respondent, the 
individual will be prevented from further communicating on the subject and will not have 
been the provided with the opportunity to make his representations known as to why the 
information should not be subject to an injunction.  
 
Ex parte hearings require the most careful scrutiny by the courts as the courts will need to 
have regard to the high standard of protection Strasbourg affords to art.10 and will need 
to determine the public interest value of the communication without giving the 
respondent an opportunity to make representations as to why the particular information is 
of value. Section (4) bolsters the protection afforded by s.12 (2) by requiring that the 
court must have particular regard to the importance of the Convention right to freedom of 
expression where the proceedings relate to material to which the respondent claims ‘or 
which appears to the court to be’: 
“journalistic, literary or artistic material (or to conduct connected with such 
material), to—  
(a)the extent to which—  
(i)the material has, or is about to, become available to the public; or  
                                                        
709Section 12 (1) HRA.  
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(ii)it is, or would be, in the public interest for the material to be published;  
(b)any relevant privacy code.” 
 
It is submitted that domestic courts should consider section 12 (4) when determining 
information obtained as a result of an unauthorised disclosure by a Crown servant where 
publication is intended. With regard to information disclosed to a traditional media outlet 
based in the domestic jurisdiction, the court must apply s.12 (4) as the information 
concerned will be journalistic material. It is argued that an injunction application made to 
prevent the publication of information on a website such as Wikileaks must also be 
considered by s.12 (4). An online disclosure outlet should be able to argue that the 
intended publication of material is for journalistic purposes. However, even if the online 
outlet had difficulty in convincing the judge that the information was for a journalistic 
purpose, s.12 (4) also covers ‘conduct connected with such material.’ This conduct could 
be argued to include Wikileaks or a similar organisation acting as a conduit to provide 
information to a traditional media outlet as a partner.  
 
If an online disclosure outlet has already published unauthorised material and the 
information has been downloaded and disseminated across the globe by the time that the 
interim hearing has been reached it is unlikely that an injunction will be granted as s.12 
(a) (i) requires the court to have regard to the extent to which the information has, or is 
about to, be made available to the public. It is submitted that in considering this section 
the court must also consider whether the grant of an injunction will be effective to 
prevent the disclosure information which is about to be available to the public. This 
effectively asks, if publication is imminent, whether an injunction can prevent it.  
 
When granting an injunction against an online disclosure outlet based outside the 
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jurisdiction the question of whether such an injunction can be effectively enforced will 
undoubtedly arise. If an application for injunctive relief is made prior to the disclosure of 
the information it is likely that the court will be faced with, firstly,  questions relating to 
service of the court order and second, whether the injunction will be recognised by the 
jurisdiction in question.  
 
The Civil Procedure Rules, pt 40.4 indentify that once a judgment or order has been made 
by the court it must be served on the respondent. Despite the fact that the respondent may 
reside outside of the jurisdiction, UK courts have been particularly flexible in allowing 
service to be conducted by electronic means. The Civil Procedure Rules, pt 6.2 (e) allow 
for service by fax or ‘other electronic communication.’ Therefore service may be 
conducted by email. Most recently a court has served an order on the social networking 
website, Facebook.
710
 Prior to this, a UK court had given authorisation to serve 
documents on Twitter.
711
  
 
As identified in Chapter two of this thesis, service of a court order may not prove difficult 
but the enforcement of such an order is likely to be problematical. Brussels Regulation I, 
Article 2 allows a judgment made in one EU member state to be enforced in another.  
Yet, Article 34 identifies that a judgment may not be enforced where recognition of it is 
‘manifestly contrary to public policy in the Member State in which recognition is sought.’ 
Again, using the Swedish Freedom of the Press Act as an example, Article 2 of the Act 
requires that no ‘written matter shall be scrutinised prior to printing nor shall it be 
permitted to prohibit the printing thereof.’ In addition the Article states that it will not be 
                                                        
710 Unreported, see further: British Lawyer uses Facebook to serve Court Summons, 14th March 2011,  
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/facebook/8382570/British-lawyer-uses-Facebook-to-serve-court-
summons.html (accessed 24/02/2012). 
711 Blaney v Persons Unknown (2009) (unreported). 
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permitted for a public authority or other public body to take any action not authorised 
under the Act to prevent the printing or publication of the material or its dissemination on 
the grounds of its content. Enforcement in Sweden or in any other country with similar 
laws is likely to be difficult. The problem with extraterritorial enforcement is that it will 
of course take time for the respective procedures to take place and for proceedings to 
begin. With regard to online outlets, the enforcement of an order becomes very much a 
moot point if an organisation chooses to disregard an order and goes ahead and publishes 
the material anyway. The nature of the internet means that the information can be swiftly 
published and disseminated.  The question of service and enforcement becomes even 
more difficult when the first publication has been made online and an injunction has been 
sought to prevent further publication. The court will be faced with attempting to serve 
orders against potentially unknown actors in multiple jurisdictions, creating many 
difficulties for subsequent enforcement. Lord Philips MR’s reasoning in AG v Times will 
most readily apply.  
 
Section 12 (3) specifically concerns the grant of interim relief and states that no such 
relief is to be granted to restrain publication before trial unless the court is satisfied that 
the applicant is ‘likely to establish that publication should not be allowed.’ Interpretation 
of this section was considered at length in the leading judgment of Cream Holdings v 
Banerjee.
712
 The case is particularly significant for the purposes of this analysis as the 
information in question concerned allegations made by a whistleblower.  
 
In Cream Holdings the respondent worked as a chartered accountant for the Cream 
group, a well known entertainment company. The respondent was dismissed in 2001 and 
                                                        
712 [2004] UKHL 44. 
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when she left she took copies of documents with her that she later claimed showed illegal 
and improper activity by her former employers. The first respondent then passed the 
documents to the Liverpool Echo newspaper who later published articles regarding 
alleged corruption between a company director at Cream Holdings and a local council 
official.  
 
Following the publication the Cream group sought injunctive relief to prevent further 
publication. The applicants were granted an interlocutory injunction by the High Court. 
The respondents (Banerjee and the newspaper) appealed the decision on the basis that the 
term ‘likely’ should be interpreted as ‘more likely than not.’ The Court of Appeal 
disagreed. Lord Nichols sitting in the House of Lords gave focus to the meaning of 
‘likely’ in s.12 (3). Lord Nichols held that to interpret ‘likely’ to mean ‘more likely than 
not’ would set the bar higher than Parliament had intended.713 Lord Nichols instead 
suggested that s.12 (3) had the effect that the court is not to make an order unless 
‘satisfied that the applicant’s prospects of success at the trial are sufficiently favourable to 
justify such an order being made in the particular circumstances of the case.’714 He 
identified that courts should be slow to make interim restraint orders where the applicant 
has not satisfied the court he will more likely than not succeed at trial.
715
  
 
Most importantly for the purposes of this analysis, Lord Nichols held that the 
aforementioned test must be met before the court embarks on exercising its discretion 
‘duly taking into account the relevant jurisprudence on article 10.’716 Lord Nicholls 
identified that there may be circumstances where a lesser degree of likelihood will 
                                                        
713 Ibid, para 20. 
714 Above n 712, para 22. 
715 Ibid. 
716 Above n 712, para 22.  
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suffice.
717
 Earlier in the judgment, Lord Nicholls identified that such circumstances may 
include where the adverse consequences of disclosure would be ‘extremely serious such 
as a grave risk of personal injury to a particular person.’ Lord Nicholls gave an example 
of an individual who had given evidence against an individual in a criminal trial and had 
received threats. In such circumstances, Lord Nicholls opined that the consequences of 
the disclosure may be serious whereas the applicant’s claim to confidentiality may be 
weak.
718
 
 
It is submitted that Lord Nicholl’s assessment of the test contained in s.12 (3) requires the 
most careful analysis.  In order to be Convention compliant, it is essential that the court 
correctly engages proportionality balancing. It will not be sufficient for the court to 
engage the aforementioned test and then, if the test is satisfied, engage the proportionality 
test. In applications or an interim injunction whereby the information has already been 
made available over the internet, a court is unlikely to find the applicant’s prospects of 
success at the trial sufficiently favourable, if the motivation is to obtain a permanent 
injunction. However, by placing such an emphasis on apparent success of an injunction, 
the court will not place sufficient regard to whether the information is in the public 
interest and what countervailing rights, if any, should be engaged. This creates a similar 
difficulty to the concerns identified in Eady J’s analysis in AG v Times.   
 
There is also the concern that the court will upon finding that the chance of the applicant 
obtaining a permanent injunction to be slim, will make a finding that interim relief is still 
required because the applicant has convinced the court that further disclosures of 
information will result in harms caused to an individual without the court conducting a 
                                                        
717 Ibid. 
718 Above n 712 para 19. 
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thorough review to identify whether the harm in allowing further information to be 
disclosed should outweigh the harm caused by an injunction to disclosure.  
 
A thorough proportionality analysis is also required when competing convention rights 
are engaged. The Wikileaks disclosures resulted in the publication of personal details 
relating to the names and addresses of individuals who had assisted the United States 
government by acting as informants. The publication of the diplomatic cables contained 
information regarding the private lives of public officials. Such information, if it were in 
reach of the jurisdiction of the ECHR and a UK domestic court, would likely engage 
art.8.  Here the court should apply the ‘new methodology’ test developed in Re S.  
 
It is submitted that Lord Nicholl’s reasoning, if applied to applications for injunctions to 
prevent the dissemination of material published on a website such as Wikileaks, identifies 
that if the information pertains to national security or the disclosure may cause harm to an 
individual it is likely that an injunction will still be granted at the interim stage.  It is 
suggested that whilst the grant of an interim injunction is unlikely to prevent the further 
unauthorised publication of documents, such an injunction may prevent newspapers 
within the United Kingdom from reporting or providing the information in an accessible 
form to their readers.  Again, the difficulty is that the information may already be widely 
accessible in the public domain, or members of the public may wish to breach the 
injunction by giving the subject further publicity by utilising a variety of available social 
media websites, many of which are based outside of the jurisdiction. 
 
In 2011, the Football player Ryan Giggs obtained a so-called ‘super injunction’ to 
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prevent the publications of details that he had an extra-marital affair.
719
 The injunction 
prevented newspapers from reporting upon any details of the parties involved and details 
of the proceedings. The identity of Giggs as the applicant in the case was posted and later 
re-published over 30,000 times on the social networking website ‘Twitter.’720 As the 
rumour of the identity of the football player spread, foreign media began to publish that 
Giggs was the applicant. News Group Newspapers applied for the injunction to be lifted; 
this application was refused on two occasions by Eady J who argued that the publication 
of the facts in national newspapers would be more intrusive than disclosures over the 
internet.
721
  Eady J eventually lifted the order, yet by this stage the identity of Giggs as 
the applicant was widely known.
722
  
 
Whilst it is suggested in the aforementioned discussion that injunctions may still be 
granted by the courts to prevent further disclosures, it is clear that judicial reasoning 
developed at a time of paper based publication is not sufficient to prevent disclosures 
utilising social media or online outlets such as Wikileaks. As a consequence, it is 
submitted that ‘traditional’ breach of confidence actions or those for misuse of private 
information are likely to be concerned first and foremost with the obtaining of damages, 
rather than the obtaining of an injunction. In legal proceedings whereby a government 
department seeks to obtain damages against a civil servant for breach of confidence, the 
motivation for doing so could be to deter other employees from making unauthorised 
disclosures. Where the disclosure has been made for the purposes of monetary gain, the 
principle motivation may be to recover the profits made as a result of the disclosure to 
                                                        
719 CTB v News Group Newspapers Ltd and Anor [2011] EWHC 1232. 
720 O.Wright, 30000 Twitter Users Could Face Legal Action over Gag Breaches, Telegraph, 23 May 2011: 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/media/online/30000-twitter-users-could-face-legal-action-over-gag-
breaches-2287787.html. 
721 CTB v News Group Newspapers Ltd and Anor [2011] EWHC 1326. 
722 CTB v News Group Newspapers Ltd and Anor [2011] EWHC 3099. 
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send a clear message to others intending to do the same that such action will not be 
tolerated. It is suggested that novel and innovative solutions are required to tackle the 
issue of online disclosure, whereby such disclosure is likely to be harmful and 
proportionately restricted by art.10 (2).  
 
5.18 Possible Solutions  
 
The extraterritorial application and enforcement of injunctions to restrain publication, is 
reliant upon international co-operation. Chapter two of this thesis identified some of the 
difficulties that UK domestic courts would face. Many of the difficulties are caused by 
uncertainty in the interpretation and application of domestic and international laws in an 
area which is yet to be fully tested by the courts. Proposals to extend and clarify treaties 
concerning international jurisdiction or a multilateral treaty which establishes uniform 
jurisdictional rules have been considered by academics writing in the area. The difficulty 
with implementing such proposals is that different countries have different laws relating 
to the protection of national security or official information and different protections for 
freedom of expression. Such difficulties may be overcome where European member 
states are signatories to both the European Convention on Human Rights and various 
European Union Directives. However, for internet regulation to be a success it must be 
universal. The global nature of the internet means that there is nothing to stop an 
individual who wishes to publish information to simply publish in a jurisdiction where a 
scheme does not reach.  
 
A possible example of where international co-operation may assist is the Internet Watch 
Foundation. The organisation was established in 1996 as a regulator tasked with the 
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monitoring of child sexual abuse and violent content. It is funded by the European Union 
and a number of ‘internet service providers, mobile operators, content providers, hosting 
providers, filtering companies, search providers, trade associations and the financial 
sector.’723 The organisation operates a ‘self regulatory’ system whereby the members 
involved are part of a ‘notice and takedown’ scheme whereby a list of offending website 
addresses or URLs is provided for the purposes of blocking the content. The United 
Kingdom could set up an independent blocking and monitoring agency to deal with 
unauthorised disclosures. 
 
The blocking of web content may appear to provide a solution to combat unauthorised 
disclosures. According to J.S. Mill, the suppression of free speech may be justified to 
prevent harm to others. Dworkin believes that this is acceptable if the state can 
demonstrate that there is clear and substantial risk to citizens or property. The difficulty 
will such arguments is that a government will claim that a document classified using the 
established criterion and subject to the Official Secrets Acts automatically poses a risk to 
society, however, as Neocleaus argues, society has no way of testing or checking these 
claims without extensive knowledge of the subject matter. As a consequence information 
may be blocked or suppressed when it is in the public interest for such expression to be 
known. Fenwick and Phillipson argue that ‘rating or vetting and filtering systems’ are 
problematic because they ‘limit consumer choice’ and are ‘frequently over-inclusive.’ 
The author agrees with this position. Whilst one would hope that the blocking of child 
abuse images would be supported by society, the blanket suppression of official 
information may receive a markedly different response. The ‘catch all’ nature of national 
security protections mean that were such expression to be blocked by electronic means 
                                                        
723See further, Internet Watch Foundation website:  http://www.iwf.org.uk/about-iwf (accessed 
20/02/2012).  
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the public may be prevented from receiving information which may be valuable. As J.S. 
Mill opined, the suppression of truth leads to falsity.  
 
A way of legitimising the blocking process may be to make the proposed blocking of any 
websites subject to an injunction. Thus, a government department could apply for an 
order to block the website, the court would then need to conduct a detailed 
proportionality analysis and determine whether there are any countervailing privacy 
interests. The first difficulty with such a proposal would be the length of time required to 
apply for an order, when the information could be published and downloaded at the click 
of a mouse. The second difficulty is the jurisdictional reach of the blocking mechanism 
and the injunction itself. International co-operation of such a scheme would take time, yet 
the speed in which the Wikileaks disclosures have taken place, and the use of social 
media to bypass court injunctions, has identified that a solution needs to be found without 
delay. The blocking of content in the home jurisdiction where it is freely available 
elsewhere would be disproportionate.
724
 Moreover, with regard to national security, the 
provision of Official Secrecy legislation is first and foremost used to prevent the 
disclosure of information which would be useful to the enemy. Blocking of the 
information in the home jurisdiction would not achieve this aim. Furthermore, blocking 
of the information in the home jurisdiction may serve as an indicator to the enemy that 
the information is genuine and useful to them. 
 
It is submitted that whilst governments across the globe attempt to grapple with the 
question of internet regulation, a workable interim measure can be achieved. It was 
identified in chapter two that members of the public will generally need to locate the 
                                                        
724 Based upon the reasoning in AG v Times. 
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information and may use a search engine to do so. Google receives content removal 
requests from governments across the globe. In the period January to June 2011, the 
organisation received 28 requests from the United Kingdom for content removal 
regarding its web search facility.
725
 The exact justifications for the requests are not 
provided, yet the information is deemed to relate to ‘privacy and security.’ In the same 
period the organisation received 135 requests to remove content for reasons of national 
security on the Youtube website. The organisation reportedly ‘fully or partially complied’ 
with 82% of the requests. The social media website Twitter has recently adopted a 
country specific censorship policy, which allows the website to block websites at the 
request of a government in a home jurisdiction. The policy has received criticism for the 
implications that it will have for freedom of expression. 
 
The aforementioned examples identify that the organisations are willing to exercise co-
operation with governments. It is suggested that as happens in the United Kingdom with 
traditional media outlets, the DA Notice system could be extended as a way of providing 
advice to the online agencies of information, which if published, could be harmful to 
national security or the defence of the realm. 
 
Whilst the scheme would require the organisation to exercise a form of editorial control 
on information posted on their respective websites, such editorial control is already in 
operation. Those who chose to join Twitter choose to agree to the terms and conditions of 
service, which identify that Twitter, reserve the right to remove content.
726
 By choosing 
to partake in the facilities offered by those services, individuals voluntarily agree to a 
                                                        
725 See further, Google Transparency Report: 
http://www.google.com/transparencyreport/governmentrequests/GB/?p=2011-06 (accessed 26/02/12). 
726 Twitter terms of service: https://twitter.com/tos (accessed 26/02/12). 
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potential restriction of their art.10 rights.
727
 The proposed model is in keeping with the 
current trend of self-regulation of the internet. Thus, general notices of the categories of 
potentially harmful material could be published, with a mechanism for rapid contact with 
a designated individual at the organisation concerned via email. The Defence Advisory 
Committee could make itself available to the organisations where advice is required. This 
proposal is of course unlikely to prevent an organisation or individuals determined to 
publish unauthorised disclosures of official material. It is submitted that the difficulties 
identified in this section lead to the conclusion that the only way a leak can be prevented 
is at its source. Therefore a Crown servant should be provided with comprehensive and 
robust alternatives to unauthorised disclosures. This discussion will now progress to 
consider circumstances whereby a Crown servant may seek permission to disclose 
information.  
 
4.19 Authorisation for disclosure  
 
In A v B
728
 a former member of the Security Service sought to challenge a decision made 
by the Director General of that service to refuse the publication of his memoirs on 
national security grounds. A commenced judicial review proceedings in order to 
challenge the decision on the basis that it was ‘unreasonable’ was ‘vitiated by bias’ and 
that it was contrary to Article 10 ECHR. A argued that he had a choice whether to bring 
judicial review proceedings either in ‘the normal courts’ or before the Investigatory 
Powers Tribunal. However, B argued that the only forum which had the jurisdiction to 
review the decision, following s.65 (2) (a) Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, 
                                                        
727 This position, whilst untested by the courts, may be considered as a form of ‘contractual waiver.’ See 
further section 2.6.2 of this thesis for jurisprudential reasoning. 
728 R (on the application of A) (Appellant) v B (Respondent) [2009] UKSC 12 for the Court of Appeal 
decision see [2009] EWCA Civ 24. 
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was the Investigatory Powers Tribunal. The Court of Appeal ruled in favour of B and A 
appealed to the newly formed Supreme Court.  
 
The Supreme Court grappled with the precise wording of S.65 (2) (a) which states that 
the jurisdiction of the IPT is ‘to be the only appropriate tribunal for the purposes of 
Section 7 Human Rights Act 1998’ in proceedings ‘against any of the intelligence 
services.’ A argued that the meaning of the word ‘tribunal’ meant that S.65 (2) (a) 
excluded matters to be heard in other types of tribunal but not in the courts.
729
 A and the 
human rights charity JUSTICE
730
 (intervening) submitted  to challenge the decision only 
before the IPT would breach Article 6 ECHR because, firstly the ‘entire hearing would 
be held in private,’ secondly, that the submissions and evidence ‘relied on respectively’ 
by the claimant and the respondent ‘may be considered at separate hearings’ meaning 
that the IPT will lack the adversarial procedure of the normal courts, thirdly that the 
claimant will only be informed of the opposing case or given access to ‘any of the 
respondent’s evidence’ with the consent of the respondent and fourthly, that no reasons 
will be given ‘for any adverse determination.’ Justice argued that the procedures of the 
IPT were contrary to the principles of open justice, whereby the right to a public hearing 
was a ‘jealously guarded feature of the common law.’731  
 
Lord Brown rejected the arguments put forward by A and Justice and stated that claims 
against the intelligence services ‘raise special problems’ and ‘cannot be dealt with in the 
same way as other claims.’ Lord Brown highlighted that this proposition was recognised 
by both Strasburg and the domestic courts, and chose to rely on a passage from R v 
                                                        
729 Ibid para 1. 
730 The full text of the intervention is accessible via:  
http://www.justice.org.uk/ourwork/humanrights/index.html (accessed 07/01/2010). 
731 Ibid at para 25.  
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Shayler whereby Lord Bingham cites several cases heard before the ECtHR which 
recognised that there is a need to ‘preserve the secrecy of information relating to 
intelligence and military operations in order to counter terrorism, criminal activity, 
hostile activity and subversion,
732
 and that the ‘thrust of those decisions’ was not to 
‘discount or disparage  the need for strict and enforceable rules’ but to ‘insist on 
adequate safeguards to ensure that the restriction does not exceed what is necessary to 
achieve the end in question.’ Lord Brown highlighted that neither A nor Justice were 
able to provide the Court with any ‘successful article 10 cases’ involving national 
security considerations ‘save only for’ Sunday Times v UK (No.2), the Spycatcher case 
whereby the disputed material was already in the public domain. 
 
Lord Brown held that there was ‘some measure of flexibility in the IPT’s rules to ‘adapt 
its procedures’ to provide ‘as much information as possible consistently with national 
security interests’ and that there were a ‘number of counterbalancing provisions’ to 
ensure that proceedings before the IPT are properly held and considered. s. 68 (6) 
imposes on the Crown the ‘widest possible duties to provide information and documents 
to the IPT as they may require.
733
 Most importantly, Lord Brown highlighted that Public 
Interest Immunity (PII) ‘could never be invoked against such a requirement’ and that 
Rule 11(1) allows the IPT to ‘receive evidence in any form, and [to] receive evidence 
that would not be admissible in a court of law.’ The aforementioned provisions, Lord 
Brown opined ‘were designed to ensure that, even in the most sensitive of intelligence 
cases, disputes can be properly determined, none of them are available in the courts.’734 
The Supreme Court held unanimously to dismiss the appeal.  
 
                                                        
732 R v Shayler [2003] 1 AC 247, para 26. The majority of the cases mentioned appear in this chapter.  
733 Ibid para 14. 
734 Ibid. 
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The consequences of the decision in A v B will be most felt by former members of the 
Security and Intelligence Services who intend to publish memoirs of their time in the 
services. It is submitted that the reasoning of the Supreme Court is in line with the 
jurisprudence of the ECtHR regarding employees who, through the nature of their work, 
voluntarily agree to restrict their Article 10 rights. The use of Public Interest Immunity 
Certificates has long been seen as a way for the Crown to circumvent liability, the fact 
that PII certificates cannot be issued before the IPT is clearly advantageous to claimants. 
The fact that employees of the Security and Intelligence Services are expected to operate 
within a ‘ring of secrecy’ means that certain procedures are needed to ensure that 
requirements of national security are observed. This has been further reflected in the fact 
that whilst employees of the Services have recently obtained employment law rights, any 
Employment Tribunal claim to consider those rights must be held with procedures 
similar to those adopted by the Special Immigration Appeals Commission. 
 
The practical implications of the decision are undoubtedly more of a concern. The fact 
that the procedures of the IPT appear somewhat restrictive in comparison to the 
procedures of the normal courts may result in former employees, frustrated in the failure 
to obtain clearance from the Director General, choosing instead to publish without 
authorisation. The risk of a future ‘Spycatcher’ type scenario may be more likely 
following the decision in A v B. There is a risk that an unauthorised publication could 
happen abroad, as happened in the case of Peter Wright’s book or Richard Thomlinson 
and following technological advancements, the information can be easily published on 
the internet on a ‘blog’ or a website such as Wikileaks. In the year where the Security 
Service MI5 published its own official history, and the Secret Intelligence Service MI6 is 
due to follow suit, one must ask if more should be done to assess the authorisation of 
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proposed memoirs by former employees, particularly as in the past former Director 
General Stella Rimington, was allowed to publish her own memoirs.
735
  
 
4.20 Proposal for a Publications Review Board 
 
It was proposed unsuccessfully during the committee stage that the 1989 Act should 
include a Publications Review Board. The board would have consisted of a chairman and 
three members appointed by the Secretary of State. The respective clause would have 
prescribed that: 
  “No information shall be disclosed, whether in books, 
articles or other media, by former members of the security and intelligence services 
without the approval of the Board.”736 
 
In submitting the material for approval, the board would then have had a six month 
period to decide whether or not the material should be authorised for publication.  The 
Publications Review Board would have directly addressed the question of members or 
former members of the security services who wished to publish their own memoirs. Such 
a measure would have also addressed any future Spycatcher scenario. Indeed, the 
approach would also be advantageous from the point of view of accuracy, providing a 
way in which to clarify that any proposed disclosures were correct. It must not be 
forgotten that the Spycatcher text contained a number of allegations, which the author 
himself later admitted to the BBC’s Panorama programme that much of the books 
content had been based more on fiction than fact.  
 
The current approval process for Civil Servants who wish to publish their memoirs is 
                                                        
735 The publication of memoirs is considered in more detail below whereby a panel to consider the 
publication of memoirs is proposed.  
736 Mr Harold Walker, Hansard, HC Debs, 25th January 1989, Col 1046.  
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detailed in Volume II of the Directory of Civil Service Guidance.
737
 All books or other 
works which draw upon official experience must apply for permission to do so by 
submitting the text for approval by their respective department. The directory states that 
no Civil Servant may publish their memoirs whilst still in the service because ‘public 
responsibility for the actions of their departments rests with ministers.’738  
 
When the Civil Servant leaves the service he must still seek approval for publication 
from the Head of his former department. Once a decision has been made the current or 
former Civil Servant must abide by the decisions of the Head of the Department in 
respect: 
“not only of State secrets, or information whose disclosure would be prejudicial 
to the UK s international relations, but also in respect of matters of trust and 
confidentiality (official advice, the views of ministers or of colleagues, or judgements on 
the qualities or abilities of ministers or of colleagues) which fall within the period of 15 
years recommended by the Radcliffe Committee”739 
 
The principles established by the Radcliffe Committee date back to 1946 and remain 
unchanged this is despite the fact that the Public Administration Select Committee has 
been highly critical of the current procedures. The Public Administration Select 
Committee has suggested that a panel should be established to hear appeals from Crown 
employees who have had requests to publish material refused. The Committee suggests 
that the panel might contain privy counsellors, former experienced politicians from more 
than one political party, a former senior public servant and a member of the judiciary 
with membership agreed by the leaders of the political parties. The Committee’s most 
recent report on the issue conceded that the establishment of another regulatory body 
                                                        
737 http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/media/cabinetoffice/propriety_and_ethics/assets/csg%20vol2.pdf 
(accessed 24/02/09). 
738 Ibid.  
739 http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200506/cmselect/cmpubadm/689/689i.pdf (accessed 
24/02/09). 
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would be costly and perhaps disproportionate to the relatively small number of persons 
who would use the panel. It then suggests that the Office of the Information 
Commissioner would provide a ready and cost effective solution.  
 
The Government’s response to the Committee report stated that it was not the ‘ultimate 
arbiter’ of publication. This was because of the fact that the Cabinet Secretary has to 
consider and investigate the consequences to national security if the information is 
published and senior officials commented upon the possible damage caused to 
government by the remarks. If publication is refused there is a right to appeal to the 
Prime Minister. 
 
Whilst there are noticeable benefits of an independent appeal panel there are several 
potential difficulties with such an ideal. If publication is refused on the grounds of 
national security there is a risk that the information would be improperly handled by the 
panel. All members of the panel would need to be given the highest security clearance. 
There is potential that the Security and Intelligence Services would not wish to impart 
information on the panel. This is most evident if one considers the current relationship 
between the Intelligence and Security Committee and the Security and Intelligence 
Services.  
 
The make-up of the panel would be questionable. If former politicians are employed 
there is grave risk that decisions may be made with political motive. There is also the 
risk that the panel will lack the experience to adequately assess the protection of national 
security information. Finally with regard to the involvement of the Information 
Commissioner there is a distinct possibility that, as recently happened with the ICO’s 
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decision to publish Cabinet minutes concerning the Belgrano incident, the Government 
may still veto the decision, thus undermining the benefits of implementing a new system. 
 
It is submitted that the benefits of an appeals panel independent of the Government and 
Civil Service represent somewhat of an ideal which if implemented would potentially 
result in non cooperation between the government and panel concerned to the detriment 
of the official who wishes to have information published. The author suggests that a 
more appropriate panel is needed which assesses the requirements of freedom of 
information alongside those of national security and is kept ‘in house’ yet addresses the 
need to be independent of government. A comparative mechanism in the United States 
may provide the answer. 
 
4.21 The Central Intelligence Agency Publications Review Board 
 
In the United States, the Central Intelligence Agency has grappled with the 
aforementioned requirements. Following the outcome of the United States Supreme 
Court decision in Snepp v United States
740
 the CIA established the Publications Review 
Board. The Board acts, not as an appellant panel but as a mechanism of approach in the 
first instance. The Board is staffed by five senior members of the CIA which represent 
each of the directorates: Administration, Intelligence, Operations, Science and 
Technology and the offices involved in cover and personnel security.  
 
The Board has the jurisdiction to information contained in ‘speeches, journal articles, 
theses, op-eds, book reviews, movie scripts, scholarly treatises and works of fiction.’ 
                                                        
740 62 L ED 2d 704 (1980). 
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Review by the Board is compulsory for all intended publication of classified material 
and it is identified clearly in the CIA confidentiality agreement which is signed before 
employees undertake employment with the agency. If employees fail to seek permission 
from the Board the CIA can apply to court to prevent the publication of the material and 
seize the profits if publication has taken place.  
 
In making a decision on the material in question the Board will either object or will 
simply state “no objections.” This position means that the Board maintains a degree of 
impartiality and whilst gives an authorisation to publish is separate and distinct from 
giving an official endorsement. The Publications Review Board has taken a surprisingly 
liberal stance to the control of national security information this is most notable in the 
relatively small number of refusals given by the Board and also by the clearance of a 
book written by a former CIA officer which detailed the story of his operational career 
‘assignment by assignment’ but ‘stuck by the rules’ by following the correct procedure 
and by not revealing the cover or identity of agents.  
 
With regard to Crown Servants involved in national security matters the CIA 
Publications Review Board provides a suitable compromise between the demands of 
national security and free speech. There are significant advantages to such a scheme in 
that it recognises that there will be occasions where people will want to publish an 
account of their experiences but would also provides a means to control the disclosure in 
line with the protection of national security. Furthermore the fact that the Publications 
Review Board reviews all works intended for publication including works of fiction is 
advantageous. Whilst it may appear overly suppressive to review works of fiction, there 
is a justifiable need consider fictional works written by former members of the Security 
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and Intelligence Services.
741
  
 
4.22 Establishing a UK framework 
 
The present legislative framework contained in the Official Secrets Act 1989 allows for 
official authorisation of disclosure. Furthermore the common law doctrine of breach of 
confidence allows for the grant of an injunction to prevent publication and to obtain 
profits made through the unauthorised disclosure of national security information. A 
distinct advantage of the board is that it would utilise senior Civil Servants who would 
be required to be impartial because of their obligation to remain impartial under values 
of the civil service code.
742
 As an added safeguard the author proposes that the board 
could publish quarterly reports containing the outcome of its decisions to be accessed by 
the Information Commissioner and the Intelligence and Security Committee. 
 
In view of the Supreme Court decision in A v B
743
 it is submitted that an internal 
mechanism would be a more appropriate forum to provide the necessary clearance to 
publish. Whilst the Investigatory Power Tribunal may be arguably the appropriate venue 
to appeal a decision to refuse clearance to publish it would also have a positive influence 
on any established publications review board who would need to be consistent in their 
decisions and should only restrict publication of information harmful to national security, 
they would not wish to be overruled by the tribunal, or for their decisions to be subject to 
negative judicial scrutiny.  
                                                        
741 Several former members of the Security and Intelligence Services have written works of spy fiction, 
including Rudyard Kipling, Ian Fleming, John Le Carre, Stella Rimmington and others have all written 
fictional novels. A BBC documentary entitled Spy Stories: Time Shift (2006) gave a historical account of 
the relationship between factual details of work of the intelligence services and fictional portrayals. The 
programme argued that the distinction had become blurred due to the writing of spy novels by former 
members of the intelligence services influenced by their experiences.  
742 Civil Service Code, Paragraphs 12 and 13. 
743 [2009] EWCA Civ 24. 
 337 
 
 
 
4.23 Conclusion 
 
4.23.1 Theoretical Model 
 
Part one of this chapter discussed freedom of information. Birkinshaw argues that 
freedom of information is necessary to ensure that citizens who participate in democratic 
society require access to the truth so that they may accurately assess information and 
distinguish between truths and lies. However, freedom of information, in contrast to 
government transparency, is reliant upon private citizens to know enough about a topic 
area to request the required information. From the outset, private citizens are placed at a 
tactical disadvantage because the ‘fact holders’ are in control of information which could 
be highly valuable to the public interest, yet those making the initial request may not 
know that such information exists. If the citizen is aware of the existence of the 
information, this chapter has identified that he may encounter a number of barriers 
resulting in an absolute or qualified exemption from disclosure.  
 
Whilst the publicity of official deliberations may provide the connection between private 
citizens as voters and public officials as representatives, there may be circumstances 
whereby the blanket disclosure of such information may be detrimental to the public 
interest, because those in power and those providing advice may feel inhibited for doing 
so for fear of criticism in future. Yet, it must also be identified that circumstances may 
arise whereby information regarding decisions taken by our predecessors is vital to the 
development of moral and ethical evaluation and to learn the lessons of past mistakes. 
Where information has been deliberately concealed from the public, a Crown servant may 
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be best placed to provide the public with such information. His actions would be most 
readily supported by the arguments from truth and from participation in democracy. 
 
Part two of this analysis considered the control of official information by the use of the 
Official Secrets Acts, the common law offence of Misconduct in Public Office and the 
civil law remedy of breach of confidence. It may be identified that all of these measures 
are intended to restrict freedom of expression. With regard to the Official Secrets Act, as 
J.S. Mill suggested, the restrictions imposed on Crown servants not to reveal such 
information may be justifiable to prevent harm to others. As Dworkin identifies, however, 
the state must be able to demonstrate ‘a clear and substantial risk’ of great harm to people 
or property. The difficulty with the Official Secrets Act is that, even though the 1989 Act 
limited harmful information to certain specified categories, the Act does not provide 
sufficient scope for a court to test whether a certain document perceived to fall within the 
specified document is in fact harmful. In contrast, the civil law remedy of breach of 
confidence does allow for such analysis to take place. It is submitted that the most 
draconian legal protection is provided by the common law offence of misconduct in 
public office. The offence does not allow for any determination as to whether the 
information is harmful but instead focuses on the act of disclosure by an individual who 
because of his position in public employment should not have communicated the 
information. The offence is contrary to the theoretical arguments for restriction of 
expression identified in chapter one of this thesis. This discussion will now turn to 
consider the legal model. 
 
4.23.2 Legal Model  
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The Freedom of Information Act contains a number of absolute or qualified exemptions 
which prevent the release of official information. Section 35 which provides an absolute 
exemption for the disclosure of information relating to the formulation of government 
policy and s.36 which relates to information prejudicial to public affairs identifies the 
most controversial limitations of the Act. The protection of such information may be 
justified to maintain the longstanding convention of collective Cabinet responsibility and 
to maintain candour between civil servants and ministers. However, by providing an 
absolute exemption, the sections allow for the protection of so-called ‘bureaucratic 
secrecy,’ which as Aftergood correctly identifies allows the state to ‘hoard information.’ 
744
 
 
As identified in the aforementioned analysis using the theoretical model, there may be 
circumstances whereby the disclosure of such information may be justified in order to 
identify wrongdoing or allow society to learn from past mistakes. What is most apparent 
is that the Official Secrets Act 1989 does not reach as far as the Freedom of Information 
Act to overtly prevent the disclosure of documents relating to government policy 
(although such documents dependent on their subject matter may be covered by the 
categories of information in the OSA). It is therefore submitted that the Freedom of 
Information Act requires reform to readdress the initial aims and objectives of the Act by 
reconsidering the number of categories of information subject to exemptions. It may also 
be identified that several key Whitehall departments are simply choosing to disregard the 
requirements of the Act to provide a response within the specified time frame. Such 
failures must be actively enforced by the Information Commissioner, the provision of an 
undertaking may not be sufficient to rectify the situation and prosecution should be 
                                                        
744 Above, n 227.  
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considered.  
 
More generally, public officials should have a positive obligation to respond to requests; 
the New Zealand Official Information Act 1982 provides such an example. This 
obligation could be drafted into the Civil Service Code. Breach of the obligation could 
allow a Civil Servant to raise concerns when the Act has not been complied with. It 
should be reiterated that a breach of FOIA would constitute a breach of a legal obligation 
under s.43B Public Interest Disclosure Act; the Information Commissioner is also a 
prescribed person, thus affording protection to Crown servants who raise concerns to 
him. Inclusion of the obligation in the Civil Service Code would bolster this protection 
and would actively promote freedom of information as an important value in democratic 
society.  
 
Part two of this chapter considered the control of Official Information. Crown servants 
working in national security matters voluntary agree to a restriction of their article 10 
rights.
745
 This may be highlighted in the symbolic gesture of signing the Official Secrets 
Act.  
 
It is submitted that the House of Lords in R v Shayler placed considerable emphasis on a 
number of authorised channels for disclosure without providing consideration as to the 
public interest value of the information. It may be identified that the Official Secrets Act 
1989 does not currently provide for such an assessment. As a consequence, it is argued 
that the Official Secrets Act 1989 is incompatible with art.10 which requires for a 
detailed analysis of competing interests in the proportionality analysis. Currently, the 
                                                        
745 See generally Hajianastassiou v Greece (1992) 16 EHRR 219. 
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common law remedy of breach of confidence allows for the effective balancing to take 
place. As Feldman correctly identifies, a court will be required to determine the public 
interest in the information where they would not be able to in a criminal case involving 
the Official Secrets Act 1989.
746
  
 
It is submitted that part of the difficulty is caused by the domestic courts historical 
reluctance to make a determination as to whether the restriction of information on 
national security grounds is justified.
747
 Post Human Rights Act 1998, it will be 
necessary for the courts to determine the public interest value of the information.  
 
In order to make the legislation convention compliant it is submitted that a delicate 
balance must be achieved to ensure that information which is labelled confidential and 
above is rightly classified and falls within the respective categories of the Official Secrets 
Act 1989. It is therefore suggested that the United Kingdom adopts the recommendations 
of the Franks report to bring the classification of documents in line with the harm tests 
contained in the Official Secrets Act.  
 
It is submitted that the Official Secrets Act does not provide sufficient scope for the 
protection of ‘last resort’ disclosures which may be protected. A codified necessity 
defence should be provided to allow for disclosures to the public whereby the raising of 
concerns internally has failed or was impracticable in the circumstances. The provision 
should also allow the public interest value in the disclosure to be determined. It will be 
identified in chapter six of this thesis that the Canadian Security of Information Act 2001 
                                                        
746 D Feldman, Civil Liberties and Human Rights in England and Wales (2nd Edition, OUP, Oxford, 2002) 
669. 
747 See generally, the Zamora [1916] 2 AC 77, 107 per Lord Parker: ‘Those who are responsible for national 
security must be the sole judges of what the national security requires.” 
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provides a model which, if implemented, would align with existing art.10 values.   
 
Failure to implement the aforementioned changes is likely to result in future non 
compliance with art.10, as it may be indentified the Guja v Moldova framework requires 
consideration as to the severity of the sanction imposed for raising the concern. A 
criminal sanction is likely to weigh heavily against the government in a proportionality 
analysis were the Guja v Moldova framework to be used.  
 
More generally, greater consistency is required in the decision to prosecute Crown 
servants for unauthorised disclosures. It cannot be acceptable that Crown servants can be 
prosecuted for making unauthorised disclosures of malpractice when other Crown 
servants have failed to adequately retain the information entrusted to them. Leaving 
documents marked top secret on a train can arguably create as much a risk to national 
security as an intentional unauthorised disclosure. Guidance should therefore be issued 
by the Crown Prosecution Service in order to ensure that where appropriate Crown 
Servants are prosecuted under Section 8.  
 
The final proposal concerns the clearance of memoirs. The fact that a Crown Servant has 
attempted to obtain authorisation to publish rather than making an unauthorised 
disclosure must be acknowledged with a fair decision making process on the part of their 
former department. It is therefore suggested that publications review panels be set up to 
decide the authorisation of proposed memoirs. Such a proposal would only be successful 
if the panels are prepared to make liberal decisions which must be deemed to be a less 
costly alternative to unauthorised disclosure.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
OFFICIAL MECHANISMS: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF PUBLIC SERVICE 
WHISTLEBLOWING MECHANISMS  
 
This chapter considers how other nation states deal with the issue of whistleblowing and 
the official whistleblower protections that they prescribe, with the aim of providing a 
contrast with the United Kingdom’s own prescribed mechanisms of official disclosure. 
Firstly it is important to indicate to the reader that the chapter is not intended to provide a 
complete narrative of whistleblower provisions throughout the world, as to do so would 
stray beyond the remit of the thesis. Instead, the clearly defined terms of reference will 
be as follows: focus will be upon a comparison of states with a similar cultural and/or 
democratic makeup, these will include: New Zealand, Australia, the United States of 
America and Canada. Within this scope, this chapter will consider whistleblowing 
provisions primarily concerning public officials, followed by public officials involved in 
matters of national security. The purpose is, therefore, to provide a critical and 
contrasting analysis of these provisions in order to ascertain whether the officially 
prescribed mechanisms of disclosure and grievance reporting in the United Kingdom  
can be improved by adopting a similar model to one of the aforementioned nation states. 
We shall begin with a consideration of New Zealand whistleblowing provisions. 
 
5.1 New Zealand: The Protected Disclosures Act 2000, New Zealand’s Answer to 
PIDA? 
 
Out of the four nation states considered in this study of available whistleblowing 
provisions, New Zealand has the most comparable whistleblowing provision to the 
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United Kingdom’s own Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998 in the form of the Protected 
Disclosures Act 2000 (PDA). In a similar way to PIDA the PDA is a ‘sector blind’ 
provision in that it aims to protect employees regardless of whether they work in the 
public or private sector. The PDA aims to promote the public interest by ‘facilitating the 
disclosure and investigation of matters of serious wrongdoing in or by an 
organisation.’748 
 
In order to qualify for protection under the PDA, the disclosure must be about ‘serious 
wrongdoing,’ reasonable belief that the ‘information is true or likely to be true’ and that 
the employee expresses a wish that the wrongdoing be investigated.
749
 The employee 
must disclose information relating to ‘serious wrongdoing’ which is defined in section 3 
of the Act as:  
“an unlawful, corrupt or irregular use of funds or resources in a public sector 
organisation, or an act, omission, or course of conduct that constitutes a serious risk to 
health and safety or the environment, an act omission or course of conduct that 
constitutes a serious risk to the maintenance of law, including the prevention, 
investigation, and detection of offences and the right to a fair trial or an act, omission or 
course of conduct that constitutes an offence”  
 
It is submitted that the aforementioned wording would most closely be associated with 
‘watchdog whistleblowing.’ Most importantly for the purpose of this analysis, the 
definition proceeds to include ‘an act, omission or course of conduct by a public official 
that is oppressive, improperly discriminatory, or grossly negligent, or that constitutes 
gross mismanagement.’ It is submitted that the New Zealand legislation proceeds further 
than the UK Public Interest Disclosure Act in that this definition clearly allows for the 
protection of value judgments. In particular, gross negligence or gross mismanagement 
                                                        
748 Section 5 Protected Disclosures Act 2000. 
749 Section 6 Protected Disclosures Act 2000. 
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are likely to be matters to which the public servant, exercising his judgment based upon 
his experience could argue that a policy decision taken is fundamentally wrong. There is 
a strong theoretical argument to suggest that policy dissent may benefit both the 
communicator and audience by facilitating debate which will both enhance the public 
interest and further enhance participation in a democracy.   
 
In contrast to PIDA the PDA requires employees to follow internal procedures before 
making a disclosure externally. At this point the relationship between whistleblowing 
provisions for the public and private sector differ as under s.11 PDA public sector 
organisations are statutorily obliged to have internal procedures in place whereas private 
sector organisations are not.
750
 
 
The internal procedures must be compliant with both the New Zealand Human Rights 
Act 1993 and the Privacy Act 1993 in that they must be independent (in that the 
individual in control of the internal disclosure mechanism is not party to the wrongdoing 
himself) and that it is confidential. Confidentiality is promoted as a key protection in the 
PDA and is prescribed in section 19.
751
 
 
It is particularly apparent that the Protected Disclosures Act does not provide an absolute 
guarantee to confidentiality; instead the person in receipt of the disclosure is expected to 
use ‘his best endeavours.’ This provision is perhaps the best acknowledgment of a 
common difficulty faced in all prescribed whistleblowing provisions, regardless of the 
                                                        
750 In cases where there is no whistleblowing policy an employee may go straight to the head of the 
organisation.  
751 For full text see: http://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/2000/0007/latest/DLM53466.html (accessed 
02/04/10).  
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jurisdiction. The protection of confidentiality can never be regarded as absolute.  
 
If a detailed investigation is conducted, the department or agency to which the 
malpractice is alleged will undoubtedly become aware that a complaint has been made 
against them. This acknowledgement should be viewed in direct contrast to the United 
States whistleblowing provisions (considered below) whereby a guarantee of 
confidentiality is given by federal law.  It is also apparent that the existence of a ‘sector 
blind’ whistleblowing provision allows for the potential discloser to consider the 
protections available to him with considerable ease. This is again in marked contrast to 
the United States’ whistleblowing provisions which are considerably more complex in 
nature.     
 
Disclosures may be made externally to an ‘appropriate authority’ in circumstances where 
the head of the organisation ‘is or may be’ involved in the serious wrongdoing alleged in 
the disclosure, because disclosure to the authority is justified by reason of urgency or 
because of inaction on behalf of the organisation or internal whistleblowing process 
within 20 working days after the disclosure was made.
752
 This requirement can be seen 
as more restrictive on the employee than the provision in s.43F PIDA which allows 
employees to make report a concern to a prescribed regulator provided that the 
disclosure is made in good faith and that the employee has reasonable belief that the 
information is substantially true. However, the NZ Ombudsman is listed as an 
                                                        
752 Section 9 Protected Disclosures Act 2000. The following is a list of appropriate authorities: the 
Commissioner of Police; the Controller and Auditor-General; the Director of the Serious Fraud Office; the 
Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security; the Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment; the 
Independent Police Complaints Authority; the Solicitor-General; the State Services Commissioner; the Health 
and Disability Commissioner; the head of every public sector agency; and the heads of certain private sector 
professional bodies having disciplinary powers over their members.  
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‘appropriate authority’ and does have powers to be involved in the investigatory process 
which may be seen as an advantage over the UK system as shall be considered below.   
 
PIDA does not require organisations to have internal whistleblowing procedures, nor 
does it require organisations to investigate the concern in a certain way. In contrast the 
PDA places considerable emphasis on how the concern is dealt with once it is initially 
reported and in respect of public sector organisations, allows employees to escalate 
concerns to a minister of the Crown or the NZ Ombudsman provided that the disclosure 
is in respect of a public sector organisation and that the internal process or appropriate 
authority: 
 
   “i) has decided not to investigate the matter; or 
(ii) has decided to investigate the matter but has not made progress with the investigation 
within a reasonable time after the date on which the disclosure was made to the person or 
appropriate authority; or 
(iii) has investigated the matter but has not taken any action in respect of the matter nor 
recommended the taking of action in respect of the matter, as the case may require; and 
(a) continues to believe on reasonable grounds that the information disclosed is true or likely 
to be true.”753 
 
In comparison s.43E PIDA allows for disclosure to a minister of the Crown without 
precondition provided that the disclosure was made in good faith.  The involvement of 
the NZ Ombudsman in the process of public interest whistleblowing is the opposite of 
the role of the UK Ombudsman who has no involvement in the reporting or investigation 
of whistleblower concerns cannot be approached directly from a member of the public 
because of the ‘MP filter.’  
 
                                                        
753 Section 10 Protected Disclosures Act 2000.  
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The NZ Ombudsman may escalate a disclosure by referring it to a minister of the Crown 
or to an appropriate authority to investigate the concern. The NZ Ombudsman has the 
power to ‘take over some investigations’ or ‘investigate in conjunction’ with a public 
sector organisation provided that the organisation consents to the involvement.
754
 The 
NZ Ombudsman cannot direct an organisation to act in a particular way but can review 
and ‘guide’ an investigation if he so chooses. Furthermore, the NZ Ombudsman may 
publish findings of the investigation in an annual report on the work of the NZ 
Ombudsman. Whether or not an employee chooses to report a concern to the NZ 
Ombudsman he can contact the Ombudsman’s Office for confidential guidance on how 
to make a protected disclosure.
755
 This may be seen as a useful resource because of the 
fact that the Ombudsman will have both the experience and contacts to provide informed 
advice. There is no official Parliamentary or governmental body in the United Kingdom 
which provides such a service. The approach taken in New Zealand is radically different 
to the approach taken in Australia (considered next), where the ‘sector specific’ 
whistleblowing provision contained in the Public Service Act 1999 have left public 
servants with inadequate protection. 
  
5.2   Australia: General Whistleblowing Provisions and the constitutional makeup of the 
Commonwealth.  
 
Before discussing the nature of available whistleblowing provisions in Australia, it is 
necessary to venture briefly into the democratic makeup of the country, the importance 
of which shall become clear. Australia exists as a Commonwealth consisting of six 
states, two major territories and other more minor territories. Each state or territory has 
                                                        
754 Section 15A Protected Disclosures Act 2000. 
755 For further information see information pamphlet on protected disclosures: 
http://www.ombudsmen.parliament.nz/imagelibrary/100035.pdf (accessed 07/01/10). 
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its own Parliament and Legislature.  
 
The constitutional significance of this is that the Commonwealth Parliament can override 
any legislation passed by the territories, but with regard to the states, can only override 
certain state legislation which concerns specific matters outlined under section 51 of the 
Australian Constitution. The consequences of the structure are twofold: firstly, the 
decentralised form of government has meant that the individual states have developed 
their own whistleblowing procedures, eventually influencing the federal legislation 
provided by the Public Service Act 1999. Secondly, it is submitted that as section 51 of 
the Constitution does not include whistleblowing provisions, thus the overriding impact 
of a uniform federal whistleblowing procedure, would be minimal. Furthermore, Lewis 
suggests that there are ‘serious doubts’ as to whether the Federal Government has the 
‘constitutional power’ to enact a uniform whistleblower statute.756 Current State or 
Territory legislation concerning government bodies, includes the: Whistleblowers 
Protection Act 1993 (South Australia) Whistleblowers Protection Act 2001 (Victoria) 
Whistleblowers Protection Act 1994 (Queensland) Public Interest Disclosure Act 1994 
(Australian Capital Territory) Protected Disclosures Act 1994 (New South Wales) and 
the Official Corruption Commission Act 1998 (Western Australia).
757
  
 
These constitutional difficulties have meant that the majority of Commonwealth public 
sector workers are without whistleblower protection.
758
 The resulting legislation at 
                                                        
756 D.Lewis, Whistleblowing Statutes in Australia: Is it Time for a New Agenda? [2003] DeakinLRev 16 
para 1. There have been several attempts to introduce federal whistleblower legislation, see in particular: 
Whistleblowers Protection Bill 1991: Senator Jo Vallentine, 12 December 1991. Whistleblowers Protection 
Bill 1993: Senator Christobel Charmarette, 5 October 1993.  
757 These Acts refer to State officials only, thus state police involved in national security or intelligence 
matters would need to approach disclosure protection at state rather than federal level. 
758 See, R. Calland & G Dehn, Whistleblowing Around the World: Law Culture and Practice (Public 
Concern at Work, London, 2005) 121. Note that at the time of writing the Australian Government had 
announced a new Commonwealth protection for whistleblowers however the precise details of the proposed 
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federal level has provided a specific protection for members of the Australian Public 
Service (APS), the Australian equivalent to the UK Civil Service, in the form of the 
Public Service Act 1999. However, this legislation has been labelled ‘narrow’ and 
‘problematical.’759 It is important to note that whilst considering the Australian 
perspective as a source of comparative material, the ‘Australian Public Service’ does not 
incorporate as wide a spectrum of agencies/departments as the UK definition of ‘Crown 
Servant’ provides.  The Australian Defence Force (an amalgamation of the army, navy 
and airforce) is dealt with separately and is governed by the Defence Act 1903 and 
policing matters are governed at state level.  
 
In contrast to the statutory provision in the United Kingdom, afforded by the Public 
Interest Disclosure Act (PIDA), Australian whistleblower legislation, both at federal and 
state levels has mostly separated the public and private sectors whereas PIDA 
encompasses both. The reasoning behind this separation has been considered as part of 
research produced by a national project, researching into the various mechanisms 
available in the Australian public sector.
760
  
 
It is noted that the various investigatory mechanisms provided for in the legislation are 
particularly complex and would not easily apply to the private sector. PIDA is used as a 
comparative mechanism which offers a ‘sector blind’ approach and which focuses on 
whistleblower protection and compensation in the event of reprisal rather than ‘detailed 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Bill are yet to be determined. See: http://www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2010/03/18/2849370.htm (accessed 
10/04/10). 
759 Caslon Analytics Guide: Secrecy and Accountability, see www.caslon.com.au/secrecyguide11.htm 
(accessed 10/04/10). 
760 See further A.Brown, Public Interest Disclosure Legislation in Australia: Towards the Next Generation, 
Commonwealth Ombudsman, 2006, 15. See also research project: Whistling While They Work-Enhancing 
the Theory and Practice of Internal Witness Management in Public Sector Organisations, Griffith 
University, http://www.griffith.edu.au/centre/slrc/whistleblowing/ (08/09/09). 
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investigative systems.’761Consideration was also given to the difference between the 
sectors in how ‘public interest’ disclosures are defined and how different agencies are 
expected to respond to such disclosures.
762
  
 
The majority of Australian whistleblower protections deal specifically with public sector 
corruption. This became a reactionary measure after a series of highly publicised 
corruption inquiries in the late 1980s and early 1990s considered that whistleblowing 
could make a significant impact on malpractice.
763
 The Whistleblowers Protection Act 
was implemented by Queensland, the first and leading State in developing whistleblower 
protection, who created the legislation as a ‘direct consequence’ to ‘massive corruption’ 
in the Queensland Public Service.
764
 If one were to contrast these reactions to the 
reactions of significant inquiries, and notable Executive scandal in the United Kingdom 
in the 1980s and 1990s, one can surmise that a very different approach was taken. 
Whistleblowing in the British Civil Service was actively discouraged and furthermore 
significant advancements in internal concern reporting for allowing Civil Servants direct 
access to the Civil Service Commissioners did not occur until the latest Civil Service 
Code was issued in 2006, a total of six years from when the Public Interest Disclosure 
Act 1998 came into force.  
 
Most interestingly, and in contrast, the background to the UK Public Interest Disclosure 
Act has been attributed not to instances of Executive maladministration but to a number 
of high profile public inquires into mostly private sector malpractice during the 1990s. 
                                                        
761 Ibid, 15. 
762 Ibid. 
763 For an historical analysis of Australian whistleblower protection see: Whistleblowing in Australia- 
Transparency, Accountability…but above all, the truth, Research Note, Parliament of Australia Department 
of Parliamentary Services, February 2005, no.31, 2004-2005. 
764 See further: S.Groene, Three Whistleblower Protection Models: A Comparative Analysis of 
Whistleblower Legislation in Australia, the United States and the United Kingdom, Public Service 
Commission of Canada October 2001.  
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This was despite a clear recognition for a need for greater accountability and 
enhancement in public standards by the Major government, responsible for the formation 
of the Committee for Standards in Public Life in 1994. One must therefore consider 
whether PIDA offers adequate protection to Crown Servants given that in the Australian 
legal jurisdiction significant emphasis is given to the distinction between the public and 
private sector. One must also consider whether there is a justification to provide a 
specific whistleblowing provision for Crown Servants given that Crown employees have 
a unique employment and Constitutional status which differs significantly from their 
private sector counterparts.  
 
The benefits of ‘sector-specific’ whistleblowing legislation for those in public service 
may be observed as an enhanced recognition that the duties of those in office are 
different to those in the private sector, that those duties must uphold high standards
765
 
and that failure to do so will lead to maladministration which may be detrimental to the 
running of the department in question or the Executive as a whole. The Australian Public 
Service whistleblowing procedures seek to encourage whistleblowing in certain 
circumstances.
766
 Section 16 Public Service Act 1999 gives protection to employees who 
report instances of ‘suspected misconduct.’ In a similar way to the UK Civil Service 
grievance reporting procedures and PIDA, a number of prescribed persons are specified  
including an Agency head, the Public Service Commissioner or the Merit Protection 
Commissioner, or persons nominated  by the department (a role comparable to the UK 
                                                        
765 For example, the ‘Nolan Standards,’ the Seven Principles in Public Life. See further: http://www.public-
standards.gov.uk/about_us/the_seven_principles_of_life.aspx (accessed 09/08/09) 
766
 For information on the mechanism see: Australian Public Service Commission, Handling misconduct: A 
human resources practitioner’s guide to the reporting and handling of suspected and determined breaches 
of the APS Code of Conduct, Commonwealth of Australia, 2007. 
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Civil Service departmental ‘nominated officers’). 
 
The conditions and procedures for making ‘whistleblower reports’ are contained in the 
Public Service Regulations 1999 (amended 2007). Section 2 (b) of the Regulations 
provides that the APS employee may report breaches of the Code of Conduct to his 
agency head or nominated person in the first instance. The Agency head is then required 
to investigate the claim unless it is considered ‘frivolous’ or ‘vexatious.’ If the APS 
employee is unhappy with the outcome he may then report the matter to the Public 
Service Commissioner. The ‘Public Service Commissioner’ is a statutory position with 
the responsibility for ‘promoting and evaluating the implementation of the Australian 
Public Service Values and Code of Conduct.’767 The employee may also approach the 
Merit Protection Commissioner (MPC). Similarly to the Public Service Commissioner, 
the remit of the MPC is enshrined in statute. However, considerable emphasis is made on 
the independence of the role. It has been stated that the MPC has a ‘key role within the 
APS in providing independent external review of actions affecting individual APS 
employees.’768 
 
Whilst the role of the Australian Commissioners is comparable to the UK Civil Service 
Commissioners (CSC) in that they are independent, there are key differences between 
the oversight bodies. With regard to the appeals mechanism, in the UK, the Civil Servant 
is required to complain internally to the head of department or ‘nominated officer.’ If he 
is unsatisfied he can then approach the Civil Service Commissioners. The position as to 
when the Commissioners will consider taking a complaint directly is unclear. In 
                                                        
767 For general information on the role of the Public Service Commissioner see further: About the 
Commission: The Public Service Commissioner, Australian Public Service Commission Website, 
http://www.apsc.gov.au. (accessed 05/07/09) 
768For a description of the role see further: About the Commission: The Merit Protection Commissioner, 
Ibid. 
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Australia, the Public Service Regulations provide for direct access to either of the 
Commissioners if it would be ‘inappropriate to report to the Agency Head,’ if this 
position is agreed with the respective Commissioner.  
 
The Australian structure allows for the complainant to have greater control over the way 
in which the complaint is handled. It is perhaps most apparent that the Merit Protection 
Commissioner offers the APS employee the opportunity to disclose the matter to an 
external office, with a primary role or ‘specialism’ to handle ‘whistleblowing’ 
complaints. Whilst the semantic differences between the defined role of the UK and 
Australian Commissioners may be slight (the CSC focuses upon ‘effectiveness’ and 
‘impartiality’ of the Service769), the complaints mechanism appears to be both modern 
and employee-focused. Furthermore, under the Commissioner’s Directions,770 Direction 
2.5 (1) (d) requires the Agency head to not only ensure that the department has an 
adequate whistleblowing procedure, but that its use is actively encouraged in appropriate 
circumstances.  
  
However whilst APS employees appear to have an advantage over their UK 
counterparts, the legislative framework provided by the Public Service Act 1999 restricts 
protection from reprisal to those who disclose via the prescribed avenues. There is no 
protection available for APS employees who make unauthorised disclosures to the 
media. In the UK the Public Interest Disclosure Act protects persons who make 
unauthorised disclosures to the media but only in ‘exceptional circumstances.’  
 
                                                        
769 See Civil Service Commissioners website: http://www.civilservicecommissioners.gov.uk/about_us.aspx 
(accessed 04/09/10). 
770 Public Service Commissioners Directions 1999. This was further incorporated by section 10 (1) (d) 
Public Service Act 1999. 
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5.2.1 Limitations on Speech 
 
The prevention of unauthorised disclosures made in the public domain for information 
obtained by APS employees has been the subject of considerable controversy in recent 
years. As a result, significant amendments have been made to the Public Service 
Regulations. Regulation 7 (13) (now 2.1) had contained a draconian provision which 
prohibited an APS employee from disclosing any information concerning public 
business, which had been obtained during the course of employment. The regulation had 
remained largely unchanged since 1902. However in 2004 the provision was amended 
after a significant legal challenge in the Federal Court.  
 
It was held in the case of Bennett
771that the provision was ‘catch all’ in nature which 
prohibited disclosure regardless of the nature of the information, the consequences of the 
disclosure and where it was made publicly available. This was held to be an infringement 
of the freedom of ‘political communication,’ an implied right in the Australian 
Constitution which had developed from Australian Federal case law in the early 
1990s.
772
 Justice Finn stated that such a provision was inconsistent with the modern 
conceptions of open government but further acknowledged that the regulation of 
information for legitimate reasons, for example the ‘effective working of government 
would be acceptable.’ He also stated that if the regulation was invalid, ‘an important part 
of Australia’s official secrecy regime would be thrown into some uncertainty.’ The case 
resulted in an amended Regulation which was intended to balance the needs of open 
                                                        
771 Bennett v President, Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (2004) 204 ALR 119.  
772 See in particular: Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1997) 189 CLR 520, 567, J. Stellios, 
Using Federalism to Protect Political Communication: Implications from Federal Representative 
Government [2007] 31 Melb. U. L. Rev. 239, S.Bronitt & J.Stellios Sedition, Security and Human Rights: 
‘Unbalanced’ Law Reform in the ‘War on Terror’ [2007] 30 Melb. U. L. Rev. 923, E. Willheim Review of 
Australian Public Law Developments [2006] 30 Melb. U. L. Rev. 269, D.Butler, A Tort of Invasion of 
Privacy in Australia? [2005] 29 Melb. U. L. Rev. 339. 
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government with the need to protect official secrecy. It restricts the disclosure of 
information prejudicial to the ‘effective working of government,’ and information 
communicated in confidence but does not prohibit the disclosure of information in the 
course of duties (such as authorised media comment) or with the authorisation of an 
Agency head or by law.  
 
5.3 Whistleblowing in the United States of America 
 
In the United States the unauthorised disclosure of material for the purposes of 
highlighting national security concerns has dramatically increased in the years following 
the terrorist attacks on September 11
th
 2001. By 2004 the Government Accountability 
Office reported an almost 50% increase in federal employees seeking protection for 
whistleblowing disclosures annually.
773
 However, the Federal employees who made the 
disclosures have received little or no protection from the whistleblowing provisions 
available to federal employees despite the fact that they have a duty to report waste, 
fraud or abuse to an appropriate authority.
774
 
 
A distinctly common feature in both United States and United Kingdom whistleblowing 
protection is that private sector employees are at a greater advantage over those working 
in Civil Service roles. This is greatly illustrated with the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act which essentially protects corporate whistleblowers.
775
  
                                                        
773 Government Accountability Office, US Office of Special Counsel: Strategy for Reducing Persistent 
Backlog of Cases Should be provided to Congress, March 2004. See also: Project on Government 
Oversight, Homeland and National Security Whistleblower Protections: The Unfinished Agenda, April 28 
2005.  
774 Executive Order 12731, accessible via National Whistleblowers Center website: 
http://www.whistleblowers.org/storage/whistleblowers/documents/eo12731%282%29.pdf (accessed 
15/04/10). 
 
775 Ibid. 
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The Civil Service Reform Act 1978 was not intended to protect whistleblowers ‘who 
disclose information which is classified or protected by statute from disclosure.’776 The 
Act covers all executive agencies but did not include the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency and as determined by 
the President, any Executive agency or unit thereof the principle function of which is the 
conduct of protecting whistleblowers runs to all Government instrumentalities. 
 
The Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 created the institutions of the Office of Personnel 
Management (OPM) the Merit Systems Protections Board (MSPB) and the Office of 
Special Counsel (OSC) as a way of providing protections for whistleblowers against 
reprisals. However, by the late 1980s it had been observed that the established 
mechanisms were ineffective.  In 1989 the Whistleblower Protection Act was passed to 
strengthen the provisions and in 1994 Public Law 103-424 extended the protections 
offered to employees of government corporations and employees in the Veterans 
Administration. To the present day, a number of legal challenges have rendered the 
Whistleblower Protection Act particularly ineffective. 
 
The Whistleblower Protection Act 1989 (WPA) was introduced to bolster whistle 
blowing provisions as a reaction to several loopholes in the Civil Service Reform Act 
created by the Courts and government agencies.
777
 The Act again exempts those 
involved in national security and defence. The WPA has significant limitations, the  
statute exempts the following federal agencies: the US Postal Service, the Postal Rate 
                                                        
776See further, Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, S.Rept. No. 95-969, 95th Cong., 2nd sess. 8 
(1978) See also: L.Fisher, National Security Whistleblowers, CRS Report for Congress, RL33215, 30th 
December 2005. 
777 See further: Project on Government Oversight. Homeland and National Security Whistleblower 
Protections: The Unfinished Agenda, 28th April 2005, 8. 
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Commission, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Central Intelligence Agency, the 
Defence Intelligence Agency, the National Imagery and Mapping Agency, the National 
Security Agency and any other ‘executive entity’ that the President determines 
‘primarily conducts foreign intelligence or counter-intelligence activities.778 Following 
an unsuccessful attempt to strengthen the Act in 2008, a new Whistleblower Protection 
(Enhancement) Act is currently making its way through the Congress. This section will 
now consider the work of the Office of Special Counsel. 
 
5.3.1 The Office of Special Counsel 
 
The Office of Special Counsel is an independent, federal and prosecutorial agency. Its 
primary role is to investigate complaints by federal employees who allege ‘Prohibited 
Personnel Practices’ (PPPs) against them as a result of making disclosures on perceived 
instances of malpractice. The twelve PPPs which are contained in S. 2302(b) of title 5 of 
the United States Code (USC) detail a range of retaliatory behaviour from giving an 
‘unauthorized preference or advantage to anyone so as to improve or injure the 
employment prospects of any particular employee or applicant;’779 to ‘engaging in 
reprisal for whistleblowing.’  
 
The Complaints Examining Unit is the initial point of contact for the employee. The Unit 
will analyse the complaint and discuss the basis of the claim with the employee. It will 
then inform the complainant by letter as to whether it will refer the complaint to the 
Investigation and Prosecution Division (IPD) or that it cannot proceed with the matter on 
the basis that it falls out of the department’s jurisdiction. If the matter is successfully 
                                                        
778 5 USC S2302(a)(2)(c) See also CRS Report for Congress, The Whistleblower Protection Act: An 
Overview, RL33918, 2007.  
779 Section 2302(b). 
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referred to the IPD, it will conduct a thorough investigation. 
 
The IPD has the authority to access records and interview persons involved and any 
witnesses to the matter in question. If the matter is unresolved after the investigation is 
complete, the investigation can then undergo a legal review to establish whether or not 
there is evidence of a violation of law, rule or regulation, and whether the matter 
warrants corrective action, disciplinary action or both. The OSC will offer the employee 
Alternative Dispute Resolution as an alternative to the IPD investigation above.  
 
The OSC also has a dedicated ‘Disclosure Unit’ which allows a federal employee to 
disclose information in a safe and confidential manner. The OSC may then direct the 
agency head to investigate and make a report on the disclosure. Following the 
investigation and subsequent report the OSC must then send a copy to the President of 
the United States and Congressional oversight committees.  
 
Whilst the above described mechanism may infer that the federal employee is given a 
comprehensive and safe avenue of disclosure, in which he can contribute to the report, 
the mechanism has significant limitations. The protection of confidentiality is not 
absolute and is potentially misleading. Firstly, the OSC may reveal the name of the 
discloser if it is ‘necessary because of an imminent danger to public health or safety or 
imminent violation of any criminal law.’780Secondly, the identity of the discloser may be 
revealed as a consequence of his disclosure regardless of whether or not his identity is 
protected, as he may be the only person who is aware of the information, or is part of a 
                                                        
780 5 USC S.213 (h). 
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limited class of persons, whereby the identity of the whistleblower can be easily 
deduced. It should also be noted that any anonymous disclosures will be referred directly 
to the Inspector General of the respective agency.  
 
There is a clear inconsistency between the work of the Complaints Examining Unit and 
the Disclosure Unit. The CEU has the power to conduct a thorough investigation in order 
to determine whether a prohibited personnel practice has occurred as a result of a 
whistleblowing disclosure whereas the DU has no such powers, it can only refer the 
matter to the agency head to conduct the investigation.  
 
The OSC has been the recipient of strong criticism over recent years. In 2004 the 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) had failed to handle the majority of cases 
within the statutory limit of 15 days. It identified it only met the 15 day limit “about 26 
percent of the time” meaning that there was a substantially high backlog of 95 to 97 
percent of cases.
781
 The time frame of which cases are investigated is a significantly 
important requirement of any affective whistleblowing provision. Complaints must be 
dealt with quickly and efficiently in order to prevent further retaliation from taking place. 
Furthermore, a significant delay would give those involved in any alleged wrongdoing 
time to conceal evidence or ‘cover their tracks’, particularly if the department is notified 
of the complaint by the OSC. 
 
In 2004 it emerged from a series of leaks to the media that the OSC was considering 
                                                        
781 Government Accountability Office, US Office of Special Counsel: Strategy for Reducing Persistent 
Backlog of Cases Should be Provided to Congress, Press Release, March 2004. 
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whether or not to continue to protect workers from discrimination on the grounds of 
sexual orientation. After voicing his disquiet over the leaks, the head of the OSC, Scott 
Bloch circulated an email to all OSC staff which forbade employees from discussing 
sensitive matters without approval. This not only prevented employees from discussing 
matters externally from the OSC but also from advising other federal departments on the 
issue. Bloch was later forced to resign.
782
 
 
Is most unnerving to consider that the federal agency given the task of protecting 
freedom of speech in the workplace would be subject to the same controversy 
concerning censorship and leaks that it seeks to investigate. The incident also raises the 
prospect of OSC staff becoming whistleblowers themselves. In 2005 The GAO 
highlighted that an aggrieved OSC employee would be required to complain in the same 
manner as any other general federal employee, to the Office of Special Counsel.
783
  
 
5.3.2 The Merit Systems Protections Board 
 
The Merit Systems Protections Board in an independent agency which deals with appeals 
from current or former federal employees where the applicant alleges that they have been 
subject to a ‘prohibited personnel action’ as a result of making a whistleblowing 
disclosure. Like the OSC the MSPB also exempts federal employees involved in national 
security. There are two prescribed avenues with which to seek access to the Board: an 
‘Otherwise Appealable Action’784 and an ‘Individual Right of Action.’785  
                                                        
782See Project on Government Oversight news feature and analysis: http://www.pogo.org/pogo-
files/alerts/whistleblower-issues/wi-osc-20081022-1.html (accessed12/01/10). 
783 See in particular: Government Accountability Office, US Office of Special Counsel: Selected 
Contracting and Human Capital Issues, GAO-06-16 November 2006,  22. 
784 This means that the federal employee is subject to a personnel action and claims that the action was 
taken because of his whistleblowing.  The employee may then seek direct access to the Board after the 
 362 
 
 
 
It can be observed that the MSPB is procedurally complex to the detriment of the 
potential federal whistleblower. The complexities of the MSPB application procedures 
and the inconsistencies surrounding the OSC do not show a whistleblower protection 
mechanism in good order. Whilst there are benefits to allowing a complainant the right 
to appeal to the MSPB if the OSC have failed to resolve the complaint, the allowance to 
seek relief from either the OSC or the MSPB in the first instance for a personnel action is 
particularly confusing if one considers that MSPB places itself above the OSC in the 
hierarchy. 
 
In the Board’s introductory literature the MSPB is described as ‘the judge’ to the OSC’s 
‘prosecuting authority.’786 With this in mind, one would assume that if the federal 
employee fits the outlined criteria to apply to either agency, he is best served by lodging 
the complaint with the MSPB. However, in doing so the complainant is actually in a 
worse position. By lodging the complaint with the OSC he has both the potential benefits 
of being able to comment upon the report and also the potential to appeal to the MSPB if 
the OSC fails to take a corrective action for his complaint, thus effectively having the 
opportunity to exhaust two agency mechanisms with the benefit of a full 65 or 120 days 
with which to appeal. If he applies to the MSPB directly he has only one course of 
action.      
 
                                                                                                                                                                     
personnel action is taken. 
785 The ‘Individual Right of Action’ has two possible strands. An employee may be subject to a personnel 
action to which he attributes to a whistleblowing disclosure, however the action is not one which is directly 
appealable to the board. He may then only appeal to the board, if the complaint is lodged via the Office of 
Special Council and the Office fails to seek a corrective action. The second strand involves a federal 
employee who is subject to a personnel action which is directly appealable to the MSPB, but the employee 
chooses to file a complaint for the personnel action via the OSC.  
786 See further U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board website: http://www.mspb.gov/ (accessed 09/04/10). 
 363 
 
 
The inherent problems of the above mechanisms, which are themselves largely 
constituted by a significantly weak statutory provision in the form of the Whistleblower 
Protection Act 1989 do not provide an adequate method of protecting federal employees 
against whistleblower reprisals. This discussion will now progress to consider Canada 
which has created Public Sector Integrity Canada, a new body established to receive and 
investigate concerns from public servants. 
5.3 Canada 
 
In Canada, high level corruption has led to a drastic overhaul of public service oversight 
and accountability mechanisms, at the forefront of these reforms has been the long 
awaited recognition of the importance of whistleblowers to public life. As the 
whistleblowing mechanism is very much in its infancy, the purpose of this section will 
be to give an outline of the events surrounding the motivation behind the Act before 
evaluating whether or not the new system will successfully contribute to the oversight of 
Executive bodies with the aim of combating and discouraging further instances of 
malpractice. 
 
The Gomery Report,
787
 which is regarded to be the catalyst for the reforms, was the 
result of a thorough investigation into a Liberal Party Quebec sponsorship programme 
which was intended to promote federalism and Canada’s profile by way of advertising. 
Adam Cutler, a procurement officer for the Public Works Department, became a 
whistleblower after refusing to be involved in malpractice in his department. Cutler 
                                                        
787 Justice John H. Gomery Commissioner, Commission of Inquiry into the Sponsorship Program and 
Advertising Activities, 2005, accessible via: http://epe.lac-bac.gc.ca/100/206/301/pco-
bcp/commissions/sponsorship-ef/06-02-10/www.gomery.ca/en/phase1report/ffr/ff_eng_full.pdf (accessed 
09/09/09). 
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suffered retaliation for his refusal to participate and subsequently lodged a complaint 
which initially led to a departmental audit. He then produced a dossier of incriminating 
evidence which led to the instigation of the Gomery Inquiry. It was discovered that a 
total of $100 million had been given to a number of advertising agencies for the sole 
purpose of generating commission and for rewarding loyal support of the party. It further 
emerged that one advertising agency had paid salaries to Liberal party members who had 
never worked for the company. During the Gomery investigation the RCMP also 
conducted enquires which led to a number of convictions. The advertising scandal left 
the Liberal Party, then in government, in disrepute. The Prime Minister Paul Martin had 
agreed to call an election 30 days after the Gomery Report had been published. As a 
result of the election the Liberal Party was ousted from office.  
 
When the advertising scandal erupted the Liberal government introduce the unsuccessful 
Bill C-25 the ‘Disclosure Protection Act’. The government then drafted a new Bill, C-11 
which was hastily pushed through the Senate shortly before the Parliamentary recess for 
the election.
788
 The Bill succeeded in gaining the approval of the Senate and the resulting 
legislation; the Public Servants Disclosure Protection Act became law.  
 
The ‘second phase’ Gomery report, which detailed a number of recommendations for 
reform, including the need for an ethical code of conduct, stated that whilst the 
Commission commended the Canadian Parliament for passing whistleblower legislation 
it believed it ‘might not have the desired effect.’789 It was argued by a number of 
                                                        
788 For a historical analysis of whistleblowing in Canada see further, Federal Accountability Initiative for 
Reform, the Canadian Experience: http://fairwhistleblower.ca/wblaws/canadian_experience.html. 
789 See further Gomery Report, Phase 2, Section D: Whistleblower Legislation, accessible via the 
Commission’s website: http://www.parl.gc.ca/information/library/PRBpubs/prb0560-e.htm (accessed 
06/08/08). 
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interested parties and former whistleblowers alike that the legislation did not go far 
enough to protect whistleblowers, and in essence was a tool to protect ministers rather 
than hold them accountable for their actions.
790
 The succeeding government, led by the 
Conservatives gave the election promise of strong accountability reforms. By building 
upon the recommendations of phase two of the Gomery report, Prime Minister Stephen 
Harper promised considerable reform to the Public Servants Disclosure Protection Act 
and new legislation in the form of Federal Accountability Act.
791
  
 
The new Act attempts to achieve this aim by offering the opportunity for employees of 
the Canadian Public Service to raise concerns internally by a person designated under the 
Act and a  new and external route to disclose information relating to wrongdoing in the 
form of an independent body called ‘Public Sector Integrity Canada’ (PSIC). This 
analysis will start by identifying what types of information may be protected by the 
Public Servants Disclosure Protection Act before considering the work of the Public 
Sector Integrity Commissioner in more detail.  
 
5.4.1 The Public Servants Disclosure Protection Act 
 
Section 8 of the PSDPA defines ‘a wrongdoing’ to include: a contravention of any Act of 
Parliament or any Regulation, a misuse of public funds or public asset, a gross 
mismanagement in the public sector, an act or omission which causes danger to life, 
health or safety of persons, harm to the environment, a serious breach of a code of 
conduct or knowingly directing or counselling a person to commit a wrongdoing.  
                                                        
790See further: 38th Parliament 1st Session, Standing Committee on Government Operations and Estimates, 
minutes of evidence, February 2005.  
791Conservative Party Manifesto ‘Stand up for Canada,’ accessible via: http://fairwhistleblower.ca/faa/2006-
01-13-Stand_Up_For_Canada_Platform.pdf  (accessed 06/08/09). 
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Section 10 of the Act requires that Chief Executives of government departments must 
establish whistleblowing procedures and designate a senior person to receive and deal 
with whistleblowing concerns.
792
 Section 11 provides that the Chief Executive must 
establish procedures to ensure the confidentiality of any concerns received. The section 
further provides a positive obligation for the Chief Executive to comply with the 
principles of procedural fairness and natural justice, protect the identity of persons 
involved in raising the concern, including the whistleblower, witnesses and any persons 
alleged to be responsible for wrongdoing. Following a finding of wrongdoing, the Chief 
Executive is obliged to provide public access to the wrongdoing in order to ensure 
transparency. Any investigations of wrongdoing carried out internally are reported and 
monitored on a yearly basis by the Treasury Board, information on wrongdoing is 
published on the website of the respective department and is monitored by the Treasury 
Board who produce yearly analysis of the publications. Sections 12 and 13 of the Act 
provide access to the internal mechanism and Commissioner respectively.  
 
Section 16 of the Act provides a public interest exception whereby a disclosure may be 
made to the public if there is not sufficient time to make the disclosure via the prescribed 
channels and the servant believes ‘on reasonable grounds that the subject matter of the 
disclosure is an act or omission’ constitutes a ‘serious offence under an Act of 
Parliament,’ or that the disclosure constitutes an ‘imminent risk of a substantial and 
specific danger to the life, health and safety of persons or to the environment.’ The 
drafting of s.16 bears similarity to the public interest offence contained in the Security of 
                                                        
792 Note that the section will not apply where the Chief Executive argues that due to the size of his 
department establishment of a senior person to receive concerns will be reasonably impractical, s.10 (4) 
PSDPA. 
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Information Act, which protects official information.
793
 
 
Section 16 PSDPA has identifiable similarities to s.43 (B) of  PIDA (UK) which defines 
what constitutes a ‘qualifying disclosure.’794 However there is considerably more 
emphasis on the justifications of ‘a lack of sufficient time’ or ‘imminence of danger’ in 
the Canadian legislation. As a consequence, it would be easier to obtain protection under 
the Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998.  
 
The most identifiable difference between the UK provisions in PIDA and the Canadian 
PSDPA is that the Canadian legislation is capable of protecting concerns raised regarding 
gross mismanagement. No further definitions of gross mismanagement are provided in 
the Act. It is submitted that gross mismanagement is likely to require the public servant to 
make a value judgement based upon his own knowledge and experience of the working 
environment to which he is in. The PSDPA can therefore protect value judgements. 
However, ‘gross mismanagement’ is not covered by s.16, meaning that public servants 
cannot raise such concerns externally to the public. It is submitted that this creates 
inconsistency in the disclosure regime afforded by the PSDPA and furthermore places 
emphasis on the available internal mechanism and the Commissioner to be effective. If 
either of those mechanisms fails the servant will have no means of ‘last resort’ protection.  
                                                        
793 This legislation will be considered in more detail below in the section pertaining to national security 
interests.  
794 “(a) that a criminal offence has been committed, is being committed or is likely to be committed,  
(b) that a person has failed, is failing or is likely to fail to comply with any legal obligation to which he is 
subject,  
(c) that a miscarriage of justice has occurred, is occurring or is likely to occur,  
(d) that the health or safety of any individual has been, is being or is likely to be endangered,  
(e) that the environment has been, is being or is likely to be damaged, or  
(f) that information tending to show any matter falling within any one of the preceding paragraphs has been, 
is being or is likely to be deliberately concealed.” 
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5.4.2 The office of Public Sector Integrity Commissioner 
 
The Public Sector Integrity Commissioner was established in 2007 and has wide ranging 
investigatory and reporting powers. The Commissioner is appointed as an ‘Agent of 
Parliament’ by an Order in Council and is then approved by resolution of both the Senate 
and House of Commons.
795
 
 
Public Sector Integrity Canada offers a prescribed route to make whistleblowing 
disclosures for employees of the public sector and also to members of the public who 
observe instances of wrongdoing. However, there are notable exceptions, the Canadian 
Military forces; the Communications Security Establishment and the Canadian Security 
Intelligence Service are all exempt from the jurisdiction of the Commissioner.
796
 The 
Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) are included in the remit for the purposes of 
allowing the PSIC to investigate complaints of reprisal, however the legislation requires 
the RCMP Officer to first exhaust internal mechanisms before approaching the Public 
Sector Integrity Commissioner (discussed below). The public sector employee may also 
be entitled to independent legal advice, paid for by PSIC to the value of $1,500 or 
exceptionally to a maximum of $3000.  
 
The Commissioner may conduct complaints of wrongdoing and also complaints of 
reprisal. In a similar way to how the UK Parliamentary Ombudsman conducts her 
                                                        
795Section 39 (1) Public Servants Disclosure Protection Act, for general information on the Commissioner 
see Public Sector Integrity Canada website: http://www.psic-ispc.gc.ca/doc.php?sid=7&lang=en (accessed 
05/09/08). 
796 For accountability mechanisms for security and intelligence see, Chapter Six, Section 6.7 of this thesis, 
for Armed Forces see Chapter Seven, Section 7.9. 
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investigations, there is an emphasis on informality.
797
 The Commissioner may appoint a 
conciliator to attempt to resolve the complaint between the parties. If this is unsuccessful 
the Commissioner may refer the complaint to the Public Servants Disclosure Protection 
Tribunal. The Commissioner may also make recommendations of corrective action to the 
relevant Chief Executive of the department, and if this does not resolve the matter she 
may refer the matter to the Tribunal, produce a special report to Parliament, or both.  
 
It is submitted that the remit of the Commissioner to consider reprisal complaints may 
provide a suggested reform to the current remit of the Civil Service Commission in the 
United Kingdom. Currently, the UK Employment Tribunal system may take up to a year 
to be decided. This creates a difficulty for claimants who are taking a detriment claim but 
still work in the organisation. The Tribunal process will also be costly to both the 
claimant and the respondent who often require legal advice and representation. Claimants 
often represent themselves and this places them at a disadvantage if the respondent has 
legal representation. The Civil Service Commission could provide an independent 
mechanism to mediate and resolve disputes.  
 
However, a consequence of the procedurally rigid system in Canada is that public 
servants have no direct access to the tribunal. This places the emphasis entirely on the 
effectiveness of the Commissioner. Decisions of the Commissioner can only be 
challenged by judicial review. The Commissioner has been the subject of fierce 
criticism. Between the years 2007-2010 the Commissioner had found no cases of 
wrongdoing or reprisals. The first Commissioner, Christine Quimet, left the organisation 
shortly before the Auditor General conducted a review into the Commissioner’s 
                                                        
797 Advice for Public Servants, Public Sector Integrity Canada Website: http://www.psic-
ispc.gc.ca/doc.php?sid=9&lang=en#toc_11 (accessed (09/08/08). 
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activities. The review was prompted after three of Quimet’s own staff raised concerns 
about her. The Auditor General’s report found that the Commissioner had taken 
retaliatory action against at least one member of staff who raised concerns to the Auditor 
General. The Auditor General made findings of mismanagement and evidence of a 
reluctance to investigate complaints received by the PSIC.  
 
A new Commissioner has appointed since the report and is currently conducting a review 
of all case files. At present the tribunal is considering the first two cases referred by the 
Commissioner. The tribunal panel consists of four independent members of the judiciary, 
one of whom acts as chairperson, and who must decide whether or not there is evidence 
of reprisal against the employee who has made the whistleblowing disclosure. With 
regards to making a ruling the panel has several options. It can permit the complainant to 
return to his or her duties; reinstate the complainant or pay compensation in lieu of 
reinstatement if the relationship of trust between the parties cannot be restored; rescind 
any measure or action, including any disciplinary action and or compensate the 
complainant.
798
  
One cannot identify the effectiveness of the rulings of the tribunal as it is yet to make a 
ruling on its first case. It noticeable, however, that the tribunal represents the last 
possible means of action at the Commissioner’s disposal. It is also evident that without 
the ability to apply to the tribunal to make a ruling on the corrective action, the 
Commissioner would have to rely on her own powers, which are limited to making 
recommendations and reports. One could therefore draw experience from the UK 
Parliamentary Ombudsman, who only has the power to make recommendations if she 
finds an instance of wrongdoing in a public department.  
                                                        
798 See further, tribunal website: http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/rpp/2008-2009/inst/prt/prt01-eng.asp (accessed 
09/09/09). 
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The Commissioner is required to report to Parliament by producing annual reports with 
strict instructions as to the content.
799
 He is also required to produce case reports of 
investigations if there is a finding of wrongdoing and to make recommendations to the 
chief executive of the respective department.
800
 If one contrasts this aspect of the 
Commissioner’s role with another UK accountability mechanism provided by the UK 
Civil Service Commissioners, one can argue that Canadian public servants are at an 
advantage over their UK counterparts. In the UK, all whistleblower complaints and 
investigations involving the UK Civil Service Commissioner are not reported in the 
public domain.  
 
5.4 Conclusion  
 
5.5.1 Application to the Theoretical Model 
 
The purpose of this chapter has been to focus upon comparative mechanisms to the 
United Kingdom. This chapter also provided consideration the employment protection 
afforded to public servants working in those jurisdictions. It may be identified, that as 
with Crown servants in the UK jurisdiction, public servants in the jurisdictions discussed 
                                                        
799 PDPSA section 38(2) The annual report must set out:  
(a) the number of general inquiries relating to this Act; 
(b) the number of disclosures received and complaints made in relation to reprisals, and the number of them 
that were acted on and those that were not acted on; 
(c) the number of investigations commenced under this Act; 
(d) the number of recommendations that the Commissioner has made and their status; 
(d.1) in relation to complaints made in relation to reprisals, the number of settlements, applications to the 
Tribunal and decisions to dismiss them; 
(e) whether there are any systemic problems that give rise to wrongdoings; 
(f) any recommendations for improvement that the Commissioner considers appropriate; and 
(g) any other matter that the Commissioner considers necessary. 
800 as per section 31(1) 8. 
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also encounter restrictions on their expression rights. Whilst the arguments from moral 
autonomy or to enhance the individual provide a justification for the raising of 
whistleblower concerns, the legal protections offered may not facilitate wider disclosures 
made to the public. Out of all of the legal protections identified, only the Canadian Public 
Servants Protection Act protects disclosures made directly to the public and moreover 
limits the protected categories of information to specified categories. Wider disclosures 
relating to gross mismanagement are not protected. This runs counter to the argument that 
freedom of speech may be justified to enhance the recipient audience and to facilitate 
participation in a democracy. Because it is very difficult for Canadian public servants to 
obtain legal protection for making whistleblowing disclosures to the public it is very 
likely that such communication will be inhibited. The unfortunate consequence is likely 
to be that public servants will choose to leak information rather than utilise the official 
mechanisms available. This discussion will now progress to consider the legal model. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 373 
 
 
5.5.2 Application to the Legal Model 
 
 
 
The framework provided by the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg 
identifies the importance of effective whistleblowing procedures. The above table 
provides a summary of the comparative approaches. It can be observed that whilst the 
Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998 allows an employee to sue an employer before an 
Employment Tribunal for damages, it does not establish procedures for dealing with any 
concerns raised via authorised mechanisms. An advantage of sector specific legislation is 
that it allows for a two pronged approach. The first stage is to deal with the information 
reported and the second stage is to support the whistleblower and protect them from 
detriment for making the disclosure. 
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It may be observed that the New Zealand legislation is similar to the Public Interest 
Disclosure Act 1998, in that it allows for the protection of disclosures made about acts 
which may cause a serious risk to health and safety or damage to the environment. The 
NZ legislation goes further than PIDA by protecting sector specific concerns such as the 
unlawful, corrupt or irregular use of funds or resources in a public sector organisation, 
grossly negligent management or gross mismanagement. Whilst some of the above 
matters may be covered by s.43 B PIDA as a breach of a legal obligation, it may be 
identified that the NZ provides protection for ‘protest whistleblowing’ about gross 
mismanagement, matters which would not be covered by PIDA.  
 
However, the New Zealand legislation requires public servants to first utilise the internal 
or external mechanisms in order to receive employment protection. Thus protest 
whistleblowing of this nature would only be acceptable via the prescribed channels. This 
method of protection places the importance on the effectiveness of those available 
channels. If those procedures are not effective there is no scope for last resort disclosure. 
As a consequence this is inconsistent with the Guja v Moldova framework.  
 
The procedurally rigid approach has caused difficulties in other jurisdictions where the 
link between employment protection and concerns raised via official channels is evident 
in the legislation. This chapter has identified that the Australian mechanism which links 
both stages together does not work well at present. The United States mechanism is both 
overly complicated and disjointed. However, in the midst of various accountability bodies 
the inspectors general stand out as apolitical investigators to which whistleblowers can 
approach. Despite the obvious constitutional differences to the UK jurisdiction the US 
jurisdiction, the inspectors general identify that need for the UK to strengthen its own 
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accountability mechanisms and for Crown Servants to have access to report concerns to 
those respective bodies.  
 
In comparison with the strong employment protection offered by the UK Public Interest 
Disclosure Act, the US protection appears weak. The National Whistleblowers Center 
(NWC) argue that currently a public servant who suffers detrimental treatment (i.e. is 
sacked or demoted) as a result of raising a concern will have ‘a less than one percent 
chance of fighting and winning their case.’801 The NWC found that the Merit Systems 
Protection Board are ‘under pressure to process as many cases as possible’ and that cases 
are decided by Administrative Judges under political pressure.
802
 Moreover it found that 
since 1994 public servants have won ‘only 3 out of 213 cases filed in the Federal Appeal 
Circuit Court of Appeal.’803 The new proposed Whistleblower Protection (Enhancement) 
Act 2009 aims to legislate to strengthen available protections for public servants but such 
enhancements can only achieved by strengthening the Office of Special Counsel and the 
Merit Systems Protection Board - institutional changes which are difficult, if not 
impossible to legislate for.  
 
The Canadian Public Servants Disclosure Protection Act is very similar to the New 
Zealand definition of wrongdoing. In addition to including information regarding public 
safety and harm to the environment, section 8 PSDPA allows for concerns regarding 
‘gross mismanagement’ in the public sector. Gross mismanagement is not defined further 
and is clearly open to subjective interpretation by the would-be whistleblower. Protest 
whistleblowing is likely to be protected if disclosures are raised internally to the 
                                                        
801 See further: 
http://www.whistleblowers.org/storage/whistleblowers/documents/3.%20whistleblower%20reform%20q&a
.pdf (accessed 21/04/2010). 
802 Ibid. 
803 Ibid. 
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prescribed channels. 
 
The Canadian legislation goes further than the New Zealand protection by allowing 
employment protection for ‘last resort’ disclosures direct to the public. However, if the 
matter concerns a risk to health and safety or the environment, the employee must 
identify an ‘imminent risk.’ Section 43 G PIDA (UK) does not require proof of an 
imminent risk. The Canadian legislation does not provide protection for concerns raised 
about gross mismanagement if they are raised to the public.  It should be identified that 
no protection for reprisals may be obtained without the assistance of the Public Sector 
Integrity Commissioner. The Commissioner may conduct reprisal investigations and may 
further refer complaints to an independent tribunal.  
 
Whilst the Canadian system provides the most comprehensive scheme of protection 
available, it also places complete emphasis on the PSIC to work effectively. However, 
this analysis has identified that the scheme has not worked effectively, meaning that a 
public servant’s only way of obtaining access to the tribunal by taking a judicial review 
claim against the Commissioner. The Canadian system does however provide an example 
of a way in which the Civil Service Commission could be further involved in Civil 
service whistleblowing. The Civil Service Commission could provide an independent 
mechanism to investigate reprisal complaints made by Civil Servants. This would be in 
addition to allowing access by civil servants to the Employment Tribunal, and could be 
used as an alternative to existing grievance procedures. It is submitted that this 
recommendation may improve Civil Service confidence in the official mechanisms 
available.  
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In comparison to other jurisdictions, the UK Public Interest Disclosure Act provides the 
least restrictive means for an employee to obtain employment protection for raising a 
public interest concern.
804
 This chapter has identified that for a procedurally rigid 
structure to be effective, the agencies or authorities tasked with dealing with the concerns 
must also be effective.  Structural rigidity places too great a burden on the agencies to 
work well, if they do not and the whistleblowing law does not provide alternative means 
to raise concerns the employee may be more inclined to bypass the available 
mechanisms and leak the information to the media.
 805
   
 
This thesis does not recommend that the Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998 be changed 
to reflect the more procedurally rigid approaches taken the other jurisdictions identified 
in this thesis. However, it is just as important in a jurisdiction where the whistleblowing 
law is not procedurally rigid that the agencies or individuals tasked with dealing with the 
concerns do so effectively.  
 
If the employee feels unable to raise his concerns in this way it is important that an 
independent authority if accessible to deal with the concern. Unauthorised disclosures to 
the media should only be considered as a last resort, yet, where the established 
procedures are considered by the public servant are perceived to be ineffective he may 
obtain art.10 protection for raising concerns directly to the public. It therefore makes 
sense to provide for the official mechanisms to provide effective alternatives to 
unauthorised disclosures. The next chapter considers the position of employees in the 
                                                        
804 For a comparison of the two approaches see further: A.Savage, Legislative Flexibility versus Procedural 
Rigidity: a Comparison of the UK and Canadian Approaches to Public Service Whistleblowing Protection, 
paper presented at 40th World Congress of the International Institute of Sociology, New Delhi, India 19th 
February 2012.  
805 This is arguably particularly true of the rigid approaches to whistleblowing identified in Australia the 
United States and Canada and the problems identified with those agencies.  
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security and intelligence services.  
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CHAPTER SIX 
 
EMPLOYEES OF THE SECURITY AND INTELLIGENCE SERVICES 
 
“Whistleblowing revelations, purporting to disclose something seriously wrong in an 
organisation, tend to reveal far more about the whistleblower than about the organisation 
which is having the whistle blown on it. These so-called ‘revelations’ have been, in my 
experience, invariably partial, one-sided and as such misleading accounts of what are 
usually much more complex than they present...The one question rarely asked is ‘Did 
you try to do something about it before going public?”806  
 
 
The requirement to combat global terrorism has placed national security at the forefront 
of our national agenda. Those given the task of protecting our national security, namely 
the Security Service (MI5), the Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) and Government 
Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) have received an increase in both workload and 
resources
807
 but have increasingly been placed under the spotlight and not always for the 
right reasons. Most recently, accusations that members of the security and intelligence 
services have been complicit in the torture of terrorist suspects have not only prompted 
questions in the Commons, but for the first time has prompted the head of the Secret 
Intelligence Service to deny the allegations in an open media forum.
808
 The torture 
allegations are most relevant to this chapter because they appeared to come from 
                                                        
806 Stella Rimmington, the former Director General of the Security Service writing in her autobiography, 
which received criticism for discussing matters thought best kept secret, S. Rimmington, Open Secret 
(Random House) 187. 
807 In the 2005 Pre-Budget Report, the Chancellor of the Exchequer announced an additional £85 million 
would be made available over three years to aid the expansion of the agencies. The ISC has indicated that 
the planned resources for 2007/08 would total £1.381.8 million in the SIA, the Single Intelligence Account, 
which is allocated to the agencies. It is notable that many of the figures were blanked out. See Further 
Intelligence and Security Committee, Annual Report, 2005-2006, Cm 6864. 
808 A century in the Shadows, 10 August 2009, see further http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b00ls8ll 
(accessed 01/09/09). It should be noted that the Security Service has denied allegations put forward by 
former intelligence officer David Shayler.  
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‘whistleblowers’ in the know.809 It should be noted that at the time of writing the head of 
MI6 has called in the Metropolitan Police to investigate an employee of MI6 who was 
allegedly complicit in the torture of a terrorist suspect. 
 
It can be observed that the work of the Security and Intelligence Services have become 
increasingly noticeable in the public domain in recent years but the question remains as 
to whether the services have become any more publicly accountable for their actions. 
Born and Leigh highlight that effective external control of the security and intelligence 
services must rest with the Executive and therefore it is essential that these services are 
under democratic control by elected politicians, who are the ‘viable custodians of public 
office in a democracy.’810 However, as we have already observed in previous sections of 
this thesis, the Executive accountability mechanisms contain inherent weaknesses. One 
may therefore consider that a strong, affective and accountable national security 
provision requires a strong, effective and accountable Executive.  The fact that the 
majority of high profile instances of unauthorised whistleblowing have involved 
unauthorised disclosures of information pertinent to national security, suggests a need to 
revaluate the accountability mechanisms of the Security and Intelligence Services.  
 
The purpose of this chapter is to consider the current safeguards in order to improve 
understanding as to why unauthorised disclosures of national security information take 
place and whether such safeguards can be improved in order to reduce unauthorised 
disclosures of national security material. Consideration will first be given to the current 
                                                        
809 David Davis, Hansard HC Deb, 7 July 2009, col 940: “As the House will realise, the account I am about 
to relay comes from several sources. I cannot properly give my sources, given the vindictive attitude of this 
Government, particularly the Foreign Office, to whistleblowers. Indeed, in this case of Rangzieb Ahmed, 
the authorities were so paranoid that they threatened to arrest a journalist for reporting facts stated in open 
court.” 
810 H. Born and I. Leigh, Making Intelligence Accountable: Legal Standards and Best Practice for 
Oversight of Intelligence Agencies (Publishing House of the Parliament of Norway, Oslo. 1995) 55. 
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complaint reporting mechanism available to employees of the Security Service and the 
Secret Intelligence Service and whether Crown employees exempt from PIDA on 
national security grounds should have the same protections as Crown Servants not 
involved in national security matters.  
 
6.1 Authorised mechanisms to raise concerns 
 
One of the key aspects of the House of Lords Judgement in R v Shayler was the lengthy 
consideration to the fact that Shayler had failed to utilise a number mechanisms available 
to him which were authorised by virtue of the Official Secrets Act 1989.
811
 Lord 
Bingham identified that concerns relating to the work of the service could be reported to 
the independent staff counsellor. Concerns about the legality of what the service had 
done could be disclosed to the Attorney General, the Director of Public Prosecutions or 
the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police.  Lord Bingham emphasised that all three 
officers were ‘subject to a clear duty, in the public interest, to uphold the law, investigate 
alleged infractions and prosecute where offences appear to have been committed, 
irrespective of any party affiliation or service loyalty.’812  
 
The Attorney General and the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police are both 
expressly mentioned as authorised persons to receive disclosures in the Official Secrets 
Act 1989.
813
 It also makes sense to include the Attorney General on the list because his 
consent is required for prosecutions under the OSA 1989.
814
 Concerns about 
misbehaviour, irregularity, maladministration, waste of resources or incompetence could 
                                                        
811 See also chapter three of this thesis. 
812 R v Shayler [2002] UKHL 11, para 27. 
813 Section 7 Official Secrets Act, Official Secrets Act (Prescription Order) 1990. 
814 Section 9 Official Secrets Act 1989.  
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be referred to the Home Secretary, the Foreign Secretary, the Secretaries of State for 
Northern Ireland or Scotland, the Prime Minister, the Secretary to the Cabinet or the 
Joint Intelligence Committee, staff of the comptroller and Auditor General, the National 
Audit Office and the Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration.
815
  
 
Lord Bingham refers to the Official Secrets Act 1989 (Prescription) Order 1990 (SI 
1990/200 which authorises disclosures to the aforementioned persons. What is most 
unclear is whether or not any of the above persons would have dealt with Shayler’s 
concerns if he had approached them and whether they would be prepared to deal with 
whistleblower complaints in general.  
 
The Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration, or ombudsman as she is better 
known, has an extensive remit to investigate government departments but one which 
expressly excludes investigations relating to national security matters.
816
 With regard to 
the Joint Intelligence Committee, several members of the security and intelligence 
services raised concerns as to the intelligence dossier used to justify invasion into Iraq, 
yet these concerns were not dealt with.
817
 Reporting concerns to the Prime Minister, the 
Home Secretary or the Foreign Secretary may also be seen as problematic, because of the 
political affiliations or possible involvement of the persons concerned. 
 
6.1.1 The Staff Counsellor 
 
The role of an independent staff counsellor was established in 1987, he is a high ranking 
former member of the security and intelligence services to whom a member of those 
                                                        
815  Ibid at 36. 
816 Schedule 3, Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration Act 1967.  
817 Brian Jones later testified to the Hutton Inquiry.  
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services could go to in order to raise concerns. Then Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher 
described the role to the Commons, in a passage later repeated by the Court of Appeal 
judgment in Shayler: 
  “He will be available to be consulted by any member of the 
security and intelligence services who has anxieties relating to the work of his or her 
service which it has not been possible to allay through the ordinary processes of 
management-staff relations. He will have access to all relevant documents and to any 
level of management in each service. He will be able to make recommendations to the 
head of the service concerned. He will also have access to the Secretary of the Cabinet if 
he wishes and will have the right to make recommendations to him. He will report as 
appropriate to the heads of the services and will report not less frequently than once a 
year to me and to my Right Hon friends the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and 
the Home Secretary as appropriate on his activities and on the working of the system.”818  
 
Historically there have been difficulties in assessing the precise role of the Staff 
Counsellor. The staff counsellor was originally introduced following the case of Michael 
Bettaney a former MI5 operative who was arrested whilst attempting to offer secrets to 
Russian agents. Bettaney had been reportedly suffering from a drinking problem which 
was known to his superiors. The Independent reported that operatives of the Security and 
Intelligence Services who were found to be spying for the other side often suffered from 
emotional problems.
819
 
 
The resulting appointee as Counsellor, Sir Philip Woodfield was described by some 
newspapers an ‘agony uncle’820 and by others as an ‘ombudsman.’821 Indeed it soon 
became clear that the role and jurisdiction of the staff counsellor had extended beyond 
the remit outlined by Thatcher.
822
 In the first few months of Sir Philip Woodfield’s new 
role he was asked by a former MI6 Officer Anthony Cavendish, to appeal on his behalf, 
                                                        
818 Hansard, HC Debs, 2 November 1987, written answers, col 512. 
819 Report of the Security Commission on the Case of Michael John Bettaney, Cmnd 9514, May 1985. 
820 See: Sir Philip Woodfield, Obituary, The Times, 19th  October 2000. 
821 J.Craig, Spies Set to Reveal Own Secrets to Ombudsman, Sunday Times, 1st November 1987. 
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after the Secret Intelligence Service blocked the publication of his memoirs, Sir Philip 
refused.
823
 In 1991 the Staff Counsellor was asked to conduct a review into the detention 
of 91 Iraqi and Palestinian nationals during the Gulf War and after exonerating the 
involvement of MI5 received criticism as a result.
824
 In 2002 the Staff Counsellor, then 
Sir John Chilcot, was asked to conduct a review into the theft information relating to the 
identities and home addresses of police officers and informants from a Northern Ireland 
police station. The appointment of Sir John to review the matter was criticised by the 
Deputy Chairman of the Northern Ireland Policing Board who questioned his 
independence.
825
  
 
In the book, Spies Lies and Whistleblowers, Annie Machon former MI5 officer and then 
girlfriend of David Shayler justified why Shayler did not raise his concerns with the 
independent staff councillor: 
“A staff councillor existed, but he was seen as a joke amongst MI5 staff, and 
officers who consulted him were labelled at best ‘unreliable’ or at worst ‘mad.’ The staff 
counsellor also had no remit to investigate allegations of criminal activity. Our line 
management had also made it clear to us that there was no independent body with the 
power to investigate our concerns… if there had been an independent route with a 
guarantee that the crimes reported would be investigated David would have used it.”826 
 
Without further information as to the work carried out by the Staff Counsellor it is 
impossible to carry out a thorough analysis of the role. However, one can identify when 
considering the mechanism against the Official Secrets Act 1989 that even if the Staff 
Counsellor did not have the remit to investigate allegations of criminal activity, Shayler 
could still have made an authorised disclosure to the Commissioner of the Metropolitan 
                                                        
823 B.Penrose, How ‘Uncle’ Refused to Help Cavendish, Sunday Times, 3rd January 1988. 
824 N.Cohen, MI5 Cleared Over Innocent Gulf War Detainees, 16th December 1991. 
825 Unknown, Cameras Fail to Catch Raiders, The People, 24th March 2002. Sir John Chilcot had 
experience as former  Permanent Secretary to Northern Ireland yet it was his role as staff counsellor which 
meant that he was considered ‘too close to MI5.’  
826 A. Machon, Spies Lies and Whistleblowers (The Book Guild, Lewis, 2005) 109. 
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Police and as it was explained in the aforementioned section reporting of criminal 
offences, the police are the most appropriate body to receive reports of alleged criminal 
activity. Machon further questions the independence of the Staff Counsellor, yet even 
with the little information given as to the role of the Staff Counsellor one can identify 
that the role stands separately from the management chain. Furthermore, the Staff 
Counsellor is available to all three services, the Security Service, the Secret Intelligence 
Service and Government Communications Headquarters. It is clear however that what 
the reporting system does lack is external oversight, which is considered below in an 
analysis of the Intelligence and Security Committee. 
 
During the Shayler case another former employee of the Security Service chose to speak 
out. Jestyn Thirkell-White
827
 was reported to have backed many of Shayler’s allegations 
and expressed that he had no confidence in the staff counsellor because he was ‘required 
to inform the personnel department’ if he had seen the counsellor and had ‘little trust in 
the role.’ Former GCHQ employee Katherine Gun stated that she chose not to approach 
the staff counsellor before leaking documents to the Guardian because she felt that the 
matter was ‘so urgent it needed direct action’ and that she believed that the person 
would: 
“…probably say 'well, we appreciate your concerns, we'll take it into 
consideration and perhaps we should meet in a week or so' was not going to be 
adequate."
828
 
 
Since the case of Shayler it should be noted that the Security Service has established an 
‘Ethical Counsellor.’ The first mention of the new role was in the Intelligence and 
                                                        
827 M.Hollingsworth, Opening the floodgates: When Jestyn Thirkell-White broke cover, he ruined MI5's 
strategy for dealing with David Shayler,The Guardian, 25th  July 2000. 
828 Author unknown, GCHQ: It was full of people like me, Gloucester Echo,  27th October 2004. 
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Security Committee’s Annual Report 2007-2008.829 The report explains that the post was 
established in 2006 to ‘provide staff with an internal avenue to raise any ethical concerns 
they may have about the Service’s work with someone who is outside their management 
line.’ The report details that around 12 individuals have approached the Ethical 
Counsellor since the post was established. The report included information regarding the 
types of concerns raised:  
“Whether the Service had adequate mechanisms to evaluate the mental and 
physical health risks to ICT agents; whether the Service should be involved in 
PREVENT work given the pressure it faces to tackle the terrorist threat directly; whether 
it was ethical for the Government to seek to alter the ideological views of its citizens (as 
part of its counter-radicalisation strategy); and whether there were sufficient controls for 
sharing information with countries that do not comply with international standards for 
the treatment of those in detention and whether guidance for staff on these matters was 
sufficiently accessible and understood.”830 
 
The ISC welcomed the establishment of the post and also stated that in absence of an 
equivalent post within SIS or GCHQ staff could approach the Staff Counsellor available 
to employees of all three services. Whilst the establishment of the ethical counsellor is a 
positive step, it is currently unclear as to where the new Ethical Counsellor and the 
existing Staff Counsellor sit in relation to each other.  
 
No information is given as to whether the new Ethical Counsellor replaces the provision 
for employees of the Security Service to raise concerns or whether employees still can 
approach the Staff Counsellor. It is too soon to tell whether the ISC will be supplied with 
such information as to the types of concerns mentioned but just as important is the 
question of how the concerns were dealt with by the ISC. It should be noted that since 
the establishment of the ISC, the Committee has provided no mention of the Staff 
Counsellor or his work in their annual Committee reports. It is submitted, that the ISC 
                                                        
829 Intelligence and Security Committee Annual Report 07-08 Cm 7542, see in particular para 56. 
 
830 Ibid, at para 56. 
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should be supplied with the information as to how many cases were dealt with, the nature 
of the concerns raised and whether or not the concerns were dealt with. It would then be 
open to the ISC to decide whether or not to probe further into the concerns detailed in the 
information supplied. The next section provides an analysis of the role of the ISC. 
 
6.2   Restricted Information, Restricted Oversight? 
 
Oversight of the Agencies is carried out by the Intelligence and Security Committee, The 
Interception of Communications Commissioner, the Intelligence Services Commissioner 
and the Investigatory Powers Tribunal. The Intelligence and Security Act 1994 created 
the Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC).
831
 It was created by John Major’s 
government, who in the same year introduced the Committee for Standards in Public 
Life. The committee is tasked with the examination of policy, administration and 
expenditure of the main three intelligence gathering bodies: the Security Service, the 
Secret Intelligence Service and Government Communications Headquarters. The 
committee comprises of nine parliamentarians drawn from both houses of Parliament. 
The members are chosen by the Prime Minister with the agreement of the leaders of the 
two main opposition parties. It is notable that as an extension of their remit, and with 
Government agreement, the ISC also examines the work of the Joint Intelligence 
Committee, and the Intelligence and Security Secretariat. It also takes evidence from the 
Defence Intelligence Staff, part of the Ministry of Defence.
832
 The ISC appointed an 
investigator, John Morrison, in 1999 in order to bring the ISC more in line with oversight 
mechanisms in other countries which have established an Inspector General. The 
investigator completed 14 reports before his contract was terminated in 2004 after he 
                                                        
831 Section 10(1) Intelligence and Security Act 1994.  
832 For a general description of the Committee’s remit see further 
http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/intelligence/ (accessed 05/09/08). 
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appeared on the BBC Panorama programme and criticised the ‘misuse of intelligence’ in 
the run up to the Iraq war. The agencies reportedly wrote to Sir David Omand, the 
Cabinet Office Security and Intelligence Coordinator stating that they had ‘lost trust’ in 
Morrison and could ‘no longer work with him.’833 At the time of writing the ISC is yet to 
appoint a replacement.  
 
The Committee’s web page indicates that the Committee is subject to s.1 (b) of the 
Official Secrets Act 1989 meaning that they have access to ‘highly classified material 
when carrying out their duties.’834 However, in reality the practice is a little less straight 
forward. Schedule 3, para 3(1) affords the heads of the agencies with the discretionary 
power to either release information to the ISC or to withhold it because the information 
is ‘sensitive’ or because the Secretary of State has determined that it should not be 
disclosed. The definition of ‘sensitive information’ is contained in para 4 and is worth 
quoting in its entirety: 
  “(a) information which might lead to the identification of, 
or provide details of, sources of information, other assistance or operational methods 
available to the Security Service, the Intelligence Service or GCHQ;  
(b) information about particular operations which have been, are being or are proposed to 
be undertaken in pursuance of any of the functions of those bodies; and  
(c) information provided by, or by an agency of, the Government of a territory outside 
the United Kingdom where that Government does not consent to the disclosure of the 
information.” 
 
At first consideration the lengthy definition above contains legitimate safeguards for 
protection of members of the services and their methods. It also provides an indication 
for the reasons behind the committee’s lack of investigation into the allegations by David 
Shayler, formerly of MI5 and Richard Tomlinson formerly of MI6. Shayler’s 
                                                        
833See No Regrets for Spy Expert: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/3965775.stm (accessed 06/01/10), 
see also A. Glees, P. Davis and J.Morrison, The Open Side of Secrecy (Social Affairs Unit, 2006) 45.  
834 Ibid. 
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unauthorised disclosures to the Mail on Sunday, had detailed alleged wrongdoing in 
operations, and with it had identified operational details and the persons concerned. The 
House of Lords judgment in Shayler further argued that he could have disclosed 
information to the Intelligence and Security Committee: 
  “This would be the situation where it was suggested that 
statutory controls were being overridden…this committee has a secretariat of civil 
servants to whom disclosure is authorised; if the relevant material was not passed on to 
the committee, judicial review would be available.”835  
 
The aforementioned reasoning is not wholly correct. The guide on Intelligence Oversight 
produced by the Intelligence and Security Committee in 2002 does mention that the ISC 
is staffed by a small Civil Service Secretariat however no information is provided that 
the Secretariat will receive complaints from members of the Security and Intelligence 
Services.
836
 Furthermore, the Official Secrets Act 1989 (Prescription) Order 1990 which 
included the JIC, Parliamentary Ombudsman and the Comptroller or Auditor General 
was not amended following the Intelligence Services Act 1994 to include the ISC as a 
means of authorised disclosure. The most recent Statutory Instrument, the Official 
Secrets Act 1989 (Prescription) Amendment Order 2007, adds the Nuclear 
Decommissioning Authority and the Independent Police Complaints Authority but does 
not add the ISC. It is submitted that this is indicative of a Committee which relies upon 
co-operation of the Security and Intelligence Services for information.  
 
Crucially, in all of the Statutory Instruments and explanatory material, there is no 
provision for authorised disclosures to be made to either the Secretariat or the 
Committee. It may also be argued that if a member of the Security and Intelligence 
                                                        
835 Ibid at 39. 
836 Ref: 253353/0702/D16, 12. Accessible via: http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/intelligence/ (accessed 
10/09/08). 
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Services made a disclosure to the Secretariat, members of the Secretariat would 
potentially be in breach of their own obligations under Section 5 of the Official Secrets 
Act 1989, which covers any individuals who receive information from making a further 
disclosure of that information. The fact that both members of the Secretariat and the 
Committee have their own obligations under the 1989 Act is also immaterial to the 
authorisation of disclosures made by a member of the Security or Intelligence Services.  
 
Whilst Lord Hope’s suggestion that an employee of the Security and Intelligence 
Services could report concerns to the Intelligence and Security Committee appears 
misguided, it does, however, raise important considerations for future reform. In cases of 
serious malpractice the ability for an employee to approach the Committee may enhance 
Parliamentary accountability of the work of the services. In the United States, members 
of the Central Intelligence Agency may report concerns to the Senate Intelligence 
Committee, albeit with the authorisation of their agency chief.
837
  Whilst the need to 
obtain approval from the Agency head may in itself be seen as problematic, employees 
of the CIA may be seen as at an advantage to their UK counterparts and it should also be 
noted that prior to the requirement to seek authorisation, members of the Senate 
committee were willing to meet CIA employees to voice their concerns ‘off the record.’  
 
This should be contrasted to the UK perspective whereby the ISC failed to acknowledge 
or investigate the accusations made by both David Shayler and Katherine Gun and 
backed away from calling for reform of the Official Secrets Act after it was informed 
that the Shayler case had dealt with the question of necessity of circumstance. In a recent 
report the ISC met the announcement that the Security Service had appointed  an Ethics 
                                                        
837 Intelligence Community Whistleblower Protection Act 1998.  
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Counsellor was met with a positive response, however, no comment was made as to 
whether the ISC would be interested in investigating any concerns that had been raised 
by the Ethics Counsellor, or any future involvement in the new post.
838
 With close public 
interest into whether members of the Security and Intelligence Services have been 
complicit in torture, one must ask whether the ISC could take a more active role as a 
mechanism to receive concerns from employees.  
 
The fact that information regarding allegations of torture has been reported the 
opposition MP David Davis, allegedly by employees ‘in the know,’ and then repeated in 
the House of Commons begs the question of whether it would be more appropriate if 
employees could report concerns to the ISC. At least such disclosures, if appropriate 
safeguards were in place, would be controlled. Unauthorised disclosures, be it to an 
opposition MP or the media harm both the reputation of the Security and Intelligence 
Services and place the Crown Servant involved under grave risk of prosecution.  
 
In order to facilitate a route for employees to approach the ISC a new Statutory 
Instrument would be required to authorise disclosures to the ISC. In principle this 
legislative change could be done with relative ease. Furthermore, considering the 
organisations currently authorised such as the Parliamentary Ombudsman (whom, it 
should be reminded cannot even accept complaints directly from the public, let alone 
investigate matters pertaining to national security) and the Independent Police 
Complaints Commission, there is considerable justification for adding the ISC to the list 
                                                        
838 ISC Annual Report, 2007-2008, para 66 C, www.independent.gov.uk/isc/files/2007-
2008_ISC_AR.pdf?attachauth=ANoY7cpxwS79_cGsxE4amhwGlgSx_zGhsaRDxqK8YVU0ZI-
5GCeMQrFUdFzUlS_R18P57fgMHRsH5xHptlQWuqX-
OakFNTZtGwQ05IZbZkXSMbMoXzO9aUnCiOgF84_Vd2OqVLRE0wKYbGprbYPsv4uwtRQ62QNyetV
dhlrue16UfeWVZ-gWabzgnAUXXJEE2rO1D7wph-S-
CWKxJ4mH0gXUrSPe9FoJWR6MomYBXMGTNVa2qdAswvg%3D&attredirects=0 (accessed 19/04/11). 
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of those authorised under the OSA.  
 
It is perhaps most worrying that the Joint Intelligence Committee is authorised under the 
OSA whereas the ISC is not, despite the Intelligence and Security Committee having 
oversight of the JIC. Unfortunately, the very nature in which the ISC receives 
intelligence information may be a difficult hurdle to overcome. Schedule 3 of the 
Intelligence Services Act 1994 creates a procedural system whereby the ISC is reliant 
upon the head of the relevant service to provide them with the information that they 
require. It may therefore be the case that to have the ISC authorised under the Official 
Secrets Act would be an unrealistic proposition under the current framework. 
 
6.3 National Security Employees and PIDA 
 
It has been suggested that the reluctance of the ‘Convention organs’ to intervene in cases 
involving whistleblowers has less of a consequence in the UK as it does in other 
European states because of the Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998 (PIDA).
839
 However, 
employees of the security and intelligence services and Civil Servants involved in 
national security matters are unprotected both if they raise concerns internally or 
externally as a journalistic source.
840
  
 
Section 193 Employment Rights Act 1996 states that employees of the Security Service, 
                                                        
839     A.Nichol, G.Millar & A.Sharland, Media Law & Human Rights (Blackstone Press, London, 2001).  
More generally, McColgan has also highlighted the ‘halfhearted application’ of Article 10 and other 
Convention provisions in the employment sphere. See: A McColgan in Human Rights At Work (The 
Institute of Employment Rights, London, 2000) Ed. K D Ewing, 73. An employee involved in national 
security matters has little protection in either domestic law (by way of S.10 Contempt of Court Act 1981 
and the Human Rights Act 1998) or under the European Convention. 
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the Secret Intelligence Service and Government Communications Headquarters do not 
have employment protection under PIDA. Furthermore, the provisions under the Act do 
not have effect where there is a Ministerial Certificate in force which certifies that 
employment ‘of a description specified in the certificate, or the employment of a 
particular person specified (or at a time specified in the certificate, was) required to be 
excepted from those provisions for the purpose of safeguarding national security.’ 
Effectively this provision covers persons who may not work in the security and 
intelligence services but who are still involved in national security matters.  
 
It should also be noted that in any event the Public Interest Disclosure Act is rooted in 
employment law. It provides no protection against prosecution for unauthorised 
disclosures such as under the Official Secrets Act 1989 or the common law offence of 
Misconduct in Public Office. Moreover, if the employee commits a criminal offence in 
disclosing the information, the disclosure will not qualify for protection under the Act.
841
 
Therefore any prosecution for unauthorised disclosure brought under the Official Secrets 
Act 1989 would deny the Crown Servant protection under PIDA and in any case it would 
be most likely that he would not have protection under PIDA because of the exemptions 
under section 11 PIDA and s.193 ERA.
842
  
 
With regards to the offence of Misconduct in Public Office, the provision of s.43B (3) 
PIDA would preclude the Crown Servant from protection under PIDA if he leaked 
information and was prosecuted under the common law offence. This situation is 
indicative of the particularly draconian nature of the offence. It is likely that a 
                                                        
841 Section 43B (3) ERA. 
842 It should be noted here that if such a prosecution were unsuccessful the Crown Servant would then be 
able to bring a PIDA claim provided that he was not subject to the exemptions listed in S.193 ERA.  Derek 
Pasquill is one such example. He was found not guilty of an offence under the Official Secrets Act and is 
currently pursuing a claim under PIDA.  
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prosecution for misconduct in public office would be brought where the information 
leaked did not fall within the remit of the Official Secrets Act 1989. This means that any 
Crown Servant not involved in national security matters (and thus not already exempted 
from PIDA protection) could still be prosecuted and would lose any protections under 
PIDA despite the public benefit of any such disclosure.  
 
If a prosecution is brought for an offence committed under the Official Secrets Act 1989 
or misconduct in public office the Employment Tribunal would postpone the 
proceedings until the outcome of the trial. If the person is acquitted of the criminal 
charge tribunal proceedings could then begin. If no proceedings have taken place the 
Employment Tribunal may wish to consider whether the employee’s conduct in making 
the disclosure amounted to a criminal offence. The Employment Tribunal should then 
assess the conduct against the same standard of proof as that used in criminal cases. This 
is again deeply problematic because of the ‘catch all’ nature of the misconduct 
offence.
843
  
 
In the aforementioned section on PIDA, it was stated that national security employees 
have no access to PIDA protection. Employees in the Security and Intelligence Services 
were given the right to have employment disputes decided by an Employment Tribunal 
in 2001.
844
 Despite this change the exemption from PIDA remained.  
 
                                                        
843 According to the view of Lord Nolan, Hansard HL 5 June 1998, col. 614:  
  “If he has been prosecuted in a criminal court, questions of proof will proceed on ordinary 
lines. If the question arises in, say, an industrial tribunal, I believe the law to be that the offence would still 
have to be proved according to the standard appropriate for crime. That was certainly the view expressed by 
my noble and learned friend Lord Lane when he was Lord Chief Justice, and on a number of occasions by 
my noble and learned friend Lord Denning. It would be a rare and rash judge who would take a different 
view.” 
 
844 Sections 191 and 193 Employment Rights Act 1996 as amended.  
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There is an argument that employees involved in national security matters should be 
afforded a degree of protection under PIDA if they raise concerns. In order to maintain 
the requirements for the protection of national security it is submitted that employees of 
the Security and Intelligence Services should receive PIDA protection for instances 
whereby they make controlled internal disclosures to either a person in the line 
management chain, the Ethical Counsellor (for MI5) or the Staff Counsellor. 
 
Currently, the tribunal procedures for national security employees are contained in Rule 
54, Schedule 2 of the Employment Tribunals (Constitution and Rules of Procedure) 
Regulations 2004.  Rule 54 provides for a system of closed hearings whereby special 
advocates are used for parts of the hearing where evidence pertinent to national security 
is considered. Special Advocates are chosen from a pool of advocates cleared for 
national security matters and have been most often used in proceedings of the Special 
Immigration Appeals Commission. Because the Employment Tribunal register is not 
readily accessible to the public there is little information as to how many times 
employment disputes regarding the Security and Intelligence Services have gone to the 
Employment Tribunal.  
 
The most readily accessible information on the relevant procedures comes from the 
Employment Appeals Tribunal judgment of Mr A Farooq v Commissioner of Police of 
the Metropolis.
845
 The case concerned a claim under the Race Relations Act 1976. The 
Applicant was a police officer who was involved in diplomatic protection of the Prime 
Minister. The Applicant failed security vetting and as he was therefore not authorised to 
                                                        
845 (2007) WL 4368105, Appeal No. UKEAT/0542/07/DM.  
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carry a firearm he was required transfer to other duties. The case was the first of its kind 
to involve the use of the new Rule 54 provisions.  
 
It should be noted that the use of special advocates has received criticism. Mr Justice 
Burton in Farooq drew attention to cases which involved the use of special advocates in 
SIAC appeals and focussed in particular on the comments of the House of Lords in 
Secretary of State for the Home Department v MB.
846
 Mr. Justice Burton sought to 
distinguish the position of Employment Tribunals using the special advocate system by 
stating that he was not ‘wholly persuaded’ that the SIAC procedures ‘must be imposed’ 
on Employment Tribunal Proceedings.  
 
Following the case of Secretary of State for the Home Department v MB, the European 
Court of Human Rights made a determination of the use of closed material procedures 
with particular reference to art.5 (4) ECHR which identifies: 
 “Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention 
shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be 
decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful.” 
 
The Strasbourg court identified that the protection afforded to national security had to be 
counterbalanced with the right to procedural fairness contained in art.5 (4). The ECtHR 
held that it was essential that ‘as much information about the allegations and evidence of 
each applicant’ be disclosed as possible ‘without compromising national security or the 
safety of others.’847 Where full disclosure was not possible, art.5 (4) required that the 
difficulties caused by the lack of disclosure must be counterbalanced in a way which 
                                                        
846 [2007] UKHL 46.  
847 A v United Kingdom 49 EHRR 695, para 217. 
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allowed each applicant to still have the possibility to effectively challenge the allegations 
against him.
848
  
 
Ultimately, the Court held that a special advocate could perform an important role in 
counterbalancing the lack of full disclosure by ‘testing the evidence on behalf of the 
detainee during the closed hearing.’ The court held that this function could not be 
performed in a useful way unless ‘the detainee was provided with sufficient information 
about the allegations against him to enable him to give effective instructions to the 
special advocate.’849 The Court identified that procedural fairness must be determined on 
a case-by-case basis. Where the evidence was ‘to a large extent disclosed’ meaning that 
the open material ‘played the predominant role in the determination’ this would be 
sufficient to identify that the applicant had had the opportunity to challenge allegations 
made against him.
850
 Where the information was not fully disclosed but the allegations 
contained in the open material provided were sufficiently specific, it should be possible 
for the applicant to provide the special advocate with information with which to refute 
them without having to know the evidence which formed the basis of the allegations. 
Here, general assertions on the topic area would not be sufficient, the applicant should be 
provided with the ‘gist’ of the information.851  
 
In the subsequent domestic decision of Secretary of State for the Home Department v 
AF
852
 (No 3) the House of Lords sought to establish whether the aforementioned 
reasoning could apply to judicial review proceedings concerning non-derogating control 
                                                        
848 Ibid, 218. 
849 Above, n 847, para 220.  
850 Above, n 847, para 220. 
851 Above, n 847, para 220. 
852 [2009] UKHL 28.  
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orders. The government argued that the reasoning in A v United Kingdom could not be 
applied to non-derogating control orders; on the basis that the nature of such orders 
meant that they did not involve the depravation of liberty. Lord Phillips identified that 
whilst there was a difference between art.5 (4) and its application in criminal 
proceedings and art.6 and its application in civil proceedings he did not believe that 
Strasbourg would draw a distinction when dealing with the minimum disclosure 
necessary for a fair trial.
853
 
 
In Home Office v Tariq, the UK Supreme Court sought to identify whether the 
‘minimum disclosure’ principle should be applied to Employment Tribunal 
proceedings.
854
 The claimant worked for the Home office as an immigration office, but 
following the arrest of his brother and cousin for alleged involvement in a suspected 
terrorist plot, he lost his security clearance. The claimant brought a claim for racial and 
religious discrimination before the Employment Tribunal and sought to challenge the 
direction of the Tribunal that the Home Office could rely upon evidence that would not 
be shown to either himself or his legal representative but could be shown to a special 
advocate appointed on his behalf.  
 
Lord Hope distinguished the reasoning in Secretary of State for the Home Department v 
AF, stating that it was an ‘entirely different case.’ In AF the individual’s fundamental 
rights were being restricted, the rule of law therefore required that the individual ‘be 
given sufficient material to enable him to answer the case that is made against him by the 
state.’ The significant difference in Tariq was, according to Lord Hope, that the claimant 
                                                        
853 Ibid, para 57. 
854 [2011] UKSC 35. 
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was not ‘faced with criminal proceedings against him or with severe restrictions on his 
personal liberty.’855 Tariq was a civil claim where the question was whether the claimant 
was entitled to damages. Lord Hope stated that whilst the claimant was ‘entitled to a fair 
hearing before an independent and impartial tribunal’ the Home office had stated that it 
could not defend the claim in open proceedings because it could not reveal how the 
security vetting procedures were carried out. Lord Hope held that this situation was 
‘unavoidable’ because of the nature of the work Mr. Tariq was employed to do. 
 
Lord Hope questioned how the balance should be struck in the instant case. He suggested 
that if the closed procedure were not to be adopted, the Home Office would be placed at 
a ‘greater disadvantage’ because it could not defend itself in open court and would have 
to concede the claim.
856
 82 In terms of the disadvantage caused to the claimant by a 
closed procedure, Lord Hope identified that the ‘general nature’ of the Home Office’s 
case had been provided to him, he would be provided with the services of a special 
advocate, his claim will be determined by an independent and impartial tribunal. 
Ultimately, Lord Hope suggested that if ‘inferences have to be drawn’ because of the 
quality of the evidence provided by the Home Office, they will be drawn ‘for the 
claimant and not against him.’857 Lord Hope held that the requirements of disclosure will 
depend on the individual circumstances of the case. Given the nature of the case in 
question, the procedural safeguards were sufficient to achieve fairness in the instant case.  
 
Whilst critics would argue that use of special advocates is not procedurally fair for the 
Applicants in SIAC proceedings, one can argue that the Rule 54 procedures can be 
                                                        
855 Ibid, para 81. 
856 Ibid, para 82. 
857 Ibid. 
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distinguished. Rule 54 allows members of the Security and Intelligence Services the 
opportunity to have employment disputes dealt with by an Employment Tribunal and this 
advancement in the protection of rights for national security employees should be 
considered a welcome improvement on those employees not having any form of access 
to the Employment Tribunal at all.  
 
At a practical level those employees who chose to undertake employment with the 
Security and Intelligence services must appreciate that the nature of their work requires 
careful handling if discussed at tribunal because Employment Tribunal judgments most 
often provide lengthy analysis of both working relationships and practices. The tension 
for a tribunal in deciding what the closed procedures in the hearing will entail is that the 
very nature of an employee’s work in the security and intelligence services is likely to 
result in the discussion of matters concerning national security. Chapter one of this thesis 
identified that employees of the security and intelligence services agree to a voluntary 
restriction of their article 10 rights in order to enter employment with those services. It is 
submitted that the provision of employment rights for those employees may require a 
form of agreed limitation of rights by consent. In providing analysis of the Tariq 
decision, Chamberlin correctly identifies that art.6 rights may be waived provided that the 
‘waiver is voluntary, informed and unequivocal.’ Thus, Chamberlin argues that by 
voluntarily agreeing to a security vetting procedure he should have waived his right to 
sufficient disclosure in any proceedings to challenge the outcome of the process. He 
suggests that this would have preserved the integrity of ‘both the security clearance 
system and the right to a fair trial.’ 
 
It should be indentified that the both the House of Lords in AF and the Supreme Court in 
 401 
 
 
Tariq placed considerable emphasis of the requirement for the court to look at the closed 
procedure process as a whole in order to determine whether a procedure has been used 
which involves a significant injustice to the claimant.
858
 A tribunal, as per the obligations 
required by s.6 HRA must ensure that the procedures of the court are conducted fairly; 
this should provide a high degree of protection to the claimant in proceedings where he 
may not be privy to the information disclosed.  If the judge fails to adopt the standard 
required, the claimant has the opportunity to appeal any decision before the Employment 
Appeals Tribunal and then, if necessary to the Court of Appeal and Supreme Court.  
 
It is submitted that to allow those employees special rights under PIDA would be a 
positive advancement. It would also distinguish between matters whereby an employee 
suffers detriment as a result of raising a public interest concern and where a person’s 
other rights are affected.
859
 Upon entering employment with the security and intelligence 
services, it is submitted that a clause could be written into the contract of employment 
which identifies that any employment law procedures entered into may be subject to the 
special advocate procedure.  
 
6.2 Part II National Security Concern Reporting and Oversight Mechanisms: An 
International Comparison  
 
6.2.1 New Zealand 
 
With regards to public service employees involved in national security matters, the 
Protected Disclosures Act (NZ) takes a very different approach to PIDA. Whereas PIDA 
                                                        
858 Ibid, para 28. 
859 PIDA aims to distinguish between public interest disclosures and private employment disputes normally 
dealt with firstly by grievance procedures. 
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offers no protection, the PDA does authorise protected disclosures for members of the 
intelligence and security services, albeit through strictly prescribed channels. Section 12 
PDA identifies the channel under the clearly identifiable heading of ‘special rules on 
procedures of intelligence and security agency.’  Section 12 requires the internal 
procedures of the intelligence and security agencies concerned to: 
  “(a) provide that the persons to whom a disclosure may be 
made must be persons holding an appropriate security clearance and be authorised to 
have access to the information; and 
(b) state that the only appropriate authority to whom information may be disclosed is the 
Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security; 
(c) invite any employee who has disclosed, or is considering the disclosure of, information 
under this Act to seek information and guidance from the Inspector-General of 
Intelligence and Security, and not from and Ombudsman; and  
(d) state that no disclosure may be made to an Ombudsman, or to a Minister of the Crown 
other than-  
(i) the Minister responsible for the relevant intelligence and security agency; or  
(ii) the Prime Minister” 
 
It can be observed that the Act allows for disclosure to security cleared persons only. The 
number of prescribed avenues of disclosure is greater than the available UK internal 
mechanism which allows for a concern to be raised no further than the ‘independent staff 
counsellor.’ It is particularly interesting to note that the Protected Disclosures Act allows 
the employee to seek advice from the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security, 
even before the disclosure has been made. In contrast, in the United Kingdom, the 
Intelligence and Security Committee does not allow for approaches from members of the 
security and intelligence services. Furthermore, when unauthorised disclosures have 
been made by members or former members of those services, it has failed to 
acknowledge them.
860
  
 
                                                        
860 The most notable examples are David Shayler, former MI5 officer and Richard Tomlinson, former MI6 
officer, both made allegations about the work of their respective services and received convictions under the 
OSA 1989. See further: I.Leigh in Born, Johnson and Leigh, Who’s Watching the Spies?: Establishing 
Intelligence Service Accountability (Potomac Books, 2005) 92. 
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The New Zealand Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security was established in 1996 
and the position is appointed by the Prime Minister upon consultation with the leader of 
the opposition.
861
 The office is independent and the person appointed with the role is 
required to be a retired High Court judge, as per the Inspector-General of Intelligence 
and Security Act 1996. His role is to assist ministers responsible for the intelligence and 
security agencies (which comprise of the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service and 
the Government Communications Security Bureau) in oversight and review. The 
Inspector-General has a right of access to service staff, records and premises.  
 
The active role of the Inspector-General has particular advantages. A compelling 
justification for the unauthorised disclosure of information to the media is that 
whistleblowers feel isolated and rather helpless in their own organisation. A lack of 
advice or information on internal procedures or a lack of recognition of the importance 
of whistleblowers in the workplace is often seen as the cause for the disclosure. The role 
of the NZ IGIS is clearly defined and most importantly, protection afforded to employees 
who complain to the NZ IGIS is further recognised in s.18 Inspector General of 
Intelligence and Security Act 1996 which predates the Protected Disclosures Act.
862
  
 
The proactive approach given by the Protected Disclosures Act and the special 
provisions available for employees involved in national security matters are an 
acknowledgement that whistleblowers exist and can be beneficial to the oversight of 
                                                        
861 This section does not consider the role of the NZ Intelligence and Security Committee which examines 
policy, receives and considers the services’ annual reports and to consider matters referred by the prime 
minster which have national security implications but which do not relate directly to the activities of the 
services). The NZ ISC are excluded from looking into matters within the NZ IGIS’ remit.  
862 “Where any employee of an intelligence and security agency brings any matter to the attention of the 
Inspector-General, that employee shall not be subjected by the intelligence and security agency to any 
penalty or discriminatory treatment of any kind in relation to his or her employment by reason only of 
having brought that matter to the attention of the InspectorGeneral unless the Inspector-General 
determines that in so doing the employee acted otherwise than in good faith.” 
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those services. It also provides a recognition that it is inevitable that there may be times 
when an employee may feel compelled to make a disclosure, regardless of the merits 
behind making the disclosure. By providing secure channels with which to disclose the 
information and by providing assistance and advice, the structure keeps the information 
‘in house’ and thus limits the temptation to make unauthorised disclosures to the public 
domain. It also separates genuine whistleblowers from those who wish to make 
vexatious disclosures to the media, for the purpose of revenge or personal gain. 
 
Currently, an equivalent to the UK Official Secrets Act exists in the form of s.78 Crimes 
Act 1961. Section78 provides for an offence of espionage whereas s.78A provides for an 
offence of wrongful communication, retention or copying of information likely to 
prejudice the security or defence of New Zealand. Section 18 Protected Disclosures Act 
affords immunity for civil and criminal proceedings for an employee who makes a 
protected disclosure. Therefore immunity is provided against prosecutions under s.78A 
but this is strictly limited as a result of s.12 PDA to the Inspector General for Intelligence 
and Security, to the minister responsible for intelligence and security and the Prime 
Minister. Immunity from civil proceedings would protect employees from actions such 
as for breach of confidence actions or libel. The most notable departure from the 
comparable UK Public Interest Disclosure Act is that s.18 PDA provides immunity for 
disciplinary proceedings resulting from the disclosure.  
 
The UK Public Interest Disclosure Act is used to sue an employer when an employee 
suffers a detriment as a result of raising a concern. Referring to the Act as ‘employment 
protection’ is somewhat of a misnomer, because protection starts post detriment. In the 
UK an employee facing disciplinary action would be advised to wait for the outcome of 
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the proceedings before deciding whether to sue. In contrast, s.18 PDA provides 
immunity from disciplinary action and therefore the protection effectively starts pre 
detriment.  
 
The next section considers the situation in Australia, where official information is still 
protected by legislation modelled on the old UK s.2 Official Secrets Act 1911 provision 
and whilst there is a clear route to raise concerns.  
  
6.3 Australia  
 
Whereas in the United Kingdom the Official Secrets Act 1989 affects a relatively small 
number of Crown Servants and the majority of Crown Servants are subject to a relatively 
short provision in the civil service code which states that servants must not disclose 
official information without authority,
863
 in Australia all Commonwealth employees 
(including APS and the Federal Police) are subject to the Public Service Regulations and 
will be consequentially liable for prosecution under the Crimes Act 1914.
864
 
 
The wording of section 70 is particularly widely framed and despite the amendment of 
the above regulations, exists to provide an absolute restriction on freedom of speech for 
Commonwealth employees. Further restrictions are contained in section 79 and concern 
the unauthorised disclosure of ‘official secrets’ without lawful excuse of information 
obtained by virtue of the employee’s official position. Section 79 is again widely framed 
and covers the act of unauthorised disclosure from the original discloser to the actions of 
                                                        
863 Civil Service Code: Standards of behaviour: Integrity, para 6. 
864 Section 70 Crimes Act. 
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persons in receipt of the information which imposes a further duty not to disclose (acting 
in a similar way to s. 5 OSA, which is aimed at preventing journalists from printing the 
information, there is yet to be a successful prosecution for a s.5 offence, although it has 
been used as a tool to threaten newspaper editors with prosecution if they publish the 
material).  
 
The penalties are severe, both the disclosure and receipt of an ‘official secret’ constitute 
an indictable offence. The sentence for unlawful disclosure is seven years, however if a 
person knowingly receives information in contravention with the Act he too will be 
subject to seven years imprisonment. 
 
6.3.2 ‘Emerging Threats’: to National Security and Open Government 
 
It has been suggested that the result of the sections ‘virtually makes it a criminal offence 
for public sector workers to tell us who occupies the room next to them.’865 However, 
despite the breadth of the above provisions, the effectiveness of both sections 70 and 79 
has been labelled ‘doubtful.’866  In contrast to the UK Official Secrets Act which 
specifically mentions the disclosure of security and intelligence information (per s. 1 
OSA 1989), section 79 does not extend the definition of ‘official secrets’ any further 
                                                        
865 P.Finn, Evidence to the Senate Select Committee on Public Interest Whistleblowing, 29th November 
1993, Canberra,61. See also, W. De Maria, Whistleblowers and Secrecy: Ethical Emissaries from the Public 
Sector, paper presented to Freedom of the Press Conference, Bond University, 11 November 1995 
http://www.bmartin.cc/dissent/documents/DeMaria_wbs.html (accessed 05/06/10). 
866 G.Rose & D.Nestorovska, Terrorism and National Security Intelligence Laws: Assessing Australian 
Reforms, Faculty of Law Research Paper, University of Wollongong, 2005. 
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than the title. However it does appear that both the restriction of information under the 
Crimes Act and the comparable UK Official Secrets Act has been subject to very similar 
criticisms. De Maria has highlighted in particular that s.70 ‘fails to distinguish between 
information that could harm the public interest and information that would assist it’ and 
that ‘no defence is available that the officer believed that they had a disclosure duty, or 
that the disclosure would not cause any detriment to the public interest…’867 
Furthermore, in relation to the protection sensitive information and the release of 
information under Australian Freedom of Information Act. Tsaknis states that there is 
now an unsavoury position whereby: 
“public sector officers as members of the public are entitled to access 
information…but… as officials, they may not disclose that information to the public.”868 
 
Further restrictions to the unauthorised disclosure of ‘operational information’ of 
intelligence matters or information relating to a warrant have been specifically 
implemented to prevent intelligence leaks.
869
 The ASIO (Australian Security Intelligence 
Organisation) Legislation Amendment Act 2003 is part of a raft of legislation which has 
been introduced to counteract the emerging terrorist threat post September 11
th
 2001.
870
  
The requirement to balance the protection of national security alongside the promotion of 
open and accountable government and Executive agencies has proved an increasing 
                                                        
867 Above, n 865. 
868 L.Tsaknis, The Commonwealth Secrecy Provisions: Time for Reform?, CLJ  [1994] 18 
869 Section 34 VAA ASIO Legislation Amendment Act 2003 (which amends the Australian Security 
Intelligence Organisation Act 1979). It should also be noted that S.78 of the Crimes Act exists to protect 
Australia against espionage activities. R v Lappas [2003] ACTA 21 was the first successful prosecution for 
the passing of top secret documents by an intelligence analyst to a prostitute who intended to sell them on to 
a foreign power. S.78 is comparable to the UK S1 Official Secrets Act 1911. 
870See further Australian Government website, the list is extensive: 
http://www.ag.gov.au/agd/www/nationalsecurity.nsf/AllDocs/826190776D49EA90CA256FAB001BA5EA
?OpenDocument (accessed 10/08/09). 
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challenge for western democratic states, particularly those involved participant in the 
Iraq war. The position of a person wishing to blow the whistle on malpractice or 
maladministration does not fit well within this sphere. 
 
The most pertinent example of this occurrence in Australia is the unauthorised disclosure 
of information made to the Australian newspaper by the Custom’s Officer Allan 
Kessing. Kessing had anonymously leaked a report that he had written which detailed a 
range of ‘serious breaches in security’ at Sidney Airport in 2005. Kessing’s report which 
detailed instances of ‘theft, drug smuggling, criminals screening damage’ and ‘serious 
terrorist risks’ was ignored by the Customs Department and he chose to leak the 
information rather than complain internally. He was convicted of a section 70 (2) offence 
and given a suspended sentence of 9 months imprisonment. The information disclosed 
prompted a swift investigation into all major Australian airports by former British Police 
chief Sir John Wheeler, who published the findings three months later which endorsed 
Kessing’s conclusions and led the then Prime Minister John Howard to pledge $200 
million to vastly overhaul security.
871
   
 
Despite providing a clear and comprehensive whistleblowing procedure, the lack of a 
public interest defence means that disclosures of information of public concern, which 
may actually enhance and benefit the national security provision in the country, will 
continue to be both highly controversial and forthcoming as the national security interest 
remains on the agenda. The national security agencies of the Australian Security 
                                                        
871 See further: J.Albrechtsen, Blowing the Whistle on Hypocrisy, The Australian,  13 April 2007. 
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Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) and the Australian Secret Intelligence Service (ASIS) 
shall now be considered. The agencies provide a direct comparison to the work of the 
United Kingdom Security Service (MI5) and the Secret Intelligence Service (MI6 or SIS) 
respectively.  
 
6.3.2.i The Australian Security Intelligence Organisation and the Australian Secret 
Intelligence Service. 
 
The Australian Security Intelligence Organisation deals with domestic security and 
counterintelligence issues, primarily defined as ‘activities prejudicial to security’ ‘acts of 
foreign interference’ and ‘attacks on Australia’s defence system.’872 Whereas APS 
employees are governed by contract under the Public Service Act, ASIO officers are 
employed under the ASIO Act 1979 by written contract with the Director-General of 
Security and are exempted from the Public Service Act by virtue of s.86. This exemption 
thus prevents access to the protections afforded to section 16 PSA. However, despite the 
introduction of the Public Service Act in 1999, which introduced the whistleblowing 
procedures for APS employees, no comparable mechanism has been introduced to rectify 
the apparent lack of whistleblowing protections for ASIO employees.
873
  
The Australian Secret Intelligence Service deals primarily with foreign intelligence and 
counterintelligence matters, ASIS staff are employed under the Intelligence Services Act 
                                                        
872 Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979, Part I S.4. 
873 This was identified in a detailed report  by the Australian Law Reform Commission, See further: 
Keeping Secrets: The Protection of Classified and Security Sensitive Information, ALRC 98, 2004, 3.44. 
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2001 and by written contract with the Director-General of ASIS.
874
 However, whilst this 
indicates a similarity to their ASIO counterparts in that ASIS employees are exempted 
from the whistleblower protections afforded under the Public Service Act, in contrast 
section 35 Intelligence Services Act requires that although ASIS employees are not 
subject to the Public Services Act, the Director General must adopt the principles of the 
Act ‘to the extent to which the Director-General considers they are consistent with the 
effective performance of ASIS.’ 
 
Whilst section 35 does provide a degree of protection for ASIS employees wishing to 
blow the whistle, as the Australian Law Reform Commission has highlighted, this does 
not mean that ASIS employees are ‘directly covered’ under s.16 PSA.875 By providing 
the Director-General with the authority to decide at what level internal protections 
should be set, the potential for abuse of the aforementioned provision becomes a distinct 
possibility. However, despite this ASIS employees enjoy a degree of whistleblower 
protection whereas ASIO employees do not.  There appears to be no identifiable 
justification as to why ASIO employees are at a disadvantage to their ASIS counterparts, 
indeed both agencies deal with information highly sensitive to national security.  It 
appears more likely therefore to be due to the fact that the legislation which governs 
ASIS is considerably more up to date. 
 
Employees of the defence and intelligence agencies do have access to the Inspector-
General of Intelligence and Security (IGIS). IGIS is an independent accountability 
                                                        
874 For a comprehensive guide to this Act see: Criminal Law and Procedure, The Intelligence Services Act 
2001[2002] Commw. L. Bull. 28, 13.  
875 Ibid 3.46. 
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mechanism with the aim of providing ‘independent assurance to the Australian 
government, the Parliament and the people.’ Most interestingly, s.33 Inspector-General 
of Intelligence and Security Act 1986 does provide complainants with a degree of 
protection from civil actions. It states that a person will not liable to an action or other 
proceeding for damages, whereby a person has made a complaint and information, 
documents or other evidence have been produced. One must question the usefulness of 
such a protection in the context of the subject matter for which IGIS deals with. IGIS’s 
primary function is to be involved in national security information, which is expressly 
protected by criminal legislation mostly in the form of the Crimes Act 1970. In the 
subsequent paragraph to the protection against civil action, the Inspector-General and his 
staff are themselves liable for criminal sanction, if they make unauthorised disclosures, 
rigidly enforced by a $5000 fine or two years imprisonment.
876
 The protection against a 
civil action in the absence of protection from possible criminal prosecution appears to be 
of little use and can therefore be seen as actively discouraging employees of ASIO and 
ASIS from contacting the IGIS.  
 
When the proposed changes to the Public Service Act and Regulations, which 
incorporated whistleblower protections for APS employees were discussed in 1997 it 
was agreed that IGIS had the primary responsibility for grievances for the Defence 
Signals Directorate (DSD) Defence Intelligence Organisation (DIO) and the Office of 
National Assessments (DSD).
877
 It is unclear as to why both ASIO and ASIS were 
excluded from the agreement, particularly when both agencies form the backbone of the 
Australian intelligence machinery. Considering that operational activities form the basis 
                                                        
876 However this would not prevent the Inspector General from raising concerns with ministers in an 
unpublished form. 
877 IGIS Annual Report 1997-1998, para 33. 
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of those agencies’ work, the accountability and oversight of such actions should be 
particularly necessary to provide effective oversight. In the year preceding the agreement 
the IGIS Annual Report itself conceded that ‘virtually all of the complaints’ received 
during the year related to ASIO and that this reflected the fact that ASIO has a ‘much 
closer working relationship with Australian citizens’ whereas ASIS and DSD are 
concerned with foreign intelligence collection and were therefore ‘much less exposed to 
members of the Australian public.
878
 
 
With such a considerable emphasis on complaints regarding ASIO it is difficult to 
ascertain why ASIO employees are not protected for making complaints to IGIS. As one 
of IGIS’ key objectives is to ‘provide assurance to the people,’ one may surmise that the 
agency whose work has the greatest affect on the Australian public requires a strong 
accountability mechanism which protects ASIO employees who complain to IGIS,  or at 
the very least one as strong as their counterparts in ASIS. It has been suggested that 
ASIO has a ‘historical lack of accountability’ which has ‘existed since its origins’ and 
that there is a ‘distinct danger’ that under the ‘counter-terrorism legislation ASIO will 
effectively operate as a law unto itself, armed with greater powers than ever before in 
Australian history.’879 
 
With this in mind, it appears that with the extensive current focus on legislative reform to 
enhance national security, the climate is ripe to allow improvements to the whistleblower 
protections for members of the national security and defence agencies. The Australian 
                                                        
878 IGIS Annual Report 1995-1996, para 55. 
879 M.Hand, ASIO, Secrecy and Lack of Accountability  11 4 Murdoch University Electronic Journal of Law 
[2004], paras 22 and 83. 
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Law Reform Commission has made a series of detailed recommendations with an 
emphasis on providing an environment that provides legislative protection for the 
aggrieved employee and appropriate handling of ‘classified and security sensitive 
material.’880 All of these reforms are yet to be implemented and therefore the current 
relationship between the employees of the aforementioned agencies and IGIS remains 
undefined. 
 
Similar instances of disclosure such as the leak by Allan Kessing have occurred in other 
Jurisdictions. The unauthorised disclosures of information detailing security concerns at 
Airports, and other installations vulnerable to terrorist attack  has  occurred in the United 
States and has prompted the redrafting of the notoriously weak provisions contained in 
the Whistleblowers Protection Act 
 
6.4 United States of America 
 
The chapter will now progress to consider federal employees not covered by the Civil 
Service Reform Act and Whistleblower Protection Act, namely those involved in 
national security matters. The aim of this section is primarily to consider any available 
whistleblower protections available to the agencies exempted from the Acts. We shall 
start with consideration of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, which has been the 
subject of a number of unauthorised disclosures, particularly in the period post 
September 11
th
 2001. 
                                                        
880880 See further ALRC discussion paper, final report, Keeping Secrets: The Protection of Classified and 
Security Sensitive Information, ALRC DP 98 2004, para 3.35 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/alrc/publications/reports/98/Ch_03.html#Heading99 (accessed 08/09/08) 
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6.4.1 The Federal Bureau of Investigation: A unique whistleblower protection? 
 
Whilst the FBI is excluded from the general protections afforded to federal employees 
via the Merit Systems Protection Board, a separate scheme is provided to protect 
employees of the FBI from whistleblower reprisals. The FBI is an agency under the 
umbrella of the Department of Justice for which the Attorney General is the head of 
department. The FBI has a wide jurisdiction to investigate national security and criminal 
matters from counter intelligence to white-collar crime. 
 
The role of the FBI in the investigation and protection of national security matters has 
dramatically increased post September 11
th
 2001 and has led to the formation of the 
National Security Branch with the specific aim of counter-terrorism. It has also been 
highlighted by the Federation of American Scientists that the FBI has developed a new 
role in foreign intelligence with a particular emphasis on informants or human 
intelligence (HUMINT).
881
 
 
Currently the FBI whistleblower protection scheme provides three designated routes: the 
Office of Professional Responsibility and the Office of Inspector General, which are both 
attached to the Department of Justice, and the FBI’s own Office of Professional 
Responsibility. All three routes are designated recipients of protected disclosures and 
offer protection against whistleblower reprisals. The Federal Employee also has an 
additional protection, which effectively provides a failsafe and takes the form of the 
Office of Attorney Recruitment and Management; however there are limitations to this 
                                                        
881The FBI as a Foreign Intelligence Organization, Federation of American Scientists, News. Accessible 
via : http://www.fas.org/blog/secrecy/2008/03/the_fbi_as_a_foreign_intellige.html (accessed 09/09/09). 
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as will be illustrated below. 
 
6.4.2 The Procedure 
 
In the first instance, the aggrieved Federal employee may choose between the Office of 
Professional Responsibility and the Department of Justice Inspector General. The body 
that receives the complaint will then conduct the investigation and then make any 
necessary recommendations. 
 
Most interestingly, the ‘roles and functions’ of the FBI scheme are deemed ‘analogous’ 
with those of the OSC and MSPB,
882
 but with the principle motivation that appeals 
‘would not be to the outside but to the Attorney General.’883 It was also mandated in 
Congress that the FBI whistleblower provisions be ‘consistent with the applicable 
provisions of’ the Whistleblower Protection Act.884 Whilst the benefits of an internal 
scheme which effectively keeps national security and operational information ‘in house’ 
are clearly advantageous, the effectiveness of the scheme has been called into question, 
further highlighting the exemption afforded to other federal employees under the WPA. 
 
The Case of Michael German
885
 is one of a number of examples where the system has 
failed to provide adequate protection for FBI employees. German became aware of 
serious failings in a counterterrorism investigation. It had primarily involved a tape of a 
                                                        
882 Department of Justice, Whistleblower Protection for Federal Bureau of Investigation Employees, 
Federal Register, November 1, 1999 (Volume 64, Number 210) Rules and Regulations, Page 58783 
883 Statement of Representative Udall 124 Cong. Rec. 28770 (1978) see also Ibid. 
884 Title 5 U.S. Code Section 2303, Prohibited Personnel Practices in the Federal Bureau of Investigation, 
See also: Project on Government Oversight, Homeland and National Security Whistleblower Protections: 
the Unfinished Agenda, April 2005, 18.  
885 A detailed study of this can be found in: M. Goodman, C. Crump, S. Corris, Disavowed: The 
Government’s Unchecked Retaliation against National Security Whistleblowers, American Civil Liberties 
Union, 2007, 6.  
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meeting between a domestic and a foreign terrorist organisation, which had detailed an 
attempt to secure ownership for the foreign organisation. Poor handling of the case 
would have resulted in the exclusion of evidence from any future prosecution. Upon 
informing his superiors of the failings, a cover-up ensued, which included the hiding of 
the aforementioned tape and the falsification of a number of official documents. German 
took evidence of the original meeting to the Department of Justice Inspector General and 
the FBI Office of Professional Responsibility. The FBI officials were immediately 
informed and were allowed to amend their reports. They did so but omitted any mention 
of terrorism from the meeting transcript. German suffered retaliation for two years and 
eventually went public by reporting the information to Congress and subsequently 
resigning his post. During the alleged retaliation, the Inspector General failed to act in 
order to protect German, furthermore it was not until over a year after German has 
resigned that he published a report acknowledging the failings and the subsequent 
retaliation. However the report was weak in substance and failed to recommend that the 
officials involved be held to account.  
 
6.4.3 The Inspectors General. 
 
The role of an Inspector General (IG) is common place in US Public Service 
departments; there are now a total of 64 statutory Inspector Generals. However, their role 
as an adequate mechanism for Federal employees to voice their grievances is 
questionable. At this juncture it is necessary to identify that the Inspector General has 
three specific if non-distinct functions. The first is to maintain oversight of the respective 
agency, to investigate its actions and any allegations of wrongdoing. The second is its 
role as a designated recipient of whistleblower complaints for the purpose of possible 
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investigation and protection against retaliation. The third role is as a recipient of 
whistleblower complaints under the Intelligence Community Whistleblower Protection 
Act 1998, whereby the complainant wishes to report an ‘urgent report’ to Congress 
(discussed below).   
 
The case of Michael German brings the Inspector General’s role as an ‘independent set 
of eyes and ears’886 into question. In a publication designed to advise potential 
whistleblowers on whether they would receive protection or not, the American Civil 
Liberties Union (ACLU) is particularly scathing in its criticisms of the inspector general 
system in general by questioning the role’s independence and by suggesting that if the IG 
‘upset the Administration’s applecart’ he or she could be ‘instantly removed.’887 
 
The ACLU’s criticisms are in stark contrast to a submission made by the OIGDOJ to a 
House Committee on Government Reform in 2006, which explained that in a five year 
period, the OIG had initiated more than 25 investigations into allegations made by FBI 
employees. He stated that the OIG had devoted ‘significant resources to investigations 
over the years and that they often involve a large number of interviews polygraph and 
forensic examinations,’ ultimately the OIG stated that they do not ‘generally publicise 
findings’ given the ‘FBI whistleblower requirements and the privacy interests of 
subjects, complainants and witnesses.’  
 
It is possible to ascertain from the OIG’s submission that within the limitations detailed 
                                                        
886 G. Friedman, B. Snyder, Impact of the Inspector General Concept & the Federal Inspector General 
Community Presentation, September 2006. Accessible via the Federal Inspector General’s website: 
http://www.ignet.gov/igs1.html (accessed 09/09/09). 
887 The Art of Anonymous Activism, published by the Government Accountability Project, Public Employees 
for Environmental Responsibility, and Project On Government Oversight, 2002, 20. Quoted in: Testimony 
of N. Schwellenbach, Investigator Project On Government Oversight, House Oversight and Government 
Reform Committee, Examining the Executive Branch Reform Act of 2007 and the Whistleblower Protection 
Enhancement Act 2007, February 13, 2007. 
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by the ACLU, a considerable effort is made to investigate whistleblower complaints. 
However, the success of the OIGDOJ is dependent upon the Inspector General agreeing 
to investigate the complaint in the first instance. Furthermore, the Michael German case 
details significant failings with regard to the reporting of findings. The time in which the 
complaint is investigated and reported upon is of particular importance, a significant 
period of time had lapsed before the final report had been made. When the report was 
made it failed to adequately hold the necessary people within the FBI to account. 
Therefore the devotion of significant resources to what appear to be detailed and 
thorough investigations is an irrelevance if the Inspector General system fails to protect 
the complainant and to, where necessary hold the persons responsible to account.  
 
One may also consider that the DOJIG’s constitutional status has deterred potential 
complainants from approaching the IG in favour of the FBI-OPR. It has been conceded 
by the IG in the past that the FBI-OPR “currently investigates most, if not all, complaints 
raised by and against FBI employees” and that if an approach is made to the IG, he will 
normally refer the case directly to the FBI Office of Professional Responsibility or seek 
the Deputy Attorney General's permission for the OIG to conduct the investigation. In 
doing so, any suggestion of independence from the administration is lost, and the 
potential to make politicised judgements becomes a real possibility.  
 
The method of reporting also exposes an inherent weakness. From the outset the 
Inspectors General were required to keep Congress ‘Fully and currently informed about 
problems and deficiencies relating to the administration of such programs and operations 
and the necessity for and progress of corrective action.’888 
                                                        
888 92 Stat 1101 at Ss 2(3). 
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However, the current reality identifies frustration by members of Congress to receive 
information on instances of wrongdoing in federal departments. Moreover, it has been 
suggested in general that Congress has ‘had to throw a fit’ in order to make the 
intelligence agencies respond to requests for information.
889
 One can determine, 
therefore, that it would be even less likely for intelligence agencies to provide evidence 
of wrongdoing or assist the respective inspector general in such matters. 
 
As a whole the system of reporting to Congress lacks sufficient teeth. In a similar way to 
the UK Parliamentary Ombudsman, the IG can only make recommendations, and his 
findings are neither binding nor enforceable. The Project on Government Oversight has 
stated:  
  “Time and again attorneys and advocates have found that 
verifying a whistleblower’s allegations is not enough: Managers who retaliate against 
whistleblowers may continue to do so unless ordered to stop.”890  
 
The IG has neither the power to put an end to such retaliation, nor does the system allow 
for the IG to offer adequate protection to the complainant whilst investigations are taking 
place. The role of the Inspector General and the effectiveness of the Intelligence 
Community Whistleblowers Protection Act 1998 (ICWPA) shall now be considered. 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
889 See L. Johnson, Governing in the Absence of Angels: On the Practice of Intelligence Accountability in 
the United States in Born, Johnson and Leigh, Who’s Watching the Spies?: Establishing Intelligence 
Service Accountability (Potomac Books, Dulles Virginia, 2005) 71. 
890 Project On Government Oversight, Homeland and National Security Whistleblower Protections: The 
Unfinished Agenda, 2005, 7. 
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6.4.4 The Intelligence Community Whistleblower Protection Act 1998: a tool for the 
enhancement of Congressional Oversight? 
 
The President and the Intelligence agencies are statutorily obliged to keep the 
‘Congressional intelligence committee fully and currently informed of the intelligence 
activities of the United States, including any significant anticipated intelligence 
activity.’891 However, the reality is that Congress has had particular difficulty in 
obtaining information and cooperation from the intelligence community.
892
The purpose 
of the ICWPA is to allow members of the intelligence community, that is members of the 
Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation and certain parts of the Department of Defense to report an ‘urgent 
concern’ to Congress. An urgent concern is defined as any of the following criterion by 
statute: 
  “(1) a serious or flagrant problem, abuse, violation of law 
or Executive order, or deficiency relating to the funding, administration, or operations of 
an intelligence activity involving classified information, but does not include differences 
of opinion concerning public policy matters; (2) “A false statement to Congress, or a 
wilful withholding from Congress, or an issue of material fact relating to the funding, 
administration or operation of an intelligence activity or (3) An action, including a 
personnel action described in section 2302(a)(2)(A) of title 5, United States Code, 
constituting reprisal or threat of reprisal prohibited under subsection (e)(3)(B) in 
response to an employee’s reporting an urgent concern in accordance with this 
paragraph.”893 
 
The ICWPA does not, however, allow employees direct access to Congress. Instead, the 
employee must report the complaint to the Inspector General of their respective agency 
and give notification that they intend to report the matter of urgent concern to Congress. 
                                                        
891 50 USCS Ss 413(a)(1) (2007). 
892 Johnson identifies, with reference to the CIA that: “On some matters the CIA has politely refused to 
cooperate…on other matters the Agency has, in essence, looked the other way, apparently hoping the 
Committee would forget or lose interest in the subject; if the committee persisted, the Agency would finally 
respond…In still other situations the CIA has sought refuge in a cloud of imprecise language.” L.Johnson, 
The US Congress and the CIA: Monitoring the Dark Side of Government [1980] LEGIS STUD QUART V 
4, 494. 
893 112 Stat 2413-14 SS 701 (1998). 
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Upon receiving the complaint the IG has 14 days to decide whether or not the complaint 
appears credible. If he decides it is, the IG is then required to inform the Director of the 
respective agency, who then has seven days to forward the matter to the Congressional 
Intelligence Committees.  
 
If the complainant is dissatisfied that the information has not been given correctly to the 
Committees, he may then approach one of the Committees directly. Considerable 
emphasis is given in the statute to the limitations on direct contact between the employee 
and the committees. In particular he is required not only to contact the IG
894
 but also to 
obtain and follow from the agency head, direction on how to contact the intelligence 
committees in accordance with “appropriate security practices.”895 Any disclosure which 
is therefore made under the mechanism effectively controlled by the agency head from 
the moment that the Inspector General notifies him. 
 
One could consider the need to control the disclosure of security sensitive information as 
a necessary requirement to safeguard national security, much in the same way that the 
New Zealand scheme allows for protected disclosures of national security information to 
take place, albeit thorough strictly prescribed channels. However, the New Zealand 
scheme does not require the involvement of the agency head in the process; instead 
disclosure through the prescribed, security cleared channels is sufficient. One must 
therefore ask why the involvement of the Agency head is necessary in the process. If the 
employee is aware of the existence of the Inspector General and is aware of the security 
cleared intelligence committees, it is difficult to ascertain why such a route should 
suffice. 
                                                        
894 Ibid (d) (2) (A). 
895 Ibid (d) (2) (B). 
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The answer may be found in the objections given to the Intelligence Community 
Whistleblowers Protection Bill by the respective agency heads and the Office of Legal 
Counsel, which represented the interests of the administration. The OLC argued that the 
President as Commander in Chief has ‘ultimate and unimpeded authority’ over the 
‘collection, retention and dissemination of national security information and that any act 
by Congress to remove this power would be ‘unconstitutional.’ 896The Administration 
stated that the Director of Central Intelligence and other heads of agency within the 
Intelligence Community had the right to examine, and in ‘certain extraordinary 
circumstances’ prevent the allegations of whistleblowers before they ‘reached the ears of 
Congress.’897 
 
In his submission to the Committee, Dr Louis Fisher rejected the notion that the 
President has autonomous control over national security information, and any statute 
proclaiming otherwise was unconstitutional. He suggested that there was no express 
‘constitutional language’ regarding national security information as it pertains to the 
President and that his authority to regulate the information was an ‘implied authority’ 
flowing from his responsibilities as Commander in Chief and Chief Executive.
898
  This 
submission is further supported by an analysis of Congressional oversight by 
Kitrosser,
899
 in which she argues that whilst Presidential secrecy is expected there is a 
‘balanced constitutional design’ whereby it ‘remains on a leash of political 
                                                        
896 See further, Statement of Randolf Moss, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, 
DOJ.S.Rep.No. 105-165 at 4 (1998) House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence 105th Congress, 
Record of Proceedings, pp7-31 and T. Newcomb, In From the Cold:The Intelligence Community 
Whistleblower Protection Act of 1998 53 [2001]  Admin. L. Rev. 1243.  
897 See Charles F.C. Ruff, Counsel to the President, Letter to Chairman Goss, 9April 1998, Record of 
Proceedings, ibid n61 pp229-230, and T Newcomb op cit n 61. 
898 Statement of Dr. Louis Fisher, Senior Specialist in Separation of Powers, Congressional Research 
Service, S.Rep.No. 105-165, at 4-5. 
899 H. Kitroser, Congressional Oversight of National Security Activities: Improving Information Funnels, 
Cardozo L.Rev. (2007). 
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accountability.’  
 
The Intelligence Community Whistleblower Protection Act clearly sought to redress the 
balance. However, what appears to have occurred is a compromise between the two 
strands of governance, which reaffirms the constitutional position of either power but in 
doing so, places the requirement of Congress to make checks on Executive power below 
the right of the President, and thus the agency heads, to have virtual autonomy over 
national security information.  
 
The objectives of Congress were clearly identifiable in the wording of the statute which 
highlighted that national security ‘is a shared responsibility’ requiring ‘joint efforts and 
mutual respect by Congress and the President’ and that Congress is empowered by the 
constitution to serve as a check on the executive branch and has a ‘need to know 
allegations of wrongdoing in the intelligence community.’900Unfortunately, the reality is 
that the ICWPA does not put Congress on a co-equal footing with the Executive. Instead 
the Act allows the Agency heads to control the information given to Congress. If the sole 
constitutional objective of the Executive were to maintain the control of national security 
and intelligence information in order to protect it, then one can argue that the disclosure 
of information to defined, security cleared channels is sufficient. By requiring the 
Agency head to be informed of the prospective disclosure, it gives the opportunity for 
any persons alleged in the ‘urgent concerns’ to be notified in advance and to cover 
tracks. In doing so this may further prevent Congress from investigating the issue 
further, by allowing any potential future submissions by the intelligence agency to be 
doctored to put the position of the agency in a favourable light. 
                                                        
900 Pub. L. No. 105-272 (1998) Intelligence Community Whistleblower Protection Act 1998 Sec 701 (b)(1). 
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It is submitted that the Intelligence Community Whistleblower Protection Act aims to 
satisfy the needs of constitutional science rather than allow for uninhibited disclosure of 
information to Congress and the protection of federal employees who make such 
disclosures. There are several evidential issues which support this assertion. Firstly, the 
ICWPA allows a prescribed avenue to disclosure Congress via the agency heads and the 
respective Inspector General. As Newcomb identifies, prior to 1996 there was an 
‘implicit accommodation’ of the unauthorised disclosure of information by employees of 
the intelligence community. Managers may have discouraged such disclosures, but did 
not punish those who did so. It was in 1996 that the OLC issued a memorandum which 
reaffirmed the President’s autonomy over national security information, at the expense of 
Congressional oversight and the revocation of security clearances began for members 
who disclosed information to Congress.
901
 
 
Secondly, the ICWPA cannot be said to protect employees from recrimination or 
‘prohibited personnel practices.’ From the wording of the statute, the layman might 
ascertain that the Intelligence Community Whistleblower Protection Act is the 
intelligence community’s equivalent to the Whistleblower Protection Act. In reality the 
ICWPA is more procedurally rigid. Under the ICWPA, if the employee complains of a 
‘prohibited personnel practice’ he must contact the IG identifying his desire to approach 
Congress on the matter, the IG must then decide if the complaint is valid and notify the 
agency head.  
 
If one were to consider a general federal employee who approached the IG with a 
                                                        
901 Newcomb, H.R. Rep. No 105-747, 10 (1998) and Record of Proceedings Op Cit n 61, 55 Statement of 
Robert M. McNamara. 
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complaint regarding a prohibited personnel practice, he should in theory, receive 
protection by the IG and in the same way the agency head is notified. Indeed, with regard 
to the intelligence community, the creation of a statutory Inspector General for the CIA 
provided a whistleblowing provision and protection against prohibited personnel 
practices; this is a separate and distinct function to the IG’s responsibilities under the 
ICWPA. With regards to the CIA therefore, an employee can approach the IG with a 
whistleblowing complaint and in theory receive protection from prohibited personnel 
practices. However, if he approached the IG with an ‘urgent concern’ with which he 
intends to report to Congress and wishes to further report information of a prohibited 
personnel practice to Congress with the aim of receiving protection, he would not receive 
the protection from the IG but from congress. In the mean time he is open to the 
possibility of further retaliation. The same instance could also occur under the unique 
system provided by the Federal Bureau of Investigation whistleblower mechanism. 
 
If the situation prior to the ICWPA allowed for members of the intelligence community 
to approach members of Congress with concerns and did not suffer retaliation from 
managers, and the Inspectors General have had a continuing duty to receive 
whistleblower complaints and provide protection against PPPs the ICWPA indicates 
Congress’ assertion of power in a bid to rebalance the constitutional settlement, rather 
than a statute to adequately provide protection of whistleblowers in the intelligence 
community. In essence, Congress had attempted to reverse the findings of the OSC 
memorandum but as a result it ended up in a worse position than prior to the 
memorandum.  
 
Thirdly, the DOJIG’s submission of evidence to the Committee during the passage of the 
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Bill indicates the necessity of such a provision: 
  “During my four years as Inspector General I have not been 
made aware of any cases involving FBI employees who have raised allegations of 
wrongdoing on a matter that would be implicated by this legislation. This may in part be 
attributable to the fact that the FBI has its own internal investigations entity FBI Office 
of Professional Responsibility… To date, we simply have not seen these types of cases 
in the Department of Justice OIG”902  
 
From the above submission, one can ascertain that Congress may have better obtained 
their objectives in another way.  It can be argued that if the ‘urgent concern’ reported 
was so serious it may well involve the agency head or senior members of the agency and 
thus any desire to keep congress better informed of possible agency wrongdoing is 
diminished. The ICWPA is a symbolic piece of legislation, which in reality does not 
protect whistleblowers within the intelligence community. 
 
6.4.5 Preparing for the demands of the future: the availability of US whistleblower 
protection post September 11
th
 2001. 
 
In 2002 Coleen Rowley, an FBI special agent wrote a letter to FBI Director Robert 
Mueller detailing significant failings by personnel in FBI headquarters in Washington 
DC in the mishandling of information provided by the Minneapolis Field Office 
concerning an investigation into a suspected terrorist, Zacarias Moussaoui, who was 
suspected to be involved in preparations for a suicide-hijacking. It was these failures 
which, Rowley alleged, had left the United States vulnerable to such terrorist attacks. 
Rowley later testified before the Senate and the 9/11 Commission, which led to an 
overhaul of the organisational structure of the agency. The 9/11 Commission embraced 
the need for whistleblowers stating that ‘democracy’s best oversight mechanism is public 
                                                        
902 Statement of Michael R.Bromwich, Inspector General, U.S. Department of Justice concerning H.R.3829: 
The Intelligence Community Whistleblower Protection Act of 1998, 10th June 1998. 
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interest disclosure.’903 
  
The year of 2002 also heralded Rowley as one of three whistleblowers to make Time 
magazine’s person(s) of the year 2002.904 However, whilst on the surface the public 
recognised the courageous efforts the employees, who brought information of serious 
failings to the public arena and prompted wide-ranging institutional change, Coleen 
Rowley did not receive any protection under the ICWPA and instead chose to make 
direct approaches to Congress. The instance of Coleen Rowley is indicative of a need to 
substantially reform the whistleblowing provisions available to those involved in 
national security matters. It has become necessary and proportionate to make 
considerable reforms to the whistleblower reporting and protection mechanism afforded 
to all US federal employees.  
 
The proposed Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act (WPEA) aims to extend the 
current Whistleblower Protection Act to include members of the intelligence 
community.
905
 Section 10 includes protections for employees of the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, the Central Intelligence Agency, The Defense Intelligence Agency, the 
National Reconnaissance Office and any other Executive agency, or element or unit 
thereof, determined by the President to have at its principal function the conduct of 
foreign intelligence or counterintelligence activities. 
 
The WPEA would present a significant breakthrough for intelligence community 
                                                        
903 See The 911 Commission Panel Report, July 2004, 103. 
904 A. Ripley and M. Sieger, Time Persons of the Year 2002: The Special Agent, Time Magazine, 22nd 
December 2002 see also: Coleen Rowley's Memo to FBI Director Robert Mueller, Time Magazine, 21st 
May, 2002 and R. Ratnesar & M. Wiesskopf, How The FBI Blew The Case, Time Magazine, 26th May 
2002. 
905 At the time of writing the proposed legislation is currently before congress. 
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whistleblowers, and if successful would arguably the most important advancement of 
whistleblower legislation in twenty years. However, one must proceed with a great deal 
of caution. A 2007 WPEA had received unanimous approval in Congress but was vetoed 
by the then President. The Administration strongly opposed the WPEA. It stated that the 
Act ‘could compromise national security,’ was unconstitutional, and overly burdensome’ 
and that ‘rather than promote and protect genuine disclosures of matters of real public 
concern, it would likely increase the number of frivolous complaints and waste 
resources.’906 
 
It is unclear how the disclosure of security sensitive material through existing prescribed 
channels could compromise national security. Indeed, in the case of Coleen Rowley, it 
appears that her submission to the 9/11 Commission contributed to the enhancement of 
national security. Furthermore, the argument relating to the Act being unconstitutional 
mirrors the arguments put forth during the Intelligence Community Whistleblower 
Protection Bill. It is still unclear as to whether or not the WPEA will succeed.  
 
If the WPEA did succeed one must ask if this would provide an increased level of 
protection to national security whistleblowers. In this chapter, a number of procedural 
shortcomings have been identified in the mechanisms which conduct the investigation of 
wrongdoing and prohibited personnel practices. The Office of Special Counsel, in 
particular, has a number of identifiable failings to the detriment of general federal 
employees who currently have access to the system.  
 
It is submitted that without significant changes to the OSC and MSPB systems, including 
                                                        
906 Statement of Administration Policy, Executive Office of the President, 13 March 2007. 
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the simplification of over complicated procedures, federal employees in the intelligence 
community do not stand to benefit substantially from access to the WPA mechanisms. In 
effect, the employees will receive access to two more potential avenues for disclosure, as 
the current system already allows for direct access to the Inspectors General.  The 
employees would therefore face the same uncertainty both in the general federal 
whistleblowing process as it stands and the difficulties associated with the WPA. It may 
therefore be suggested that the Administration was right in its assertion that the WPEA 
may harm national security; however this would be because faced with a weak and 
uncertain whistleblowing mechanism it is more likely that members of the intelligence 
community would choose to make unauthorised disclosures to the media. 
 
6.5 Canada 
 
In Canada the advancement of whistleblowing provisions for the National Security and 
Law Enforcement agencies was prompted after a number of damaging instances of 
corruption. The Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) is the national police service 
of Canada. The service is unique in that it has a responsibility at national, federal, 
provincial and municipal level.
907
 Prior to 1984, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police 
Security Service dealt with matters relating to national security and intelligence, with 
counter intelligence matters being handled by the RCMP’s Special Branch.908 However, 
after a number of allegations surfaced in the 1970s, the McDonald Commission
909
 was 
established. Upon reporting in 1981 the Commission identified a number of instances of 
serious wrongdoing by the service in its attempts to deal with Quebec seperatives. This 
                                                        
907 For further information of the role see: About the RCMP, Royal Canadian Mounted Police Website:  
http://www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/about/index_e.htm (accessed 19/03/08). 
908 For a potted history of the RCMP see RCMP:A Brief History, June 22nd 2005, CBC News Website: 
http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/rcmp/ (accessed 19/03/08). 
909 The Royal Commission of Inquiry into Certain Activities of the RCMP, Established 1977. 
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included breaking in to the offices of Parti Québécois (a party which campaigns for 
national sovereignty for Quebec), theft of a membership list, conducting illegal bugging 
activities, opening mail, forging documents and burning a barn where the Black Panther 
Party (a far left movement which campaigned for African-American civil rights) and a 
Marxist terrorist group called Front de Libération du Québec were intending to meet.  
The McDonald report recommended that the RCMP be detached of national security 
responsibilities and that a civilian agency should be formed to deal with matters of 
intelligence and national security. The Canadian Security Intelligence Act came into 
force in 1984 and established the Canadian Security Intelligence Service.
910
 
In the present day, the RCMP has resumed a degree of responsibilities relating to 
national security matters. In the post 9/11 era, the RCMP has continued investigate 
counter-terrorism matters under the guise of ‘National Security Criminal Investigations’ 
(NSCI). The RCMP asserts that the statutory mandate for this is governed by S6 (1) 
Security Offences Act 1985, although the statutory power is by no means comprehensive 
and does not identify specific operational duties.
911
 Instead section 6 requires the RCMP 
to perform duties in relation to an offence in section two which states: 
“(a) the alleged offence arises out of conduct constituting a threat to the security 
of Canada within the meaning of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act…” 
 
From the above section it is clear that despite the desire of the RCMP to no longer be 
involved in national security activities, it has been doing so since 1985. This change of 
stance is no doubt a response to the bombing of an Air India flight which had flown from 
                                                        
910Ibid Second Report Volume Two,754 and S.Farson, Canada’s Long Road from model Lawe to Effective 
Political Oversight of Security Intelligence, in H.Born, L.Johnson, and I.Leigh, Who’s Watching the Spies? 
Establishing Intelligence Service Accountability (Potomatic Books, Dulles Virginia, 2005) 99. 
911 Section 6, “ (1) Members of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police who are peace officers have the 
primary responsibility to perform the duties that are assigned to peace officers in relation to any offence 
referred to in section 2 or the apprehension of the commission of such an offence.”  
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Montreal Airport on 23
rd
 June 1985. In the continuing inquiry it has been widely alleged 
that the security failings at Montreal Airport in 1985 were a result of a lack of 
cooperation between CSIS and the RCMP.
912
 
 
The current working relationship between the two agencies appears to be far more 
cooperative. The RCMP is reliant on CSIS for the ‘significant portion’ of national 
security information and intelligence that it receives and acts upon.  Consequentially, the 
fact that CSIS exists as a civilian agency, means that it needs the arrest powers of the 
RCMP to work effectively. This is a similar situation to the UK relationship between 
MI5 and the Metropolitan Police’s Special Branch. The cooperation is further bolstered 
by a secondment programme. However, Collins suggests that CSIS has suffered criticism 
‘since its inception’ and that most recently this criticism stems from an ‘inability to cope’ 
with the threat of terrorism.
913
  
 
6.5.1 Internal Accountability of RCMP: A failure to adequately investigate. 
 
There have been a number of instances of corruption and failings which have involved 
the leaking of information or whistleblowing within the RCMP. The most notable case 
involved the RCMP pension scheme. Denise Revine, a Human Resources director for the 
RCMP discovered that managers were using the RCMP’s pension plan to cipher off 
millions of Canadian dollars to not only pay for ‘operational expenses’ such as laptop 
computers but for overpriced contracts that were awarded to families and friends of the 
                                                        
912 Commission of Inquiry  into the Investigation of the Bombing of Air India Flight 182 see website: 
http://www.majorcomm.ca/en/index.asp (accessed 12/01/10). 
913 D.Collins, Spies Like Them: The Canadian Security Intelligence Service and Its Place in World 
Intelligence, [2002] 24 Sydney L. Rev. 505.  
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individuals concerned.
914
 Revine then reported the information to the then head of the 
RCMP Giuliano Zaccardelli who promised an investigation. In the mean time, 
unconnected to Revine, Staff Sergeant John Lewis made several complaints about a 
person who it later emerged had significant involvement with the scandal Lewis reported 
his concerns to Zaccardelli but these were ignored.  
 
Zaccardelli instigated a criminal investigation into the pension scandal; however he later 
decided to drop the investigation in favour of an internal audit. The Auditor-General also 
conducted a probe and the Ottawa Police also investigated. However, whilst evidence of 
wrongdoing was found, involving a number of high ranking officials within RCMP, 
there were no formal punishments or sanctions of any kind. An independent 
investigation was later instigated by the public accounts committee. The report of the 
investigation which was published in July 2007 found significant failings in the RCMP’s 
internal whistleblowing provisions.
915
 The new RCMP Commissioner, William Elliot 
has stated that he intends to change the institutional culture of the service to encourage 
whistleblowers and that this would mean opening up communications for people to come 
forward.
916
 The Commissioner has designated a task force to investigate this, however at 
the time of writing no significant findings or changes to the structure have been reported.  
 
6.5.2 External Accountability and whistleblowing: RCMP and CSIS 
 
It should be noted that the former RCMP Commissioner, Giuliano Zaccardelli resigned 
                                                        
914K May, Pensions Crisis Strikes at RCMP Core, Vancouver Sun, Saturday, April 14, 2007. 
915 See: A Matter of Trust: Report of the Independent Investigator. 
into Matters Relating to RCMP Pension and Insurance Plans, available via: 
http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/rcmppension-retraitegrc/_fl/report-en.pdf See also Caslon Analytics Guide: 
http://www.caslon.com.au/whistlecasesnote5.htm (accessed 10/09/09). 
 
916See further: New RCMP Commissioner to encourage Whistleblowers, Ottawa Press, September 7th 2007. 
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his post before having to give evidence before a Commission investigating the 
circumstances behind the detention and torture of Meher Arar. Meher Arar, a Canadian 
Citizen formerly of Syria, had been wrongly identified by the RCMP as an Al Qaeda 
suspect. In 2002, upon returning from a family holiday, Arar made a stopover in New 
York. He was detained by the United States Immigration and Naturalisation Service 
(INS), after receiving information from the RCMP. Despite being in ownership of a 
Canadian passport, Canadian officials informed the INS that Arar was no longer a citizen 
of Canada. Arar was deported to his native country of Syria where he was tortured whilst 
questioned as to his alleged involvement in terrorist activities. Upon being allowed to 
return to Canada, Arar mounted a legal challenge against the Canadian and United States 
governments.  After an RCMP internal investigation and an external Inquiry instigated 
by the Canadian Government the RCMP was forced to apologise, yet failed to hold the 
officers responsible to account.  
 
The Arar inquiry report detailed significant failings in the external accountability of the 
RCMP’s national security activities.917 The Commissioner of the Inquiry stated that the 
need for an external review mechanism to review the RCMP’s involvement in national 
security matters had become ‘overwhelming.’ He recommended that a new mechanism 
called the Independent Complaints and National Security Review Agency for the RCMP 
(ICRA) be formed; however despite Parliamentary discussion no significant changes to 
the external accountability of RCMP have been made. 
 
6.5.3      CSIS: Accountability and Oversight 
 
                                                        
917 Commission of Inquiry into the actions of Canadian Officials in Relation to Meher Arar, 2006. See 
further http://www.sirc-csars.gc.ca/pdfs/cm_arar_bgv1-eng.pdf (accessed 01/10/2010).  
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With regards to the accountability of the Canadian Security and Intelligence Services 
two mechanisms are provided. The first is an internal mechanism provided by the 
Inspector General. Under S.30 CSIS Act, the Inspector General has the function to 
monitor the compliance by the Service of its operational policies, and to review the 
operational activities of the Service. Under S.31 CSIS Act, the Inspector General is 
entitled to any information which is required for the purpose of his investigation and may 
compel members of CSIS to provide him with information if needed.  
 
The Inspector General has a further function in relation to periodical CSIS reports. The 
Director of CSIS is required to submit periodical reports to the relevant minister 
detailing the operational activites of the Service.
918
 The Inspector General will then 
receive a copy of the report and will issue a certificate indicating whether he is satisfied 
with the report of if he is of the opinion that an act detailed in the report is not authorised 
by the Act or that it involves ‘an unreasonable or unnecessary exercise by the Service of 
any of its powers.
919
 
 
The Inspector General is effectively an internal auditor of CSIS
920
 and consequentially 
the Inspector General’s certificate is not released in the public domain.  However, upon 
producing the certificate, he is required ‘as soon as is practicable’ to pass a copy of both 
the certificate and the report to an external review mechanism, the Security and 
Intelligence Review Committee (SIRC).
921
 SIRC can also instruct the Inspector General 
to conduct investigations where necessary. The Committee’s mandate is to review past 
operations of CSIS and also to receive complaints by members of the public.  
                                                        
918 See S.30 CSIS Act. 
919 S.33(2) CSIS Act. 
920 For information on the role of the Inspector General, CSIS, see further Public Safety Canada website: 
http://ww2.ps-sp.gc.ca/igcsis/index_e.asp (accessed 07/09/09). 
921 As per S. 33(3) CSIS Act. 
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6.5.4  SIRC: The Canadian Security Intelligence Review Committee 
 
The Security and Intelligence Review Committee was established in 1984 under s.34 of 
the CSIS Act. Its objectives are to provide an independent and external review 
mechanism which provides oversight of the work of CSIS. Furthermore, it investigates 
complaints from citizens and receives complaints from individuals who have been 
denied security clearance or whose security clearance has been revoked.
922
 The results of 
the Committee’s work are published in an annual report to Parliament. The report is first 
security vetted before reaching the public domain and consequentially some information 
contained in the report will remain secret.
923
 
 
The ability for CSIS employees to make direct complaints to SIRC is not clear and 
requires careful analysis. In Canada national security information is protected by the 
Security of Information Act 2001, which unlike the United Kingdom Official Secrets Act 
1989 contains a public interest defence. Section 15(2) carefully balances the public 
interest in disclosure against the public interest of non-disclosure: 
“(a) the person acts for the purpose of disclosing an offence under an Act of Parliament 
that he or she reasonably believes has been, is being or is about to be committed by 
another person in the purported performance of that person’s duties and functions for, or 
on behalf of, the Government of Canada; and 
(b) the public interest in the disclosure outweighs the public interest in non-disclosure.” 
 
In assessing the balance it is necessary for the court to consider a number of factors such 
as whether the person had reasonable grounds to believe that the disclosure was in the 
                                                        
922 See further Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act 1984, in particular S.38 (a) and S.42 (3) for a 
review of the work of CSIS and general background information see: SIRC, Reflections: Twenty Years of 
Independent External Review of Security Intelligence in Canada, 2005. See also D. Collins Op Cit n.540 
para 3. 
923 See further s.53 CSIS Act and D.Collins Ibid. 
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public interest (s.15 (4) (d)) the seriousness of the alleged offence (s.15 (4) (4)) and the 
extent of the risk of harm created by the disclosure (s.15 (4) (f). Most importantly there 
must be evidence of prior disclosure of the information under s.15 (5) to one of several 
prescribed channels including: 
  “(i) the Security Intelligence Review Committee, if the 
person’s concern relates to an alleged offence that has been, is being or is about to be 
committed by another person in the purported performance of that person’s duties and 
functions of service for, or on behalf of, the Government of Canada, other than a person 
who is a member of the Communications Security Establishment, and he or she has not 
received a response from the Security Intelligence Review Committee within a 
reasonable time…” 
 
The Security and Intelligence Review Committee is therefore, a prescribed avenue to 
receive a whistleblowing complaint from a member of CSIS. However under section 
41(2) CSIS Act 1984: 
 “(2) The Review Committee shall not investigate a complaint in respect of 
which the complainant is entitled to seek redress by means of a grievance procedure 
established pursuant to this Act or the Public Service Labour Relations Act.”    
 
The above passage indicates that SIRC cannot provide protection for employment 
grievances suffered by members of CSIS, yet SIRC identifies on its dedicated website 
that the conditions prescribed by section 41(2) do not prevent the Committee from 
‘investigating cases’ and ‘making findings and recommendations’ where ‘individuals 
feel that they have not had their complaints answered satisfactorily by CSIS.’924 
 
The situation is therefore uncertain as to whether: firstly, SIRC will investigate 
complaints from members of CSIS and secondly, whether they will investigate instances 
of reprisal. It is clear that SIRC has the jurisdiction to investigate complaints relating to 
the revocation of security clearances, which often occurs when employees in the 
                                                        
924 SIRC website accessible via: http://www.sirc-csars.gc.ca/cmpplt/index-eng.html (accessed 07/09/09). 
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intelligence community attempt to blow the whistle. However, it is important to stress 
that any investigations that take place by SIRC will result in recommendations made to 
the Director of CSIS, not corrective action.
925
 
 
The SIRC 1988-1989 annual report identified that the CSIS Act 1984 does not provide 
CSIS employees with protection from whistleblower reprisal and recommended that the 
Act be amended to ensure that any complaints made to SIRC by employees are allowed 
to be made anonymously and that employment protection would be provided for 
employees who make such complaints.
926
 The recommendations have not been 
implemented and the situation continues to remain unclear. Furthermore, the Public 
Service Labour Relations Act does provide protection for employment grievances but 
has no mention of whistleblowing or protection of complaints reporting. CSIS employees 
are therefore put at a significant disadvantage as any employment reprisal complaints 
they do make will not be dealt with by SIRC who not only have experience in 
intelligence and national security matters but unparalleled access to CSIS. There is also a 
clear jurisdictional problem here as any revocation of security clearances as a result of 
reprisals should fall under the very jurisdiction of the Committee prevented from 
investigating employment reprisals, SIRC. 
 
6.6 Conclusion 
 
6.6.1 Theoretical model 
 
The requirements of employment in the Security and Intelligence services place an 
                                                        
925 See further, the Supreme Court decision of Thomson [1992] 1 S.C.R. 385. 
926 See further, SIRC Annual Report 1988-1989, para 14. 
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inevitable limitation on the individual’s right to moral autonomy. The effect of an 
individual choosing to disregard the restrictions imposed on him to exercise his own will 
outside of the ‘closed circle’ imposed by his employers could be detrimental to the public 
interest where the information concerned is harmful. A restriction on the individual’s 
right to moral autonomy may be justified, according to J.S. Mill to prevent harm to 
others, to which Dworkin argues that the state must be able to identify ‘a clear and 
substantial risk’ of great damage to citizens or property. The restriction may also be 
justified in order to maintain loyalty in the service. As Bok argues, it may be disloyal to 
colleagues to raise concerns to the public first without trying to utilise internal 
mechanisms. Given the nature of employment, loyalty to colleagues and the service may 
be considered a prerequisite.  
 
As Bok identifies, state secrecy creates an inevitable conflict between citizens and the 
state. Because the nature of state secrecy places so much power in the hands of the ‘fact 
holders’ there is great potential for abuse of such power. As Aftergood correctly 
identifies, government secrecy may be used to obtain political advantage. It may also be 
used to shield members of the public and those responsible for external oversight of the 
services from information relating to illegal conduct.
927
 The exercise of moral autonomy 
may therefore be required for an individual to voice his concerns to his colleagues and 
superiors to state that he believes a particular course of action may be harmful or wrong. 
On this basis ‘internal dissent’ may be justified. This further provides a strong theoretical 
justification for ‘protest whistleblowing’ whereby the individual identifies that a policy 
decision taken is wrong. Whilst the policy decision may not contain information relating 
to illegality, there may be adverse ethical or public safety issues which may arise if the 
                                                        
927 Above, n 227. 
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consequences of an intended policy are not fully explored.  
 
Unauthorised disclosures to the public may be justified in order to prevent immediate 
harm to individuals. In providing a theoretical justification of necessity, Brudner holds 
that it cannot be used as a justification whereby the individual who breaks the law 
‘imposes grave risks on the health of persons.’928 It is submitted that this reasoning is 
correct and is further supported by Howard Dennis who suggests that it should be for the 
legislature to regulate the ordering of harms with specific defences.
929
 This provides a 
strong theoretical justification for the drafting of a necessity defence, which the author 
suggests should be based on the Canadian Security of Information Act 2001.     
 
It is submitted that, as Howard Dennis suggests, the defence of necessity should be 
confined to circumstances whereby there is either an emergency situation or where there 
is a conflict of duty giving rise to a danger of death or serious injury.  In the security and 
intelligence context, this may include where an employee raises a concern to the public 
about a policy relating to extraordinary rendition and torture. Anonymous unauthorised 
disclosures of this nature must only be justified in the narrowest of circumstances, where 
the whistleblower has genuine fears for his safety. This is because if the individual 
intends to rectify an immediate threat of harm to individuals, he must avail himself to the 
recipients of the messages he is trying to convey. A leak of a document may not have the 
desired effect. If the information is provided to a journalist the correct message may not 
be communicated. An anonymous note may not provide sufficient information.  
 
                                                        
928 Above, n 74. 
929 Above, n 76. 
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The aforementioned analysis is also applicable to considering justifications for civil 
disobedience. This is most relevant where the Crown Servant chooses to breach the 
Official Secrets Act 1989. Whilst the threat may not be immediate, the servant may make 
an unauthorised disclosure of information because he believes a policy decision to be 
wrong. The justification for civil disobedience bears close similarities to protest 
whistleblowing. The information disclosed should be of a high value to the public 
interest. Anonymous acts of civil disobedience must be questioned. As Rawls correctly 
identifies the act of civil disobedience should be in public, not in secret.
930
 In order for 
the act to be justified to society, the whistleblower should make himself known in order 
for the source’s motives to be challenged. This discussion will now proceed to discuss the 
legal model.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7.6.1 Legal model  
 
Before considering the legal model it is necessary to consider whether the Guja v 
Moldova framework may be applied to employees working in the Security and 
Intelligence Services. The leading Strasbourg decision on national security employment 
is Hadjianastassiou v Greece. In this decision the applicant was a Greek airforce officer 
who published an article in a journal detailing missile technology for a fee. The applicant 
was convicted for breaching official secrecy. In conducting the proportionality analysis to 
determine whether a breach of art.10 had occurred, the Strasbourg court did not consider 
the public interest value of the information disclosed. Instead, the court focussed upon the 
                                                        
930 Above, n 82. 
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fact that the information disclosed identified technical details regarding a weapon which 
could cause ‘serious damage to national security.’ The court also focussed upon the duty 
of confidence owed by the applicant. The ECtHR held that the court had not overstepped 
the limits of the margin of appreciation which must be left to domestic courts regarding 
matters of national security.  
 
It is submitted that the court in making its ruling failed conduct sufficient analysis of the 
information disclosed. Whilst the court correctly identified that domestic authorities are 
provided with a margin of appreciation with regards to national security matters, by 
failing to accurately assess the information the court could not determine whether the 
information was capable of being harmful to national security. In keeping with existing 
values determined in a number of decided cases, the court should have determined 
whether the public in the disclosure outweighed the public interest in non-disclosure. 
Hadjianastassiou may be further distinguished from Guja v Moldova. The Court in 
Hadjianastassiou had to rule on a situation whereby the applicant had published an article 
for profit. In contrast the Court in Guja v Moldova identified that the case had been the 
first time that the ECtHR was required to make a ruling on a situation regarding 
whistleblowing. Whilst it is recognised that the European Court of Human Rights is not 
required to follow precedent, it is submitted that in cases involving whistleblowing, the 
Guja v Moldova framework should be used. The framework most closely aligns with 
art.10 values by allowing for a determination of the public interest value in the 
information disclosed. It is only after making this determination that the court hold 
whether or not the domestic authority has overstepped its margin of appreciation.  
 
In applying the Guja v Moldova framework, the Court will be required to make a 
determination as to whether alternative channels for raising the concerns were available 
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and whether those channels where effective. The ECtHR drew upon both materials from 
the United Nations and the Council of Europe in order to determine that the state of 
Moldova should have provided procedures and protection for whistleblowers. It is 
therefore submitted that the following recommendation by the United Nations Special 
Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights while Countering 
Terrorism is relevant to this analysis:  
 
“Practice 18. There are internal procedures in place for members of intelligence 
services to report wrongdoing. These are complemented by an independent body that has 
a mandate and access to the necessary information to fully investigate and take action to 
address wrongdoing when internal procedures have proved inadequate. Members of 
intelligence services who, acting in good faith, report wrongdoing are legally protected 
from any form of reprisal. These protections extend to disclosures made to the media or 
the public at large if they are made as a last resort and pertain to matters of significant 
public concern.”931 
 
It is further identified that the Council of Europe Resolution 1729 requires that 
whistleblowing provisions should be comprehensive and should extend to the security 
and intelligence services.
932
 It is submitted, as the aforementioned analysis has identified, 
that the available mechanisms appear to fall far short of the recommended best practice. 
 
The operation of the concern reporting mechanism available to members of the UK 
Intelligence and Security Services is not well publicised. Whilst this may be for the 
legitimate aim of safeguarding national security, it is difficult to assess whether the role 
of staff counsellor is fit for purpose. In the absence of official information critical 
analysis can be found in media reports or by accounts of former officials who have 
                                                        
931 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms while countering terrorism, Compilation of good practices on legal and institutional frameworks 
and measures that ensure respect for human rights by intelligence agencies while countering terrorism, 
including on their oversight,  2010:  http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G10/134/10/PDF/G1013410.pdf?OpenElement (accessed 06/02/12). 
932 Accessible via: http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link=/Documents/AdoptedText/ta10/ERES1729.htm 
(accessed 06/02/12). 
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chosen to bypass the staff counsellor in favour of unauthorised disclosures. Information 
provided in the recent ISC annual report regarding the establishment of an ‘Ethical 
Counsellor’ for MI5 is a positive step in the right direction, however there is no 
information of the Counsellor’s role in relation to the Staff Counsellor, or indeed 
whether the role of the Staff Counsellor has been replaced.  
 
One of the key arguments against the inclusion of a public interest defence in the Official 
Secrets Act 1989 was that the Services had a staff counsellor in order to raise concerns, 
the role of the Staff Counsellor is therefore most important as he is meant to provide the 
clear alternative to making an unauthorised disclosure. The staff counsellor was meant to 
act as a conduit between the Servant and the respective agency head, or the Prime 
Minister, in deal with any alleged malpractice. It is most alarming therefore that the Staff 
Counsellor appears to have no input in the work of the Intelligence and Security 
Committee. If the Staff Counsellor is effective in his role, he could surely assist the ISC 
in holding the Security and Intelligence Services to account.  
 
The following table (overleaf) displays the available statutory whistleblowing provisions 
from other jurisdictions. The table is not intended to be exhaustive of all mechanisms 
available but acts as a comparator the ISC. 
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It can be observed that the New Zealand IGIS has both the capacity to receive 
whistleblowing concerns and to independently investigate. The New Zealand model is 
the most useful comparator as the Protected Disclosures Act was modelled on the UK 
Public Interest Disclosure Act. The PDA (NZ) goes much further than PIDA (UK) by 
including employees of the NZ Security and Intelligence Services. The PDA is 
procedurally rigid by comparison to PIDA which does not require employees to exhaust 
internal mechanisms or follow strictly prescribed mechanisms to obtain protection. The 
consequence of this rigidity is that it is much easier to legislate for national security 
whistleblowing because in order to qualify as a protected disclosure the employee must 
exhaust the stages prescribed in the Act. Most importantly, the New Zealand Inspector 
General has both the capacity to receive and investigate the complaints. The UK 
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Intelligence and Security Committee does not have the jurisdiction to conduct either 
functions. 
 
The Australian position is a little more uncertain as it is effectively up to the Director 
General of the respective agency to decide what internal provisions are implemented to 
mirror the protections available to public servants not involved in national security 
mechanisms. Like the NZ IGIS, the Australian IGIS can receive whistleblower 
complaints from employees.  
 
Employees who report concerns to the IGIS have a degree of protection from civil action 
but unlike their New Zealand counterparts do not have any protection from criminal 
action.  In a submission to the House of Representatives Standing Committee on Legal 
and Constitutional Affairs the current IGIS, Ian Carnell suggested that if new public 
interest disclosure provisions are implemented for Commonwealth employees, s.33 of 
the IGIS Act could be expanded allow for protection from criminal actions. Carnell said 
that he believed the IGIS is the correct external body to receive concerns but that he 
would support the setting up of an internal agency for employees to go to with an 
obligation for the agency to report concerns to the IGIS.
933
 Carnell also said that the IGIS 
and his staff speak regularly at induction courses and at seminars for the intelligence 
services and would be willing to conduct training on public interest disclosures.
934
  
 
The submission of the Australian IGIS identifies the level of access that he and his staff 
                                                        
933 http://www.aph.gov.au/house/committee/laca/whistleblowing/subs/sub003.pdf  at 9 (accessed 04/05/10) 
934 Ibid at 12. Note that the Committee has recommended that a new Commonwealth Public Interest 
Disclosure Bill includes a provision for protected disclosures to be made by employees of the Security and 
Intelligence services to either the IGIS or the Commonwealth Ombudsman, this would expand the current 
role of the Ombudsman in intelligence matters as he may currently consult with the IGIS but cannot receive 
concerns from employees of the Australian Intelligence Community. Following the Committee report a 
draft Bill has been proposed but is yet to be published.  
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have to the Intelligence and Security Agencies. Carnell states that all of his staff at the 
IGIS have been vetted to Top Secret level thorough positive vetting. It is clear that the 
IGIS would not have had the same level of access to the agencies without such high 
clearance. In comparison the Intelligence and Security Committee, whilst notified under 
the Official Secrets Act 1989 are not subject to security vetting.
935
 Parliamentary 
Committees are often not subject to security vetting because it is argued that to provide 
such vetting would remove the degree of independence.  
 
Despite multiple mechanisms available to employees of the US intelligence community, 
critics have argued that there is a lack of protection for employees to speak up. US 
employees do however have access to the various Inspector Generals and may, with 
consent, approach the Congressional Intelligence Committees. The Canadian model 
whilst uncertain does provide scope for employees to raise concerns. Furthermore 
regardless of the provisions available employees have the benefit of a public interest 
defence, built into their official secrets legislation. It is recommended that the United 
Kingdom provide a public interest defence based upon this model.
936
 
 
It is most apparent, that despite criticisms of the accountability mechanisms in other 
jurisdictions, a common feature is that employees have access to the independent 
mechanism. The ISC must therefore take more of an active role in the work of the staff 
counsellor and or the respective ethical counsellor. 
 
One must ask why employees of the UK intelligence community have been exempted 
from PIDA. At the very least inclusion of a special provision in PIDA for employees 
                                                        
935 See answer to question by Jacqui Smith MP, HC Debs 7 May 2009, Col 433.  
936 See further below. 
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who report concerns to the Staff Counsellor would be a positive first step.  
 
The New Zealand mechanism illustrates that employment protection for whistleblowers 
can be provided and that the concern itself can be raised in controlled channels. The next 
stage would be to develop an effective parliamentary oversight mechanism. The ISC 
cannot function to its full potential without an inspector. It is submitted that this role 
should be enshrined in statute, not to restrict the function of the role of inspector or the 
ISC, which has to a certain extent evolved beyond its statutory remit since its inception, 
but to ensure that an inspector is permanently in place. An alternative recommendation 
would be to formalise the role of the Staff Counsellor, attach his position to the ISC and 
replace the inspector, thus providing both the investigatory capacity and link to the ISC.  
 
Whilst it is understood that to give employees of the Security and Intelligence Services 
the employment protection and mechanisms to report concerns may be seen as a 
significant and perhaps unwelcome reform, one must address the recent situation 
whereby employees of the services have been leaking to opposition MP David Davis. 
The consequences of such leaks are not only bad for the reputation of the services and a 
potential risk to national security but are recognition of the failure of available 
mechanisms to adequately deal with whistleblower concerns and to hold the services to 
account.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
 
FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND LAWFULL DISSENT IN THE ARMED FORCES  
 
The purpose of this chapter is to consider the position of armed forces personnel as 
whistleblowers. The motivation for considering the position of members of the armed 
forces can be found in the fact that members of the armed forces are considered to be 
Crown servants by virtue of section 12 Official Secrets Act 1989. Furthermore, like their 
counterparts in the security and intelligence services, members of the armed forces are 
excluded from the whistleblowing protections provided by the Public Interest Disclosure 
Act 1998.
937
  
 
This chapter shall provide an analysis, firstly of the nature and protection of freedom of 
speech in the armed forces. It shall then consider procedures with regards to available 
complaints mechanisms and with it the involvement of independent oversight bodies. 
The chapter will also provide a comparative analysis of complaints and oversight 
mechanisms in other jurisdictions, together with the consideration of freedom of speech 
and level of authorised dissent within those jurisdictions. It is suggested that the free 
speech of armed forces personnel is of a particular value, as servicemen offer a unique 
viewpoint and specialist knowledge of matters which are of vital national interest.  
 
It will become apparent to the reader that the issue of discipline and adherence to 
authority are features which are fundamental to the structure, safety, security and 
                                                        
937  Members of the armed forces are excluded from the employment rights afforded by PIDA by virtue of 
s.192 Employment Rights Act 1996. For a comprehensive overview of the position of armed forces 
personnel as Crown servants see: P. Rowe, Military Servants, in  M.Sunkin and S.Payne, The Nature of the 
Crown: A Legal and Political Analysis (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1999) 297. 
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everyday running of the armed forces. It should therefore be observed that whilst this 
chapter deals with a number of different issues arising from the question of freedom of 
speech in the armed forces, the consideration of discipline remains a constant, underlying 
feature.     
 
It is necessary to identify that the rights of armed forces personnel can be observed in 
two forums: the first, in a wartime situation, and secondly, what may be referred to as 
‘back at the barracks.’ The practical purpose of these distinctions shall become clear at 
several points during the analysis; however one must not consider the human rights 
protection or indeed the potential for abuse of those rights in isolation. In recent years the 
question of human rights and controversial allegations of abuse in the United Kingdom 
armed forces have crossed both forums.
938
  
 
There is a notable distinction between the ‘civilian’ Crown servant and a member of the 
armed forces. The armed forces are reliant upon a hierarchical command structure to 
maintain efficiency. Based upon rank, the structure requires subordinates to obey the 
orders of a superior officer. The structure also allows for ‘administrative action’ or 
                                                        
938  It has recently been identified that the Human Rights Act may have jurisdiction for serving armed forces 
personnel abroad, however this will depend on the particular circumstance of the case. In R (Al-Skeini and 
others) v Secretary of State for Defence [2007] UKHL 26 it was held that the Human Rights Act had extra-
territorial jurisdiction in relation to the abuse of prisoners in a UK run prison in Iraq. In R(Catherine Smith) 
v The Assistant Deputy Coroner for Oxfordshire and  The Secretary of State for Defence v The Assistant 
Deputy Coroner for Oxfordshire [2006] EWHC 694 (Admin) it was held that Article 2 ECHR, the right to 
life, applied to UK armed forces personnel serving abroad “wherever he or she may be,” however particular 
emphasis was given throughout the judgement that the applicability of the Human Rights Act and 
Convention rights was dependent on the ‘particular facts of the case’ (see for example para 20 of the 
judgement). The Court of Appeal later upheld the decision of the lower court. However, the decision was 
overturned by the Supreme Court, the court ruling that the Human Rights Act only applies to servicemen 
abroad whilst on an army base, it does not extend to when they go off the base. See R(on the application of 
Smith) (FC) (Respondent) v Secretary of State for Defence (Appellant) and another [2010] UKSC 29. 
For an inquiry into the abuse of prisoners see the Aitkin Report, available online: 
http://www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/7AC894D3-1430-4AD1-911F-8210C3342CC5/0/aitken_rep.pdf 
(accessed 06/10/09). 
 450 
 
 
punishments to be considered by superior officers for matters relating to discipline.
939
 
Therefore, whereas a Civil Servant would be subject to obligations prescribed by the 
criminal law and by the Civil Service Code, the military justice system is structured to 
deal with both matters of criminal law and discipline, by way of court martial or by 
‘administrative action.’940  
 
Chapter one of this thesis identified that it may be acceptable to restrict freedom of 
expression for the following reasons: firstly, where the information pertains to national 
security or operational information and the disclosure of such information may cause 
grave harm to individuals and property.
941
Secondly, because of the nature of work in the 
armed forces, restriction may be considered necessary to prevent insubordinate or overtly 
political expression.
942
  
 
It will be observed that there are a number of mechanisms available in the United 
Kingdom jurisdiction to enforce restrictions which take a number of different approaches 
and which utilise the aforementioned military justice system to full effect. 
 
7.1 Part One: Disclosures made in the Public Domain 
 
7.1.1 National Security and Protection of Operational Information. 
 
                                                        
939For discussion of this in relation to the human rights of armed forces personnel see: P. Rowe, The Impact 
of Human Rights Law on Armed Forces (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2006) 7. 
 
941 Theoretical justifications may be identified in the work of Dworkin argues that such limitations may be 
justified if the state demonstrates ‘a clear and substantial risk to the person or property of others. Above, n 
31, 204. 
942 This may be identified as a voluntary restriction of art.10 rights, for further discussion see below. 
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The Queen’s Regulations for the Army state that: 
  “Every officer is responsible for ensuring that all persons 
under his command are acquainted with the provisions of the Official Secrets Act 1911-
1989, and with the need for strict compliance with those provisions. All personnel are to 
be reminded annually of their responsibilities under the Acts. On joining and leaving the 
Regular Services all personnel will sign declarations regarding the Official Secrets Act 
on Ministry of Defence Forms 134 and 135 respectively.”943 
 
Section 42 Armed Forces Act 2006 reaffirms this position by expressly incorporating the 
Official Secrets Acts by extending all acts ‘punishable by the law of England and Wales’ 
into the jurisdiction of the armed forces.
944
 
 
It can be identified that the Official Secrets Acts impose extensive restrictions on the 
communication of information obtained in an official capacity. Section 1 Official Secrets 
Act 1911, gives a broad definition of the act of spying which includes the 
communication of information which is intended to be ‘directly or indirectly useful to 
the enemy.’945  
 
The Official Secrets Act 1989 contains specific provisions relating to the work of the 
armed forces. Section 2 provides that a disclosure is damaging if it: 
  “(a) It damages the capability of, or of any part of, the 
armed forces of the Crown to carry out their tasks or leads to loss of life or injury to 
members of those forces or serious damage to the equipment or installations of those 
forces; or 
(b) ...it endangers the interests of the United Kingdom abroad, seriously obstructs the 
promotion or protection by the United Kingdom of those interests or endangers the 
safety of British citizens abroad.” 
 
Section 3 OSA 1989 identifies an implied obligation for armed forces personnel with 
regard to foreign relations. In particular s.3 (2) (a) states that a disclosure is damaging if: 
                                                        
943  See further: The Queen’s Regulations for the Army, Official Information and Public Relations, Chapter 
12, J12.001. 
944Section 42 Armed Forces Act 2006, see in particular S.42(1).  
945Section 1 Armed Forces Act 2006 also contains a separate provision with regard to ‘assisting an enemy.’ 
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  “It endangers the interests of the United Kingdom abroad, 
seriously disrupts the promotion or protection by the United Kingdom or endangers the 
safety of British citizens abroad.” 
 
With regard to joint operations, for example those conducted by NATO section 6 OSA 
protects information entrusted in confidence to other States or international 
organisations. 
 
Despite wide-ranging statutory restrictions, the government has, on occasion failed to 
prosecute or prevent the unlawful disclosure of official information. One unsuccessful 
attempt to proceed in a prosecution for breaching the Official Secrets Act concerns an 
Army whistleblower. Using the pseudonym Martin Ingram, the soldier contributed to a 
series of articles in the Sunday Times which detailed the activities of the Force Research 
Unit, a covert army intelligence unit, during the late 1980s and early 1990s.
946
 Ingram’s 
allegations prompted a police investigation into the claims, headed by the then 
Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police, Sir John Stevens which focused upon the 
alleged collusion between members of army intelligence and loyalist paramilitaries in the 
murder of a Belfast solicitor, Pat Finucane.
947
  
 
The most common problem posed for successive governments, has been the publication 
of memoirs of former servicemen for commercial purposes. The first case worthy of note 
concerns the controversy surrounding the sinking of the General Belgrano by the 
submarine HMS Conqueror during the Falklands Conflict in 1982.
948
 Following the 
sinking, Lieutenant Sethia a junior officer on board the submarine released a diary 
                                                        
946 See, N. Hopkins and R. Norton-Taylor, Army Whistleblower will not be Prosecuted, Guardian, 30th 
November, 2000. 
947 Despite drawing reference to the information, the Stevens Enquiry (sic) did not interview Ingram and did 
not discuss the incidents arising from the disclosure of information. See further The Stevens Enquiry (sic) 
Report, 17th April 2003. 
948 Sethia v Stern, The Times, 4th November, 1987. 
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detailing his experiences during the conflict. Sethia passed the diary to Simon O’Keefe, a 
fellow officer on the Conqueror whose father was in publishing. O’Keefe then passed the 
diary on to Tam Dalyell MP. The contents of the diary were deemed particularly 
valuable as it had been announced in Parliament in 1984 by the then Defence Secretary 
Michael Heseltine that the submarine’s naval log had gone missing. After extracts from 
the diary were published in The Observer, Sethia issued proceedings for liable and 
breach of copyright against the newspaper. Sethia then issued liable proceedings against 
the Mail on Sunday and the Sun newspapers after it was alleged that the stolen navel log 
had been recovered from Mr Sethia’s possession.  
 
During the case, the defendants had the intention to rely upon the diary for the defence of 
justification. It was then that a Public Interest Immunity Certificate was issued by the 
Treasury Solicitor on Behalf of the Defence Secretary, George Younger. He argued that 
disclosure of the information would cause ‘unquantifiable damage’ to the ‘operational 
capability’ of nuclear submarines. Despite acknowledging that the extracts had already 
been published by the newspapers Younger argued that it would be ‘contrary to the 
national interest on the grounds of national security’ to compare the authenticity of the 
passages. The parties agreed to the certificate and Sethia was awarded £260,000, a then 
record amount of damages.
949
 
 
The circumstances surrounding the case are particularly interesting. During the 
proceedings Patrick Milmo QC, counsel for Mr Sethia identified a number of sources 
whereby the detail in the diary had been readily accessible to the public domain, 
including articles in newspapers, books and television programmes. Michael Hill QC 
                                                        
949 See further: 260,000 pound damages for Belgrano man, The Times, 14 November 1987 (author 
unknown).  
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argued that there was ‘no difference’ between Mr Sethia taking the naval log and ‘his 
receiving information from the log to put in his diary.’ By agreeing to the consent order 
Mr Sethia did not pursue the disclosure of the information subject to the Public Interest 
Immunity Certificate but instead sought to clarify that agreement to the certificate did 
not mean that the parties agreed to the contents of the certificate or that the matters in the 
certificate were true.
950
 
 
From the information given, it may be arguable that due to the loss of the naval log, the 
diary contained details which could have assisted the opposition MPs or indeed members 
of the public in ascertaining the correct facts surrounding the Belgrano sinking in order 
to hold the government to account. This position is reflected in a point of order raised by 
George Foulkes MP with the Speaker of the House of Commons.
951
 The effects of the 
Belgrano diary case raises the question of whether certain information can be shielded 
from the public domain, regardless of the fact that the information is readily accessible to 
those able to purchase a newspaper.  
 
Following the 1991 Gulf War, some former members of the Special Air Services (SAS) 
chose to publish their own accounts of a failed mission whilst acting as a patrol with the 
call sign ‘Bravo Two Zero.’ In 1993, a former soldier using the pseudonym Andy 
McNabb published a book entitled Bravo Two Zero which later resulted in a television 
film. In 1995, another soldier using the pseudonym Chris Ryan published his version of 
the events in a book entitled The One that Got Away which was also made into a film 
made for television. Both accounts appeared to differ somewhat from each other. It was 
                                                        
950 See S.Herbert, Law Report: Diary Details not the Issue, The Guardian, 2nd November 1987. 
951 This position is reflected in a point of order raised by George Foulkes MP with the Speaker of the House 
of Commons Hansard, HC Debs, 27 November 1984, vol. 68, col 782-3. 
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at this point that some members of the SAS who believed that the writers had not told the 
correct facts and that some of the events detailed were entirely fictitious urged the 
Ministry of Defence to correct the errors in the public domain.
952
 The Ministry of 
Defence failed to provide the corrections and to suppress the disclosure of the 
information.  
 
The controversial actions of McNabb and Ryan prompted the SAS Regimental 
Association to conduct a poll of its members as to whether binding contracts preventing 
unauthorised disclosure should be introduced. 96.8% of the respondents favoured the 
contracts and in 1996, the Ministry of Defence introduced them.
953
 Failure to agree to 
sign the contracts would result in the soldier being ‘returned to unit’ meaning that he 
would become an ordinary soldier in the position he was in before joining the Special 
Forces regiment, thus returning to a lower rate of pay, and loosing the prestige associated 
with the position.  
 
Most notably, information of the exact content of the aforementioned confidentiality 
contract would not have been published in the public domain had it not been for the case 
of ‘Mike Coburn.’954 Coburn was a serving SAS soldier from New Zealand who was 
also present on the Bravo Two Zero patrol. After signing the contract during active 
service, Coburn decided to leave the SAS and then write his own book entitled Soldier 
Five: The Real Truth about the Bravo Two Zero Mission.  
                                                        
952 For a detailed account of this see: R v Her Majesty’s Attorney-General for England and Wales 
Respondent from the Court of Appeal of New Zealand, Privy Council, Appeal No 61/2002 delivered 17th 
March 2003.  
953 Ibid  
954 A pseudonym.  
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After the UK publisher Holder & Stoughton sent a copy of the manuscript to the 
Ministry of Defence for approval, the Attorney-General issued proceedings in the High 
Court of New Zealand for Breach of Confidence to restrain publication, to obtain 
damages and any available profits.
955
 Coburn then pleaded that he had signed the 
contract under military orders and this had amounted to duress or undue influence.  
 
The High Court (NZ) agreed with Coburn. Most interestingly, Salmon J identified that 
the relationship between the soldier and his superior officers gave rise to the presumption 
of undue influence, which means that a contract should not be allowed to stand if consent 
has been obtained through unacceptable means. This was further propounded by the fact 
that he was not given the opportunity to seek legal advice and was prevented from 
having a copy of the contract.  
 
The Court of Appeal (NZ) disagreed with the decision that the signing of the contract 
was a ‘military order.’ It was considered that the soldier had the choice between either 
signing the contract or being returned to his unit. Whilst this put considerable pressure 
on him, this pressure was not unlawful. Coburn appealed to the Privy Council whereby 
the Court of Appeal decision was upheld. It was considered that the MOD was 
‘reasonably entitled’ to regard anyone ‘unwilling to sign the contract’ as ‘unsuitable for 
the ‘SAS.’956 The Privy Council’s reasoning reflects jurisprudence both of the European 
Court of Human Rights and U.S. Supreme Court which identifies that if a person chooses 
to be employed in a specific role, he must accept the limitations on his freedom of 
expression which arise from it.  
                                                        
955 Ibid 
956 Ibid para 18. 
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In upholding the Court of Appeal’s (NZ) decision, the Privy Council refused the 
injunction, instead awarding the MOD with all proceeds from the sale of the book.
957
 
This had the effect of allowing the publication of the material in the public domain, 
whilst recognising the importance and validity of the contract in question by not 
allowing ‘Coburn’ to profit the disclosures. The Privy Council drew reference to Tipping 
J’s comments in the Court of Appeal (NZ) judgment which identified that ‘the particular 
and unusual circumstances’ justified a decision not to allow the injunction. It can 
therefore be observed that there was a clear public interest in allowing the general public 
to hear an alternative and conflicting account of the events surrounding the ‘Bravo Two 
Zero’ mission but that the court also recognised the importance of the confidentiality 
contracts in preventing former members of the SAS from profiting from their 
experiences.  
 
The judgment does however identify that use of the confidentiality contracts as a means 
to protect operational information is far from certain. The contracts provide the Ministry 
of Defence with a civil mechanism with which to apply to suppress the information and 
seek damages yet it is up to the court to decide, on the individual circumstances of the 
case whether or not the information will be suppressed. This mechanism can be 
contrasted with the criminal law protection of the Official Secrets Act 1989.  
 
With regard to the national security or operational information protected by the Act, 
                                                        
957 A useful comparison of this is the US case of Snepp v United States (1980) 444 U.S. 507. The case 
concerned a former CIA employee who had written a book about the agency’s activities in Vietnam and 
failed to seek approval before publication, contrary to the confidentiality contract he had signed. The court 
denied Snepp with the royalties from the book for not seeking prior approval. It was held that this did not 
amount to a breach of First Amendment rights due to the fact that Snepp had breached the constructive trust 
between himself and the government which had jeopardised the safety of CIA operatives. 
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there is no such degree of latitude or judicial discretion. The content of the information 
concerned is irrelevant, the mere fact that a person has disclosed the information is 
sufficient to bring a prosecution under the Act. Therefore in terms of a mechanism to 
protect against the unauthorised disclosure of national security and operational 
information, the Official Secrets Act 1989 at least in codified form, provides an 
enhanced degree of certainty in comparison to the use of confidentiality contracts.  
 
In the Privy Council judgment, Lord Scott of Foscote dissented. He focussed directly 
upon the nature of the command structure and the constitutional position of armed forces 
personnel as servants of the Crown. He argued that: 
  “The appellant was not…an unworldly man in a secluded 
religious order. He was a soldier in a highly trained and efficient fighting unit. The 
essence of efficiency in a military unit is obedience to orders. The armed forces operate 
on a hierarchical basis. Each rank looks to the rank above for direction and, having 
received that direction is expected to comply with it. It is…entirely artificial to draw 
sharp distinctions between orders from senior officers… breach of which will be an 
offence under military law… and ‘orders’ couched as requests or recommendations…It 
is to be born in mind that members of Her Majesty’s Armed Services do not, unlike 
ordinary employees, enter into contract with their employers… and can be dismissed by 
the Royal Prerogative. It is their agreement to serve, not any contract, that subjects them 
to… discipline and military law.”958 
 
Lord Scott’s understanding of the relationship between the superior and subordinate 
ranks needs careful consideration. There is an established command structure in place in 
the UK Armed Forces, the basis of which armed forces personnel are employed at the 
pleasure of the royal prerogative. Whilst this factor distinguishes armed forces personnel 
from their counterparts in other sectors of Crown service, there are significant examples 
from decided case law which suggest that Crown servants do have a contract of 
employment, or may have a contract of employment depending upon the context of the 
situation. In relation to breach of confidence proceedings and national security the 
                                                        
958 Ibid, paras 44-45. 
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Spycatcher judgements are particularly relevant.
959
 It was held that despite the existence 
of a contract of employment with the Crown, a duty of confidence existed, arising from 
the nature of the employment (as a member of the Security Service MI5) and the duty to 
protect national security information. 
 
The question of whether or not a contract of employment exists between the Crown and 
her servants has been debated in a number of decided cases. The issue has continually 
arisen in judicial review proceedings whereby successive governments have identified 
the existence of a contractual relationship in order to prevent the Crown servant from 
obtaining access to judicial review. However, successive governments have also 
capitalised on the uncertainty surrounding the status of Crown employees by denying the 
existence of a contractual relationship to provide a favourable outcome in civil actions 
against the Crown. Whilst one cannot predict the exact course of action the Crown would 
take in future breach of confidence proceedings against a member of the Special Forces, 
it is submitted as highly likely that the Crown would advocate the existence of a 
contractual relationship between the parties and evidence of a significant number of 
judgements suggests that the courts would recognise the existence of such a 
relationship.
960
  
 
The Coburn judgment illustrates an unsuccessful attempt to restrict the unauthorised 
disclosure of official information. With regards to the use of confidentiality contracts as 
a deterrent from future unauthorised disclosures, the contracts have failed to prevent a 
                                                        
959 see in particular: Attorney-General v Guardian Newspapers Ltd [1991] All ER 398 (No 2) at 769, per 
Lord Griffiths. 
960 See e.g., R v Lord Chancellor’s Department ex parte Nangle [1992] 1 All ER 879 whereby the court 
held that there was a contract with the Crown, contrast with McClaren v Home Office [1990] IRLR 338 
whereby the Crown asserted that Civil Servants did not have valid contracts. For discussion on the 
constitutional status of armed forces personnel see: P. Rowe in The Nature of the Crown: A Legal and 
Political Analysis (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003), Eds M. Sunkin & S. Payne, 267 
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number of  servicemen from going ‘on the record’ about their time in the Special 
Forces.
961
 However a recent judgment suggests that the use of confidentiality contracts 
by the UK Special Forces is having an impact on the control of operational and national 
security information, at least in recognising the importance of seeking prior authorisation 
before disclosing the information in the public domain.  
 
In Ministry of Defence v Griffin
962
 the Ministry of Defence commenced breach of 
confidence proceedings against a former serving soldier in the UK Special Forces after 
several unauthorised disclosures had been made. The MOD sought a permanent 
injunction to prevent further disclosures from taking place. The main consideration for 
the court was whether or not it was acceptable for an individual serviceman to decide 
whether or not the information concerned would constitute a breach of confidence, or if 
the serviceman must, in all circumstances seek prior authorisation in a process referred to 
as obtaining ‘express prior authority in writing’ (EPAW). The court identified that 
serving members and former members of the UK Special Forces were reluctant to 
approach the MOD for prior authority.
963
 This was exemplified in the Griffin judgment. 
Griffin had allegations of wrongdoing involving the actions of American soldiers in Iraq 
and that he did not trust the MOD procedure. He believed that the MOD would allow for 
only a very narrow ‘scope of permitted disclosure’ and that if he reported the 
wrongdoing to the authorities, the allegations would either not be investigated properly 
or would be out of the authorities’ jurisdiction.964 
                                                        
961 In January 2005 the High Court issued a writ to sue four former SAS Soldiers, John MacAleese, Eddie 
Stone and two unnamed others despite the fact that the BBC television programme that they had contributed 
to, SAS Survival Secrets, had been screened a year before and had been repeated several times without 
complaint from the MOD. It was reported that the men in question went into hiding. See further: C. Leake, 
Gagged...the SAS embassy siege hero who gave survival tips on the BBC, Mail on Sunday, 16th January 
2005.   
962 [2008] EWHC 1542 (QB) 
963 Ibid para 20. 
964 Ibid para 14. 
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 Mr Justice Eady held that the injunction would continue to be in force and that if Griffin 
had any further disclosures to make he must first seek approval by way of EPAW.
965
 If 
he was dissatisfied with the response from the MOD he could then consider making an 
application for judicial review. This proposition, whilst undoubtedly giving the applicant 
a further avenue with which to seek recourse, blurs the distinction between a soldier 
serving under the royal prerogative and an individual fulfilling his contractual 
obligations which was identified in the dissenting judgment in Coburn. 
 
The Griffin judgment is particularly worthy of note as Mr Justice Eady considered the 
public interest argument made by Griffin’s Counsel of disclosing allegations of 
wrongdoing. He identified that members of the armed forces are exempt from the 
whistleblower protections provided by the Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998. He stated 
that to allow such an argument would nullify the exemption in the Act.
966
 Most 
interestingly, Mr Justice Eady drew reference to R v Shayler and the statutory obligation 
of confidence provided in the criminal law by the Official Secrets Act 1989. He 
suggested that clauses (1) and (2) in the confidentiality contract ‘echo’ section 1 Official 
Secrets Act 1989 and that the use of confidentiality contracts are ‘clearly intended’ to 
achieve the same ‘policy objectives’ that is in the interests of national security but with 
the distinction that a breach of obligation will be enforced, through ‘remedies available 
in civil litigation rather than by way of criminal sanctions.
967
 
 
One must ask why successive UK governments have failed to bring prosecutions for 
breaches of the Official Secrets Acts against former servicemen who make unauthorised 
                                                        
965 Ibid para 35. 
966 Ibid para 29. 
967 Ibid para 16. 
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disclosures. One can argue that the Official Secrets Acts existed as a type of ‘contract’ 
which imposes criminal sanctions and a lifelong ban on disclosure of official information 
long before the drafting of the confidentiality contracts took place.  
 
A distinct comparison between the effects of the above mechanisms can be given when 
considering the intelligence community and former Secret Intelligence Service MI6 
officer Richard Tomlinson, ironically a former soldier serving in the Territorial SAS. 
After Tomlinson gave a synopsis of a proposed book detailing his career in the Secret 
Intelligence Service to an Australian publisher, he was arrested for breaching the Official 
Secrets Act 1989. Tomlinson pleaded guilty and was given a twelve month custodial 
sentence.
968
 The events happened around a similar time implementation of the 
confidentiality contracts.  
 
With regard to control of national security and operational information, there is a notable 
advantage of using confidentiality contracts. Such contracts give the government the 
jurisdiction to sue for Breach of Confidence, and to apply for an injunction to block 
publication of the unauthorised material. Being a criminal offence, the Official Secrets 
Acts do not provide for such proceedings and to sue for contract damages. Whilst the 
attraction of receiving financial remuneration would not be the principle motivation for 
the Crown’s proceedings, the imposition of damages to leave the defendant ‘out of 
pocket’ and the potential to be a deterrent to those considering an unauthorised 
disclosure is a welcome dividend. 
 
Section 5 Official Secrets Act 1989 does provide for the prosecution of newspapers or 
                                                        
968 Tomlinson was released after six months for good behaviour. 
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journalists who publish unauthorised information obtained from a Crown servant; 
however the provision is used as a threat to inhibit publication rather than a legal 
certainty.
969
With regard to the civil remedies made available as a result of the use of 
confidentiality contracts there is the potential for the prospective publisher, newspaper 
editor or journalist to incur tortious liability for inducing the member of the UK Special 
Forces to breach the contract with the Crown.  
 
The tort of inducement originates from the case of Lumley v Gye.
970
 The essential 
elements are that a third party will have the intention to make a direct procurement of a 
breach. In Lumley v Gye the defendant offered one of the parties to a contract a financial 
inducement in order to break the contract. This would directly relate to a scenario 
whereby a serving or former member of the UK Special Forces was offered the 
opportunity by a publisher or newspaper to sell his story. Furthermore, there does not 
have to be evidential proof of unlawful conduct to constitute a breach of the tort of 
inducement, the unauthorised disclosure of national security or operational information 
would provide evidence of unlawful conduct, under the Official Secrets Act 1989, thus 
far exceeding the evidential requirement to commit the Tort.    
 
One may argue that taking action, either civil or criminal, against the media for 
publishing the unauthorised disclosures of a member of the armed forces, is unjust and 
detrimental to media freedom. There is little doubt that the action may dissuade 
servicemen from making unauthorised disclosures, or the media from prompting such 
action. However in a world where media access and coverage of the armed forces is 
extensive, such action may be considered as highly damaging to media relations. One 
                                                        
 
 
970(1852) 2 C&B. 
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must therefore ask whether such suppression of official information is best undertaken 
by agreement with the media. The next section shall consider the issue of contact with 
the media, starting with an analysis of Defence Advisory notices. 
 
7.2 Contact with the media  
 
The Defence Advisory Notice may be used as a means of ‘avoiding confrontation’ 
between the government and the media.
971
  The system provides a ‘voluntary code’ 
which offers guidance to the British media on the publication or broadcasting of national 
security information, to prevent the ‘inadvertent public disclosure’ of information that 
would compromise military and intelligence operations and methods, put at risk those 
who are involved in such operations or lead to attacks that would ‘damage the critical 
national infrastructure’ or ‘endanger lives.’972 Defence Advisory notices are issued by 
the ‘Defence, Press & Broadcasting Advisory Committee’ of which there are currently 
five standing DA Notices: 
 “DA Notice 01: Military Operations, Plans and Capabilities, 
DA Notice 02: Nuclear & Non- Nuclear Weapons & Equipment, DA Notice 03: Ciphers 
& Secure Communications, DA Notice 04: Sensitive Installations & Home Addresses, 
DA Notice 05: United Kingdom Security and Intelligence Services and Special 
Services.”973 
 
If journalists wish to seek clarification as to whether or not the information they wish to 
publish falls within the aforementioned restricted they may contact the Secretary of the 
Committee directly by telephone. The aim is one of co-operation and the Committee 
                                                        
971 H. Fenwick and G. Phillipson, Media Freedom under the Human Rights Act (Oxford University Press, 
Oxford 2006) 957, more generally see also: N.Wilkinson, The Official History of the United Kingdom’s D 
Notice System (Routledge, Abingdon) 2009, P. Sadler, National Security and the D-Notice System (Ashgate, 
Aldershot) 2001, P. Sadler, Still Keeping Secrets? The DA Notice System post 9/11 [2007] Comms.L. 12(6) 
205, D.Fairley, D Notices Official Secrets and the Law [1990] O.J.L.S. 10(3) 430. 
972 See Defence Advisory Notice System website: www.dnotice.org.uk (accessed 07/08/08). 
973Ibid. 
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meets with representatives of the media twice yearly to discuss the operation of the 
system and whether or not changes need to be made. 
 
The Intelligence and Security Committee
974
 states that the current DA-Notice system and 
the Agencies relationships with the media more generally are ‘not working as effectively 
as they might’ and that this is ‘putting lives at risk.’975 This appears to further support 
earlier claims made by the current DA Notice Secretary, Air Vice-Marshall Andrew 
Vallance, that the system is facing difficulty. He focussed upon the BBC’s decision to 
show footage of four alleged members of British Intelligence retrieving data from a 
wireless data storage devise hidden in an artificial rock in a suburb of Moscow. Despite 
receiving advice, the BBC editors chose to air the footage.
976
 When considering the 
giving of advice, Vallance reiterated the need for a balanced, independent approach 
stating that: 
  “There is a tendency of Government to look upon the DA-
Notice System as its own arm. But it is not. You have to be objective about it, as, if you 
step out of line, the editors, publishers and broadcasters just won’t come to you 
again.”977 
 
If the aforementioned media personnel do not approach the Secretary, there is a 
considerable possibility that information that should be protected is instead released into 
the public domain to the detriment of national security interests. Without evidence of a 
clear working relationship, the DA Notice system is ineffective. It is submitted that the 
system fails to provide a watertight solution to the requirement to protect national 
security information. Furthermore this point is reiterated by the fact that the Official 
Secrets Acts provides for prosecution of persons for the unauthorised disclosure of 
                                                        
974 Intelligence and Security Committee, Annual Report 2006-2007, Cm 7299.  
975 Ibid Para M, 40. 
976 Internet Undermining DA-Notices, says DPBAC Secretary, Press Gazette, 19th May 2006.  
977 Ibid. 
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national security and can prevent the person from making further unauthorised 
disclosures but it cannot protect the information itself.  
 
Despite inherent difficulties associated with the DA Notice system, there has been a 
noticeable increase in media involvement in times of armed conflict. The introduction of 
‘embedded journalists’ has allowed the media to provide unprecedented access to the 
work of the armed forces, it has also been a concept which has been reliant upon trust 
and cooperation between the Ministry of Defence, Armed Forces Personnel and the 
Media. A document entitled ‘The Green Book’ has been produced in consultation with 
editors, press and broadcasting organisations and details the process of embedded 
journalists.
978
 Before journalists are allowed to shadow members of the armed forces, 
they must first be accredited in order to protect ‘operational security.’979  
 
In return for access, the embedded journalist is subject to wide-ranging controls on the 
release of information.  The journalist may be required, albeit on occasion to submit the 
product of their reports, i.e. in the form of written material or video recordings etc for 
security checking before transmission. The emphasis however, is on a fair and ‘even 
handed approach.’980  
 
7.2.1   Media Access: A time of national interest. 
 
On 15th March 2007, whilst on patrol off the coast in Iraq, fifteen Royal Naval and 
Royal Marine personnel were captured by Iranian forces for allegedly straying into 
Iranian waters. After spending twelve days in captivity the personnel were allowed to 
                                                        
978 The Green Book, MOD Working Arrangements with the Media, Ministry of Defence.  
979 Ibid para 19. 
980 Ibid para 28. 
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return home and upon doing so were authorised by the Ministry of Defence to give 
interviews to the media and to receive payment for those interviews. The action received 
considerable criticism from several Members of Parliament and commentators and the 
controversy resulted in a thorough review of the policy regarding media access to 
military personnel.
981
  
 
The report by Tony Hall suggested that there had been a significant increase in media 
access to the armed forces and military operations since the Falklands conflict and that 
the industry as a whole had become more competitive. Most importantly for the interests 
of this study Hall suggested that there is now a ‘greater focus on individuals and 
individual rights thought society’ and a ‘lesser inclination to accept the requirements 
imposed by employers’ meaning that the ‘all of one company’ ethos of the armed forces 
is ‘more difficult to uphold.’982  
 
In light of the above statement there is a clear possibility of harm being caused to the 
operational stability of the armed forces by individuals if interviews are given to the 
media or if material is disclosed without prior permission sought. However, one can also 
argue that by giving superior officers a forum with which to voice their own personal 
viewpoints can give rise to the prospect of discrimination on the basis of rank. The next 
section shall consider the media access of senior offices to aim to determine whether this 
discrimination is an acceptable consequence of the command structure. 
                                                        
981 The Foreign Affairs Select Committee were particularly critical of the decision to allow the Sailors to 
sell their stories to the press. See Foreign Policy Aspects of the Detention of Naval Personnel by the Islamic 
Republic of Iran, Sixth Report of 2006-2007 Cm 7211 at 61. See also comments by Dr. Liam Fox MP 
Hansard HC Debs 16 April 2007 Col 28. 
982  Report by Tony Hall on Review of Media Access to Personnel, 2007. It should be noted that the Foreign 
Affairs Select Committee was critical of the findings of the Hall Report. See Sixth Report Ibid at 56.  
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7.2.2 Media Access: Superior Officers 
 
In 2006 General Sir Richard Dannatt, the then head of the British Army talked openly in 
an interview to the Daily Mail and made several comments which were in direct contrast 
to government policy.
983
 General Sir Richard Dannatt has become increasingly 
outspoken during and after his time in office, by both voicing his own personal 
viewpoints as to the situation in Iraq and Afghanistan and by criticising the welfare of 
serving armed forces personnel to campaign for better equipment and living standards 
for servicemen.  
 
Keith Sampson MP stated during a Commons debate, in relation to the increasing 
number of concerns voiced by senior officers that it was ‘unusual’ to not only have 
concerns raised from retired military personnel but ‘from serving officers’ and that it 
should be accepted that military personnel ‘have a deep interest in politics’ and ‘will 
argue strongly not only about military matters but about matters that concern them as 
ordinary voters.’984 
 
Dannatt’s comments have caused controversy and criticism, but the views have also 
raised more important concerns in relation to the differences between the ranks. If 
military personnel do have a deep interest in politics, it appears that the opportunity to 
freely voice such political opinion is reserved for senior officers. General Sir Richard 
Dannatt and other commanding officers are provided with media access in order to 
conduct briefings.  
                                                        
983  S .Sands, Sir Richard Dannatt: A very honest General, Daily Mail, 12 October 2006. 
984 Hansard, HC Debs, 12 Dec 2007, Col 353.  
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Given the controversy surrounding any criticisms of government policy and the need for 
cooperation between the government and commanding officers of the armed forces it is 
more likely that such events will go unpunished and subsequently the aftermath will 
become an exercise in political damage limitation. Again, the Dannatt episode is 
evidence of this. Following the scathing comments, the government sought to ‘clarify’ 
the Major General’s assertions to bring them in line with government policy. In contrast, 
soldiers who are in the lower ranks are less likely to be provided with an open media 
forum and are likely to be punished for their dissent. 
 
7.3   Access to a public forum? The Subordinate Ranks 
 
In the lower ranks, members of armed forces are more likely to get their message across 
through the median of technology. The Hall Report indicated that the proliferation of 
technology had led to ‘risks of operations’ and individuals and that such a risk was 
increasing. It recommended that urgent consideration must be given to policies dealing 
with: 
  “...the use of mobile phones, the video capacity of mobile 
phones, and the use of blogs, emails and social networking sites.”985 
 
He further indicated that: 
  “Given the rise of the “citizen journalist”, the implications 
need to be thought through as a responsibility.”986 
 
                                                        
985 The use of digital images of the abuse of Iraqi detainees in Abu Grahib prison was used by an American 
soldier to show evidence of the abuse on the American 60 Minutes programme, more detail of the incident 
will be given in the section considering comparative complaints mechanisms. Air Vice-Marshall Vallance, 
the DA-Notice Secretary has also voiced concerns with regard to the increase of technology, describing the 
internet as a ‘serious threat. See also P. Sadler, Still Keeping Secrets? The DA-Notice System post 9/11 
[2007] Comms. L. 12(6), 205. 
986 Above, n 982 at 67.  
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The Ministry of Defence has responded by issuing wide ranging military Regulations 
restricting servicemen from contact with the media and for communicating information 
in public. From the outset the regulations indicate that the purpose of the rules is to 
‘ensure that operational security is upheld and that standards of political impartiality and 
public accountability are met at all times.’ Principally, all contact with the news media 
must first be approved by the Director-General, Media and Communication (DGMC) via 
the Director, News Press Office (D News). Ministers will be consulted when 
necessary.
987
  
 
Section 3 (9) states that the restrictions also apply to the ‘writing of letters to 
newspapers, contributing to online debates, or participating in radio or television 
programmes, including phone ins on any topic relating to official defence matters, 
contact with the media at conferences and seminars, and invitations to media 
representatives to speak to briefings, courses or other departmental events.’ Under 
section 3 (11) it states that if approval is given, the range of topics which can be covered 
will be agreed at the time of authorisation and that no comment should extend beyond 
the prescribed topics.  
 
Section 4 deals specifically with the ‘communication in public’ of defence or related 
matters and attempts to tackle the concerns identified by Tony Hall head on. It details a 
number examples including, the use of mobile devises, publishing information in a blog, 
books, academic material, speaking at conferences, taking part in external surveys or 
interviews with the media. Quite interestingly, the section also details the use of on-line 
social networking sites.  
                                                        
987 Defence Instructions and Notices, Contact with the Media and Communicating in Public, 2007 DIN 03-
06 
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There is a contrast between the publication of a blog, which takes the form of a ‘personal 
website’ and a social networking site, which tends to be for the use of communication 
between friends. A blog provides a method of imparting information into the public 
domain whereas a social networking site may be likened to sending an email or having a 
telephone conversation. Despite these differences, under the aforementioned regulations, 
the serviceman is still required to seek approval before discussing information even if the 
purpose of the communication is to vent non-specific information surrounding ‘a bad day 
at work’ for example.  
 
Section 5 deals with the authorisation for contact with the news media and 
communicating in public. Personnel of a 1 star rank are required to seek approval from 
the DGMC in the same way that their subordinates are required to. Requests must be 
submitted 7 days in advance of the proposed media interview. In comparison military 
personnel of a 2 star rank and above are required to seek permission from the relevant 
minister.  
 
There are several identifiable concerns arising from the new regulations. In relation to 
the requirement to seek approval directly from a minister, the section allows for the 
possibility of political interference, particularly if the subject matter of the proposed 
communication is of a nature which is critical of government policy. The political 
neutrality of members of the armed forces is considered as a fundamental requirement; to 
not only maintain discipline (a concept which will be explored in further detail below) 
but also to maintain the citizen in uniform approach.  
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The concept comes from the German military system and also acts as a suitable 
comparative to the UK mechanism. The approach was developed as part of the 
foundation of a new military system after the fall of the Nazi regime. The soldier is 
expected to develop a degree of personal autonomy in order to utilise his ‘rights and 
responsibilities as a politically active citizen.’988 This purposive approach therefore aims 
to prevent acts which allow the armed forces be used as an overtly political tool by a 
dictatorial regime.  
 
In the UK the aforementioned regulations also identify a common problem shared with 
civilian Crown servants. A servant of the Crown is expected to act and make decisions in 
a politically neutral way, yet for reasons of practicality is expected to serve the 
government of the day.  
 
7.4 Do the regulations allow for an acceptable form of discrimination? 
 
The regulations allow for the discrimination of different ranks of the armed forces. The 
European Court of Human Rights decision in Engel stated that the limitation of Article 
10 rights for the subordinate ranks was necessary for the maintenance discipline and 
therefore constituted an accepted form of discrimination in relation to Article 14.
989
 This 
can be observed by the way that the regulations treat the lower ranks in comparison to 
officers at command level. The consequences of failing to seek permission before 
disclosing information contrary to the restrictions may be a ‘serious disciplinary or 
administrative matter’ which could ‘ultimately lead to dismissal.’990 Traditionally, 
disciplinary matters are dealt with either by the chain of command structure, whereby the 
                                                        
988  G.Nolte, European Military Law Systems (Walter de Gruyter, Berlin, 2003) 77. 
989 For further discussion see below. 
990 Above, n 987,  para 2. 
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matter is considered by a senior officer, or by way of court-martial. As Born and Leigh 
identify, superior officers have ‘a very high degree of control over the life of individual 
servicemen’ and under ‘extreme conditions of service’ disciplinary matters may need to 
be dealt with where: 
  “...Full procedural safeguards are not attainable and where 
there is an urgent and paramount need to restore discipline if the effectiveness of a 
mission is not to be compromised.”991 
 
This scenario is directly reflective of the concerns in the Hall Report which suggested 
that the proliferation of technology and increase in media participation in wartime 
operations had led to the compromise of those operations. The potential for disciplinary 
matters to be dealt with by superior officers in such situations is therefore high.  
 
If one were to contrast the position of the lower ranks with the requirement for officers 
of a command level to seek authorisation from ministers before releasing such 
information or media comment as prescribed by the regulations, one must consider that 
there is limited potential for disciplinary action for acting contrary to the regulations. 
One may wish to consider the position of the head of the Army for example. If he fails to 
seek authorisation from the respective minister for making potentially adverse 
comments, critical of government policy, he could not be punished under the traditional 
command structure. Furthermore, it is highly unlikely that he or another person of a 
similar rank would face a court-martial. Again, this is in keeping with the justification of 
political neutrality which aims to maintain a level of discipline in the armed forces, at a 
command level the requirement to adhere to this level of discipline is diminished.  
 
The German ‘citizen in uniform’ provides an alternative approach which acknowledges 
                                                        
991 I.Leigh & H.Born, Handbook on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of Armed Forces 
Personnel, (OSCE/ODIHR, 2008) 221. 
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that the armed forces are subject to the ‘primacy of politics’ which is defined in the 
following structure: 
  “Primacy of politics means that the armed forces answer to 
politicians who are responsible to Parliament and that they are subject to special 
parliamentary control, a hierarchical order pervading all aspects of service and the 
principle of command and obedience.”992 
 
The ‘primacy of politics’ approach does not readily apply to the UK jurisdiction. If one 
were to consider armed forces personnel in comparison to a different form of Crown 
service, that of Civil Servants, it is evident that whilst the servant is under the control of 
a minister, the Civil Service Code and established convention places political 
impartiality at the forefront of working practice. Furthermore, the UK constitutional 
status of the armed forces means that personnel are deployed and controlled by ministers, 
in the name of the Monarch, using powers bestowed by the royal prerogative. This 
means that whilst Parliament may hold the government to account, through debate or 
committee, Parliament does not control the UK armed forces. The next section shall 
consider approaches taken by the European Court of Human Rights. 
 
7.5 European Court of Human Rights: Approaches 
 
Article 10 (2) of the European Convention on Human Rights allows a particularly wide 
restriction of the right to freedom of expression ‘in the interests of national security.’ A 
contrast can therefore be drawn between a Crown servant as a member of the armed 
forces and Crown servants involved in other areas of work. Unless servants are involved 
in work of a department which is involved in national security matters, such as the 
Ministry of Defence of the intelligence services, for example, they are much less likely 
                                                        
992 Joint Service Regulation, Inner Fuhrung, ZDV 10/1, para 205 accessible via: http://www.kas-
benin.de/mil/innere-fuehrung-eng.pdf (accessed 10/10/10).  
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to have their speech restricted. In comparison, the very nature of a position as a member 
of armed forces personnel can be deemed as ‘in the interests of national security’ and 
thus the restriction on the freedom of expression of servicemen will be far greater. This 
stance has been reflected in a number of decided cases heard by the European Court of 
Human Rights.  
 
In Hadjianastassiou v Greece
993
 the applicant, an officer in the Greek air force, failed to 
convince the court the information he disclosed did not risk national security. The Court 
rejected the claim on the basis that the state’s interest in keeping information regarding 
the development of the missile secret was legitimate. The Court was influenced by the 
reasoning in Engel and Others v the Netherlands.
994
  
 
In Engel the Court held that Article 10 applies to members of the armed forces just as it 
does to other persons ‘within the jurisdiction of the Contracting States,’ yet it identified 
that: 
  “The proper functioning of an army is hardly imaginable 
without legal rules designed to prevent servicemen from undermining military discipline, 
for example by writings.”995  
 
The Court’s determination may be identified as the “citizens in uniform” approach. 
Therefore, if a citizen joins the armed forces, he will still retain the right to freedom of 
expression, but will be subject to certain limitations imposed by the requirements of 
being a member of the armed forces. In essence this means that the limitations of certain 
Convention rights are therefore acceptable as the individual chose to surrender those 
rights as a condition of service.  
                                                        
993 (1992) 16 ECHR 219. 
994 (1976)1 EHRR 647. 
995 Ibid, para 94 onwards. 
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A pertinent example of the voluntary surrender of the freedom of expression can be 
found in the ‘signing’ of the Official Secrets Acts. The act of signing the OSA is not a 
legal requirement but it is a symbolic formal recognition that the individual will conform 
to not releasing information pertaining to national security, thus voluntarily surrendering 
the right to freedom of expression in those circumstances.
996
  
 
The approach taken in Engel, has continued to set the benchmark for subsequent Article 
10 Challenges.
997
 In Engel the Court also considered the question of Article 14 ECHR 
which advocates that the rights and freedoms contained in the Convention are to be 
secured without limitation. This would clearly apply to Article 10 rights. However in 
following its own interpretation of the ‘Citizens in Uniform’ approach it stated that: 
  “The hierarchical structure inherent in armies entails 
differentiation according to rank. Corresponding to the various ranks are differing 
responsibilities which in their turn justify certain inequalities of treatment in the 
disciplinary sphere. Such inequalities are traditionally encountered in the contracting 
states and are tolerated by international humanitarian law...In this respect; the European 
Convention allows for the competent national authorities a considerable margin of 
appreciation.”998 
 
The approach taken by the ECtHR reflects a practical application of the Citizens in 
Uniform approach, however by allowing member states a wide margin of appreciation 
one can argue that Strasbourg has failed to fully acknowledge the spirit of the doctrine.  
It can be observed from the Engel decision that the right to freedom of speech is 
                                                        
 
 
997 For example: Le Cour Grandmaison and Fritz v France, Appl. No. 11567/85, 53 DR 150 (1987) the 
Court found that the imprisonment of two conscripts who distributed information calling for the withdrawal 
of French troops from Germany did not violate Article 10. Similarly, in E.S. v Germany Appl. No. 
23576/94 84 DR 58 (1995) the Court held that the dismissal of German military personnel for criticizing 
government policy on television was an acceptable limitation of rights under Article 10. The signing of 
confidentiality contracts by special forces personnel would also be an example of the voluntary restriction 
of Article 10 rights. 
998 (1976)1 EHRR 647 Para 72. 
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considerably more restricted in the lower ranks than it is in the high ranks of command 
level. This can be viewed as a necessary requirement of the chain of command in order 
to maintain an appropriate level of discipline, particularly in wartime. Polit ical neutrality 
should be considered from two standpoints: the first concerns the degree of political 
independence from the government of which the member of armed forces personnel 
serves. The second concerns the extent to which servicemen need to remain independent 
in order to maintain practical functionality of the armed forces. The next section will 
focus upon internal dissent, namely freedom of speech in relation to unlawful orders and 
official complaints procedures. 
 
7.6 Internal Dissent: Unlawful Orders and Official Complaints. 
 
In the United Kingdom jurisdiction, armed forces personnel do not have a duty to obey 
an order if it is deemed unlawful; however in contrast there is no recognised obligation 
that servicemen have a duty to disobey unlawful orders either. One can consider however 
that there is an implied duty to disobey in the doctrine of individual accountability. 
Therefore, for any acts committed by a member of armed forces personnel, he will be in 
individually liable. This point has been reiterated by s.42 Armed Forces Act 2006 which 
has extended all acts ‘punishable by the law of England and Wales’ into the jurisdiction 
of the armed forces.
999
 In contrast, the doctrine of command responsibility, applies to 
commanding officers. Under this doctrine, a commanding officer will not only be 
responsible for his own actions but for the actions of his subordinates. The United 
                                                        
999Section 42 Armed Forces Act 2006, see in particular Section 42(1) “A person is subject to service law, or 
a civilian subject to service discipline, commits an offence under this section if he does any act that-(a) is 
punishable by the law of England and Wales; or (b) if done in England or Wales, would be so punishable.” 
See also Section 44 which deals with attempting criminal conduct, S.45 conspiring to commit criminal 
conduct, Section 46 inciting criminal conduct and S.47 Aiding, abetting, counselling or procuring criminal 
conduct.  
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Kingdom approach differs to Denmark, France and Italy, where soldiers in the respective 
jurisdictions have a duty to obey an ‘obvious’ illegal order.1000  
 
In comparison, German military personnel conduct their duties in accordance with the 
concept of ‘Inner Fuhrung.’ Established alongside the ‘citizen in uniform approach,’ 
‘Inner Fuhrung’ places its emphasis on “leadership and civic education.” Moral and 
ethical considerations are therefore placed at the forefront of conduct in military life. It is 
stated specifically that the internal order of the armed forces should: 
  “...diverge from society’s standards of behaviour only 
where this is necessary to fulfil their military mission.”1001 
 
 
The method for implementing the doctrine resides in a responsibility for commanding 
officers to ‘set an example’ to their subordinates. This means that superiors are required 
to develop an environment of trust between themselves and their subordinates and be 
ready to talk to their servicemen. Individuals are given ‘considerable latitude’ in taking 
decisions and action and are able to actively develop their own opinions freely.
1002
  
 
Nolte identifies that in the United Kingdom, servicemen take a risk by refusing to obey 
an order which they consider unlawful, when it is in fact lawful.
1003
 The implied duty to 
disobey orders does not therefore account for the extent to which the individual 
serviceman has knowledge of the law. By incorporating all offences deemed criminal 
into the armed forces jurisdiction, the serving soldier may not be fully aware of the 
complexities of certain legal principles. The way in which a serviceman objects to the 
order is particularly important here. If he directly approaches the officer in question, he 
                                                        
1000Above, n 988, 93 
1001 Federal Ministry of Defense, Joint Service Regulation, Inner Fuhrung ZDV 10/1 updated 1993. Para 
207. 
1002   Ibid para 302. 
1003   Ibid. 
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may be accused of using ‘threatening or insubordinate language.’1004 One way of 
legitimising the refusal to obey a command would therefore be to make an official 
complaint. 
 
7.7 Official Complaints Procedures. 
 
Until recently, the United Kingdom Armed Forces did not have a formal independent 
complaints procedure. Following the deaths of four army recruits at Deepcut Barracks in 
Surrey, an independent inquiry headed by Nicholas Blake QC investigated the 
circumstances surrounding the deaths and concluded that there were serious instances of 
bullying and harassment and that trainees who felt poorly treated were reluctant to 
complain against NCOs. Those who did complain were vulnerable to reprisals and 
received an ‘ineffective response’ by their ‘immediate supervisors.’1005 Ultimately, Blake 
identified that the system of military complaints cannot depend on the efficiency of an 
individual Commanding Officer or the perception ‘he or she creates that the chain of 
command is approachable and caring.’1006He stated that the evidence had presented a 
‘substantial challenge to the present system,’ identifying that other personnel had not 
brought instances of unacceptable conduct to the attention of the commanding officer. 
He further noted that, the confidentiality of complainants was an issue, the alleged 
abuser and other members of staff had been aware of visits made to the Army Welfare 
Service, this gave the potential for retaliation against the complainants.
1007
 
 
The report recommended that a ‘military ombudsman’ be established with a remit to 
                                                        
1004
 Section 33 Army Act 1955 concerns insubordinate behaviour. 
1005  Nicholas Blake QC, The Deepcut Review, 2006. 
1006 Ibid para 12.83. 
1007 Ibid. 
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investigate complaints from servicemen or their families about ‘specific allegations of 
conduct prejudicial to their welfare.’1008 It was also suggested that the proposed 
ombudsman took a supervisory role in the investigation of complaints made to the 
authorities, for example the Royal Military Police. If the ombudsman was not satisfied 
with the way in which the complaint was handled he would be able to ‘instigate legal 
proceedings to set aside legally flawed decisions not to prosecute.’1009 The proposed 
ombudsman would have been in marked contrast to the equivalent civilian review bodies 
of the Civil Service Commissioners and the Parliamentary Commissioner for 
Administration in that neither have the power to instigate legal proceedings. 
 
The government published a response to the review which acknowledged the need for an 
independent complaints commissioner but with significant limitations on the proposed 
powers. It argued that the proposed commissioner would undermine the chain of the 
command, would undermine the role of the prosecuting authorities and that the 
independent prosecuting authorities make their decisions under the general 
superintendence of the Attorney General.
1010
 
 
It is submitted that the aforementioned response does not adequately consider the 
findings of the Blake Review. With regard to the command structure, Nicholas Blake QC 
identified at several points in the report that ‘significant numbers’ of trainee soldiers at 
Deepcut felt unwilling to approach their superiors.
1011
 The success of the command 
structure system is largely dependent upon the persons within that system, whom may 
                                                        
1008 Ibid para 12.101. 
1009 Ibid. 
1010 Response to Recommendation 26, The Government’s Response to the Deepcut Review, June 2006 Cm 
6851. 
 
1011   Ibid 12.82. 
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have a degree of personal involvement in the complaint, may be the subject of the 
complaint, or may be inclined to follow their own personal viewpoint to the detriment of 
the complainant. Moreover, there are difficulties associated with the role of the Attorney 
General in cases which may be of political importance. In considering whether or not a 
prosecution is in the public interest the Attorney General is expected to consult with 
ministers. Whilst the scope of this practice has now been limited informally by 
agreement between government and the Attorney General, the Shawcross exercise still 
extends to matters pertaining to national security of which the work of the armed forces 
would undoubtedly be included. 
 
The Defence Select Committee agreed with the government’s proposals to introduce a 
Service Complaints Commissioner, but voiced concerns as to the independence of the 
position.
1012
 In response, the government argued that the commissioner would have 
‘significant powers.’ it was stated that in order to ‘introduce the greatest independence to 
the system’ it would appoint someone independent of the armed forces and Civil Service, 
proclaiming that they hoped to ‘open the field to as wide a variety of applicants as 
possible.’1013 
 
One might assume that the best way of achieving the ‘greatest independence’ to the 
system would be to allow the position of commissioner to be entirely separate of the 
command structure. The Blake Review was established in response of allegations that 
                                                        
1012 See Armed Forces Bill: Proposal for a Services Complaints Commissioner, 2006 HC1711, 8, 
recommendation 5: “We recommend that the House agree with the Lords Amendments establishing a 
Service Complaints Commissioner, but it should do so in the knowledge that there is concern that these 
amendments do not go far enough to ensure independence in the complaints process and that much of the 
detail remains to be established by secondary legislation.” 
 
1013 Armed Forces Bill Proposal for a Service Complaints Commissioner:  Government Response to the 
Committee’s Fourteenth Report of Session 2005-2006, HC 180 Appendix 1. S.366 Armed Forces Act 2006 
establishes the Commissioner. 
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there had been a ‘cover up’ of the events surrounding the soldiers’ deaths. It is submitted 
therefore that an independent complaints mechanism is a fundamental necessity to 
indicate to the public and to Parliament that in the presence of an independent 
commissioner ‘cover up’ would be a highly unlikely occurrence. 
 
On 1
st
 January 2008 the first ‘Services Complaints Commissioner’ (SCC) was appointed 
as part of an independent complaint mechanism with substantial limitations, on the 
model proposed in the Deepcut Report. The Armed Forces Act 2006 affords both serving 
and former armed forces personnel the right to make a compliant if the serviceman 
believes that he has been wronged in any matter relating to his service.
1014
 The process 
still utilises the command structure of which the Deepcut Report identified inherent 
difficulties.  
 
The complaint is submitted in writing either by completion of a ‘Service Complaint 
Form’ or in the form of a letter in the first instance. There is a time limit which extends 
to three months from the time that the matter complained of occurred.
1015
 This can be 
extended if the Commanding Officer (CO) decides that it would be “just and equitable to 
do so.”1016 Such examples given are if the serviceman is hospitalised or deployed on 
operations and thus is unable to have access to the materials necessary to make the 
complaint.
1017
  
 
                                                        
1014 Section 334 Armed Forces Act provides that a person may complain: (1) If— (a) a person subject to 
service law thinks himself wronged in any matter relating to his service, or (b) a person who has ceased to 
be subject to service law thinks himself wronged in any such matter which occurred while he was so 
subject, he may make a complaint about the matter under this section (a “service 
complaint”). 
1015 Section 334 (5), (6) Armed Forces Act 2006. 
1016 Redress of Individual Grievances: Service Complaints, Issue 1.0, Ministry of Defence, JSP 831 2007. 
para 5. 
1017 Ibid. 
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Complaints are excluded if they relate to pensions, discretionary awards, and discipline 
in relation to judgments made by court-martial and other criminal or disciplinary 
decisions, compensation and criminal injuries compensation, decisions relating to 
exemption from call out (applicable to reservists) and decisions made by the Security 
Vetting Appeals Panel.
1018
 Interestingly, the recommendation by the Deepcut Report for 
family members and other concerned parties to complain has been included. 
 
In making a complaint the serviceman has several options. He can seek informal 
resolution through the chain of command, lodge a service complaint directly with the 
Commanding Officer or submit an allegation with the Service Complaints 
Commissioner, if he is of an officer rank he may wish to petition the Crown.  
 
From the outset, the guidelines appear to recommend the informal approach by stating 
that whilst a complaint ‘must be taken seriously’ many can be ‘swiftly and satisfactorily 
resolved informally.’1019The emphasis on taking the informal approach would appear 
advantageous to servicemen who may fear that their complaint may result in either 
reprisal or that the complaint will not be dealt with in a serious and thorough manner.  
 
7.7.1 Formal Complaints Structure 
 
If the complaint is dealt with formally it may take the form of one of three levels. Level 
one concerns the ‘prescribed officer’ who will essentially be the Commanding 
Officer.
1020
 If the Commanding Officer feels that he cannot deal with the complaint 
                                                        
1018 There is a full list of exemptions contained in Schedule 1 The Armed Forces (Redress of Individual 
Grievances) Regulations 2007. 
1019 Ibid para 1. 
1020 Ibid para 15. 
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effectively, or that he lacks the ‘authority to grant redress’ he will submit it to Level 
two.
1021
 Level two concerns the Senior Officer, who will be at least one rank above the 
Commanding Officer, again, the Senior Officer will consider whether or not it is 
appropriate for him to deal with the complaint, if he does not have the authority to grant 
redress he will refer the complaint to the next stage, level three. Level three concerns the 
most serious level and is headed by the Defence Council level which can form a ‘Service 
Complaints Panel,’1022 to be considered below.  
 
7.7.2 Submitting a complaint directly to the Commanding Officer 
 
If a Serviceman submits a complaint directly to the Commanding Officer, it may cause 
anxiety for servicemen wishing to make a complaint, again because of fears of reprisal. 
There is also the possibility that the Commanding Officer may be involved in the 
wrongdoing complained of. This factor has been considered and neatly dealt with by the 
appeals mechanism. If a CO is involved, his superior officer should be approached; if he 
too is implicated in the alleged wrongdoing then an officer of equal rank to the Superior 
Officer will be nominated by the lead headquarters for the respective service.
1023
  The 
Commanding Officer who receives the complaint must also check to see whether or not 
he is implicated or is the subject of the complaint and if so, he is required to refer the 
matter to his immediate superior in the chain of command or if that officer is implicated 
in or the subject of the complaint and officer of equal or superior rank will be chosen by 
the lead head quarters of the respective service.
1024
 
 
                                                        
1021 Ibid. 
1022 Ibid. 
1023 Ibid, para 2.  
1024 Redress of Individual Service Complaints, MOD, Issue 1.0 JSP 831. 
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Upon receiving a complaint the Commanding Officer will decide to either investigate the 
complaint, or to refer it to levels two and three. If the CO decides to investigate the 
complaint he will then make a decision as to whether the complaint is valid and whether 
or not he has the appropriate means of granting redress.
1025
 If the Commanding Officer 
chooses to decide the complaint, the complainant has the option of having the matter 
referred to levels two and three if he is unhappy with the outcome. The Senior Officer at 
level two therefore acts as a further check on the actions of the Commanding Officer. If 
he chooses to investigate and decide upon the compliant he must consider whether to: 
uphold, reject, or refer the complaint. In doing so he must submit the outcome of his 
decision in writing to the complainant. 
 
At level three the Defence Council has the option of making a decision on the complaint, 
of delegating the complaint to a Service Complaints Panel for consideration and a 
decision or delegating the complaint to the panel for consideration and a 
recommendation. The Defence Council will then make the decision based upon the 
recommendation of the panel.
1026
   
 
The Service Complaints Panel is comprised of two serving military officers of a 1* 
rank.
1027
 An independent member of the panel will be appointed in cases whereby the 
matter relates to instances of: 
  “a. discrimination; b. harassment; c. bullying; d. dishonest, 
improper or biased behaviour; e. failure of the Ministry of Defence to provide medical, 
dental or nursing care where the Ministry of Defence was responsible for providing that 
care; f. negligence in the provision by Ministry of Defence healthcare professionals of 
medical, dental or nursing care; or g. concerning the exercise by a Service policeman of 
his statutory powers as a Service policeman.”1028 
                                                        
1025 See further Chapter Three Part  5 of the Regulations, Ibid. 
1026 Ibid Chapter Five Para 1. 
1027 Section 336 Armed Forces Act 2006. 
1028 Regulation 9 Armed Forces (Redress of Individual Grievances) Regulations 2007. 
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Section 336(7) gives the power for the Secretary of State to appoint an ‘independent 
person’ who must not be either a member of the Civil Service or a serving member of the 
armed forces. 
 
One must ask if a person appointed by the Secretary of State can truly be regarded as 
independent. Whilst there are the clear exclusions under s.336 (7) to avoid a direct 
conflict of interest there are no defined exclusions which ensure that the ‘independent’ 
person is not associated with the Secretary of State in any way and that he or she does 
not have any other conflict of interest which may involve the armed forces in any way.  
 
The use of the term ‘independent’ is misleading to the complainant and the layperson 
who may not either have the access or knowledge to fully research the Armed Forces Act 
or the related regulations. It is also quite apparent from consideration of the service 
complaints mechanism that the formal route is both procedurally complex and the 
appointment of an independent member of the panel by the Secretary of State adds to the 
formality. It may therefore be likely that an individual Serviceman may choose to have 
the complaint dealt with informally, to not proceed with the complaint at all, or if he or 
she is witness to serious malpractice, make an unauthorised disclosure to the media. The 
command structure may also dissuade servicemen, particularly in the lower ranks or of a 
young age (bearing in mind that a person can be enrolled in the armed forces at the age 
of 16) from making a complaint. The serviceman may either feel influenced my 
commanding officers, be nervous of the command structure, or fear reprisals for the 
result of the complaint. Most worryingly, at no stage does the structure allow for the 
complete confidentiality of the complainant. This fails to address the key concern of the 
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Blake Report which indicated that Servicemen did not have the protection of 
confidentiality. 
 
7.1 The Role of the Service Complaints Commissioner 
 
Speaking of her role, the newly appointed Service Complaints Commissioner (SCC) Dr 
Susan Atkins stated that: 
  “The SCC is a very powerful ‘somebody else,’ people can 
right to me directly –as can family or friends on their behalf- and where I think it’s 
serious enough I can put the complaint into the system at a higher level”1029    
 
It is difficult to ascertain how the SSC can be deemed “very powerful.” In comparison 
with the military ombudsman proposed by the Deepcut Report, the reality is that 
Commissioner has more of an advisory and oversight, audit type role. If an individual 
contacts the Commissioner, the serviceman will be advised on whether or not the 
complaint should be dealt with informally or formally by way of a ‘service compliant.’ If 
the matter is dealt with by a service complaint the SSC will then refer the matter to the 
Commanding Officer for investigation.  
 
The Commissioner has no investigatory powers and in a similar way to the 
Parliamentary Ombudsman, will report yearly to Parliament. A father of one of the 
soldiers who died at the Deepcut Barracks has branded the role of the Commissioner as 
“pointless” and a “toothless tiger.”1030 The comments echo often lodged criticisms of the 
Parliamentary Ombudsman; however the main difference is that the Parliamentary 
Ombudsman does have the power to conduct investigations. The power to issue reports 
                                                        
1029 Defence News, First ever Service Personnel Complaints Commissioner appointed, 7 Nov 07, Ministry 
of Defence website, accessible via: 
www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/DefenceNews/DefencePolicyAndBusiness  (09/08/09). 
1030   Geoff Gray, father of Private Geoff Gray speaking on BBC News, Wednesday 7 November 2007 
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to Parliament has, as illustrated at previous points in this thesis, proved to be ineffective, 
as successive governments have chosen to ignore recommendations in the report.  
 
One must ask what the benefits are to servicemen in approaching the Commissioner. In 
providing an advisory role, it can be suggested that the Commissioner is providing little 
more than a service which could be provided by the Citizens Advice Bureau or by 
personal research. In providing the referral role, by referring the complaint to the 
Commanding Officer, the Commissioner is effectively indicating that the complaint is of 
a serious nature. The SCC will be beneficial as she will undoubtedly have better access 
to the Commanding Officer than the respective complainant. However, by lacking the 
powers to personally investigate or if required to rule against the facts, the SCC’s impact 
is minimal.  
 
The government’s justification that the implementation of the Deepcut Review’s 
perceived ombudsman would be detrimental to the command structure requires closer 
analysis. The chain of command can be identified as a common feature of all armed 
forces. However, this has not prevented the implementation of Ombudsmen in other 
jurisdictions and this was made quite apparent in the Deepcut Review.
1031
  
 
What is most concerning is the Commissioner’s lack of involvement once the complaint 
is referred to the Commanding officer. This, in conjunction with the lack of a truly 
independent appointed member of the panel leaves significant gaps in the accountability 
mechanism.  
 
                                                        
1031   http://www.official-documents.gov.uk/document/hc0506/hc07/0795/0795.pdf (accessed 04/08/09). 
para 12.94. 
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The author proposes that a solution to both of these difficulties could easily be obtained. 
The independent member of the panel should be replaced by the Service Complaints 
Commissioner. This would ensure that all cases that are heard by the panel are dealt with 
consistently and with the appropriate level of oversight. Most importantly such a reform 
would not need a significant change in the drafting of the legislation. The Service 
Complaints Commissioner already satisfies the criterion prescribed by s.336 (7) Armed 
Forces Act, which proscribes that the independent member of the panel should not be a 
member of the Civil Service or armed forces. Furthermore, the provision which regulates 
the appointment of the Service Complaints Commissioner, s.366 (3) Armed Forces Act 
effectively mirrors the provisions contained in s.336 (7). Therefore, there is nothing to 
prevent the Secretary of State from appointing the Service Complaints Commissioner as 
the independent person on the panel. If the Secretary of State chose to codify the adapted 
role of the Commissioner, there is legislative scope to do so by virtue of s.336 (4) which 
requires the Secretary of State to provide regulations for the complaints mechanism.  
 
A pertinent argument is that the proposal would increase the Commissioner’s workload. 
However, the Commissioner’s oversight role suggests that she would already have a 
close interest in the complaints and would need to fully read and consider any reports 
made by the Defence Council. In being involved with the adjudication of the complaint, 
the Commissioner would have an intimate knowledge of the matters in question and 
would also save a considerable amount of time in having to report against any matters 
where she feels that the complaint was not handled properly. One may also argue that the 
Commissioner would be insufficiently qualified to be a member of the complaints panel. 
However there is nothing in the Armed Forces Act or the Regulations which state that 
the independent person should possess any specialist skills or attributes, merely that they 
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are independent of the armed forces or the Civil Service. This chapter shall now progress 
to consider how other jurisdictions deal with complaints by armed forces personnel and 
oversight of complaints mechanisms. 
 
7.2 Comparative Complaints Mechanisms. 
 
In the Republic of Ireland, the Irish Ombudsman for the Defence Forces provides a close 
comparison to the UK Services Complaints Commissioner.
1032
 The position was 
established in 2005 and is independent of the Irish Defence Force and the command 
structure. The Ombudsman is statutorily defined by virtue of the Defence Forces Act 
2004 (Eire) and is appointed by the President of the Republic of Ireland on 
recommendation of the government. The complainant is required to exhaust all internal 
procedures before making a complaint to the Ombudsman. If the Ombudsman 
investigates the complaint she can make recommendations to the Minister of Defence 
which offers proposals for corrective action. If she is unsatisfied with the response she 
may voice her concerns by publishing a special report.  
 
The Ombudsman for the Defence Forces (Eire) offers a compromise which respects the 
traditional command structure of the armed forces and which provides oversight where 
necessary. However, the Ombudsman is excluded from investigating concerns raised 
about security or operational matters.
1033
 This imposes a substantial limitation on the 
investigatory remit of the office, suggesting that the Ombudsman is best suited for 
investigating matters of person to person employment grievances (e.g. discrimination or 
allegations of personal malpractice, what is known as in the US Public Service 
                                                        
1032See website: http://www.odf.ie (accessed 09/09/08). 
1033 See further: Section 5 Ombudsman (Defence Forces) Act 2004. 
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jurisdiction as ‘prohibited personnel practices’) rather than major allegations of 
malpractice involving servicemen on operations. 
 
In Australia, the Commonwealth Ombudsman has the jurisdiction to investigate 
complaints under the title of ‘Defence Force Ombudsman.’ The Ombudsman has a 
dedicated ‘Defence Team’ and can receive complaints from serving or former members 
of the Australian Defence Force. In direct contrast to the United Kingdom Services 
complaints mechanism, the Defence Ombudsman (AUS) has the power to investigate 
complaints about matters of discharge, pay and allowances, pensions and internal 
complaint handling with the ADF.  
 
The Defence Ombudsman regularly cooperates with agencies which have an 
‘overlapping function’ within the Department of Defence. The Complaints Resolution 
Agency deals with internal grievance complaints whereas the Inspector-General of the 
Australian Defence Force (IGADF) has the jurisdiction to investigate complaints of 
unacceptable behaviour. The IGADF is independent of the chain of command and offers 
direct access for ADF personnel and also any other person who wishes to make a 
complaint. The IGAF’s investigatory remit is as follows: 
  “abuse of authority/process, denial of procedural fairness, 
cover-up or failure to act; unlawful punishments and, victimisation, harassment, threats, 
intimidation, bullying and bastardisation(corruption).”1034 
 
The most recent Defence Report to consider the scheme appeared to identify that the 
IGAF system is in good shape. It stated that focus group discussions with ADF units, 
representing 20% of the ADF’s total personnel identified that ADF personnel ‘would not 
hesitate to use avenues of complaint when required to do so,’ that they were satisfied that 
                                                        
1034 Part 11A Ombudsman Act 1976. 
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the disciplinary process was fair and that there were ‘few instances of bullying and 
harassment.’1035 
 
The Australian Department of Defence (Defence) operates a ‘Defence Whistleblower 
Scheme.’ The scheme extends to both civilian defence employees, members of the 
Australian Defence Force and contractors or other persons supplying goods or services to 
Defence.
1036
 Servicemen are expected to report concerns through the chain of command. 
However, if the serviceman perceives the chain of command to be ‘tainted or ineffective’ 
or he believes that he will be ‘victimised, discriminated against or disadvantaged’ he 
may raise the concern by using the whistleblower scheme. The types of concern 
misconduct which may give rise to a whistleblower report have been defined to include: 
  “(a) fraud or any other activity that may breach 
commonwealth legislation (b) misconduct under the Public Service Act 1999 (C) 
unethical behaviour (d) misuse or mismanagement of departmental resources (e) 
harassment or unlawful discrimination (f) breaches of security (g) behaviour that could 
jeopardise the good reputation of Defence and that of its members; and (h) practices that 
compromise occupational health and safety.” 
 
The scheme operates a 24 hour whistleblower hotline, and concerns may also be raised 
in person, by arranging a meeting with the director of investigation and recovery, or in 
writing. The Inspector General will then decide, in consultation with the serviceman the 
best way to investigate the complaint, the complaint may be investigated by the Inspector 
General or the matter may be referred to the chain of command, Service Police, Defence 
Security Authority or the Defence Safety Management Agency. In exceptional 
circumstances the matter may be referred to an external agency to Defence.  
 
Servicemen are protected from detrimental treatment for raising a concern through either 
the chain of command or by using the Defence Whistleblower Scheme by virtue of s.16 
                                                        
1035See Department of Defence, Annual Report, 2006-2007, 157.  
1036 Defence Instructions (General), Defence Whistleblower Scheme, PERS 45-5, 1st July 2002.  
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Public Service Act 1999. Whilst the criticisms of s.16 Public Service Act 1999 identified 
in Chapter  five of this thesis still apply, the position of servicemen in ADF is further 
bolstered by the fact that instances of detrimental action may be referred to Service 
Police if it constitutes a disciplinary offence under the Defence Force Discipline Act 
1982.
1037
 The scheme provides assurances for whistleblowers whose identity may be 
known or guessed as a result of the concern being raised, stating that specific measures 
will be undertaken to protect the serviceman from detrimental treatment or 
discrimination if necessary.
1038
 
 
The Australian independent internal review mechanism would be deemed unworkable in 
the United Kingdom jurisdiction.  One must why this is the case as the principles of the 
Australian Armed Forces have been obtained historically by the United Kingdom Armed 
Forces. The UK Government’s justification for disallowing one independent review 
mechanism investigatory powers does not appear valid when the Australian Defence 
Force has two.  
 
In Canada, the Canadian Army operates an ethics programme and has a ‘Lamplighter 
Protocol.’1039 The protocol supports a legal obligation for servicemen to report 
malpractice by allowing for designated officers, namely Unit Ethics Coordinators, Area 
Ethics Coordinators the Army Ethics Officer, to act as a conduit to report concerns to the 
‘proper authority’ to investigate.1040 The Ethics Officer operates an Ethical Helpline 
which offers guidance and allows servicemen to report concerns. The aforementioned 
officers do not have the power to investigate but can track the concerns raised to them. 
                                                        
1037 http://www.defence.gov.au/defencemagazine/editions/200608/groups/ig.htm (accessed 05/04/10).  
1038 http://www.defence.gov.au/ig/gir.htm (accessed 05/04/10). 
1039 LFCO 21-18:  http://www.army.forces.gc.ca/land-terre/aep-peat/lfco-ocft/annexc-eng.asp (accessed 
10/05/10). 
1040 Ibid 
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The protocol identifies that members of the Canadian armed forces do not have 
legislated protection for raising concerns. A ‘degree of anonymity’ is provided but 
confidentiality cannot be guaranteed. Despite the noticeable lack of protection offered 
from reprisal the protocol aims to create a culture ‘indirect encouragement’ for 
servicemen to raise concerns.
1041
  
 
The Canadian Armed Forces has the ‘National Defence and Canadian Forces 
Ombudsman.’ Like the Australian mechanism, he too has investigatory powers and 
offers direct access for servicemen, albeit with limitations.
1042
 The Ombudsman was 
created after a public enquiry into Canadian military activities in Somalia.
1043
  
 
The Ombudsman (CA) acts independently as a ‘neutral third party’ and reports directly 
to the Minister of National Defence. Since the office was established it has been 
approached more than 12,000 times by members of the defence community.
1044
 The 
Ombudsman (CA) will not be allowed to investigate a complaint if the complainant has 
not ‘availed himself’ of one or more of the following mechanisms available to the 
complainant. 
                                      “A. The CF (Canadian Forces) redress of grievance process; B. 
The public service grievance and complaints process; C. The Security Intelligence 
Review Committee; or D. The Complaint process under Part IV of the National Defence 
Act.”1045 
 
The Ombudsman (CA) must then consider if: 
                                                        
1041 Ibid 
1042 To be considered below. 
1043 On 16 March 1993 the Canadian Airborne Regiment captured and severely beat a Somali teenager who 
later died in custody. 
 
1044See: About Us, National Defence and Canadian Armed Forces Ombudsman Website, 
www.ombudsman.forces.gc.ca (accessed 02/03/09) for an analysis of the public service grievance process 
and the Security Intelligence Review Committee see chapter 5 of this thesis. 
1045 Ministerial Directives, para 13. See further ‘Our Mandate’ National Defence and Canadian Forces 
Ombudsman website: www.ombudsman.forces.gc.ca (accessed 02/03/09). 
 495 
 
 
                                    “A. Access to a complaint mechanism will cause undue hardship 
to a complainant; B. The Complaint raises systematic issues; or C. The complainant and 
the competent authority agree to refer the complaint to the Ombudsman.” 
 
A member of the Canadian Forces has the choice of several different avenues with which 
to make an official compliant. This reduces the chance of soldiers making unauthorised 
disclosures to the media. However, the consequence of this is that the serviceman would 
first need to attempt to use one of the available mechanisms before the Ombudsman can 
investigate. If the serviceman does not have confidence in the aforementioned 
mechanisms he may be dissuaded from raising the concern, meaning that the 
Ombudsman (CA) would not be provided with information of what may be a very 
serious public concern. Yet in contrast to the UK armed forces, Canadian soldiers are at 
a significant advantage over their UK counterparts. Again, the external complaint and 
accountability mechanisms are allowed to work alongside the internal complaints 
process provided for by the CF redress and grievance process. 
 
Before leaving office the outgoing Ombudsman (CA) released a report in 2005 which 
was highly critical of the Canadian mechanism. He stated that the office had failed to 
obtain the full mandate it should have and that this was due to ‘exaggerated fears’ within 
the Canadian Defence Forces of ‘outside interference’ with ‘military autonomy.’1046 He 
stated that a ‘fully effective ombudsman’s office has to be credible, both to the members 
who rely upon it and to those who are subject to its oversight.’1047 
 
The aforementioned comments provide considerations of best practice, to which the UK 
Service Complaints Commissioner should be based, most notably the wording focuses 
                                                        
1046 Overhauling Oversight, Ombudsman White Paper, A Compromised Mandate, Para 3 the full, 
comprehensive report is accessible online via: http://www.ombudsman.forces.gc.ca/rep-rap/sr-rs/wp-lb/rep-
rap-03-eng.asp#Compromised%20Mandate (accessed 10/09/09). 
1047 Ibid para 1. 
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upon independence but also on the key consideration of ‘credibility.’ Again, one must 
ask if the UK SCC can be regarded as credible, despite its lack of investigatory power. 
 
In the United States, significant reforms have been made in relation to the armed forces 
complaints mechanism due to scandal surrounding the conduct of US soldiers at Abu 
Grahib prison. A reserve soldier, Joe Darby was leant a CD containing a number of 
photographs during his time serving in Iraq. The CD had photographs containing general 
shots around the region but also contained horrific images of the abuse of Iraqi prisoners 
by his colleagues. Darby chose to send the CD to the US Army Criminal Investigation 
Command. An investigation followed which led to several soldiers including, Private 
Lynndie England (who was featured posing in a number of the photographs) being 
convicted by an army court-martial. Derby had wished to remain anonymous. However, 
during a televised Senate hearing, the Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld publically 
thanked him. As a consequence, Derby’s home in Maryland has been vandalised, he has 
faced death threats and has been forced to live in protective military custody.
1048
  
 
The events surrounding Joseph Derby had led to an overhaul of the complaints reporting 
mechanism. Armed forces personnel are able to make a complaint via the chain of 
command
1049
 but also have direct and confidential access to either their respective 
service Inspector General (IG) or directly to the Department of Defence Inspector 
General by using the ‘Defense Hotline.’ The Service Inspector Generals act effectively 
as ‘an extension of the commander,’ working directly for him, the Inspector General has 
the power to conduct investigations but does not have the power to provide resolution, as 
this is dealt with by the commander. This means that there must be a close relationship 
                                                        
1048 See further H. Rosin, When Joseph Comes Marching Home, Washington Post, 17 May 2004. 
1049 The communication to the chain of command will be regarded as a protected communication’ under 
s.1034 (2) (b) Title 10 U.S.C.  
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between the commander and the Inspector General. It is stated that for the role to be 
effective the IG must be ‘sufficiently independent’ in order to continue to receive 
complaints from soldiers.
1050
 Whilst one may question the independence of a Service 
Inspector General, there is a clear advantage in that the IG is a service officer within the 
respective service, and that the IG system is therefore in keeping with the traditional 
‘command structure’ doctrine. The Department of Defense Inspector General is, in 
comparison, entirely separate of the command structure and instead reports directly to 
the Secretary of Defense and Congress.
1051
  
 
The Defense Hotline allows for any person whether a serving member of the armed 
forces or a civilian to report instances of a violation of ethical standards or the law.
1052
 It 
is staffed by professional investigators with knowledge of the relevant laws and 
regulations.
1053
Calls can be made anonymously or identities of callers will be kept 
confidential.   
 
Under the Military Whistleblowers Protection Act, members of the US armed forces 
have direct access to members of Congress and like members of the intelligence 
community, are protected from reprisal for doing so. Under the reforms following the 
release of the identity of the Abu Grahib whistleblower, such communication is now a 
protected communication and is defined as: 
                                   “A communication in which a member of the Armed Forces 
provides information that the member reasonably believes evidences a violation of law 
or regulation, including sexual harassment or unlawful discrimination, mismanagement, 
a gross waste of funds or other resources, an abuse of authority, or a substantial and 
                                                        
1050 See further, First Army Portal, Evolution of the IG: www.first.army.mil/ig/igevolut.htm (accessed 
10/09/08). 
1051 For a discussion on the role of the Department of Defense IG see Chapter 5. 
1052 See DOD Website: www.dodig.mil/HOTLINE/index.html (accessed 10/09/08) 
1053 Ibid. 
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specific danger to public health or safety...”1054 
 
Despite the improvements the Government Accountability Project (GAO) has called for 
a radical overhaul to bring the military in line with current reforms of the Whistleblower 
Protection Act.
1055
 It is clear that the all of the comparative mechanisms detailed above 
provide both internal and external complaints reporting mechanisms. It therefore appears 
unacceptable that the United Kingdom is incapable of providing such a mechanism.  
 
7.3     Conclusion 
 
7.3.1 Theoretical model  
 
It has been identified in the aforementioned analysis that Crown servants as members of 
the armed forces have an enhanced duty of loyalty compared to employees of the Civil 
Service. He is required to follow force discipline codes, must follow regulations 
regarding potential contact with the media, and furthermore is required to adhere to the 
Official Secrets Acts. The consequences of an individual exercising his right to freedom 
of expression on moral autonomy grounds may result in charges of insubordination and 
disciplinary action taken against him. It is submitted therefore that the nature of work in 
the armed forces is likely to have a detrimental impact the expression of value 
judgements.  
 
This thesis identified that the service regulations discriminate between the superior and 
subordinate ranks. The subordinate ranks are faced with significant barriers to 
                                                        
1054 Statute 1034 Title 10 U.S.C. Regulation: DOD Directive 7050.06. Note that the provision did not 
prevent the unauthorised disclosure of 91,731 documents to the wikileaks website. At the time of writing 
biggest leak of its kind is currently under investigation by US authorities. 
1055 A.Miles, Military Whistleblowers Need Protections, Buffalo News, 21 March, 2007. 
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communicating with the public. The regulations place restrictions on communication with 
the media and engagement with members of the public by writing publishable material, 
communicating on social networking sites, taking part in surveys and speaking at 
conferences without prior authorisation. The restrictions in place, therefore, make it very 
difficult for a serviceman in the subordinate ranks to engage in protest whistleblowing of 
any sort. In contrast, whilst senior military personnel require authorisation from a 
minister of the crown before being interviewed for the media, senior military figures have 
openly voiced their concerns about government policy they believe to be wrong or 
detrimental to the armed forces. This may be identified as protest whistleblowing.  
 
One must question whether the regulations are fair. The regulations clearly discriminate 
between senior officers and those serving in the subordinate ranks; however, all of the 
theoretical justifications for freedom of expression identified in chapter two of this thesis 
do not discriminate between different categories of communicators. The justifications for 
restricting the right to freedom of expression are based around the prevention of speech 
which causes harm. Shauer provides the most appropriate analysis by identifying that 
communication to a group of people may cause harm to society by prompting those 
individuals to disobey the law.
1056
 In the context of the armed forces, it is submitted that 
communication by armed forces personnel may be harmful in two ways. Firstly, that the 
speech contains details regarding operational information, such as the whereabouts of 
personnel in theatre. Second, where the communication in itself causes armed forces 
personnel to disobey orders or disregard the chain of command, causing a breakdown in 
discipline. The specific harm caused may be where the failure to obey an order results 
injury or capture of service personnel by enemy combatants.  
                                                        
1056Above, n 12, 10. 
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The second identifiable harm has close similarities to discussions associated with civil 
disobedience. In discussing moral objections for military activity and armed forces 
personnel, Coady conducts a theoretical analysis drawing reference to Hobbes’ 
Leviathan. Where Hobbes identifies that a citizen may refuse to fight an enemy ‘without 
injustice,’1057 Coady suggests that this assessment must be made by an individual 
choosing whether or not to serve the state, identifying that the individual will need to 
determine how grave the risk is posed by the enemy to the state itself. It is submitted that 
this reasoning is significant as service personnel may be required to fight in war zones 
whereby no immediate threat is posed to the United Kingdom. If this analysis is correct, 
this would provide the scope for individual service personnel to engage in protest 
whistleblowing if they believed a decision to conduct military operations in another state 
was wrong. Here, it should be identified that longstanding judicial reasoning from the 
United States Supreme Court has suggested that speech which may affect military 
operations may be restricted if to allow it would result in ‘imminent lawless action.’1058  
 
It is necessary to further distinguish between the possible forms of civil disobedience. A 
serviceman who chooses to disobey an order by a superior will most likely be engaged in 
what Dworkin correctly refers to as a persuasive act.
1059
 This is because the serviceman 
will be required to justifiy his actions or indeed inaction to his superiors and his fellow 
servicemen. In comparison the unauthorised disclosures of thousands of documents by an 
alleged serving member of the United States military would be a non-persuasive act. This 
is because the disclosures are designed to shock both the governments involved and 
                                                        
1057 C.A.J., Coady, Messy Morality and the Art of the Possible (1990) Proceedings of the Aristotelian 
Society, 64. 
1058Brandenberg v Ohio [1969] 395 US 44. 
1059 Above, n 88. 
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members of society into taking action. The defence of necessity may be more easily 
justified whereby an individual discloses information in order to prevent an imminent 
threat of harm. However, again it must be noted that necessity should not be justified 
where the disclosure of the information could be as equally or as more harmful as the act 
the serviceman is trying to prevent.
1060
 
 
7.3.2 Legal model  
 
 
 
From the above account of comparative mechanisms it is clear that there are many 
different options available, both for complaints handling and the provision of oversight. 
What is most apparent is that despite fears of interference with the command structure, 
an independent mechanism can exist alongside the existing internal structure. The 
                                                        
1060 This reasoning is supported by Brudner’s theoretical concept of necessity, see further Above, n 74, 365. 
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Australian approach is the most indicative of this and as the United Kingdom armed 
forces are institutionally similar one must ask if the Service Complaints Commissioner is 
the best possible oversight mechanism for armed forces personnel. 
 
The Citizens in Uniform approach identified in Engel suggests that it will be necessary 
for both reasons of discipline and for the protection of national security that expression 
rights of service personnel may be justified as per Article 10 (2). It is necessary, 
however, to consider the different types of expression that this restriction may permit. 
There is a difference between the serviceman who makes an unauthorised disclosure in 
order to publish or article for a fee, the serviceman who chooses to openly question and 
rally support from his fellow troops to question a decision or policy that he does not 
agree with, and the serviceman who may be able to provide information that is of a high 
value to the public interest.  
 
The European Court of Human Rights has repeatedly identified that ‘freedom of 
expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of a democratic society and for 
each individual’s self fulfilment.’1061 In order to be consistent with these values it is 
submitted that a public interest defence is required in the Official Secrets Act for ‘last 
resort disclosures.’ The Council of Europe Resolution 1429 holds that whistleblower 
protection should extend to service personnel in the armed forces. Most importantly, a 
court must make a determination of the public interest value of the information. This 
reasoning is entirely consistent with the ‘citizen in uniform approach’ as citizens do not 
agree to relinquish their Convention rights, but instead agree to a proportionate 
restriction. Where the information is considered to be of a high value to the public 
                                                        
1061 See for example: Lingens v Austria (1996) 8 EHRR 103, para 41. 
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interest this is likely to render any restriction and subsequent sanction imposed on the 
communicator as disproportionate. It is again reiterated that the Guja v Moldova 
framework should be applied. In conducting the proportionality analysis the court should 
therefore place emphasis on whether the applicant had alternative means for making the 
disclosure. 
 
In the light of the wide ranging restrictions of speech imposed on United Kingdom 
Armed Forces Personnel, the requirement to provide a strong, consistent and trusted 
accountability mechanism for complaints has become of fundamental importance to the 
accountability of the UK armed forces. The absence of a strong, independent and clearly 
accountable mechanism make any restriction of speech less valid and the potential for 
armed forces personnel to make unauthorised disclosures a more likely possibility. 
Therefore a balance must be achieved between the restriction of speech and the right for 
members of the armed forces to report concerns through a defined and trusted reporting 
process. 
 
With regards to mechanisms available to servicemen in comparable jurisdictions one can 
ascertain that the Ombudsman for the Defence Forces (Eire) requires servicemen to 
exhaust internal procedures before allowing complaints to be made to her office. This 
may act as a bar to concerns being raised because a serviceman who does not trust the 
chain of command, perhaps because the officer is involved in the concern or because he 
does not believe the matter will be dealt with appropriately may not want to take the risk 
in raising a concern this way.  
 
The whistleblowing mechanism open to members of the Australian Defence Force 
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encourages servicemen to raise concerns through the chain of command but allows for a 
direct approach, through the Defence Whistleblower Scheme, to the Inspector General of 
the Australian Defence Force. The Defence Whistleblower Scheme is available to both 
servicemen of the ADF and Civilian members of defence. There are clear benefits of 
allowing both civilian workers and members of the armed forces the opportunity to raise 
concerns and obtain a degree of employment protection for doing so.  
 
In the United Kingdom, the review by Charles Haddon-Cave QC into the crash of a 
Nimrod aircraft in Afghanistan which caused the death of 14 servicemen identified that 
safety concerns had been ignored.
1062
 Furthermore, the report highlighted failings 
involving the Air Force, the Ministry of Defence and private contractors BAE Systems 
and Quintex. In a working environment which requires cross cooperation between 
servicemen and Civil Servants, it would make sense for employees of both the services 
and the Ministry of Defence to be able to raise concerns through the same channels and 
to receive protection where necessary. Civil Servants already receive PIDA protection. 
One must ask whether servicemen should have access an equivalent degree of protection 
in order to foster a culture whereby servicemen have the confidence to raise concerns to 
an independent mechanism when there is a block in the chain of command.  
 
Servicemen of the armed forces are distinct from civilian employees, not only in that 
they do not qualify for PIDA protection but by the fact that the very nature of their work 
signifies a very different employment relationship and organisational culture. The 
Australian mechanism deals with the risk of reprisal to servicemen by making it a forces 
discipline issue, subject to forces regulations rather than an employment issue. This 
                                                        
1062 http://www.official-documents.gov.uk/document/hc0809/hc10/1025/1025.pdf (accessed 04/04/10). 
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method effectively supports the protection of those who raise concerns whilst 
recognising the unique culture of the armed forces, which places the chain of command 
and discipline at the forefront.  
 
Similar to the Australian mechanism, both the Canadian and United States mechanisms 
offer a dedicated whistleblowing hotline with investigations carried out by an Inspector 
General or Canadian Forces Ombudsman respectively. The US Military Whistleblowers 
Protection Act allows US servicemen to obtain protection for disclosures made directly 
to congressional committees. This may be seen as a better protection than that offered to 
members of the US Intelligence Community who must first seek authority from their 
respective agency head before approaching Congress. The Canadian Ombudsman is 
however limited in that concerns reported to his office must first be raised using one of 
the available grievance or complaint reporting procedures. This may have the 
consequence that the concern may become caught up in administrative processes or may 
not be raised at all if the Serviceman does trust the mechanisms, meaning that the 
Ombudsman (CA) will not be provided with the necessary information to investigate an 
important public concern.  
 
The Canadian Army ‘Lamplighter Protocol’ acts in a similar way to the Services 
Complaints Commissioner in that it is used to record and pass on complaints to an 
officer to investigate. Whilst the protocol lacks the required teeth to be an effective 
whistleblower mechanism it sits alongside the existing National Defence and Canadian 
Forces Ombudsman and exists as part of a wider framework to promote a culture of 
ethics in the Canadian Army. The lamplighter protocol exists to enhance the internal 
mechanisms in place in the Canadian Army.  
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The Services Complaints Commissioner represents a missed opportunity to the detriment 
of the servicemen that the mechanism aims to protect. If one considers the findings of the 
Deepcut report in full, the government failed to adequately deal with the main concerns 
that internal complaints dealt with by the command structure were ineffective. A crucial 
failing of the SCC is that it has been set up to act as a type of lamplighter protocol – a 
means to pass on and record concerns to be investigated internally – rather than to act as 
an investigatory and oversight body in its own right. Unless the SCC receives the 
jurisdiction to investigate and report on concerns, Servicemen in the United Kingdom 
Armed Forces will not be provided with a robust mechanism to report concerns and a 
viable alternative to unauthorised disclosure. The proposals made in this chapter (at part 
1.8) are easily achievable and should not be overlooked because of fears that the 
command structure will be affected. An effective accountability mechanism can only 
further enhance the reputation of both the command structure and the United Kingdom 
Armed Forces. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
“Democracy’s best oversight mechanism is public interest disclosure” 
9/11 Commission Panel Report
1063
 
 
This thesis has aimed to provide an insight into authorised reporting of concerns through 
the official mechanisms available, and unofficial disclosures made to the media and the 
possible consequences for making those disclosures. It has also considered the position 
of members of the Security and Intelligence Services and armed forces who have special 
duties and obligations and do not have access to the Public Interest Disclosures Act.  
 
Chapter one of this thesis identified a number of theoretical justifications for freedom of 
expression, identifying that an individual has a right follow his own moral which may 
differ from societal norms. Whistleblowing speech may be justified to enhance the 
individual and, consequentially the recipient audience. It may be identified that the 
strongest arguments for raising concerns in the public interest are the justifications from 
truth and from participation in a democracy. In particular, these arguments most closely 
cohere with article 10 values. 
 
Crown servants have an instrumental part to play in the running the Executive and the 
nation. If Executive malpractice occurs, it is the Crown servant who will most likely be 
                                                        
1063 July 2004, 103.  
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aware of it. In a democratic society, Crown servants are in the unique position to 
participate in the oversight of the Executive. In a Convention compliant democracy, 
citizens have a right to communicate and receive information which is of a public 
interest.
1064
 Such information may include matters of serious public concern
1065
 giving 
rise to criticism of the government or public figures
1066
 that must be subject to close 
scrutiny, not only of the legislative authorities, but also of the press and public 
opinion.
1067
  
 
The identified theoretical justifications and Strasbourg jurisprudence differ in relation to 
freedom of expression in employment. Whilst the theoretical justifications hold that 
freedom of expression can only be justified to prevent harm, Strasbourg has held that an 
individual’s chosen employment may impact on his right to freedom of expression under 
art.10. Crown servants agree to abide by rules of conduct in relation to political 
activities, legal obligations in relation to the law of confidence and the Official Secrets 
Acts. Failure to abide by the aforementioned restrictions is likely to result in the Civil 
Servant losing his employment, or being prosecuted under the Official Secrets Acts. 
Restriction of political expression and activity may be justified under art.10 (2) ECHR, 
whereby an individual choosing to engage in such employment agrees to a voluntary 
restriction of his art.10 rights. It is submitted that the restriction of political expression 
and the restriction of the right to communicate information obtained in the workplace 
creates difficulties for Crown Servants who intend to (as Vickers correctly distinguishes) 
become a ‘watchdog whistleblower’ or a ‘protest whistleblower.’ 
 
                                                        
1064 Sunday Times v UK (1979) A 30. 
1065 Thorgeirson v Iceland (1992) 14 EHRR 843. 
1066 Lingens v Austria (1986) 8 EHRR 103.  
1067 Castells v Spain (1992) 14 E.H.R.R. 445. 
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Crown servants owe a duty of loyalty to their minister and also to the government of the 
day. However, paragraph 8 of the Civil Service Code makes it clear that Civil servants 
‘must not deceive or knowingly mislead ministers, Parliament or others.’ Moreover the 
Code states at, paragraph 13, thatCivil Servants must be politically impartial. The 
provisions of the code are undoubtedly in conflict, particularly in situations whereby the 
Crown Servant observes Executive malpractice.  
 
An individual who becomes engaged in protest whistleblowing is likely to encounter the 
most difficulty in raising a concern about a policy decision which he believes to be 
wrong. Protest whistleblowing is currently not covered by the Public Interest Disclosure 
Act 1998. Where an individual discloses policy documents, not to prove wrongdoing or 
malpractice in the content of the information, but to prove that the substance of the 
decision making behind the policy is wrong, based upon his experiences, it will be 
necessary for a court to apply the most appropriate standard of review.  
 
Strasbourg has traditionally provided a high standard of protection for political 
expression. This clearly extends to the protection for speech which may criticise the 
actions of a public authority.
1068
 The right to express one’s opinions must therefore be 
considered as worth of protection as the expression of factual or evidence based 
information. It will be for the domestic courts to determine the public interest value of 
the information concerned by engaging the proportionality analysis. In order to apply the 
appropriate standard of review it is submitted that where the court is making a 
determination of ‘protest whistleblowing’ the analysis should be based with particular 
reference to Lingens v Austria. Where the information concerns ‘watchdog’ 
                                                        
1068Ibid. 
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whistleblowing, it is submitted that the framework in Guja v Moldova should be used as 
it places emphasis on determining the truth of the disclosures. 
 
It is identified that where the Crown servant has identified that an individual has 
purposefully mislead Parliament and or the general public, this is likely to provide 
evidence of wrongdoing to which the Crown servant may raise and obtain protection 
using the existing Civil Service Code. It is submitted that where the expression of value 
judgments is at issue, an Employment Tribunal must, as per their obligations in s.6 
Human Rights Act, provide protection.
1069
  Because the Public Interest Disclosure Act 
1998 places emphasis on ‘watchdog whistleblowing’ it is noted that a tribunal may not 
place adequate consideration to the expression of value judgements. It is submitted that 
enforcement of art.10 rights may be dealt with separately to a Public Interest Disclosure 
Act claim. It may however, alternatively be necessary to use s.3 Human Rights Act in 
order to read down wording to ensure that s.43B is compatible with art.10 when the 
Employment Tribunal is making a determination regarding the disclosure of policy 
documents not covered by the ‘protected disclosures’ identified in that section.  
 
In order to enhance protection for Civil Servants who raise concerns about policy issues, 
it is submitted that the Civil Service Code be amended to include a new section relating 
to ‘gross mismanagement’ based upon the approaches taken in the New Zealand and 
Canadian jurisdictions identified in chapter six of this thesis. By placing the amendment 
in the Civil Service code, the employee will be able to obtain already existing 
employment protection under s.43 B PIDA, for raising a concern about a breach of a 
legal obligation. It will be identified that in order for this reform to take effect, reforms 
                                                        
1069 Based upon the reasoning identified in Lingens v Austria.  
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will be required to the accountability mechanisms available to Crown servants.
1070
  
 
8.1 The Emergence of Online Outlets to Facilitate Disclosure  
 
 
Whilst this thesis has identified that disclosures to Wikileaks or a similar organisation 
may be justified by using the theoretical arguments for freedom of expression, the 
resulting disclosures may cause identifiable problems. The anonymous disclosure of 
official documents, without information to provide an explanation of the contents may 
mean that the messages communicated may be either lost or misunderstood. Whilst the 
recipient audience may benefit from the disclosures, this thesis has identified that, so far, 
the organisation has been reliant upon traditional media outlets to provide accessible 
analysis and promotion of the material to the public. The consequences of Wikileaks 
acting as a conduit, however, mean that the proximity between the source and the 
recipient audience becomes much wider than the traditional journalist and source 
relationship. As Bok correctly identifies, this means that the messages communicated by 
the whistleblower may be lost whilst the potential for newspapers to publish inaccurate or 
misleading information because of an inability to check and confirm information directly 
with the source is increased.
1071
  
 
Whilst Wikileaks has promoted a ‘safe haven’ for anonymous whistleblowing, chapter 
three of this thesis identified that the protections afforded may not be absolute. The 
process of contacting Wikileaks or a similar organisation may still require the Crown 
Servant to access his internet service provider, search via a search engine provided by 
organisations such as Google and to communicate using email or social networking 
                                                        
1070 See further below. 
1071 Above, n 44. 
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websites. The apparent ease in which information has been obtained from those websites 
may undermine the systems that Wikileaks has in place to protect whistleblowers. 
 
Part of the motivation in contacting Wikileaks instead of directly contacting a traditional 
media outlet may stem from the reasoning that domestic courts in the United Kingdom 
have failed to afford adequate protection to journalistic sources. The cases of Ashworth 
and Interbrew, in particular, identify that the UK courts have failed to afford sufficient 
weight to the protection of journalistic sources by wrongly focussing on the malevolent 
motive of the source, to which the Strasbourg Court in FT v UK identified that 
determination of why the source was motivated to disclose the information can only be 
properly ascertained by cross examination of the source. The objective of an application 
for source disclosure is not to determine the guilt or innocence of the source and therefore 
the motivation of the source should not be afforded sufficient weight in the 
proportionality test.  
 
8.2 Official Mechanisms 
 
It is submitted that the ECtHR decision in Guja v Moldova, places a positive obligation 
on the Civil Service and Civil Service Commission (as per their obligations in s.6 
Human Rights Act 1998) to provide effective alternatives to unauthorised disclosures.  
 
If a Crown servant observes malpractice he may approach his line manager or 
alternatively his nominated officer. A report by the charity Public Concern at Work 
highlighted that the provision for nominated officers differed considerably from 
department to department, meaning that a Crown servant in one department is 
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considerably better off in reporting the concern than if he works in another.
1072
 This does 
not appear acceptable when all Crown servants are expected to follow the same Civil 
Service Code. It is recommended that a uniform system of nominated officers should be 
implemented across the Civil Service. In order to build consistency in the service offered 
it is suggested that training be given to those officers by the Civil Service 
Commissioners. Based on the Canadian public service whistleblowing provisions, it is 
then suggested that reporting obligations should be put in place to require line managers 
and nominated officers who deal with whistleblowing concerns to record those concerns 
centrally for monitoring by the Civil Service Commission. 
 
A Crown servant may also report the concern to the Civil Service Commissioners, if they 
do not believe the response from the line manager or nominated officer to be reasonable. 
The Civil Service Code also states that the Commissioners will ‘consider taking a 
complaint direct.’ The Commissioners do not publish the outcome of complaints so it is 
very difficult to ascertain whether or not their role is effective. It should be noted that a 
response to a Freedom of Information Act request by the author has highlighted that 
since 1996 the Commissioners have investigated very few allegations of wrongdoing.  
 
In order to bolster Civil Service confidence in the Commission, it is suggested that the 
Commissioners should be engaged in the whistleblowing process at an earlier stage, 
rather than acting as an ‘avenue of last resort’ whereby the internal mechanisms have 
failed. It is submitted that the Commissioners’ powers could be extended based upon the 
Canadian Public Sector Integrity Commissioner, to include the jurisdiction to investigate 
and make rulings on reprisals, this could also include a mediation service between an 
                                                        
1072 See chapter two of this thesis.  
 514 
 
 
aggrieved individual and those involved in the department.  
 
In order to provide an authorised alternative to unauthorised leaking via Wikileaks and 
other online outlets, it is suggested that an anonymised reporting system be established. 
This would provide an encrypted platform for employees working in departments to raise 
concerns to the Commissioners or via the nominated officers. The encrypted system 
would prevent those investigating from tracing the whistleblower but would contain an 
online submission form including standardised questions so that the required information 
could be obtained. Whilst anonymous reporting should be actively discouraged, the 
whistleblower could be provided with a reference number to allow for subsequent 
communication between the investigator and the whistleblower. It is submitted that the 
theoretical justification for such a platform can be identified in the work of Raines and 
Scott who identify that receiver responses to anonymous communication is greatly 
improved where the recipient can interact with the communicator in order to evaluate the 
veracity of the claims made.
1073
  
 
Further amendments are required to improve confidence in the Civil Service 
Commission. Currently, there is no course of appeal against the decision of the 
Commissioners. Paragraph 18 of the Code states that if the matters cannot be resolved 
and that a Civil Servant feels that he cannot carry out the instructions he has been given 
he will have to resign from the Civil Service.
1074
 
 
Paragraph 18 places considerable importance on the Civil Service Commissioners to 
                                                        
1073 S.Rains and C.Scott, To Identify or Not to Indentify: A Theoretical Model of Reicever Responses to 
Anonymous Communication [2007] Communication Theory 1, 74. 
1074 http://www.civilservice.gov.uk/about/values/cscode/rights.aspx (accessed 06/01/10). 
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carry out their role effectively. At the time of writing the Civil Service Commissioners 
had issued detailed guidance on their website identifying their role in handling 
complaints or appeals under the Civil Service Code. This may be identified as a positive 
step considering that prior to 8
th
 January 2010 the Commissioner’s website carried little 
information as to how appeals under the code would be handled or that it would accept 
complaints direct.  
 
Paragraph 18 carries a negative message that if the Commissioners do not deal with the 
complaint the Crown servant will have to resign. There is a clear risk that a Crown 
servant who reads this passage may believe that he is better off making an unauthorised 
disclosure because he does not have trust in the Civil Service Commissioners to 
appropriately deal the concern and believes that he would have to leave the Service 
anyway.
1075
  
 
Part of the mistrust in the Commissioners may stem from the fact that the Civil Service 
Commissioners are not consistent with the stepped disclosure regime of the Public 
Interest Disclosures Act. The Committee on Standards in Public Life stated clearly in 
their Third report that in order for a whistleblowing mechanism to work effectively 
employees should be able to go outside of the organisation in order to report the concern. 
The Civil Service Commissioners are not a prescribed regulator in PIDA. This places 
Civil Servants at a disadvantage to employees who work in the private sector or non 
Civil Servants who work in the public sector. An NHS nurse for example could report a 
                                                        
1075This proposition is supported by evidence provided by journalist David Henke before the PASC inquiry 
on leaks and whistleblowing that leaks mostly came about because the civil servant was ‘concerned about a 
specific issue and became exasperated with internal processes’ and that ‘between 70% and 80% of civil 
servants who had leaked material to him had made some attempt to pursue the matter through official 
channels.’ HC 83, para 70  
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmselect/cmpubadm/83/83.pdf (accessed 02/02/10). 
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concern to the Care Quality Commission, prescribed under PIDA and would not be 
expected to leave his profession if he did not like the outcome of the investigation. It is 
recommended that Paragraph 18 be removed from the Civil Service Code in order to 
build greater confidence in the Civil Service Code and internal provisions.  
 
The new guidance fails to mention what the Civil Service Commissioners will do if 
faced with an allegation that a minister has lied to Parliament or the Public or if he is 
putting pressure on the Crown servant to lie. In evidence before the PASC the first Civil 
Service Commissioner identified that if faced with such a situation she would pass the 
information on the Cabinet Secretary to investigate. The Commissioners can only 
investigate breaches of the Civil Service Code, not the Ministerial Code. Such a scenario 
highlights the difficulty in the Code’s reliance on the Civil Service Commissioners. If the 
Commissioners fail to refer a matter to the Cabinet Secretary or the Cabinet Secretary 
fails to investigate the concern, the Crown Servant will have little option but to leave as 
per paragraph 18.  
 
The scenario presents a sizeable gap in the accountability of Executive malpractice.  The 
Committee on Standards in Public Life concedes that there is no specific individual or 
organisation to assess complaints against ministers. Currently, investigations may be 
carried out by Sir Philip Mawer the Independent Advisor on Ministerial Interests, but Sir 
Philip must be instructed by the Prime Minister to investigate. Furthermore, the decision 
to make public the outcome of the investigation is made by the Prime Minister alone.
1076
  
 
The appointment of Sir Philip Mawer may be seen as a positive step in enhancing the 
                                                        
1076 See chapter two, section 2.15 of this thesis. 
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accountability of ministerial actions however the role lacks the required independence 
and teeth to be fully effective. The Public Administration Select Committee has 
previously recommended that ministerial conduct could be investigated by the 
Parliamentary Ombudsman. Currently Civil Servants do not have direct access to the 
Ombudsman and furthermore the mechanism is available to members of the public, but 
only through the cumbersome MP filter.  
 
There is a significant hurdle to overcome in that the doctrine of ministerial responsibility 
means that the Prime Minister is ‘ultimately responsible to Parliament for the conduct of 
his administration.’1077 A compromise is therefore needed between the requirements of 
constitutional convention and the requirements of Parliament to hold the Executive to 
account. It is also notable that the Ministerial Code has not been included in the 
Constitution and Governance Bill despite the inclusion of the Civil Service Code and a 
new code for Special Advisers.  
 
It is recommended that the role of Independent Ministerial Advisor be replaced by a 
‘Commissioner for Ministerial Conduct.’ The Commissioner should have the power to 
investigate concerns without needing the permission of the Prime Minister. The 
Commissioner should be able to submit his report to the Prime Minister and allow the 
Prime Minister a reasonable time frame, perhaps 21 days, in order to make corrective 
action. It would be then for the Commissioner to report his findings to Parliament.  
 
It is not suggested that the Parliamentary Ombudsman should investigate ministerial 
misconduct, as the Ombudsman primarily deals with complaints on behalf of the public 
                                                        
1077 http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/media/135230/mawer_annualreport.pdf (accessed 05/01/10).  
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and would require significant modifications to take on the work, such as removal of the 
MP filter. However, if a member of the public is having difficulty with a government 
department and is alleging malpractice, it is the Crown servants who work in the 
departments who will be most likely aware. It makes sense that if the Crown servant is 
aware that a member of the public has been mistreated he should be able to provide the 
Ombudsman with such information. 
 
In the most extreme cases, whereby it is apparent that a criminal offence has been 
committed , Chapter four of this thesis identifies that Civil Servants are expected to first 
approach an ‘Offence Inquiry Point’ with details of the offence. The wording of this 
instruction is contrary to Paragraph 17 of the Civil Service Code which states that 
allegations of criminal conduct should be reported to the police. It is submitted that the 
role of the Offence Inquiry Point be considered closely. It should be used as a means to 
obtain advice and should not dissuade a Crown servant from reporting allegations of 
criminal conduct.  
 
The Public Interest Disclosure Act works as a backstop to allow employees who have 
suffered a detriment to sue their employer for damages. It allows for controlled internal 
disclosures, to be made to the nominated officer or line manager, for controlled external 
disclosures to be made to a regulator and a degree of protection for disclosures made to 
the media. What it does not provide for is mechanisms to investigate concern or 
provision for the concern to be investigated. In comparison the New Zealand Protected 
Disclosures Act facilitates the investigation of the concern by requiring the public 
servant to exhaust internal mechanisms before he can approach the NZ Ombudsman. 
Similarly, the Australian Public Service Regulations are ‘sector specific’ in that the 
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regulations only relate to Public Servants but aim to deal with both the concern and the 
investigation of the concern. The Canadian mechanism requires public servants to report 
concerns to Public Sector Integrity Canada in order to receive whistleblower protection.  
 
The United Kingdom provision contained in PIDA provides the least procedurally rigid 
means of obtaining employment protection for reporting a public concern. This means 
that in terms of employment protection, Crown servants may be seen as better off than 
public servants in many other jurisdictions, but as a consequence lack the robust 
mechanisms to deal with the reported concerns.  
 
One must ask why a Crown servant would raise a public interest concern through official 
mechanisms. If the servant is raising the concern in good faith his motivation is most 
likely to be that he would like the concern to be investigated and the malpractice to stop. 
It is submitted therefore that in order to deal with the concern, first and foremost strong 
accountability mechanisms must be in place to first deal with the concern. The 
employment protection is a secondary motivation and the use of PIDA will only be 
necessary if the Servant suffers a detriment as a result of raising the concern.  
 
The most recent introduction of guidance for Civil Servants to report concerns to the 
Commissioners is a welcome start to reform. The second and most important reform 
would be to make the Civil Service Commissioners a prescribed regulator under section 
43F PIDA. This would bolster the employment protection for Crown servants but would 
have the effect of bringing the provisions closer to those enjoyed by private sector 
employees. Including the Commissioners into s.43F has become even more important 
following changes in April 2010 whereby tribunal claims are referred to prescribed 
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regulators to investigate the concerns.
1078
 If the Commissioners fail to be included this 
will further disadvantage Civil Servants. Proposals to place the Commissioners on a 
statutory footing in the Constitutional and Governance Bill mean that the time is right for 
reform. 
 
 
8.3 Closing the Gaps in the Mechanisms of Executive Accountability.  
 
 
 
The above diagram illustrates the proposed accountability mechanism and is in line with 
the current Civil Service Code.
1079
 It is submitted that the proposed scheme aligns to 
art.10 values by providing mechanisms for the employee to raise concerns. 
 
Civil Servants may report concerns to their nominated officer or to the Civil Service 
Commissioners. If the Civil Servant reports a matter to the Civil Service Commissioner 
                                                        
1078 See further  http://www.berr.gov.uk/files/file54221.pdf (accessed 07/02/10).  
1079 Note that for ease of understanding this diagram does not include an approach to a line manager.   
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it would be up to them to decide how to deal with the complaint. If the concern is 
regarding an alleged breach of the Ministerial Code it should be referred directly to the 
proposed Commissioner for Ministerial Conduct to investigate. If the matter falls within 
the remit of the Parliamentary Ombudsman it should be referred to the Parliamentary 
Ombudsman to investigate. If necessary the bodies would be able to pool resources to 
investigate allegations which cross their respective remits. If the matter is so serious as to 
amount to information regarding criminal conduct it may also be referred to the police. 
Ultimately, it will be for the respective body to deliver annual reports to Parliament and 
to give evidence to the Public Administration Select Committee as a matter of course. If 
the respective body fails to obtain the corrective action required to rectify the concern it 
would have the capacity to deliver a special report to Parliament.  
 
The objectives of this proposal are to enhance existing accountability mechanisms and to 
provide Crown servants a means to report a public interest concern within the confines of 
the existing framework. The proposal fits within the stepped disclosure regime contained 
in the Public Interest Disclosure Act by allowing a Crown servant to make a controlled 
external disclosure to the Civil Service Commission. Most importantly, this does not 
place the Servant at risk of breaching the Civil Service Code, the Official Secrets Acts or 
Misconduct in Public Office.  
 
It will be observed that the aforementioned proposal does not allow for Crown servants 
to report concerns to Members of Parliament or the Public Administration Select 
Committee. It is submitted that to allow the Crown servant to report directly to the PASC 
creates difficulties with regard to the employee’s obligation to be politically impartial. 
The well established Osmotherly rules make it particularly difficult for a Crown servant 
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to appear before a committee.  This reasoning is further supported by the Strasbourg 
decision in Ahmed v UK whereby a restriction of art.10 rights to maintain political 
impartiality in public service was held to be proportionate. It should be noted, however, 
that the Guja v Moldova framework allows protection for a disclosure made as a last 
resort whereby all other means of raising the concern have failed or where it is not 
practical to use alternative means. Therefore it is reiterated that where the information is 
of a particular value to the public interest disclosure to an opposition MP or 
Parliamentary committee the balance may be weighed in favour of protecting the 
disclosure.  
 
8.4 Interaction with Freedom of Information  
 
Article 10 ECHR does not currently convey a general of access to public information, as 
identified in Leander v Sweden, art.10 does not embody an obligation on governments to 
impart such information to the individual.’1080 The lack of rights protection afforded to 
freedom of information must be considered alongside the established jurisprudential 
position of the importance of the communication of information for both communicator 
and audience interests.  
 
Freedom of information is particularly important for the advancement of an informed 
democratic society. The justifications for providing such information bear close similarity 
to the justifications that freedom of expression is necessary for truth and for participation 
in a democratic society. Chapter three of this thesis provided an insight into the various 
sections contained in FOIA, it noted that the government objects to promote and improve 
transparency have been significantly undermined because of a number of qualified and 
                                                        
1080[1987] 9 EHRR 433.  
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absolute exemptions which create a barrier to the disclosure of important public interest 
information. It was also identified that government departments have at times simply 
disregarded the time limits imposed by the Act. These failings create a justification for 
Crown servants to disclose information which has been purposefully covered up or 
wrongly exempted. Whilst breach of the existing Freedom of Information Act would be 
covered by s.43 B PIDA as a breach of a legal obligation, it is proposed that freedom of 
information be included as a new section of the Civil Service Code. It is submitted that 
this would promote the importance of freedom of information and bolster the existing 
protection for Civil Servants.  
 
8.5 The Control of Official Information 
 
 
It is submitted that the House of Lords in R v Shayler wrongly determined that the 
Official Secrets Act 1989 was compatible with art.10 because of the number of 
authorised channels for disclosure. During the proportionality analysis, consideration 
must be given to the public interest value of the information. The Official Secrets Act 
1989 does not allow for such an assessment. It is reiterated that whilst domestic courts 
retain a margin of appreciation to determine national security matters, they are likely to 
overstep this margin of appreciation whereby the information concerned in the 
proportionality analysis is of a high value to the public interest or is not harmful to 
national security.  
 
Certain reforms are required to ensure compliance with art.10 values. Firstly it is 
suggested that a closer link is needed between the classification of documents and the 
alleged categories of harm contained in the Act. The Franks Committee on the Reform of 
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s.2 OSA 1911 suggested that the classification of documents should be built into the Act. 
Whilst it has been argued that the classification of documents has no bearing on the 
required harm tests, research of the cases shows that the classification of documents is 
significant to determining the degree of harm caused by the unauthorised disclosure. 
Second, it is submitted that a public interest defence be drafted and that this should be 
modelled on the Canadian s.16 Security of Information Act 2001. It is submitted that this 
proposal is consistent with art.10 values as the Guja v Moldova framework allows for 
‘last resort’ protection.  It is argued that the common law offence of misconduct in public 
office is incompatible with art.10 values as it does not allow for an assessment of the 
public interest value of the information concerned.  
 
With regard to breach of confidence actions this thesis has identified that enforcement of 
injunctions in the era of Wikileaks and extensive social networking will be extremely 
difficult. It may therefore be argued at alternatives should be considered such as a 
voluntary code for organisations such as Google and Twitter, based upon the DA Notice 
system. Breach of confidence may still be used where a government is seeking to recover 
the money from an individual who has sought to profit from the disclosure. Again the 
court will need to provide a thorough assessment of the competing interests when 
conducting the proportionality analysis.  
 
8.5 National Security Employees 
 
Employees of the Intelligence and Security Services have an enhanced responsibility to 
ensure that their work is not disclosed in the public domain, this reasoning is consistent 
with art.10 (2). Chapter six of this thesis argued that the reasoning in Guja v Moldova 
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should be applied to national security whistleblowers. Again, emphasis must be placed 
on the effectiveness of the official mechanisms as an alternative to unauthorised 
disclosure. 
 
Currently, there appears to be no independent oversight by the Intelligence and Security 
Committee and subsequently critical analysis of the role is only provided by disgruntled 
former employees who have chosen not to use the Staff Counsellor.  Information 
provided in the latest ISC annual report stated that a new ‘Ethical Counsellor’ has been 
introduced however there was no information in the report to explain how the new post 
interacts with the role of the Staff Counsellor, or indeed whether or not the Staff 
Counsellor has been replaced. Worryingly, the Staff Counsellor appears to have no input 
in the work of the Intelligence and Security Committee.  
 
The New Zealand mechanism for national security employees provides the most useful 
comparator as the NZ Protected Disclosures Act was modelled on the UK Public Interest 
Disclosure Act. The New Zealand IGIS has both the capacity to receive whistleblowng 
concerns and to independently investigate and moreover employment protection is 
available to those who raise concerns. The New Zealand mechanism identifies the 
potential of including UK employees of the Security and Intelligence Services in PIDA. 
However it also identifies a failing in our own oversight mechanism. The fact that the 
UK lacks an investigatory capacity means that the ISC is weak in comparison to 
equivalent oversight bodies located in the comparative jurisdictions. 
  
Like the NZ IGIS, the Australian IGIS can receive whistleblower complaints from 
employees. With regards to protection from detriment the position is more uncertain as it 
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is up to the Director General of the respective agency to decide what internal provisions 
are implemented to mirror the protections available to public servants not involved in 
national security matters.  
 
The protections available to employees in the US intelligence community have received 
criticism. However, US employees do have access to the various Inspector Generals and 
may, with consent, approach the Congressional Intelligence Committees. With regards to 
the Canadian mechanism provided by the Security and Intelligence Review Committee, 
it is not certain whether direct approaches by employees will be investigated however 
there is scope for employees to raise concerns. Regardless of the provisions available 
Canadian employees have the benefit of a public interest defence, built into their official 
secrets legislation. A common feature of the aforementioned mechanisms is that 
employees have access to an oversight body outside their department.  
 
It is recommended that the ISC take a much more active role in the work of the Staff 
Counsellor. It is submitted that the first stage should be to include special provision in 
PIDA for employees who report concerns to the Staff Counsellor. The second stage 
would be to develop an effective parliamentary oversight mechanism. The ISC requires 
an inspector to function more effectively.  It is suggested that in order to ensure that the 
role of inspector is a permanent appointment, the role should be enshrined in statute. As 
an alternative, the role of the Staff Counsellor should be formalised and replace the role 
of the ISC’s investigator in order to provide both the much needed investigatory capacity 
and connection to the ISC in order to ensure that the ISC has the critical information it 
requires to effectively perform its function.  
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8.6 Armed Forces 
 
Members of the United Kingdom Armed Forces, like their counterparts in the UK 
Security and Intelligence Services, do not have access to the employment protection 
afforded by the Public Interest Disclosures Act 1998. Similarly, jurisprudence from the 
European Court of Human Rights is clear that persons who sign up to the armed forces 
agree to a restriction of freedom of speech under Article 10 ECHR. Members of the UK 
Armed Forces also have an obligation to adhere to a rigid command structure whereby 
the failure to carry out the instructions of a superior officer may result in criminal 
sanction. As a consequence, the armed forces restrict the moral autonomy right of the 
individual. It is therefore argued that the most detrimental impact is to the exercise of 
political expression and protest whistleblowing, which is arguably likely to result in 
disciplinary action.  
 
The aforementioned obligations are likely to weigh heavily against a military 
whistleblower in a proportionality analysis. However, it is recognized that whilst soldiers 
act as citizens in uniform, the restrictions on speech may be outweighed whereby the 
information disclosed is of a high value to the public interest. It is submitted that the 
Guja v Moldova framework is sufficiently flexible to incorporate members of the armed 
forces.  
 
In terms of the effectiveness of alternative mechanisms, the rigid obligations placed on 
members of the armed forces make the implementation of an independent complaints 
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mechanism a difficult task. Following the Blake Review into the deaths of soldiers at 
Deepcut Barracks it was recommended that an ombudsman be established to receive and 
investigate concerns from Services personnel. In response to the recommendation a 
Services Complaints Commissioner was introduced.  
 
The Services Complaints Commissioner falls short of the recommendations made in the 
Deepcut Review. If a Serviceman contacts the Commissioner, he will be advised on 
whether or not the complaint should be dealt with informally or formally by way of a 
‘service compliant.’ If the matter is dealt with by a service complaint the SSC will then 
refer the matter to the Commanding Officer for investigation. The SSC has no 
investigatory remit and cannot make findings. In the absence of any such powers the 
SSC’s power appears to extend little further than the ability to make telephone calls to 
the respective commanding officer.  
 
Despite the difficult task in implementing a complaints mechanism for the armed forces, 
this thesis has identified several comparative jurisdictions whereby an independent body 
have been established with both the power to investigate and make findings. Most 
notably, members of the Australian armed forces have two available complaints 
mechanisms. The UK Government’s justification for disallowing one independent 
review mechanism investigatory powers on the basis that it would undermine the chain 
of command does not hold weight considering that the Australian armed forces are 
historically based upon our own UK armed forces.  
 
It is submitted that a considerable rethink of the powers of the SSC is required in order to 
reflect the recommendations of the Blake Review. In the absence of such reform the 
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author proposes that the Commissioner be able to sit as an ‘independent person’ on 
Services Complaints Panels in order to assist in the adjudication of complaints made by 
members of the armed forces.
1081
 An independent person is currently required to sit on 
the panel in order to provide the reasoning of a person who is not a member of the armed 
forces. There is nothing in the Armed Forces Act or the Regulations which state that the 
independent person should possess any specialist skills or attributes, merely that they are 
independent of the armed forces or the Civil Service. Therefore the Complaints 
Commissioner could sit in that role. Whilst one may argue that this would give the 
Services Complaints Commissioner too much power, as she would be involved in 
investigation and adjudication, it should not be forgotten that the Parliamentary 
Ombudsman in the UK jurisdiction and Inspectors General in other jurisdictions both 
investigate and make findings on a complaint, much needed powers that the current SSC 
currently lacks.  
 
 
 
 
8.7 Final Observations  
 
 
The recommendations identified in this chapter and elsewhere in the thesis do not provide 
a complete solution to unauthorised disclosures. Unauthorised disclosures or leaking of 
information by Crown servants can be potentially harmful to national security and to the 
source of the information. Leaks can also be highly embarrassing to the government and 
can act as a means of holding the government or government departments to account, 
thus providing important information for members of the public to come to their own 
                                                        
1081 Chapter 5 at section 5.9. 
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conclusions about executive actions, and to make an informed decision on polling day, 
something which is vital in a democracy.  
 
Unauthorised disclosures may occur because the source is motivated ‘out of profit or 
spite’ but leaks can also identify the failure of our democratic oversight mechanisms to 
hold the Executive to account. The Crown servant may be distrustful of the mechanism or 
may have raised concerns and is unsatisfied at the response. Crown servants are placed in 
a unique position to observe Executive malpractice if it occurs and to report on it. It is 
therefore vital that robust mechanisms are in place to allow Crown servants to raise 
concerns and to provide a viable alternative to unauthorised disclosures. Most 
importantly, if members of the government chose not to engage in malpractice, the risk of 
unauthorised disclosures would undoubtedly diminish, but whilst instances of Executive 
malpractice continue to occur, public interest whistleblowers will continue to provide an 
important check on Executive action.  
“But what is government itself, but the greatest of all reflections on human nature? If 
men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, 
neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary. In framing a 
government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: 
you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place 
oblige it to control itself. A dependence on the people is, no doubt, the primary control on 
the government; but experience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary 
precautions.”  
James Maddison
1082
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
1082 http://www.constitution.org/fed/federa51.htm 
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